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Abstract
Alan Fox’s unitarist ideology provided a useful categorisation of managerial perspectives
on managing employees and the nature of organisation. However, it was an intuitive
framework, developed as part of a reformist argument for a pluralist system of industrial
relations. It was not based on a systematic, empirical study of managers and, while applied
to research, there has been little testing of the construct.
The primary research question addressed in this thesis is whether managers in
contemporary SMEs exhibit unitarist characteristics. A number of subsidiary questions
follow. The first set explores managers’ attitudes towards managerial prerogative, conflict,
collective workplace relations and trade unions. Analysis of the data produced 11 unitarist
dimensions. The second addresses whether organisational and personal characteristics and
managers’ perceptions of the limitations on management are significant for SME
managers’ ideological frameworks. The third identifies whether consultative, participative
and collective practices are employed in work organisations. The definition of managerial
ideology, including both managers’ beliefs and values and also their workplace behaviour
and practices, led to testing the relationship between the unitarist dimensions and
managerial practice, and managers’ satisfaction with employees. Finally, the thesis
investigated whether there were any significant links between managerial practices and
managers’ satisfaction with employee performance.
The methodology included a mail survey of SME managers in Eastern Australia with 206
respondents, and an interview programme of 20 SME managers in Brisbane, Queensland.
The significant findings of this research are, first, that consultative or participative
managerial practices do not necessarily reflect a pluralist ideology or orientation. SME
managers limit the scope of decisions for involving employees, and usually shopfloor
employees, utilising practices that do not compromise managerial power or managerial
prerogative. Second, organisational and personal characteristics are relatively unimportant
contextual variables in management behaviour in SMEs, unless it was described as a family
business. Third, this thesis provides an alternative to the conclusions of some industrial
relations scholars that managers employ a mix of unitarist and pluralist strategies. The
adoption of apparently pluralist management practices in consultation and employee
participation are revealed in this research as being predominantly non-threatening to
managerial prerogative and organisational power structures in workplaces in terms of who
is involved or excluded, and about what matters employees are consulted or involved. The
overall results of managers’ attitudes to collective workplace arrangements and trade
unions confirm a general unitarist orientation in Australian SMEs. Fourth, the evidence
does not suggest any clear binding of values and beliefs with managerial behaviour.
Underpinning normative perspectives on management is an underlying commitment to
protecting managers’ power in the work organisation. It is this fundamental political
commitment that both guides and constrains strategic choice in managing employees in
SMEs. Unitarist ideology is thus central to the norms of management, and goes to the core
of managerial prerogative. Finally, the results indicated that SME managers in the study
usually did not demonstrate strong attachments to their views on the issues presented to
them.
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1CHAPTER 1: THE STUDY OF MANAGERIAL IDEOLOGY IN
AUSTRALIAN SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED ENTERPRISES
1.1 Introduction
Industrial relations is centrally concerned with the problematics of the relationships
between management and employees in work organisations. The problematics of the
management-employee relationship extend beyond the organisation, are governed by
legislation, are influenced by political ideologies, and are affected by the actions of
institutions outside the work organisation. Work organisations are those organisations
whose principal purpose is the production of goods or the provision of services, and those
purposes are achieved through the labour of employees.
One of the areas an industrial relations researcher might address relates to the
assumptions, or the beliefs and values, or ideology, of managers about, and the behaviour
of managers in, managing employees. This particular problematic is the subject of this
thesis.
Although industrial relations scholars have, for the most part, only marginally addressed
managerial ideology, the focus of this thesis does have some antecedents. The most
influential of these was Alan Fox’s papers on managerial ideology in the mid-1960s (Fox
1966a; 1966b). Fox’s 1960s essays and books (1971; 1973; 1974) popularised among
industrial relations academics the classification of managers’ assumptions about the
employment relationship into three frameworks or ideologies. These were the unitarist,
pluralist and radical (Marxist) frameworks. These frameworks generated considerable
discussion about management style in the United Kingdom during the 1980s and about the
appropriateness of the pluralist models initially proposed, and later repudiated, by Fox
(1974).
Alan Fox’s 1966 essays on management (1966a; 1996b; 1969) popularised the
classification of managers’ assumptions about the employment relationship into three
frameworks or ideologies: the unitarist framework, the pluralist framework, and the
2Marxist, or radical, framework. The purpose of his paper, written for the British Royal
Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations, was to demonstrate
specifically that ‘group conflict within work organizations was, in our pattern of society
at least, endemic to the situation and not simply the result of ill-disposed agitators using
their influence for political ends’ (Fox 1990, p. 231).
Accounts of unitarism commonly contain a number of characteristic attitudes towards, and
assumptions about, the role of management, the nature of work organisations, employee-
management relationships, the role of organised labour, and conflict. Emphasising the
role of managing employees in the achievement of organisational goals, the unitary
perspective of the organisation stresses a community of interest, common values and
shared objectives between employers and employees. Management prerogative is
inherent in the structure and purpose of the organisation. The underlying assumptions of
unitarist perspectives are that harmony is the norm for organisations, the respective parties
(management and workers) are on an equal footing and conflict is the product of mischief.
A significant implication of the unitarist perspective on conflict, that has a bearing on
managers’ attitudes towards collective bargaining and trade unions as the agents of
employees, is that conflict is irrational. A key conclusion to be drawn from this
perspective on conflict in the workplace is that conflict, in whatever forms it may be
manifested, is a deviation from the normal harmonious relations between employers and
their employees. The implication of such a conclusion is that the agenda of an external
body such as a union bears the seeds of dissent and conflict because the objectives of the
union are at odds with the objectives of management. Trade unions are regarded as a third
party intrusion into the organisation, which competes with management for the loyalty of
employees (see, for example, Salamon 1987, p. 27) and undermines managerial
prerogative.
A growing area of research interest for industrial relations scholars has been the
employment relationship in small business and non-unionised firms. The scope of this
thesis encompasses the assumptions of managers in small and medium sized enterprises
(SMEs) about managing employees. For the purposes of this thesis, and consistent with
3other work on SMEs by Wiesner and McDonald (2001a), SMEs are defined as
organisations with between 20 and 200 employees.
While Fox’s work was based on his observations around 40 years ago, this study has
ongoing relevance for the analysis of industrial relations in Australia within the context
of industrial relations reform during the 1980s and 1990s and the current Coalition
Government’s plans to make substantial changes to Australian industrial relations
legislation. The policy background to the research and the unitarist characteristics of
some of the responses are outlined in section 1.2. In section 1.3 there is a brief
description of the breadth of references to unitarism in industrial relations publications,
followed by a discussion in section 1.4 of the terminology used. This thesis refers to the
ideology of managers in SMEs. There is a discussion of the definition of SMEs in
section 1.5. The justification for, and timeliness of, conducting research on the unitarist
ideology is presented in section 1.6. This is related in section 1.7 to the objective of the
thesis and presentation of the principal research question, from which all the other
research questions flow. The research methods employed are introduced in section 1.8
followed, in section 1.9, by recognition of the limitations of the research in the thesis.
Finally, section 1.10 briefly outlines the structure of the chapters in the thesis.
1.2 Background to the research: unitarism and the Australian public policy
debate
In the context of an increased focus on management in industrial relations studies, outlined
in chapter 2, section 2.2, the question of the values and beliefs of managers is relevant to
furthering the understanding of management in industrial relations processes by examining
one of the key contributions on managerial ideology, Fox's unitarist framework.
Debate on the future of Australian industrial relations during the 1980s and 1990s and
the proposed changes to industrial relations legislation in 2004-2005 essentially focussed
on two perspectives on legislation as a framework for reform in the regulation of work
within organisations. These perspectives broadly followed the distinction made by Fox
between unitarist and pluralist industrial relations.
4The Australian debate covered a range of issues: decentralisation of the determination of
terms and conditions of employment; whether unions should be the principal bargaining
agents in negotiations between employers and workers; the special legal status of
unions; whether strike action should be protected; the role of the Australian Industrial
Relations Commission (AIRC) in determining wages and conditions and resolving
disputes; deregulation of the labour market; whether awards and agreements should have
collective or individual application to employees; the application of bargaining in non-
unionised workplaces; and the transformation of work practices to bring about greater
competitiveness of Australian industry in a global market through productivity,
efficiency and flexibility.
While there was a broad consensus in Australia about the need for change during the
1980s and 1990s, the debate was fuelled by deep divisions about how that change was to
be effected and how far the changes should range. These divisions were rooted in
fundamentally different assumptions about the nature of the employment relationship.
The central divide at the public policy level was reflected by the contrasts in emphasis
on the generation of workplace agreements between the Industrial Relations Reform Act
1993, introduced by the Keating Labor Government, and the Howard Coalition
Government’s Workplace Relations Act 1996. The former Act distinguished between
collective agreements involving unions (‘Certified Agreements’) and non-union,
collective agreements between employees and employers (‘Enterprise Flexibility
Agreements’). The 1996 Act provided for three types of arrangements: ‘Certified
Agreements’, which were collective agreements negotiated with unions; a second type
of ‘Certified Agreement’ which could be unilaterally developed by management and put
to a vote of employees, with or without negotiation, negating the term ‘agreement’ in the
designation; and individual contracts (‘Australian Workplace Agreements’). The
provisions for these types of arrangements were set against a principle of ‘freedom of
association’, which made no reference to the ILO Conventions No. 87, ‘Freedom of
Association and the Right to Organise’, as the Keating Government legislation had, or
Convention No. 98, ‘Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining’. The freedom of
association principle in the objects of the Workplace Relations Act refers only to ‘the
rights of employees and employers to join an organisation or association of their choice,
5or not to join an organisation or association’ (Thorpe & McDonald 1998, p. 25). By
2004, the Liberal Party had translated the principle of individual choice (White 1978, p.
26) into an emphasis on protection, promotion and enhancement of a ‘freedom to
contract’ (Liberal Party 2004, p. 6).
It could be argued that the Workplace Relations Act 1996 and the Coalition’s industrial
relations policy during the 2004 elections (Liberal Party 2004) represent the ascendancy
of unitarist industrial relations in Australia. Bennett (1994, p. 227) characterised the
managerial views, which prevailed in the debate, as ‘a form of managerial
fundamentalism which rejects unions, insists on unilateral management control and on
the identity of interest between employer and employee’. These are three of the key
characteristics of a unitarist framework delineated in textbooks, for example, in Deery,
Plowman, Walsh and Brown (2001, pp. 7-8).
Current developments in Australian industrial relations and the road to the
transformation of industrial relations in Australia during the 1980s and 1990s indicate
that the study of unitarism retains contemporary relevance for research.
The ascendancy of management in terms of regaining managerial prerogative, obtaining
significant concessions in collective bargaining, and in adopting strategies which challenge
the assumptions which underpin collective industrial relations was explained in the United
States in terms of a 'transformation' theory (Kochan et al. 1984; Kochan et al. 1994). The
transformation of industrial relations was conceived as a dynamic interaction of
environmental pressures, managerial values and existing business strategies, structures and
policies, which drive industrial relations, and human resource management policies
(Kochan et al. 1994, p. 13). Managers are depicted as decision-makers and initiators in
making strategic choices. This contrasts with Dunlop's theory of adaptive systems
(Roomkin & Juris 1990, pp. 108-9).
Although Kochan et al. took the declining fortunes of the U.S. labour movement as their
starting point, management values and strategies were positioned at the centre of their
analysis. This analysis depicted management seizing the initiative over unions in dealing
with the substantial environmental changes of the 1980s and 1990s (Kochan et al. 1984;
6Strauss 1984; Adams 1988b; Aaron 1987; Salaman 1989; Barbash 1991; Craypo 1992).
As Gospel (1983a, p. 1) noted, it is management, which ‘plays a predominant role in
shaping work relations and the industrial relations system'.
The American experience was more than a matter of timely strategic initiatives and
adaptation to a changing economic environment. Kochan, Katz and McKersie argued that
one of the key characteristics of their transformation theory was the venting of latent union
avoidance under the financial stresses of the deep recession of the early 1980s. Lawler
(1990) suggested that aggressive anti-unionism might be an outcome of shifting
management values and ideologies. Kochan et al. (1994, p. 14) disagreed, suggesting that
rather than a change in managerial preferences or ideology, United States managers had
always opposed the idea of unions in their businesses and that union recognition was a
pragmatic or strategic adaptation to the high costs of avoiding or dislodging established
unions. It is attitudes to collectivism and trade unions, which alert the industrial relations
student to the ideology of managers, together with managerial attitudes towards managerial
prerogative and conflict.
The changes experienced in the United States were reflected in Australia by a range of new
and different management approaches to industrial relations regulation, during a ‘decade of
continuous change’ during the 1980s, (Dabscheck 1989, p. x). The propensity for some
firms to pursue actively the decline of trade unions through anti-union court actions
became more common in Australia, although still unusual, with cases such as
Mundginberri Meat Works and Dollar Sweets where employers sued the unions for taking
industrial action. Such cases may be seen as an attempt by management to re-establish
managerial prerogative through litigation (Thompson 1992). These developments
culminated in the award of several million dollars damages against the Australian
Federation of Air Pilots following the pilots' dispute of 1989 (McCallum 2002, p. 234).
During the early 1990s, other major employers in Australia adopted anti-union stances, one
highly publicized example being an aggressive attempt by Australian Pulp and Paper Mills
in 1992 to by-pass unions in introducing workplace changes by refusing to negotiate
changes (Thompson 1992). Comalco, a company in the Rio Tinto group, adopted a
7sophisticated strategy of union avoidance in introducing individual contracts (McDonald &
Timo 1996). The Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993, despite its origins in the Accord
between the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and the Labor Government,
provided further stimulus for firms to develop union avoidance strategies. A range of firms
such as Woodside Petroleum and Optus introduced non-union enterprise flexibility
'agreements' with their employees (Long 1995, p. 32) under the Industrial Relations
Reform Act 1993. These cases raised serious challenges to the trade unions' ability to
retain membership and representational roles in organised workplaces, and represented the
development of workplace scenarios where managerial prerogative prevailed, workplace
collectivism was unravelled, and conflict was seen as concomitant with third party
interference.
These tendencies received political and legislative momentum through Liberal Party
industrial relations policy, Better Pay for Better Work (Liberal Party 1996) and the
Workplace Relations Act 1996. In promoting the new provisions, the federal Coalition
Minister for Workplace Relations and Small Business, Hon. Peter Reith, emphasised the
ability of employers to by-pass trade unions by utilising non-negotiated certified
‘agreements’ and individual contracts under the ‘Australian Workplace Agreements’
provisions, never placing emphasis upon certified agreements negotiated with trade unions
(Thorpe & McDonald 1998). In 1998 there was an attempt by Patrick’s Stevedoring at
replacing the unionised waterfront workforce with a specifically trained, non-union
workforce with the involvement of the federal Minister for Workplace Relations and Small
Business (Sutton 1998; Elias 1998). By 2004, the Coalition’s emphasis on reforming the
industrial relations system had overtly placed the interests of businesses at the head of its
policy with its key framework based upon ‘a more harmonized workplace relations
system’, assistance ‘to business, especially small business, to enter into workplace
agreements’, in order ‘to ensure that the concept of freedom to contract is protected,
promoted and enhanced’, and to promote individual contracts (Australian Workplace
8Agreements) in order to benefit ‘small businesses in particular from the workplace
flexibility that flows from the use of AWAs’1 (Liberal Party 2004).
Explicitly confrontationist, ‘new right’ policies in Australia, reflecting a unitarist
perspective on the employment relationship, included the abolition of unions and industrial
tribunals (Dabscheck 1992). The president of the HR Nicholls Society, for example, in an
address to the Young Liberals Convention stated that the abolition of the Industrial
Relations Commission was central to reform (Evans 2002). The Chief Executive Officers
of some of the largest corporations in the country, some employer associations, and
organisations such as the H.R. Nicholls Society, opposed trade unions, condemned
government intervention as collectivist, socialist and economically misguided, and their
ideas were based on laissez faire market models and individualism (Levitas 1986, pp. 1-4).
Among the employer associations, the Business Council of Australia commissioned an
enquiry which recommended the adoption of individual contracts, limited union presence
in organisations where ‘managers will have a strong incentive to work towards
representation arrangements which maximise common purpose’, and a diminished role for
the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (Hilmer et al. 1993, pp. 110-23).
Dabscheck (1992, pp. 313-14) argued that confrontationist policies promoted in ‘new right’
policies explicitly included the abolition of unions and industrial tribunals. Wright (1995,
pp. 208-9) tied in the ‘reassertion of managerial prerogative’ in the late twentieth-century
to the ‘confrontational model of the New Right’, which he characterised as ‘authoritarian’
and ‘directive’.
Key public policy ‘reform’ advocates such as Peter Costello - later to become Treasurer in
the Howard Coalition Government - supported attempts to remove the protection afforded
unions by industrial relations legislation (Costello 1987). ‘New right’ policies were not
always consistent: they also supported a re-direction of state intervention rather than a call
for minimalist government (Clegg, Dow & Boreham 1983, p. 35). In the Australian case,
this saw the institution of a bureaucracy to support the introduction of individualised
agreements (AWAs) – the Office of the Employment Advocate.
1 Australian Workplace Agreements
9The public policy developments, which flowed from such influences, have been widely
regarded by industrial relations scholars in Australia as being unitarist. The Workplace
Relations Act 1996, it has been argued, is unitarist in intent with respect to weakening
unionism, the introduction of decentralised bargaining, the sanctioning and regulation of
individual contracts in industrial relations legislation, downgrading the Australian
Industrial Relations Commission (Callus 1996; Nelson 1998; Gahan & Hearn-Mackinnon
2000; Thornthwaite & Sheldon 2000), and some work organisations have taken the
opportunity to promote a unitarist culture (Campling 1998) and lead to instances of a
hardening in management attitudes towards collective workplace arrangements and the
unions in some large-scale businesses such as Telstra (Ross 2003, pp. 176-8).
British writers referred to changes in industrial relations following the Thatcher
Government policies on industrial relations from 1979 in terms of the reconstruction of
workplace industrial relations where management might exercise a wide range of strategies
to influence the conduct of industrial relations (Purcell and Sisson 1983, p. 102). Jones and
Rose (1986, pp. 35-6; 56) discussed the long-standing characteristics of capital-labour
relationships in British industry in terms of an industrial ‘transition’. They concluded that
there probably has been a permanent alteration in the way work will be organised and the
terrain upon which workplace industrial relations will be conducted. The Thatcher
programme weakened unions, narrowed the scope of collective regulation, and
individualised employment relations (Howell 2004, p. 4). Such developments are to the
forefront in Australia as the Howard Government proceeds to attempt to reconstruct
Australian industrial relations (Liberal Party 2005) in a unitarist image.
1.3 Unitarism and industrial relations theory
Unitarism has been neither systematically developed nor extensively debated as a concept
and there are presumptions about its status as a theory. Typically, accounts will describe
briefly the unitarist approaches towards management of employees characterised by F.W.
Taylor and scientific management, the Hawthorne - human relations school, and neo-
human relations. Unitarism is briefly iterated in most general industrial relations student
textbooks in Australia of the 1980s and 1990s. These include Deery and Plowman (1991,
pp. 5-9), Horstman (1992, pp. 288-92), Dabscheck (1995, pp. 85-6), Fox, Howard and
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Pittard (1995, p. 243), Alexander and Lewer (1996, pp. 6-7), Deery et al. (1997, pp. 1.4-
1.8), Mortimer & Morris (1998, pp. 69-70), Keenoy and Kelly (1998, p. 191), and Petzall,
Timo and Abbott (2000, pp. 19-20). Dabscheck and Niland (1981, pp. 14-15), in
canvassing different approaches to industrial relations, did not refer to Fox’s frameworks
but, in outlining an approach which focuses on efficiency and output, distinguish between
scientific management and human relations. Gardner and Palmer (1997, pp. 231-3)
mentioned unitarism in passing in an account of an ‘administrative perspective on
management’. In his history of labour management in Australia, Wright (1995, pp. 5-6)
argued that most managers viewed the management of employees in unitarist terms. An
edited textbook (Teicher, Holland & Gough 2002) contained two short summaries of the
unitarist framework by Gough, Holland and Teicher (2002, pp 42-4) and Van Gramberg
(2002, pp 208-9).
The unitarist framework also received an airing in Australian journals and book chapters.
Kirkbride (1985), for example, reviewed Fox’s contrast between unitarism and pluralism in
a discussion on the neglect of the concept of power in industrial relations research.
Rimmer (1989) identified unitarism as a component of ‘employee relations’. Boxall and
Dowling (1990) referred to the Fox unitarist/pluralist dichotomy in passing. In the mid-
1990s, Provis (1996) argued that there had been a resurgence of unitarism in Australia.
The accounts in these textbooks and papers summarise and re-state, rather than build upon,
Fox’s characterisation of ‘unitary’ managerial attitudes towards the management of
employees and labour relations, which was likewise brief.
1.4 Ideology: assumptions, attitudes, perspectives and values
One of the reasons for the neglect of a developed theory might be that unitarism is not a
theory as such, but merely an industrial relations classification of a set of assumptions
made by managers about the power structure within work organisations. Unitarism thus
presently has the status of a management-centred ideology rather than a theory of
managerial behaviour. Nevertheless, some texts do refer specifically to unitarism as a
theory (eg., Nicholls 1999, pp. 17-21), and this is implicit in the industrial relations
accounts of unitarism in textbook chapters devoted to theory in industrial relations.
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The term, assumptions, is used in this thesis generically to refer to the values2 and
beliefs subscribed to by managers. Values and beliefs are treated as synonyms. It
relates to ideology because ideology constitutes a set of general, taken-for-granted
beliefs about how the social world operates to identify what outcomes are desirable and
how they can best be achieved (Simons & Ingram 1997, p. 784). In the context of
discussing the industrial relations ideology of Canadian academics, Godard (1992, p.
239) defined ideology in terms of ‘frameworks of interconnected values, beliefs, and
assumptions’. Ideology thus also provides a reference for management behaviour
(Starbuck 1982; Alvesson 1991; Godard 1997) and legitimacy for desired courses of
action (Goll & Zeitz 1991, p. 191). The term, ‘values’, refers to ‘a broad tendency to
prefer certain states of affairs over others’ (Hofstede 1998, p. 478) or provide
‘definitions of what is desirable within a group or society’ (Watson 1980, p. 10). Other
studies refer to attitudes and these are the focus of much of the literature on quantitative
methodology when it addresses abstract conceptions. Thus, Oppenheim (1992, p. 175)
notes that ‘attitudes are parts of a wider compound of values, beliefs and feelings’.
Throughout this thesis the terms ‘assumptions’, ‘perspective’ and ‘attitudes’ will also be
used to refer to values. Beliefs or values are linked as inextricable elements of
managers’ construction of organisational ‘reality’ generally, of the management-
employee relationship in particular, and of the course of action managers adopt in
dealing with that relationship.
1.5 Small and Medium Sized Enterprises
In this thesis, the study of unitarist ideology focuses on managers in small and medium
sized enterprises. The thesis was developed in the context of a wider research project on
employee management and organisational change in Australian SMEs developed and
conducted by the author and Dr Retha Wiesner at University of Southern Queensland.
The most common definition is around employee numbers (Atkins & Lowe 1996) and
there is great variation between approaches to the range workforce sizes that constitutes
a small or medium sized business. They found that 34 of 50 empirical studies of SMEs
used employee numbers as the criterion for determining size. The European
2 Gouldner (1971, p. 32) refers to beliefs as ‘background assumptions’.
12
Commission’s definition avoided the complexities of differentiating between industries
adopted by the 1971 UK Bolton Committee by focussing on the size of the firm’s
workforce (Storey 1994). Johns et al. (1989) also differentiated employment size
between industries in considering Australian small business. Julien et al. (1994) in a
regional study of SMEs in Quebec, Canada, settled on 250 as the maximum size. The
European Commission distinguished between small enterprises (10-99 employees) and
medium enterprises (100-499 employees) so that, according to the European
Commission, a SME is an organisation, which employs fewer than 500 workers. There
is, therefore, some debate about what constitutes an SME (Johns et al. 1989; von
Potobsky 1992; Storey 1994; Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al. 1996; Osteryoung et al. 1995)
with definitions varying between countries and industry sectors. A manufacturing
business of 500 employees would likely be classified as an SME in the USA but would
constitute a large organisation in Australia (Johns & Storey 1983, p.5).
While there are variations in the literature for determining the size of an SME between
countries, this also occurs within countries. Upper limits as high as 500 and as low as
100 have been applied to small business in the USA (Hornsby & Kuratko 1990;
Osteryoung et al. 1995). Numbers as high as 500 have also been applied in the UK
(Duberly & Walley 1995) although an upper limit of 200 is more usual (Atkins & Lowe
1996; Bacon et al. 1996; Joyce et al. 1990). Other elements in the definition of SMEs
have included the type of ownership, degree of corporate independence, the nature of
managerial processes, the degree of use of business planning, turnover rates and value of
assets (Atkins & Lowe 1996, pp. 42-3; Bacon et al. 1996, p.85; Duberly & Walley 1995,
p.893; Hornsby & Kurato 1990, p.9; Joyce et al. 1990, p.50; Osteryoung et al. 1995,
p.77). This was discussed briefly in McDonald and Wiesner’s paper, ‘Collective
Bargaining and Organisational Change in Regional SMEs’ (1997, p. 486).
Reflecting this definitional focus, some small business and general surveys in Australia
have categorised businesses and workplaces primarily according to size (employment
numbers). The most widely used definition of small business applied in Australian
studies follows the distinction made by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). The
ABS distinguishes the application of size between industry sectors. Thus, small
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business is defined in terms of fewer than 100 employees in the manufacturing sector
and fewer than 20 in retail, wholesale, construction and service sectors. The ABS small
business classification also requires that an enterprise be independently owned and
operated, closely controlled by the owner/managers who contribute most if not all of the
operating capital and with the principal decision making functions resting with the
owner/managers (ABS Cat. No. 1321.0, 1990). Other distinctions are made, including
‘micro business’, which are businesses other than agriculture employing fewer than 5
people. The next size bracket was 100-249 employees (Collins, 1993). In the 1990 and
1995 Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (AWIRS 1990 and AWIRS
1995) workplaces were categorised according to size brackets of 5-19, 20-49, 50-99,
100-199, 200-499, 500+ (Callus et al. 1991; Morehead et al. 1997). A Portrait of
Australian Business (Productivity Commission/ Department of Industry, Science and
Technology 1997), which was a large scale (8756 respondents), longitudinal study of the
nature and activities of Australian firms, broke down small business further into ‘micro
business’, that is, businesses other than agriculture employing fewer than 5 people (also
an ABS definition) and size categories of 1-4, 5-9, and 10-19 employees. Some other
larger studies, such as national surveys of human resource management practices in
1989 and 1993, defined small business as employing fewer than 100 employees. The
next size bracket was 100-249 employees (Collins, 1993).
Following Baron (1995), McDonald and Wiesner (1998; 1999) defined SMEs as
organisations employing between 20 and 200 employees with small businesses
constituted by 100 or fewer employees and medium sized businesses ranging from 100 to
199 employees. Since this was in the context of a research project considering not only
employee management practices but also organisational change practices in SMEs, the
definition’s focus was on employment size. SMEs with a workforce within this range will
be expected to have a management structure. Smaller organisations tend to have less
formal organisational structures and informal HRM and change practices (Callus et al.
1991; Olson and Terpstra 1992).
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1.6 Justification for research on unitarism
In chapter 2, it is suggested that contemporary management practice continues to apply
unitarist frames of reference to management in work organisations and is endemic in
smaller organisations (Ram 2000). This suggests a powerful reason for testing the unitarist
ideal-type posited in Fox's work and applied to accounts of management in industrial
relations research. However, there are a number of other, incontrovertible reasons for
further research. Taken together, the following grounds suggest a strong relevance for this
research on unitarism. By themselves, the individual rationales may be rather less
compelling.
There are five reasons for researching unitarism. First, Fox’s frameworks have been quite
influential in the field of industrial relations, particularly in the United Kingdom and
Australasia. His unitarist construct is found described in most industrial relations
textbooks in both regions. Second, the frameworks have been found to be inadequate as
categories of management behaviour, because, it has been argued, managers may employ a
range of pluralist and unitarist strategies in managing employees. Third, aspects of Fox’s
unitarist framework surface in industrial relations public policy development, which may
provide a significant and reinforcing frame of reference for management attitudes and
behaviour in the management of employees. This is a major contribution of the study.
Fourth, neither Ross nor Fox developed the unitarist ideal-type out of any systematic
empirical research. This thesis attempts to remedy this failure by applying the detail of the
construct to managerial attitudes towards the management of employees. Fifth, the
concept has been applied to occasional studies of management in the field of industrial
relations, but Fox’s ideal-type has been tested in few studies. It is these final two aspects,
which constitute the most persuasive reasons for undertaking this research. Each of these
points will now be considered in more detail.
In his 1966 paper, ‘Managerial ideology and industrial relations’, Fox observed that ‘if
there is something approaching consensus among detached observers of industry that a
given pattern of ideas is sufficiently widespread among managers to be noteworthy, a valid
basis for discussion exists’ (Fox 1966b, p. 366). That remains pertinent, as some industrial
relations scholars have argued that there has been a resurgence of unitarism (Kessler &
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Palmer 1996; Provis 1996; van den Broek 1997) and that human resource management has
sustained unitarist perspectives on the employment relationship (Haworth 1987).
However, unitarism does not, of necessity, involve managerial abandonment of collective
bargaining and collective forms. Danford (1997), for example, studies a case of
management’s retention of collective forms with the objective of ensuring outcomes
compatible with organisational objectives, while asserting managerial prerogative,
focussing on shopfloor cooperation and participation, and emphasising joint interests of
management and employees. These studies suggest that research on the unitarist
perspective remains relevant to the study of management in industrial relations,
notwithstanding that the notion of a unitarist ideology is widely iterated in industrial
relations texts, however briefly, as indicated in section 1.3 above, and in Australian human
resource management texts (Dessler, Griffiths, Lloyd-Walker & Williams 1999, pp. 641-2;
Stone 2002, p. 530).
Fox’s ‘framework’ has been called an ideal-type (Purcell & Sisson 1983; Danford 1997)
rather than a model. Following Weber’s distinction between an ideal-type and a
descriptive type, the latter being an ‘abstract synthesis of those traits which are common to
numerous concrete phenomena’, unitarism might be regarded as a descriptive type.
However, since unitarism is an ideology, it is clearly an ideal-type, which Weber defined
as ‘the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view (1949, cited in Giddens 1971,
p. 142). Fox did not refer to the concept as a theory of itself, although he was interested in
developing theory in industrial relations about management behaviour (Fox 1990). It was,
rather, a classification of managerial attitudes with which he contrasted other sets of
attitudes, in particular, the pluralist perspective. He may have been wise in using the term,
‘framework’ rather than ‘theory’. These frameworks, or perspectives, have been criticised
for their inadequate definitions (Jackson 1977, p. 254) and their narrow conceptions
(Purcell 1987, p. 534). Jackson (1977, p. 28) pointed out that Fox did not attempt to
develop a comprehensive theory of management frames of reference. Later, Fox (1974a)
refined his concept by introducing a typology of management style. Purcell and Sisson
(1983) further developed a set of five ideal types of management behaviour building on
Fox’s typology. Fox (1974a, p. 308) did, however, conclude that managers might adopt a
mixture of unitarist and pluralist perspectives in their approaches towards the management
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of employees as Wright (1995) subsequently found in his study of Australian managers.
Later, on the basis that a range of variations might be found in practices where firms
ascribed to either a pluralist or a unitarist frame of reference, Purcell (1987) developed a
concept of management style around the axes of individualism and collectivism. If critics
of Fox’s characterisation of managerial perspectives are concerned about the empirical
validity of his construct, then this study does make a contribution by seeking to apply his
notion in a comprehensive examination of managerial attitudes.
There remains an ongoing potential for usage of unitarist ideology both in studies of
managerial assumptions and behaviour at the level of the organisation and, as canvassed in
section 1.2, in the development of industrial relations at the public policy level.
References to unitarism had occurred in industrial relations literature to such an extent
during the 1980s that Batstone (1988, p. 11), for example, noted that ‘the essential features
of a unitarist approach to industrial relations have been widely discussed and need little
repetition here’. This applied to both the organisational and public policy levels.
However, if there is little empirical research on the characteristics of a unitarist ideology, it
is apposite that this study will make a contribution to consideration of whether or not the
unitarist construct has analytical worth for studies of the management of employees in
organisations or of the public policy environment in which managers will manage
employees.
Although the construct may provide a useful but limited categorisation of some forms of
managerial attitudes and behaviour, and has been widely applied, unitarism does not
appear to have been systematically validated empirically. Neither Fox nor Norman Ross
(1958; 1964) before him developed the notion of unitarism upon systematic empirical
studies. Fox implicitly admitted as much, noting only that his paper was ‘written in the
belief that the observation of those with knowledge in the field would support certain
limited propositions of this nature’ (Fox 1966b, p. 366). Fox appears merely to have
described a set of managerial assumptions, which, in Hill's terms (1981, p. 12), lead to ‘a
model of the firm as a homogenous community based on shared interests, united by shared
values and with a high moral density’. Likewise, there has been little testing of Ross's and
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Fox's concept even though a plethora of research publications have applied the concept.
This is not an adequate basis for theory and is only the first step in developing a theory of
managerial ideology for, as Dabscheck (1995, p. 2) observes, ‘Scholars accept nothing a
priori’. Where the unitarist ideology was tested in Australia (Deery & Dowling 1988), the
study was flawed, as is discussed in chapter 2.
This present study therefore seeks to contribute to the literature on managerial attitudes and
behaviour by employing an empirical study of managerial attitudes to test the unitarist
framework, across its four principal characteristics.
The final reason for the relevance of this study is the question of the affinity between forms
of HRM on the one hand and a unitarist perspective on the other (Gunnigle 1992; Muller
1999; Holland, Nelson & Fisher 2000; Gough, Holland & Teicher 2002; Lewis, Thornhill
& Saunders 2003). Guest and Hoque (1996, p. 13) drew the distinction between two
approaches to a 'new industrial relations'. The HRM ideology, they argued, had the
potential to replace the old pluralist industrial relations with individualism. A number of
other authors have critically concluded that HRM harbours unitarist and individualistic
values (Provis 1996; Muller 1999; Gooderham, Nordhaug & Ringdal 1999; Holland,
Nelson & Fisher 2000). Sisson (1989, p. 31), for example, argued that the HRM approach
to the management of labour ‘is simply a piece of ideology designed to make unilateral
management action more palatable’. American models of HRM have been criticized for
being based on a unitarist concept of organisation from which have been derived normative
and prescriptive accounts of employee management practices (Brewster 1995).
Purcell (1993, p. 517) concluded that HRM contributes to the concentration of power in the
hands of management where HRM legitimises managerial authority, employees are
referred to as team members, and employees are committed to organisational objectives.
The link between unitarist ideology and other management strategies associated with
HRM, such as total quality management, has likewise been noted (Snape & Wilkinson
1995; Provis 1996; Boaden 1996; Webb 1996; Castillo 1997; Houston & Studman 2001;
Knights & McCabe 2002). Marchington and Grugulis (2000 p. 1119), for example, argue
that unitarist assumptions are integral to HRM best practice, particularly since various
18
forms of participation do not include a provision for an independent employee voice.
Heery (1997) equated 'hard' and 'soft' versions of human resource practices in instituting
individual performance-related pay with versions of hard or the soft unitarism. Leopold
and Hallier (1999, p. 717) tied high commitment/high performance HRM to the
individualisation of employment and unitarist approaches to employee management.
There is no universal consensus about unitarism. In response to commentaries in which
HRM was aligned with a unitarist framework, Boxall and Dowling (1990, p. 206) argued
that analysis of HRM in these terms was ‘caught in something of a time warp around Fox’s
framework’. Like Sisson and Purcell, they sought to develop an alternative typology of
management style. Godard and Delaney (2000) suggested that the link between HRM and
human relations is not complete, arguing that new work practices and HRM do not fully
embrace the human relations version of unitarism, although it does entail a shift away from
the traditional pluralist framework of industrial relations. Guest and Hogue (1996, p. 14)
suggested that the unitarist-pluralist dichotomy might be better replaced with ‘notions of
coexistence or complementarity’. The prevalence of HRM and the alternative models of
characterising management behaviour suggest that the investigation of unitarism remains a
most pertinent research enterprise in this decade.
1.7 Objective of thesis and principal research question
The objective of this thesis is to fill the gap in industrial relations research on
management by empirically investigating managers' values as applied to the
management of employees. Fox had based his trilogy of unitarism, pluralism and
Marxism/radicalism on general observation rather than any systematic empirical study,
and he was, as he termed it in his autobiography, ‘groping towards a theoretical structure
that went beyond’ Flanders’s theory of collective bargaining in contrast to those who
‘had a strong empirical preference with no taste or patience for any attempt to construct
a theoretical framework for the subject’ (Fox 1990, p. 231). While Deery and Dowling
(1988) had set out to examine the ideology of specialist industrial relations and
personnel managers, their study did not address the assumptions of managers generally,
nor was it a comprehensive examination of the unitarist construct. A critique of this
paper can be found in section 2.8 of chapter 2.
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This thesis seeks only to test Fox’s unitarist framework. This occurs at the level not of
grand theory as attempted, for example, by Dunlop in 1958, nor of middle-range theory,
but of empirically testing theory (Kochan 1993, p. 362). Thus, the principal research
question, from which all others follow, and which guides the research for this thesis is:
Do managers in SMEs exhibit the characteristics of a unitarist ideology in managing
employees? Four sets of attitude scales can be developed from Fox’s delineation of the
unitarist framework. These are managers’ attitudes towards managerial prerogative,
conflict, collective workplace relations, and trade unions. This principal research
question generates a range of specific research questions and hypotheses about Fox’s
unitarist framework, which will be addressed in chapter 6.
The first set of specific research questions addresses the significance of relationships
between the four unitarist features and various characteristics of the organisation and
various characteristics of the manager. The second set covers the significance of the
relationship between managers’ attitudes and workplace practices. This is followed by
an investigation of the relationship between managers’ attitudes and their satisfaction or
otherwise with employee performance.
The contribution of this thesis to the literature on industrial relations in small and
medium sized businesses will be not only to build on research already conducted on
management practices in Australian SMEs by Wiesner and McDonald and others by
providing empirical evidence regarding the ideology of managers in managing
employees in SMEs. How this will be achieved is addressed by considering the
methodology to be employed.
1.8 Research methods
If there were an empirical foundation for Fox’s influential unitarist framework, it would
apply to a population of managers. Individual case studies or ethnographic research into
a single or small number of work organisations were, therefore, not considered
appropriate. A second option was to interview a number of managers and to conduct an
analysis of the transcripts. This did not recommend itself as the primary research
method because of cost considerations and limitations on accessing managers in a range
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of organisation sizes, locations, industry types, and corporate structures together with the
added problem of generalisability.
It was decided, therefore, to conduct the research principally by the administration of a
mailed survey questionnaire. Questions were developed either from the literature or
from statements in the public domain, which reflect managerial values and from other
research conducted as part of McDonald and Wiesner’s research project on employee
management in SMEs. There were two main types of questions in the survey. First,
there were forced-response questions which either required a yes/no answer or which
required the respondent to identify categories into which characteristics of their
organisation, their personal background, or their practices fell. The second set of
questions related to the five components of Fox’s unitary construct, identified in section
1.4 above. These utilised five-point Likert scales to identify the intensity of managers’
values regarding selected aspects of management.
In addition, a semi-structured interview program was conducted with 19 managers in the
Brisbane metropolitan area, covering the main aspects of the unitarist construct (see p.
146). This programme was designed both to obtain qualitative data and to assist in the
development of the final survey questionnaire.
This research was conducted in the context of a wider study of the management of
employees and organisational change in Australian SMEs conducted with my colleague,
Dr Retha Wiesner. The broader study has undergone four phases. First, there was a
regional pilot study of 70 managers in the Toowoomba area; second, a survey of
Queensland SME managers; third, an Australia wide survey of SMEs using a Dunn and
Bradstreet stratified sample (see p. 211); and, fourth, the commencement of a number of
international collaborations.
The sample frame included two types of respondents: those who had participated in the
national survey of Australian SMEs and who had indicated that they were prepared to
participate in further studies conducted by Wiesner and McDonald; and those who did
not give such an indication. Every second respondent to the national survey, of both
types, was selected in order of receipt until a sample of 500 managers was achieved.
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The second determinant of the sample was the location of the respondent’s organisation
in the eastern states of Australia.
1.9 Limitations
There are a number of methodological limitations in self-reporting in surveys. These are
discussed in more detail in chapter 4. The findings of this thesis refer only to managers
in SMEs and do not necessarily apply to managers in larger organisations. However,
small and medium sized businesses do constitute the bulk of organisations in the
Australian economy and employ a significant proportion of the workforce, and thus
managerial ideology in SMEs is significant for the Australian work experience
generally. Are the characteristics of SME managers found in this survey applicable to
all SME managers? While the original sample frame for Wiesner and McDonald’s
research on Australian SMEs was stratified according to size, state and industry, this is
not true for this sample, which is a sub-set of respondents in that original sample frame.
This is an Australian study and there is a need to conduct further research both in this
country and overseas.
Fox developed the unitary framework as a category of managerial ideology, which he
contrasted with a pluralist framework. In this thesis, any conclusions with respect to
alternative frameworks to unitarism are avoided. Given that some of the recent
industrial relations literature argues that unitarism is alive and well in managerial
perspectives, leading to the coining of the term ‘neo-unitary’ theory (Nicholls 1999, p.
20), the purpose of this thesis was to test these assertions by empirically investigating
whether those unitarist characteristics are commonplace among contemporary SME
managers.
Another limitation of this thesis is that it does not explore the intellectual origins of
Fox’s classification of the unitarist framework beyond a brief consideration of Ross’s
1958 essay (Ross 1958), which applied the unitarist construct to management. This path
would lead us to an examination of the liberal and neo-liberal origins of unitarism and a
detailed study of managerial texts such as those by Fayol, Taylor, Barnard, Drucker,
Peters and Waterman, and others. Only passing reference has been made to that genre.
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A theoretical tradition, to which unitarism may be linked, is structural-functionalism
(Hyman & Brough 1975, pp. 150-7; Burrell & Morgan 1979). This is referred to briefly
in the discussion on the ontology and epistemology of the study (section 4.2).
A further limitation is that the thesis does not attempt to locate the social origins of
managers’ assumptions about managing employees. It was feasible for this research to
have also embarked on such aspects as the manager’s social class, investigating class
proxies such as parent’s occupation and educational levels (for example, see Mitchell
1998) or managers’ wealth and income. The choice made was to limit the extent of the
research on these types of issues to the highest level of education of the manager, the
source of their managerial ideas and whether they are owners of the work organisation,
and to leave detailed class and social analysis to other projects and other researchers.
There are two reasons for this limitation. First, the effort of the research for this thesis
was directed towards an in-depth examination of managers’ perspectives on the
employment relationship and whether that perspective constituted a unitarist ideology
rather than the historical and intellectual origins of those assumptions, although the
intellectual traditions are briefly surveyed in chapter 2 (section 2.4). On the one hand
this avoids reductionism, but the danger of this approach, on the other hand, is that it
might lead to an analysis devoid of context. This is avoided by studying managers’
ideology as both the context itself of managerial behaviour and whether management
behaviour reflects any unitarist ideology. However, the focus is upon the ideology of
managers as organisational participants rather than their hegemonic role, although the
conclusions drawn about consultation and employee participation suggest that these
practices, as applied in SMEs, serve to sustain managerial prerogative. In their role as
agents of the owners of the means of production they may be seen to be part of such a
class, although, as Nichols (1969) points out, managers have their own distinct interests.
1.10 Outline of the thesis
In chapter 2, the research commences with a literature survey of ideology. This review
will address some of the various theoretical approaches to the question of ideology
generally. Both managerial ideology and the industrial relations literature on unitarism
are specifically considered, including a review of the strategic choice literature. The
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review in chapter 3 narrows the focus to specific sources for each of the questions in the
survey questionnaire.
In chapter 4, the methodology employed is described and the questionnaire subjected to
validity checks, reliability tests and factor analysis. The ontological and epistemological
issues associated with choosing an empirical methodology are discussed. This
discussion is seen as particularly significant for any researcher in a discipline, which
addresses the problematics of work, a key focus of industrial relations, as defined in
section 1.1.
The results from the interview programme are enumerated, collated and summarised in
chapter 5. Chapter 6 reports the findings of the survey data and these are analysed to
determine the significance of relationships between the variables tested. Finally, in
chapter 7, there is discussion of the findings, which relates the significant relationships
between the unitarist and other variables to the literature, and discusses implications of
the conclusions for industrial relations and further research in the field on management.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW: UNITARISM AND IDEOLOGY
2.1 Introduction
This industrial relations thesis studies the ideology of managers in the management of
employees, in particular the concept of a unitary framework, which is said to be
characteristic of some managers’ perspectives on the role of controlling, directing and
leading employees. The topic falls within the context of the growth of interest in
management among industrial relations scholars since the late 1980s. Furthermore, a
number of industrial relations writers argue that this unitarist ideology has contemporary
pervasiveness. Because the research was conducted within a broader project on employee
management and organisational change in small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs),
this investigation of unitarism is limited to an examination of managers and their attitudes
in establishments whose employment size ranges from 20 to 200 employees.
The community of industrial relations scholars now has an established interest in
management and the roles of managers in the employment relationship, an interest that has
grown since the late 1980s. Nevertheless, the landmark work on managers’ behaviour in
industrial relations was conducted in the late 1950s and the 1960s by, first, Ross (1958)
and then, more influentially, by Fox (1966a; 1966b). Fox followed these influential papers
with further publications in the 1970s on the typologies of management behaviour (Fox
1971; 1974a; 1974b).
Fox identified three ‘frameworks’ which might guide managerial approaches to the
management of employees: unitarism, pluralism and radicalism. In this thesis, the focus is
on the first of these frameworks. Unitarism is commonly defined in terms of managers’
ideas, attitudes or beliefs. Thus, according to the Glossary of Australian Industrial
Relations unitarism is a set of ‘beliefs, orientations or a predisposition’, which operates as
a ‘philosophy or style of management [guiding] managers’ actions with respect to
organisational policy and practice’ and which ‘forms the basis for traditional management
and organisational practice’ (Sutcliffe & Callus 1994, p. 198). This philosophy or style
encompasses a view of the organisation as a unitary structure notwithstanding the
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complexity that accompanies larger organisations and the variety of forms of
specialisation, standardisation, formalisation, centralisation and configuration of the
manager’s role structure, which are to be found in them. Fox specifically identified the
unitary framework as an ideology derived from the ‘classical school’ of management,
which includes scientific management and the ‘human relations’ or ‘naturalistic school’
(Fox 1966b, p. 366). As indicated in chapter 1, section 1.1, there are four key sets of
attitudes with which managerial unitarism is associated: attitudes towards managerial
prerogative, conflict, collective workplace relations generally and trade unions
specifically3.
The purpose of this chapter is, first, to place this thesis within the context of research in the
industrial relations field on management and research on industrial relations in small and
medium sized enterprises. The second intent of this chapter is to provide a broad
background in the literature on ideology generally and the specific work of Fox and his
successors on unitarist ideology in particular. This will be significant for aspects of the
empirical investigation into the ideology and behaviour of managers in SMEs. In chapter
3, the direct relationship between the literature and the aspects of unitarism to be
investigated in this thesis are enumerated.
2.1.1 Arrangement of the literature review
This chapter commences with an account of the growth of interest in managers among
industrial relations researchers (section 2.2) and of industrial relations research in small
and SMEs in section 2.3. The intellectual traditions of unitarism are outlined in section
2.4. Fox identified these as scientific management (sub-section 2.4.1) and the
humanist/neo-humanist traditions (sub-section 2.4.2). Two implications of these
approaches to management of labour for perspectives on the employment relationship and
work organisations are then developed in section 2.5: the emphasis upon consensus and
harmony (sub-section 2.5.1) and the notion that power is neutral (sub-section 2.5.2). The
section concludes with a brief reference to management styles, which Fox (1974)
developed from a high trust/low trust dichotomy. The question of the relevance of
3 Kitay and Marchington (1996) refer to management dimensions, which include attitudes to at least trade
unions, employee participation, and conflict resolution.
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unitarism is discussed in section 2.6 in terms of its usefulness as a framework for managing
employees and as a construct in the analysis of the employment relationship. Fox's
analysis of managers' approaches to the management of employees is treated in terms of
unitarism as an ideology in section 2.7). The use of the term, ideology, has had a number
of problems attached to it. These are discussed in sub-section 2.7.1, followed by a critical
reference to Dunlop's use of ideology in his model of an industrial relations system (sub-
section 2.7.2). Unitarism as ideology is placed within the broader context of Marxist and
non-Marxist notions of ideology. One of the influential non-Marxist constructs of
managerial ideology is the concept of strategic choice. The discussion of this proceeds in
sub-section 2.7.3 and is related back to management and ideology in sub-sections 2.7.4 and
unitarism as ideology in sub-section 2.7.5, followed by drawing of the distinction between
management and employers (sub-section 2.7.6). Distinguishing between studies that utilise
the unitarist label and those which empirically analyse managerial ideology, the review
then proceeds to a critical account of Australian studies of managerial ideology (section
2.8). The chapter is summarized in section 2.9.
In placing the question of managers and a unitarist ideology in a broader context, the next
section considers industrial relations approaches to management.
2.2 Management in industrial relations research
The study of management from an industrial relations perspective has grown out of interest
in the phenomena of organised labour and collective bargaining (Taylor & Bray 1986, p. 1;
Strauss 1998, p. 179). This was stimulated by changes in management strategies (Kochan
et al. 1994), particularly as the parties dealt with workplace changes aimed at improving
the efficiency and productivity of organisations (Morehead et al. 1997, p. 81).
Research in industrial relations on any aspect of management had had a limited emphasis
despite Fox’s 1966 paper and, across the Atlantic, Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison and Myers’
focus on ‘the really universal phenomenon affecting workers – the inevitable structuring of
the managers and the managed in the course of industrialization’ (Kerr et al. 1960, pp. 7-8).
This had also been true for Australian industrial relations research (Lansbury & Ford 1980;
Macdonald 1985; Taylor & Bray 1986, pp. 10-11; Blain & Plowman 1987, p. 303; Deery
& Dowling 1988; Lansbury & Westcott 1992, p. 402; Wright 1995, p. 2). Bray (1986, p.
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124) argued that the neglect was almost complete because of the domination of unions and
the arbitration system as research topics. By the late 1980s, Plowman (1989a, p.1) had
noted that there was a growing awareness of the need to incorporate the role of
management in the study of industrial relations, and warned that the absence of a focus on
management would ‘put at risk the well-being of industrial relations as a field of study’
(Plowman 1989b, p. 10). Nevertheless, there remained at the beginning of the 1990s little
systematic or comprehensive information in Australia on the organisation of the
management function or the nature of the management of industrial relations (Callus et al.
1991, p. 75). Keenoy, however, had made the broader point that the analysis of trade
unions, shop stewards, industrial conflict and collective bargaining would be meaningless
without a clear, if sometimes implied, understanding of the role and interests of
management (Keenoy 1991, p. 315). Notwithstanding this argument, explicit attention to
the industrial relations of management had been a rare phenomenon.
By the mid to late 1990s, there had been a considerable increase in both theoretical and
empirical work on management in the Industrial Relations field4 (Sisson and Marginson
1995, p. 90; Strauss & Whitfield 1998, p. 7). Management is a growing subject of
industrial relations research in Australia (Bennett 1999). This emphasis upon the
managerial function in industrial relations has been variously attributed in Australia to a
‘more assertive approach taken by management to industrial relations matters’ (Deery,
Plowman & Walsh 1997, p. 6.1), ‘changes to human resource management practices
initiated by management at corporate and enterprise levels’ (Gardner & Palmer 1997, p.
227), and with the growing emphasis upon improving workplace efficiency and
productivity observed by Morehead et al. (1997, p. 81), referred to in section 2.1 above.
Some of this interest was in response to the development of business strategies associated
with changes to production systems, technological developments, skills formation, and job
design (Mathews 1994). Such developments had also led to the study of management and
industrial relations strategy in United Kingdom (Thurley & Wood 1983; Gospel & Littler
4 While it could be argued that human resource management falls within the purvey of industrial relations
research, the study of management in the industrial relations field is here distinguished from studies on
human resource management.
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1983) and the United States (Kochan, McKersie, & Cappelli 1984; Kochan, Katz &
McKersie 1994; Strauss 1984; Lewin 1987).
Much of the work on management in industrial relations has had to do with typologies of
management style. This is reflected in accounts of management style in industrial relations
textbooks in the United Kingdom (Legge 1995; Hollinshead, Nicholls & Tailby 1999;
Lewis, Thornhill & Saunders 20030 and Australia (Fox, Howard & Pittard 1995; Keenoy
& Kelly 1998; Deery, Plowman, Walsh & Brown 2001) and the report of the second
Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (Morehead et al. 1997). A further
summary of approaches to management style is to be found in section 2.6 below.
Before proceeding to the discussion on ideology and unitarism, industrial relations research
in the Australian small and medium sized business sector is reviewed.
2.3 Industrial relations and small and medium sized enterprises in Australia
There remains only a small, although growing, body of specific work on industrial
relations in Australian small business since the late 1980s. When Sutcliffe and Kitay
(1988), surveyed the literature on small business and employment relations, they found
'uncharted territory'. In the 1980s researchers barely recognised industrial relations as
applying to Australian small or medium sized enterprises. This is significant because the
role of enterprise bargaining in addressing workplace change in the late 1980s and 1990s
was central to government strategies in encouraging organisations to adapt to a global
economy. An earlier survey of 2,000 very small businesses in NSW found that both
employers and employees were more removed from mainstream industrial relations
practices than their counterparts in larger enterprises (Sappey 1985). Isaac (1993) also
noted that very little systematic study had been published about industrial relations in small
business. By the turn of the century, Australian small business industrial relations was still
frontier territory.
What was known about industrial relations in small or medium sized businesses by the early
1990s, tended to be inferred from studies of large enterprises (Isaac 1993). Barrett (1995;
1998a; 1998b) and Barrett and Buttigieg (1999) conducted meta-analyses of Australian
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS) data. Interest in various aspects of
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industrial relations in small business was prompted by the findings of the 1990 AWIRS
(Callus et al. 1991) and the 1995 AWIRS findings in which Morehead et al. (1997, pp.
299-322) devoted a chapter to small business industrial relations.
SMEs constitute a significant proportion of all businesses in Australia, and employ a
significant proportion of the workforce. This critical mass in the labour market was
reflected in the findings of the 1990 AWIRS. AWIRS found that 23 percent of all
workplaces employed between 20 and 199 workers and employed 38 percent of the
workforce, whereas 75 percent of surveyed workplaces with a workforce of 5-19 employed
23 percent of all employees.
Smaller firms tend to be informally organized, particularly in their management of
employment issues. In small firms in the metals industry in Australia, for example,
Bramble (1989) found industrial relations practices to be informal and governed largely by
management attitudes. Workplaces with 200 or more employees constituted only 3 percent
of all workplaces but employed 40 percent of the workforce overall (Callus et al 1991).
Callus et al. (1991, p. 161) also found that 71 percent of informal workplaces had fewer
than 50 employees, although only 29 percent of workplaces with between 20 and 49
employees were informal, so the assumption that work organisations with more than 20
employees will be more likely to have a management structure was an arbitrary one with
some foundation for expecting SMEs with more than 20 employees to have some
managerial structure. In 2001, small and medium sized businesses in Australia (20 - 200
employees) employed 31.2 percent of the workforce (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2003).
The study will therefore be significant in identifying the assumptions guiding the
behaviour of the managers of a significant proportion of the workforce.
There were a few specific Australian studies of industrial relations in small business during
the 1990s. The first appears to have been a paper on industrial relations in small Australian
workplaces by Callus, Kitay, and Sutcliffe (1992). The second was a joint project of the
then Confederation of Australian Industry (now Australian Chamber of Commerce and
Industry), the Commonwealth Department of Industrial Relations and Joe Isaac in 1992
(Isaac, Kates, Peetz, Fisher, Macklin & Short 1993), which surveyed a range of industrial
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relations issues in member firms affiliated with the Confederation of Australian Industry
and employing up to 50 employees. Studies of small business characteristics analysing
AWIRS data have considered the empirical evidence about unionisation (Barrett &
Buttigieg 1999), industrial harmony in small business (Barrett 1998b; 1999), award
coverage, over-award payments, and agreements in small business. The large Business
Longitudinal Survey of Small Business reported some individual industrial relations and
human resource aspects, such as the presence of agreements or individual contracts,
employment arrangements and agreements, and formal training of employees (Productivity
Commission/Department of Industry, Science and Technology 1997).
Other Australian studies have provided evidence about enterprise bargaining in SMEs
(McDonald & Wiesner 1999) and small business (Cairncross & Buultjens 2002),
employee participation (McDonald and Wiesner 1999) and management style (Barrett
1998b; McDonald and Wiesner 2000). Barrett (1995) and Thorpe and McDonald (1997)
have referred to award coverage, over-award payments, and agreements in small
business, and McDonald and Wiesner (1997) reported on collective bargaining in SMEs.
In addition, there have been some descriptive Australian studies on human resource
management in SMEs (e.g., Kotey 1999; Wiesner, McDonald & du Plessis 1997;
Wiesner & McDonald 2001a, 2001b). Kotey and Slade (2005) observed that the
adoption of formal human resource management practices increases according to firm
size in Australian SMEs. Horstman (1999) found that there was a relative lack of
interest in workplace agreements in small businesses in the context of Australia’s newly
deregulated and decentralised industrial relations.
Barrett (1999) examined a single case study in the Australian information industry of
size affects on industrial relations. A survey by Curtain (reported in Gome and Way
1994) found negative attitudes to enterprise bargaining in small businesses and he
suggested that small business preferred either awards or individual contracts. Ryan
(1997) critically examined British studies on HRM and collective arrangements in a
study of ‘high commitment management’ and pluralism in a network of five SMEs.
Bacon et al. (1996) and Swain (1997) likewise challenged the characterisation of small
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business management style in terms of unitarist attributes of high control and resistance
to employee participation.
There is a growing interest in Australian regional small business industrial relations.
Markey, Hodgkinson, Murray, Mylett and Pomfret (1997) surveyed small business
employment and market structures, human resource management practices and industrial
relations in the Illawarra region of New South Wales. Queensland regional studies include
work on SMEs in the Toowoomba region (McDonald & Wiesner 1997) and small firm
human resource practices on the Sunshine Coast5 (Kotey 1999).
The development of a small business literature in Australian industrial relations has
occurred against the background of similar complaints in the early 1990s about the lack of
research on small business industrial relations in the United Kingdom (Purcell 1993),
although there was an earlier North American call for greater research interest in small
firms and establishments in a paper on employment in small business (Granovetter 1984).
Since, there has been a widening interest in human resource management and industrial
relations in small business, with growing debates. On the one hand, Marlow & Patton
(1993), for example, concluded the profile of small firms is conducive to applying human
resource practices to employment in the United Kingdom. Bacon et al. (1996) agreed,
finding HRM practices in small business were implemented informally and concluding that
the 'bleak house' scenario of no collective representation and an absence of HRM was not
the norm, a finding reflected in Wiesner and McDonald's (2001a) study of human resource
practices in Australian SMEs. Wilkinson (1999) in a study of employment relations in
SMEs concluded that the literature on industrial relations in small business tended to
polarise into the 'small is beautiful' versus the 'bleak house' perspective. On the other hand,
Duberley & Walley (1995), in a North American study, revealed a lack of strategic HRM
in SMEs, although Chapman (1999, p.78) noted that common patterns of behaviour rather
than strategy are to be found in small firms. This possibly reflects differences between in
human resource management approaches in the United Kingdom and North America.
5 The paper is erroneously headed 'Human resource management practices of Gold Coast small firms…'
but the study refers to small firms on the Sunshine Coast region of Queensland.
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Wagar (1998) in a regional study of Canadian small business found a size effect for the
take-up of human resource practices.
General studies of industrial relations, 'employment relations' and human resources in
small businesses or SMEs during the 1990s included a prospective study of HR
requirements in US small business (Hornsby & Kuratko 1990), human resource practices
in small and large Canadian firms (Golhar & Deshpande 1996), and strategic HRM
(Duberley & Walley 1995; Marlow 2000). Examples of specific topics have included
managerial relations of control in Canadian small business (Chapman 1999), aspects of
recruitment and selection (Barber, Wesson, Roberson & Taylor 1999; Heneman III &
Berkley 1999), impacts of unionisation on HR practices in small US firms (Flanagan &
Deshpande 1996), and the effectiveness of British industrial relations codes of practice and
age discrimination in small business (Loretto, Duncan & White 2000). Knight and
Latrielle (2001), in a meta-analysis of the 1998 British Workplace Employment Relations
Survey data, found a size effect for rates of disciplinary sanctions and dismissals. Other
studies have involved small business case studies: employment relations in general practice
in the United Kingdom (Newton & Hunt 1997); the impact of customer requirements on
small firm industrial relations in the United Kingdom (Kinnie & Purcell 1999); and a
single case study of a small, non-unionised firms which employed no standard human
resource management practices (Dundon & Grugulis 1999).
The next section considers one of Fox’s ideal types of values and beliefs with respect to
managing employees: the development of the unitarist ideology.
2.4 The intellectual traditions of unitarism
Fox noted in the mid-1970s that managerial ideology had its origins in the ‘historical
texture of class, status, and power’ and in the assumptions of the common law of
employment (Fox 1974a, p. 250). However, it was not until 1958 that Norman Ross
introduced the concept of a unitary ideology to the labour management question in
industrial relations, criticising management theory for supporting ‘the concept of the firm
as a unitary or monolithic structure’ and emphasising ‘integration and organic unity’ in
industrial organisations. Ross’s purpose was to advocate the practical and theoretical
importance of applying pluralist models to the theory of the firm in order to overcome the
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problems he identified with the application of a unitary model to organisations. According
to Ross, the unitary concept brings with it an authoritarianism, which is met by ‘employee
resentment and resistance’. He argued that trade unions had developed as a ‘countervailing
power’ in response to the exercise of arbitrary management action resulting in an ongoing
struggle between management and unions (Ross 1958, pp. 100-103).
The concept became more widely known in industrial relations following the publication
of two papers by Alan Fox in 1966 and subsequent publication of his work. Fox, like
Ross, developed his account of the unitarist perspective within the context of an argument
in which he advocated pluralist industrial relations. His normative argument reflected the
emphasis of much post-war British industrial sociology on Weberian ideas of interest
group conflict, eschewing unitarist models of industrial organisation (Parker 2000).
Ross and Fox fitted within an industrial relations tradition in which industrial relations
research can be characterised as being problem-centred (Shalev 1980, p. 26; Kaufman
1993; Kochan 1993, p. 354; Kochan 1998, pp. 32-4), practically oriented (Walker 1977;
Purcell & Smith 1979, p. ix; Hyman 1980, p. 38), and an applied field (Kerr 1983, p. 17).
Much industrial relations research has therefore been policy oriented (Rees 1977, p. 3; Kerr
1978, p. 131; Strauss & Feuille 1978; Brown & Wright 1994, p. 153; Strauss & Whitfield
1998; Siegal 1998), a function, which has been urged upon industrial relations scholars
(Kochan & Wienstein 1994, p. 501). Fox, in particular, writing for a government review of
the British industrial relations system, was reformist and policy-oriented. This approach to
industrial relations was part of a long tradition within what Hyman (1989, pp. 5-6) called a
‘reformist paradigm’ in which there was ‘a public policy commitment to collective
bargaining as the main vehicle of social welfare and social control in industry’. Indeed,
Hyman (2001, p. 475) himself argues for an activist role for industrial relations in
‘discovering alternatives’ to the ‘ideological deployment of ideas of regulation’, which are
faced in Australia under the Howard Government and in other countries, for, as Cambridge
(2001, p. 92) argues, ‘The growth of the neoliberal free market ideology and the
intensification of globalization have significantly altered the present balance of power
among the actors in the industrial relations system’.
34
Fox discussed the characteristics of unitarism at two levels. At the first level he placed
unitarism within its intellectual traditions. At the second level, he referred to unitarism as
an ideology. One of these traditions flowed from what he called the ‘classical school of
management’, which was encapsulated in the scientific management movement. The other
followed the human relations perspective of organisational relationships. He argued that,
although the two approaches were in some respects diametrically opposed with respect to
their adherents’ perspectives on the sociology of the workplace, there were certain
fundamentals common to both (Fox 1966a, p. 368). On this point, Godard (1992, p. 242)
complained that Fox’s conception of unitarist ideology failed ‘to differentiate between the
neoclassical or “laissez faire” school in economics and the managerial or “human
relations” school in organizational behaviour, both of which arguably embody distinctive
ideologies’. However, Fox’s treatises on unitarism were sociological rather than
economic.
According to Bendix (1974), both scientific management and human relations provided
different frameworks for unitarist models of management, transforming managerial
ideology in the twentieth-century. The first of the intellectual traditions referred to by Fox
is classical managerialism. This is discussed in the next sub-section.
2.4.1 'Classical’ managerialism and scientific management
According to Fox (1966a pp. 367-8), the classical managerial perspective, or
managerialism, includes managers’ perceptions about upholding managerial prerogative,
conflict within the organisation, collective arrangements and trade unions. Grey (1996, pp.
601-2) defines managerialism as 'an ideology that secures and legitimates the interests of
managers as a social group', which stresses both that the world is manageable and that it
should be managed’. In this sense unitarism may be considered a form of managerialism.
According to Fox, managerial prerogative encompasses notions of a single source of
legitimate authority. Legitimate authority brings with it the expectation of employee
loyalty as a moral imperative. Unity of purpose under managerial prerogative is said to be
good because managerial prerogative is efficient and will produce such a large surplus that
conflict over distribution will be unnecessary. Thus, the achievement of such social and
economic outcomes depends upon managers retaining managerial prerogative.
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Conflict, including dissenting behaviours, is believed to have no place in organisations.
Challenges to legitimate authority are considered incompatible with loyalty. Where
conflict does occur, it may arise from employee failings such as short-sightedness or
incompetence. Furthermore, management requires scientific determination in matters such
as wage rates.
Therefore, within a classical managerialist framework, trade unions have no legitimate role
and collective workplace arrangements such as collective bargaining distract and detract
from the role of management. Not only does the presence of unions undermine the
technical exercise of management functions, but they also undermine loyalty within the
organisation and constitute a rival source of authority. This perspective arises from a
notion of organisation as an isolated community, which is here taken to mean a discrete
social unit. Scientific management, or Taylorism, had codified management practice
consistent with these underpinnings.
Taylorism was a mixed bag for managers. On the one hand, according to Bendix (1974, pp
280-1), the major objectives of scientific management coincided with employer/manager
objectives: the elimination of ‘soldiering’, or deliberately and collectively slowing the pace
of work; abolishing the ‘bad practices of trade unions’; dealing with individual workers
rather than collective relations; and the restoration of the absolute authority of
management. On the other hand, Taylor’s scheme of work organisation diminished the
exercise of managerial judgement and discretion, interfering with the exercise of
managerial prerogative. It was, nevertheless, a form of rationalising labour by systematic
management (Littler 1985, p.11). In the United Kingdom, the reorganisation of work
relations was slow, uneven, and challenged by both trade unions and managers alike
(Gospel 1983a, p. 14). The patterns of scientific management were not simple. Taylorism
was based on ‘job fragmentation’, often modified, and a mixture of strategies was
employed. Many Australian line managers resisted the implementation of scientific
management principles because they threatened their traditional shopfloor control (Wright
1995, p. 220) and managerial prerogative.
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Scientific management also consisted of a set of ideological assertions about labour and a
set of perspectives on the opposition of ‘science’ and traditional human judgement, in
which jobs and tasks and peoples’ working lives were treated as a residual factor of the
relationship between machines and products (Littler 1985, pp. 11; 21). Scientific
management was thus a ‘social ideology derived from the technical rationalization of
industry’ in which management was modelled on the engineering profession, and
technology was used for social and organisational control (Merkle 1980, pp. 82, 87, 92-
93). Managers dictated to the worker the precise manner in which work is to be performed
(Braverman 1974, p. 90). This ‘machine model of organization’ (Merkle 1980, p. 288)
involved management in the process of the gathering and development of knowledge of the
labor process, the concentration of this knowledge in the hands of managers, and ‘the use
of this monopoly over knowledge to control each step of the labor process and its mode of
execution’ (Braverman 1974, p. 119). Kaufman (1993, p. 24) likewise observed that the
Taylorist model was unilaterally implemented and administered by management.
The Taylorist system of scientific management was, therefore, more than a technique of
organisation. It was an ideology, which not only was expressed in terms of workplace
efficiency but also advanced what Taylor perceived as a social good:
It painted a picture of a conflict-free, high consumption utopia based on mass production; it
presented techniques for the suppression of class conflict and advocated a new unity of social
interest; it provided an avenue for middle-class mobility and the growth of a new professionalism
(Merkle 1980, pp. 15-16).
This aspect of unitarist ideology had widespread but uneven impact in that scientific
management was both the foundation of business administration but was rejected by
subsequent management theory. Scientific management displayed a number of other
paradoxes, one of the most significant issues being the breaking down of craft skills while
opening up the professionalisation of management and other occupations (Merkle 1980, p.
297). The issue of de-skilling, which Braverman (1974) raised as a characteristic of
modern capitalism, was controversial6. The professionalisation of management involved
the notion of management as a highly technical function requiring specialised education,
6 The deskilling effects of scientific management was also central to Braverman's thesis (1974), but the
deskilling argument was challenged by a number of labour process writers and others who followed (eg.,
Littler 1982; Wood 1982; Littler & Salaman 1982, Storey 1983). Littler (1987) surveys this debate.
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training and expertise, and which shared the service and the ethic of social responsibility of
the traditional professions, applied to serving the interests of the owners. Professionalism
fostered the unitary view of the firm in which the legitimacy of exercising managerial
prerogatives in directing and controlling employees is unquestionable, and the management
function is carried out against a framework of consensus which enabled and justified the
containment of conflict in the enterprise should it occur (Hill 1981, p. 40).
In the face of union and some management opposition, scientific management was not
widely put into practice in the UK (Littler 1982, p. 50; Rose 1988, p. 56) or Australia
(Dufty & Fells 1989, p. 51), impacted on countries in different periods (Littler 1982, p. 50),
and its effects on management practice were only partial in Australia (Wright 1995, p. 91).
It has been argued, however, that the Australian award system was ‘overwhelmingly
Taylorist’ because of narrow job classifications, the freezing of tasks with respect to
technology, wages based on jobs rather than set according to skills, and little skills training
apart from induction (Curtain & Mathews 1992, p. 436).
The second stream of development of a unitarist ideology, considered in the next sub-
section, is rooted in human relations and neo-human relations.
2.4.2 Human Relations and Neo Human Relations
In delineating the characteristics of unitarism generated by the human relations, or
‘naturalistic’, school of management, Fox focussed on notions of leadership, which could
be provided by informal leaders of work groups as well as managers. The problem for the
notion of a unitary organisation posed by work groups is that they could establish values
and norms of behaviour, which run counter to official organisational interests established
by management. If a work organisation is a complex social structure, it is capable of
generating goals and norms antithetical to those established by management on behalf of
the organisation. Where conflict occurs, the situation is regarded as being symptomatic of
organisational dysfunction. Thus a healthy organisation must be unified around one central
source of authority. This authority must be accepted by subordinates in order to be
effective and is necessary for organisational health. Conflict occurs as an outcome of
managerial incompetence in the failure to apply scientific, rational principles to the
planning and coordination of work, a failure of leadership, and managers failing, for
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example, to provide effective communication between management and employees.
Finally, ‘enlightened’ management, which does not exhibit the failings leading to conflict,
renders unions unnecessary except as negotiating bodies in the labour market, but located
outside the workplace (Fox 1966a, pp. 368-71).
Human relations and neo-human relations reinterpreted the engineering solutions and
economic models of work by applying psychological principles (Kaufman 1993, p. 25).
The human relations framework was also seen to focus on the social needs of workers with
the argument centred on the view that workers seek satisfaction primarily from
membership of stable work-groups (Silverman 1970, p. 75). Neo-human relations
advocates took the view that the needs for intrinsic work satisfaction would be achieved
through unity of purpose (Deery et al. 1997, p. 1.7), leading to the humanisation of work
and employment through job redesign and other techniques (e.g., Hackman & Oldham
1980). Nevertheless, as Hill (1981, pp. 52-3) pointed out, ‘humanised’ work systems still
maintain managerial control and separation of employees from significant decisions
concerning the production process.
According to Bendix, Elton Mayo argued, first, that workers acted in solidarity rather than
as isolated individuals with the consequence that management should both be concerned
with workers’ attitudes and feelings and be less concerned with notions of the logic of
economic self-interest as the primary motivation of employees. This led to the second
focus of human relations management: an emphasis on the motivation of employees based
upon the workers’ ‘social routines’ governed by ‘human skill’. Third, Mayo reinterpreted
managerial authority in terms of fostering cooperative teamwork among employees and
providing an organisational environment, which satisfied workers’ desire to cooperate
(Bendix 1974, pp. 313-19). The human relations models required an emphasis, as well, on
trust, loyalty and effort. This had to be achieved within the context of workers and
employers both desiring maximum satisfaction and financial return, despite the conflict,
which may exist between each party's goals. Good industrial relations, Kaufman (1993, p.
25) went on to explain in elucidating the neo-human relations perspective, is thus
dependent upon mutuality through 'a sense of partnership and an environment conducive to
cooperation, trust, loyalty, and hard work'.
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Employee commitment cements the unity of the organisation. This is one of the tenets of
the human relations/neo-human relations school, which constitute unitarism (Fox 1973, p.
186; Deery and Plowman 1991; Fox et al. 1995, p. 41; Deery et al. 1997, pp. 1.5-1.8). The
explanation of the meaning of the role of manager provided by the human relations/neo-
human relations doctrine rested first on an argument that subordinates lack a logical
framework with respect to the workplace; second, any lack of cooperation shields an urge
to collaborate; third, wages claims mask a need for personal approval; and, fourth, the role
of managers is one of brokering social harmony.
The abstract concepts in the intellectual traditions of unitarism were applied consciously in
Australia at some levels. During the mid-1980s, for example, the then Executive Director
of the Business Council of Australia, Geoff Allen, claimed that there had been a switch
away from scientific management and that the prevailing philosophy of management ‘has
its roots in both a humanitarian concern for human satisfaction in work, as well as the
perceived productivity gains from a contented and motivated workforce’ (Allen 1986, p.
344). One implication of this employer advocate’s perspective is the suggestion that no
real conflict of interest exists between worker and employer (see also Silverman 1970, p.
76). When human relations sociologists did consider conflict it was in terms of the
normality of cooperation and consensus and the abnormality of conflict. Human relations
provided a model of management in the firm in which managers could perceive themselves
as representatives of shared aspirations, backed by a scientifically developed body of
professional knowledge and techniques for dealing with ‘the human aspects of the
managerial control function’ (Hill 1981, p. 1).
The technical competence of managers provided the reason for employees to accept
managerial authority (Hill 1981, p. 40). There are, however, long-standing criticisms of
human relations: that empirical testing of human relations techniques revealed that they
often did not have the desired effect on productivity and work satisfaction; that human
relations tended to ignore environmental factors; that human relations exhibited a crude
management orientation; and that human relations under-estimated the measure of genuine
conflict between the satisfaction of individual needs and the organisation's goal of
efficiency (Silverman 1970, p. 76).
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In summary, the characteristics of the human relations/neo-human relations, or the
‘naturalistic’ school of management, in Fox's (1966a, pp. 368-9) unitary ideology, focus,
first, on leadership provided by both management and by informal leaders of work groups.
Second, the problem with work groups is that they could establish values and norms of
behaviour, which run counter to official organisational interests. Third, a complex social
structure is capable of generating goals and norms antithetical to the official organisation.
This situation is symptomatic of organisational dysfunction whereas a healthy organisation
must be unified around one central source of authority, which will be effective only if
accepted by subordinates. Fourth, conflict is not an intrinsic characteristic of work
organisations, but the outcome of managerial incompetence through the failure to apply
scientific, rational principles to the planning and coordination of work. It may arise from a
failure of leadership and social skills in managers, such as a breakdown in effective
communication between management and employees. Fifth, ‘enlightened’ management
renders unions unnecessary except as negotiating bodies in the labour market, located
outside the workplace. Sixth, Fox argues that at the root of unitarism there rests ‘a
profound belief in the personal qualities of leadership, and a disinclination to acknowledge
the realities of class and authority divisions in society while in fact introducing them into
the very fabric of industrial organization. These beliefs create a disposition to accept the
fundamental tenet of both the theoretical orientations that the industrial organization is a
unitary structure’. He also argued that the classical and humanist/neo-humanist strands of
unitarism are not mutually exclusive patterns of assumptions and might fall into a
combination of approaches, since they are both premised on a concept of the organisation
as a monolithic structure with a single set of interrelated relationships. Kristensen (1999,
pp. 94-5) criticised the unitarist construct as a ‘narrow-track model of industrial
organization’.
2.5 Characteristics of unitarist ideology
Two concomitant characteristics, which follow from the unitarist construct as developed
here, are that there exists a value consensus among organisational members and a
harmonious organisation, on the one hand, and the concept that power is neutral, on the
other hand. These aspects are considered in the next two sub-sections.
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2.5.1 Consensus and Harmony
The principles of value consensus and common interest are elements of an equilibrium
perspective on organisation in which organisations are viewed as inherently cooperative
systems which require sensitive management to maintain them in states of equilibrium
(Burrell & Morgan 1979, p. 148). In the 1930s, Barnard (1968, p. 82) had argued that the
conditions for the functioning of organisations are necessarily built upon the elements of
communication, willingness to serve and common purpose. In Burrell and Morgan's terms
(1979, pp. 148-9), organisations are, therefore, ‘cooperative enterprises in pursuit of a
common purpose’, essentially unitary in nature. However, whether or not workers and
management might have some interests in common, it is not clear that they have
distinctively shared values (Provis 1996, p. 480). Provis links a managerial focus on
shared values to the achievement of cooperation and commitment for organisational
effectiveness:
The proponents of the new unitarism imply that in general values have wider and deeper effects on
people’s behaviour than interests alone, and this seems to be a plausible claim…. Because value
commitments provide the means for interpersonal and public justifications of actions, they are
particularly important for establishing and maintaining organizations (Provis 1996, p. 480).
Whether there is such a ‘new unitarism’ or merely its resurgence and managers apply
established unitarist principles to the management of employees in contemporary work
organisations is a tangential issue for this thesis. Organisational effectiveness is shaped by
the primary objectives of a private enterprise organisation to make profits and to survive.
These objectives are ‘supported by powerful social and psychological forces which ensure
that a considerable capacity for co-operation is evoked among the members of the
organisation created to perform [them]’ (Rice 1958, cited in Burrell & Morgan 1979, pp.
155-6). Other open systems models likewise assume that organisations are characterised
by ‘functional unity’, which only fails to work well when certain imperatives are not being
met. In other words, the view of organisation as a system united by the pursuit of a
common set of objectives (Burrell & Morgan 1979, pp. 156-60; Kast & Rozenzweig 1992)
is firmly rooted in structural-functionalist theory (Hyman & Brough 1975; Burrell &
Morgan 1979).
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‘Value-consensus’ is the basis of social order within the functionalist paradigm, but
functionalism provides no developed account of value-consensus itself, except to reify
social relations and social processes or to attribute to the intentions of members of society
(or of an organisation) the processes and institutions which generate and sustain value-
consensus (Hyman & Brough 1975, pp. 153-4). There are obvious logical implications of
the latter attribute: ‘if it is the members themselves who constitute the source of such
consensus, then is the answer not tautological or entailing an (infinite) regress[ion] that can
only be broken by positing harmony of interest among the members concerned’ (Oliga
1996, p. 55; see also Hyman & Brough 1975, p. 154). Hyman and Brough (1975, p. 163)
argued that there are affinities between unitarism, functionalism and systems theory, each
of which have three key characteristics:
… 1) common values are treated as the primary basis of social relations and social order (hence
idealist and harmonistic perspectives are integral to its problematic); 2) the unequal distribution of
power, deprivations and material advantages is treated as a derivative of consensually defined goals;
3) inequality is at the same time treated as functional, as ultimately advantageous even for those
whose immediate situation is highly disadvantageous (Hyman & Brough 1975, p. 155)
If such assumptions are held about the nature of an organisation, the determined outcomes
of the relationships between management and employees and the inherent rightness of
inequality of the employment relationship are self-sustaining aspects of a unitarist
ideology.
Giles (1989, p. 133), in considering state involvement in industrial relations, agrees that
there is a close affinity between the unitary perspective and systems theory. The
functionalist perspective also leads to the characteristics of the unitarist view in which
emphasis is placed upon the achievement of common objectives which unite the
organisation, and in which the members of the organisation strive towards the achievement
of those objectives in the manner of a well-integrated team (Burrell & Morgan 1979, p.
204).
The idea of harmony of interests in work organisations reinforces and complements the
notion of neutral power (Oliga 1996, p. 58) and control. This is examined in the next
section.
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2.5.2 Unitarism and power
The term, ‘power and control’ is used where possible in this sub-section because industrial
relations scholars treat the interrelationship of power and control in diverse ways. Storey
(1983, p. 10), for example, linked the notion of control to the exercise of power, which is
‘in the last analysis a means towards the achievement of surplus value’. By contrast,
Marchington (1979, p. 134) defined control as ‘the possible end result of a process, which
involves the usage of power: in other words, power refers to the process of achieving
control’. For Purcell and Smith (1979, p. ix), control and power are synonymous. They
argued that the term, control, refers to ‘the extent and means by which any interested group
- management, workers, trade unions or the state - attempts to achieve its objectives in the
work environment’. Control, they added, involves not only the promotion of
management’s (or, indeed, workers’) objectives but also power in dealing with the
priorities of others. Smith (1979, p. 5) took a similar approach: to exercise control means
‘the ability to promote one’s own desired objectives, or alternatively the power to resist
undesirable ones’. For other industrial relations writers, it is not an issue. Edwards (1979,
p. 17), for example, referred to control in the work organisation in terms of managers'
strategies ‘to obtain desired work behaviour from workers’. But, the achievement of
management objectives is dependent upon the relative strength of the parties in the
employment relationship. This reflects a dual flow of control processes in which
managers’ and employees’ objectives may coincide in some or all respects, complement
each other, be in conflict, or as Salaman (1989, p. 85) concluded, be complex and
contradictory. The outcome of the processes of control is thus subject to bargaining and
other attempts at influencing outcomes, which are characteristic of industrial relations
(Purcell & Smith 1979, p. ix). Unitarist managers may resist the modification of processes
and objectives, or reluctantly adopt pluralist elements in the management of employees
because the concept of managerial power and control is an implicit aspect of managerial
prerogative. But, the management of employees might be the means to an end rather than
an end in itself.
Corporate strategies, Child (1985, p. 108) points out, ‘are not necessarily formulated with
the management of labour and structuring of jobs explicitly in mind’, since the principal
objective of the firm relates to profit (see also Edwards 1986, p. 2; Storey 1983, p. 13;
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Oliga 1996, p. 57). Furthermore, increased power and control over labour may be
perceived as only one of the ways of securing profits (Streeck 1987, p. 284). Salaman
(1989, p. 85) also argues that the workforce, work design, labour costs, and productivity
are some of the variables, which relate to an organisation’s profit4. Hence, power and
control in the organisation of work processes will be only subsidiary to management
strategies aimed ultimately at the survival of the firm as a viable concern (Rose & Jones
1985, p. 91).
Nonetheless, power and control, which is an interactive process between controller and
controlled, is a salient feature of organisational dynamics. It is the ‘inescapable interface
between managers and their employees’, where workers have the potential both directly
and indirectly to influence management planning (Storey 1983, p. 83;. 85). In this sense,
power and control can be an interactive process or shared in the sense that in exercising
control the manager requires some cooperation in the process by the subordinates.
Managers may encounter either direct or indirect resistance by workers in exercising power
and control. The limits of that resistance may be tempered and constrained by workers’
interests in preserving the viability of the organisation in the product or service market
(Edwards 1986), leading managers to the imperative to bargain as an integral element of
management power and control where the workforce is not entirely acquiescent: thus
management may ‘regain control by sharing it’ (Flanders 1970, p. 172).
Oliga (1996, p. 55) described management’s role as ‘cybernetic’: that is, management
within a unitarist perspective may be viewed as guiding the organisation towards the
realisation of common goals and interests. Cybernetics is, he stated, ‘about control, which
is the profession of management’ (Oliga 1996, p. 56). The exercise of authority, and power
and control, is a matter of realising managerial prerogative, which ensures that employees
in the organisation perform functions that are in the interests of its survival. Power and
control, however, is ‘power over other people’ (Hyman & Brough 1975, p. 184). In
unitarist explanations of the organisation, power is either ignored, or if it does figure it is
regarded as ‘little more than a neutral resource which oils the wheels of the system as a
4. In the case of non-profit organisations, the principal, non-service objective might translate to
maintaining a balanced budget.
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whole’ (Burrell & Morgan 1979, p. 203). Recognition of power and control creates a
logical problem for functionalist and systems theory and for a unitarist ideology: in a
system based upon a unitarist consensus, the fact of the centralisation of that power and
control in the hands of managers threatens the harmonistic basis of social order in the
organisation (Hyman & Brough 1975, p. 184). Those who support that consensus, but who
are excluded from the exercise of power and control, might withdraw their consent. In
organisations, managers do dominate as the representatives of capital and the ‘seemingly
necessary managerialist control and domination is legitimated and naturalized’. This is a
feature of the capitalist mode of production. As Engels (1969, p. 378) observed in 1873,
'… on the one hand, a certain authority, no matter how delegated, and on the other hand, a
certain subordination, are things which, independently of all social organisation, are
imposed upon us together with the material conditions under which we produce and make
products circulate'.
A unitarist perspective applied to management control of, and power over, employees
concentrates on what management needs to do in order to accomplish organisational
objectives by overseeing employees’ work, correcting problems as they occur, and
assessing the work of employees. In other words, this organisational approach to the
question of power and control focuses upon what management does to employees. The
following extract from an organisational behaviour text illustrates the unitarist focus on the
link between control systems and what managers do in bringing about a convergence of
employee objectives with organisational objectives:
An effective control system ensures that activities are completed in ways that lead to the attainment
of the organisation's goals. The criterion of an effective control system is the extent to which it
creates goal congruence. If a control system sometimes leads to goal congruence and sometimes to
goal conflict, it is ineffective, or less effective than might be desired (Robbins & Mukerji 1990, p.
358).
This view of management and organisation fits unambiguously into the unitarist
framework of common interest and the concomitant characteristic that if common interest
is not achieved it is an outcome of technical failure by management. However, control is
not simply imposed by management ‘but emerges from an amalgam of different elements:
managers are likely to use a variety of means of controlling the labour process and tying
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workers to the firm’ (Edwards 1986, p. 41). Cressy and MacInness (1980, cited in Hyman
1987, p. 40) argue that
even though capital owns (and therefore has the right to ‘control’) both means of production and the
worker, in practice capital must surrender the means of production to the ‘control’ of the workers for
their actual use in the production process .... It is precisely because capital must surrender the use of
its means of production to labour that capital must to some degree seek a cooperative relationship
with it.
There are two implications for unitarism of this perspective on power and control and the
relationship between managers and the managed. The first is that there is a tension
between, on the one hand, the focus on managerial control and the characteristics of an
organisation, which are integral to that role, such as authority and legitimacy and, on the
other hand, managers' reliance on employees to recognise managerial prerogative. Second,
power and control are clearly exercised by management for management acting on behalf
of employers. As de Vroey (1980, p. 225) argues from a Marxist perspective, the
separation of ownership and control through management does not alter relations in the
mode of production. In that sense, power and control cannot be considered as neutral
attributes of the relationship between employers, managers and employees, but rather as an
inextricable aspect of the management process. However, in the unitarist construct the role
of power and control in organisational life is not articulated because it forms part of the
‘taken for granted assumptions’, which underpin the perspectives of unitarist managers
(Kirkbride 1985, p. 276).
The concept of ideology, which will be discussed in sections 2.6 and 2.7, has problems if it
does not address questions of power and control. Thompson criticised Seliger (1976) and
others for the failure to address the connection between ideology and domination, which,
he argues, can only be explored through an investigation of the asymmetrical relations of
power and the ways in which these arrangements are sustained (Thompson 1984, p. 95).
This point has particular significance for the study of management and ideology.
Thompson defines power as
a capacity which enables or empowers some agents to make decisions, pursue ends or realize
interests; it empowers them in such a way that, without this institutionally endowed capacity, they
would not have been able to carry out the relevant course (Thompson 1984, p. 129, emphases in
original).
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Domination occurs when the relations of power are systematically asymmetrical. This
takes place when agents, such as managers, are ‘institutionally endowed with power in a
way which excludes, and to some significant degree remains inaccessible to, other agents
or groups of agents, irrespective of the basis upon which such exclusion is carried out’.
Under capitalism, this is secured and specified by the capital/wage-labour relation. Thus,
‘to study ideology is to study the ways in which meaning (signification) serves to sustain
relations of dominance’ (Thompson 1984, pp. 130-1). This notion of domination is an
extension of the action-related values and beliefs of managers, which are components of
the definition of ideology, as will be seen in section 2.6 below.
Management attitudes to the employment contract are particularly relevant. The idea of a
contract of employment drawn up between free and equal agents, freely negotiating in a
context of both parties seeking to maximise their utilities in a competitive market, serves to
legitimate the imbalance of power between employer and employee and management
prerogative (Fox 1974a, pp. 182-3; 188). Creighton and Stewart (1990, p. 3) argue that the
notion of a voluntary and equitable agreement being entered into by a potential employee
and an individual employer is ‘largely a legal fiction’. The only significant element of
agreement is the initial decision to enter into the relationship of employer and employee
(Creighton, Ford & Mitchell 1983). The inequality of power between employer and
employee is such that the high probability is that for much of the time the employee feels
‘virtually coerced’ into ‘settling for whatever he could get’ (Fox 1974a, p. 182). The
master-servant framework of employment underwrote power inequality.
Master-servant law upheld management prerogative and reinforced employees’ duty of
loyalty and obedience to the employer when they entered into an employment contract
(Fox 1974a, pp. 204-5). Within an asymmetrical power relationship, buttressed by contract
of employment law, employees are likely to self-censor their overt behaviour rather than to
challenge the status quo (Bennett 1995) at the point of settling a contract as well as in the
course of an ongoing employment relationship. This is one set of possible employee
responses to management ideologies. These are referred to because they illustrate the
circular and contradictory aspects of power in the ideology underpinning the manager-
employee relationship.
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Fox's (1974a) further contribution was to distinguish between low trust and high trust
managerial strategies, which has given rise to a literature on management style, briefly
outlined in chapter 1, section 1.5, which he further initiated in the development of six point
typology of the relations between management and employees.
The next section considers the question of the relevance of Fox's ideal-type to
contemporary industrial relations.
2.6 The relevance of Fox’s unitarist construct
It is over 45 years since Ross focussed on the unitary construct and almost 40 years since
Fox developed the notion of a unitary ideology. Has unitarism therefore become outmoded
in the changing contemporary environment? There are two aspects of this question, which
will now be critically evaluated. The first relates to the usefulness of unitarism as a
framework for managing in organisations. The second refers to the usefulness of the
construct in the analysis of the employment relationship.
Both Ross and Fox addressed the first aspect in their seminal papers. Ross called the
unitarist framework a ‘blind spot in management theory’ (Ross 1958, p. 101). Fox
concluded that the unitary perspective was diminishingly useful because effective control
in a changing, more complex environment required the development of a new ideology and
new sources of legitimation (Fox 1973, p. 192). At the end of the 1970s, Burrell and
Morgan noted that ‘it is now rare to find theoretical perspectives which reflect the unitary
view in an extreme sense’ (Burrell & Morgan 1979, p 205). In the mid-1980s, Edwards
argued that unitarism could not adequately explain the causes of conflict in the workplace.
He conceded that some of the managerial characteristics that were accorded to a unitarist
framework for the workplace could have some advantages for employees (Edwards 1986,
pp. 20-1).
The second aspect relates to the usefulness of the construct in analysing the management-
employee relationship. Wright, in his history of the management of labour in Australia,
concluded that most employers did view the management of labour from a unitarist
perspective. However, he also observed that employers adopted complex and
contradictory strategies, which make the clear-cut categorisation of management behaviour
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with respect to unitarism difficult (Wright 1995, pp. 5-6). For Purcell (1987, p. 535-6),
Fox’s distinction of the unitarist and pluralist frameworks was also too simplistic, failing to
take account of the range of managerial behaviours, which are manifest in both unitary and
pluralist conceptions of the work organisation. Furthermore, it was unclear to Purcell
whether these terms were applied only to managerial beliefs and policies towards trade
unions or to other aspects of the employment relationship and he developed a typology of
management styles, based on the nexus of individualism and collectivism, designed to take
account of a range of managerial approaches to the problematics of managing employees.
Fox (1974a) had developed his own six-category typology in the mid-1970s. Poole (1986)
built a four-style typology around Fox's dichotomy of unitarism and pluralism. Horstman
(1988, pp. 413-16) posited a solution to the critique of unitarism as a one-dimensional
category of managerial perspectives and behaviour by utilising Sisson’s (1984) managerial
styles as a framework for distinguishing between ‘imposed unitarism’ by which managers
coerce reluctant employees into teamwork, and ‘self-generated unitarism’ where
employees are induced to adopt and internalise managerial objectives voluntarily within a
system of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards. This distinction points to strategic options for
operationalising a unitarist framework.
The problem with any typology of management style – or of managers’ behaviour in
managing employees generally – is that managers might spend most of their time dealing
with employees using whatever process or style that suits their immediate purpose. That is
to say, pragmatism or opportunism might be the prevailing modus operandi of
management (Purcell & Ahlstrand 1987, p. 405). Purcell and Ahlstrand later modified
Purcell’s earlier typology, employing a ‘management style matrix’ around the earlier
dimensions of management style. They distinguished three dimensions of individualism –
employee development, paternalism and cost minimalisation – and three dimensions of
collectivism - non-unitarist, adversarial and cooperative behaviour – (Purcell & Ahlstrand
1994, cited in Deery et al. 2001, pp. 191-5). However, it is not clear how this model
addresses the problem they raised about the prevalent absence of any consistent strategy in
the cases they studied.
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Despite the problem for analysis of managerial behaviour and ideology this absence of
strategy in managing employees might present, the unitarist construct continues to be
applied to accounts of labour management, particularly in Australia and the United
Kingdom, especially with respect to strategies and attitudes towards trade unions.
Examples can be found such as in the textbook, The Dynamics of Australian Industrial
Relations (Dufty & Fells 1989, p. 66), and in Wright (1995, p. 5).
Nevertheless, the prevalence of the construct in contemporary industrial relations analysis
suggests there is considerable worth in fleshing out the notion of unitarism. Hamberger
(1995, pp. 35-6) argued that the majority of Australian industrial relations academics had
criticised managers' rejection of collective bargaining and the rationale that employers and
employees have more in common than separates them. He described the employment of
the unitarist label as ‘pejorative’. This is not a view to which this academic would
subscribe, although it is relevant to keep in mind the reformist context in which Fox had
contrasted radical, pluralist and unitarist frameworks. The growing use in Australia of the
term, ‘employee relations’, even by some mainstream industrial relations academics (for
example, Teicher, Holland & Gough 2002), reflects not only the decentralisation of
industrial relations, but also in the presence of a ‘unitarist value system’ (Rimmer 1995, pp.
73-4). Dabscheck described the Business Council of Australia’s (BCA) prescriptions for
reform of Australian industrial relations as indicative of the unitarist perspective
(Dabscheck 1995, pp. 86-7).
In the public debate on Australian industrial relations reform, collective industrial relations
was challenged by what Bennett (1994, p. 227) called ‘a form of managerial
fundamentalism’ reflected in the BCA contributions to the debate. This represented an
affirmation of management in which not only were unions marginalised or rejected but also
there was an insistence on ‘unilateral management control and on the identity of interest
between employer and employee’, unitarism in other words. This might extend, for
example, to recruitment practices, weeding out union-oriented applicants for jobs (van den
Broek 1997). Given changes to the industrial relations system in Australia and the take-up
of human resource management strategies, unitarist approaches to managing employees are
more likely (Fisher Dowling & Garnham 1999, p. 511). The widespread unitarist shaping
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of employee management is even more likely with the emphasis on individual contracts by
the Howard Government policy on industrial relations (Liberal Party 2005).
The proposals to transform a collectively oriented industrial relations system into one
characterised by minimally regulated and individualised workplace relations could be seen
as a ‘unitarist renaissance’ in contemporary labour management strategies (van den Broek
1997). This was not always seen as inevitable. Haworth (1987, p. 418), for example,
argued that ‘scholarship [had] disposed of unitarism as a viable mode of social organisation
generations ago’. Nonetheless, he argued optimistically that, while unitarism in the
previous two decades had provided management with a framework for regaining
ideological and organisational control, it was unlikely to succeed as a prevailing ideology,
despite mounting an argument that unitarism had made ground through HRM.
Recent studies reinforce the expansion of unitarism in Australian organisations. Francis
(2002), in a single case study, argued that the discourse of HRM focuses on marginalising
the role of trade unions and developing a unitary view of the firm through market, team,
and single status metaphors. Provis (1996, pp. 474-5) agreed that the rise of HRM had
accompanied a resurgence of unitarist approaches to management, accompanied by total
quality management, customer focus and changing organisational structures. These, Provis
argued, are reflected in a growing emphasis on employee cooperation and commitment
associated with an increasing significance placed on enterprise culture and values.
These developments reflect the pervasiveness of unitarism in other countries. In a
comparative study of the of industrial relations in Australia and New Zealand, Harbridge
and Walsh (2002) found that key characteristics of deregulation in New Zealand resulted in
employer bargaining ascendency leading to de-unionisation, de-collectivisation and the
individualisation of the employment contract, which would indicate a shift from pluralist to
unitarist employment relations. Gunnigle (1992), for example, found a strengthening of
unitarism evident through union resistance and a growth of opposition to union recognition
in Eire. Industrial relations in British organisations had also been suffused with unitarist
principles. In the 1980s, Edwards had argued that the unitarist perspective was widely
adopted in United Kingdom (Edwards 1986, p. 20). Purcell and Sisson (1983, p. 117) saw
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British developments as representing a shift towards unitarist policies characterised by
coercion of employees rather than by cooperation between management and workers.
Bacon and Storey (2000) suggested that employer opposition to the British Labour
government's reform of the Thatcher government's legislation as well as the findings of the
1998 Workplace Employment Relations Survey indicate that managerial unitarism remains
the norm.
Behind the attitudes towards collectivism and trade unions are perspectives on the unity of
the organisation that are management focussed and based on what Oliga (1996, p. 54)
called the claim of value consensus and common interest. Oliga treated unitarism as a
composite of these two elements of ideology.
The application of specific practices that cement corporate unitarism can extend to specific
human resources practices. In the recruitment and selection of employees, unitarist
principles can be entrenched by establishing an employment relationship characterised by
individual accountability and commitment to corporate goals, the elimination of union
backgrounds and union experience from the workplace, and enforcing individual non-
union contracts on employees (van den Broek 2003, p. 523). Clarke (2003, p. 142) argues
that training needs analysis involves a linear process based on rationality, empiricism and
legitimate authority that assumes the commonality of interests between employees and the
organisation.
There have been several references to ideology throughout the chapter to this point. This is
because, for Fox, unitarism is an ideology. The purpose of the next section is to place this
unitarist ideology in a broader theoretical context.
2.7 Unitarism as ideology
The account in this section is a selective discourse, with the discussion developing around
ideology as a set of beliefs and values to which managers subscribe in managing
employees and focuses on the unitarist ideology. It is mindful of Sartori's (1987, p. 499)
complaint about the substitution of the term, ideology, for terms such as ideas beliefs and
values. In this thesis, managers’ assumptions, or beliefs and values, as ideology, are joined
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to managerial action and behaviour in managing employees. This is discussed in sub-
section 2.7.3 below.
While there has been an increasing interest in managers and management in industrial
relations research, this literature has generally neglected the ideology of managers,
notwithstanding Bendix's 1956 book, Work and Authority in Industry (Bendix 1974),
Dunlop's 1958 book, Industrial Relations Systems (Dunlop 1971), Fox's 1966 essays (Fox
1966a; 1966b), Hyman's 1975 work, Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction (Hyman
1975), and Kochan et al.'s 1986 book, The Transformation of American Industrial
Relations (Kochan et al. 1994). Different models of ideology were adopted in these
publications, however the debate over ideology throughout the 1980s and 1990s (for
example, Hall 1978; Thompson 1984; Boudon 1989; Hawkes 1996) has largely passed by
industrial relations scholars. Nichols (1969) and Poole (1975) represented earlier
perspectives on ideology and industrial relations. Nichols surveyed British managers and
distinguished between the interests of managers and employers. Poole considered the
ideological constraints on managers in their contemplation of employee participation and
industrial democracy, and concluded that twentieth-century managerial ideology militated
against employee participation in decision making at the workplace. He concluded that the
principal focus had been on industrial efficiency (Poole 1975, pp. 53-6). Wood (1978, p.
55) also advocated a central place for ideology in industrial relations as a field, a plea
which was largely ignored by industrial relations scholars.
The writers in the political economy of industrial relations did not ignore ideology.
Discussion of ideology suffuses Hyman’s analysis of power in industrial relations (Hyman
1975; 1989). Indeed, a political economy perspective on industrial relations requires
attention to ideology as both one of the contexts, and characteristics, of work relations
(Taylor & Bray 1986, p. 3). Labour process theory is central to political economy
perspectives on the employment relationship. However, even a key exponent of labour
process theory, Harry Braverman, discussed Taylor’s scientific management only in terms
of ‘the explicit verbalization of the capitalist mode of production’ (Braverman 1974, p. 86).
Littler, by contrast, searched for a ‘vocabulary of concepts for discussing ideological
relationships’ and his analysis of Taylorism and human relations is in terms of ‘pattern(s)
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of ideological control’ (Littler 1982, pp. 39; 55), a term, which encompass both values and
assumptions about managing employees on the one hand and managerial action on the
other. This perspective on ideology adopted in this thesis removes the study from the
realms of contingency and related theories. Nevertheless, ideology is a problematic
construct.
Problems with the application of ideology in organisational research and industrial
relations will be discussed in sub-section 2.7.1 and Dunlop’s use of ideology in his
industrial relations system theory briefly analysed and rejected 2.7.5 in sub-section 2.7.2.
The following sub-section will pick up on the concept of ideology as ideas or values taken
together with the action. Ideology is critically considered in its application to managers in
sub-section 2.7.4. Section 2.7.5 follows with an account, which brings together the broader
concept of ideology with unitarism. Managers and employers do not necessarily have the
same interests although it is common to conflate their interests in accounts of the
employment relationship. This question is discussed in the ideological context in sub-
section 2.7.6. The section concludes with a discussion in sub-section 2.7.7 of ideology and
managerial prerogative, which considers the purposes of managerial ideology.
2.7.1 Problems with the application of ideology in analyses of work organisations
and industrial relations
Ideology is a term, which has been used loosely in organisational theory (Weiss & Miller
1987, p. 107). It is often used broadly and without clear definition (Godard 1992, p. 239-
41; 1997, p. 207). For example, McCann, Hassard, and Morris (2004) use the term,
ideology, on 27 occasions in a paper on middle managers and organisational ideology
without once defining what they mean by ‘organizational ideology’. This can be
understood only in the context that the authors subscribe to unitarist assumptions about the
nature of work organisations, especially in the assumption that every member of an
organisation shares, or ought to share the so-called organisational ideology.
The problem of ascribing ideology goes back to Marx, whose use of the term had a number
of meanings attached (Bottomore & Rubel 1963, p. 21) and Marx refined the concept in
later writings (McLellan 1986, p. 15). Gurvitch identified thirteen meanings in Marx
(1953 cited in Ollman 1971, p. 6) and there have been a number of transformations of the
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term both in Marxism and the sociology of knowledge (Berger & Luckman 1971, p. 228).
Political theorists utilise a range of meanings (for example, Manning 1980; Hall 1978;
Thompson 1984; Boudon 1989; Hawkes 1996), and Seliger (1976, p. 15) argues that
ideology is ‘invested with a strange variety of meanings’. Some authors in organisational
studies use the term ‘ideology’ when they are referring to aspects of strategy or function,
for example in the term, an ‘entrepreneurial ideology’ (Newman 2000). Others talk of
organisations having an ideology (Barker 2000), as we have seen, and Goll and Zeitz
(1991) refer to a 'corporate ideology'. Likewise, organisations, including corporations,
may be structured according to, and the dynamics influenced by, sets of managerial or
policy-maker beliefs and values. However, ideology refers to people who hold to such
values and beliefs, rather than organisations.
Muddled perspectives on ideology such as those referred to here sometimes lead to
abstruse statements such as ‘the interpretation that environments are rapidly changing
and the restructuring that underpins that interpretation appear to have acquired the status
of an order-creating ideology’ (McKinley & Scherer 2000, p. 740). Rather, the
restructuring of an organisation and how that is conducted may reflect the managers'
values and beliefs, which suggest the scope of that change and how it might be
implemented. Restructuring as a process, or even as an outcome, does not have a set of
values and beliefs, or an ideology: managers apply those values and beliefs to what they
do in organisational change and the shape of that change might reflect the values and
beliefs that constitute ideology.
Perhaps the epitome of the misuse of the term, ideology, lies in Thompson and
Bunderson’s (2003) concoction of the term, ‘ideological currency’ as if ideology were
an object of exchange. They defined their term ‘as credible commitments to pursue a
valued cause or principle (not limited to self-interest) that are implicitly exchanged at the
nexus of the individual-organization relationship’, taking the form of ‘contributions
toward the organization's capacity to pursue the cause’, ‘perceived organizational
obligations to support the cause or principle and, thus, to give employees legitimate
claim to participation in the cause’.
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Similar examples of misuse can also be found in industrial relations. Adams and
McQuillan (2000), for example, refer to the ‘ideology of restructuring’ and Murakami
(2000) and Hyman (2001, cited above, section 2.4) refer to an ‘ideology of “deregulation”’.
Neither restructuring nor deregulation has an ideology: the initiators of such actions and
programmes or policies explicitly or implicitly apply their ideological assumptions to their
decision-making.
Where some industrial relations scholars have addressed the values and beliefs of
managers, they have avoided the use of the term ‘ideology’ altogether, and referred, for
example, to the originating philosophies and the policies that influence action (Purcell
1987, p. 534). Ideology may be referred to obliquely in terms of doctrine (Rose 1988), or
frameworks (Fox 1966a, 1971). Sutcliffe and Kitay (1988, p. 536) were equally oblique
when they asked, first, whether Australian small business owners had distinctive beliefs
about 'employment relations', and, second, whether such beliefs formed the basis of anti-
labour political action.
Ideology was an integral element in Dunlop's attempts at developing a comprehensive
theory of an industrial relations system. His conception is critically examined in the next
sub-section.
2.7.2 Ideology in Dunlop's Industrial Relations System Theory
In constructing his model of an industrial relations system, Dunlop defined ideology as ‘a
set of ideas and beliefs commonly held by the actors that helps to bind or to integrate the
system together as an entity’. Applying this to the industrial relations system, Dunlop
argued that a distinct industrial ideology consists of
a common body of ideas that defines the role and place of each actor and that defines the ideas
which each actor holds towards the place and the function of others in the system. The idea or
philosophy of a stable system involves a congruence or compatibility among these views and the
rest of the system (Dunlop 1971, pp. 16-17).
While developing this notion of a common ideology, which binds the system together, he
acknowledges the possibility of disparate ideologies, which might render the system
unstable:
Thus, in a community in which the managers hold a highly paternalistic view towards workers and
the workers hold there is no function for managers, there would be no common ideology in which in
which each actor provided a legitimate role for the other (Dunlop 1971, p. 17).
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This raises the fundamental question of whether there is a system at all if the parties do not
subscribe to a common ideology and whether a system requires a bonding ideology. The
notion of a common ideology is at best problematic, since it is conceivable that one of the
actors, or a combination, will seek to destroy another as Dabscheck (1980, p. 199) argued,
or attempt to attain the ascendancy on the basis of disparate ideologies. Dunlop attempts to
resolve the contradiction between stable and unstable systems by arguing that, first,
hierarchies of managers, second, workers when they are organised, and, third, public
agencies, tend to rework and reiterate the ideas of intellectuals, publicists and other
specialists, and each may therefore develop an explicit ideology (Dunlop 1971, p. 18).
But, if the parties develop their own ideologies and those ideas are not common then
stability in the system will be at risk. Thus, the concept of a common ideology, which is at
the core of Dunlop's industrial system, includes an unresolved contradiction that there is a
commonly held set of ideas and values which binds the system, and which is taken as
given, but ideologies may not be held in common. Yet, he concludes, ‘Each industrial-
relations system contains its ideology or shared understandings’ (Dunlop 1971, p. 19).
This notion of ‘shared understandings’ appears to be a weaker version of his definition of
ideology. A ‘shared understanding’ may be an agreement to disagree as much as holding a
common position on the operation of the system. The Dunlop model of ideology is,
therefore, not regarded as satisfactory as an explanation for the values and beliefs
managers bring to the management of employees, and his concept of shared understandings
is rejected.
In the next sub-section, ideology is discussed in terms of not only the underlying beliefs
and values, but also of the action and strategic choices that organisational participants
might adopt.
2.7.3 Ideology, action and strategic choice
The linkage between Marx's ideology and some of the subsequent theorists rests in the
concept of ideology as a prerequisite for managerial behaviour in the productive
relationship8. References to attitudes, opinions beliefs and values are to be found in both
8 To restrict the notion of ‘material production’ to manufacturing is to limit the usefulness of an analysis of
ideology by ignoring the growth of the service sector and knowledge based industries at the beginning of
the new millennium.
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Marxist (eg, Poulantzas 1973) and non-Marxist language (eg, Parsons 1951; Friedrich
1963; Plamanatz 1971; Starbuck 1982; Jaensch 1983; Eagleton 1991) when ideology is
explicated.
Non-Marxists such as Bell (1960), Friedrich (1963, p. 90) and Friedrich and Brzezinski
(1966, p. 88) viewed ideologies as action-related systems of ideas. Seliger (1976, p. 16)
referred to ideology as ‘action-oriented thought’ and Goll and Zeitz (1991, p.191) as
‘action-impelling’. Fox (1974, p. 271) himself regarded both unitarism and pluralism as
‘frames of reference through which men perceive and define social phenomena, and their
perceptions and definitions determine their behaviour’ (sic). However, as he pointed out in
his original paper, behaviour may conflict with ideology (Fox 1966b, p. 396). Marx would
have disagreed: ‘Men make their own history’, but they cannot do so ‘under circumstances
chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted
from the past’ (Marx 1969a, p. 398).
While action is implicit in the notion of ideology, there is a difference in the Marxist
perspective on ideology. Poulantzas (1973, p. 7), for example, referred to ideology as
being 'present to such an extent in all the agents' activities that it becomes indistinguishable
from their lived experience'. This is a qualitatively different perspective on ideology from
the assumptions and action perspectives of non-Marxists. Marx had laid this ground in The
German Ideology by asserting that 'The production of ideas, of conceptions, of
consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material
intercourse of men, the language of real life' (Marx 1969b, pp. 24-5). This link between
beliefs and values and action has had a variety of Marxist interpretations in the notion of
praxis. Lefebvre (1968, p. 34), for example, noted that ideologies mediate between what
people do and their consciousness/language, but that praxis ‘involves differences, levels,
polarizations, contradictions’. The radical Brazilian pedagogue, Paolo Freire (1972, p. 91)
defined praxis, ‘which, as the reflection and action which truly transform reality, is the
source of knowledge and creation’.
Another approach to the linkage of action with values and beliefs in ideology is taken in
the concept of strategic choice. In this framework, the problematics identified by
managers, the solutions they canvass, and the strategies they put in place are couched in,
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and limited by, the terms of the sets of values, assumptions and ideas which constitute their
framework (Godard 1997). Ideology is therefore central to explaining the choices, which
managers consider and enact, rather than merely being the rational basis for strategy
suggested in some of the literature (Kochan et al. 1994, pp. 12-13; Godard 1997, pp. 206-
7). Child argued that the incorporation of strategic choice in a theory of organisation
involved the recognition of an essentially political process in which ideological values
would be applied by managers in dealing with the constraints and opportunities within
which organisations operated (Child 1972, p. 16). The concept of strategic choice was
developed in response to environmental determinism in which ‘the contextual factors
determine structural variables because of certain, primarily economic, constraints the
former are assumed to impose’ (Child 1972, p. 2). Whittington (1988, p. 533) noted,
however, that the contextual variables provide a pre-condition for the exercise of choice
and inform the content of the choice made. Gospel likewise argued that, in a market
economy, the nature of the markets will play a large part in shaping labour decisions and
constraining choices. He contended that the structure of the firm also mediates the
environmental effects, both constraining and facilitating strategic choice in employee
management and choice of structure. Furthermore, he argued, that if the nature of the
managerial hierarchy constitutes an important variable influencing labour management
decisions, so too does the technology employed. The range of choices available to
managers, however, is not limitless (Gospel 1992, pp. 6-8).
According to Kochan et al. (1984, pp 21-2), strategic choices can be made only where the
environmental constraints do not prevent the parties from choosing between alternatives.
If the finite diversity of choices explicit in Gospel’s final proposition is accepted, then the
notion of a unitary organisation moving as if all its members were working in the same
direction will always be problematic (Thurley & Wood 1983, p. 3). Likewise, defining
management strategy as ‘homogenous, uniform, accurately reflecting external conditions,
the necessary courses of actions and the means of achieving them’ is a ‘profoundly naive’
view about management rationality (Salaman 1989, p. 83). Streeck (1987, p. 281)
questioned whether the shift to management of the initiative in industrial relations in fact
involves the implied element of strategic freedom of choice at all. The ‘imperatives of
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profitability and the need to keep control over the labour force’ may both constrain and
guide strategic choice.
Strategic choice theory in industrial relations has been reviewed by a number of industrial
relations scholars (Anderson 1989; Gardner 1989; Lawler 1990; Gardner & Palmer 1992;
Gahan 1992). The central elements of this strategic choice concept as applied to industrial
relations, are, firstly, that strategy is a matter of choice by management or unions between
one course of action or another (tactics). Secondly, the choice of tactics is targeted at
control over processes and outcomes of the management’s interrelationship with unions
and its employees. Thirdly, there will be an interaction between industrial relations
strategies. There is a consensus among some industrial relations scholars, as we have seen
in section 2.2, that management has seized the initiative in industrial relations following
the economic crises of the 1980s. But there is debate as to whether a transformation of
industrial relations has occurred. For example, Strauss (1984, p. 2) and Chelius ) and
Dworkin (1990, pp. 3-4) disagree. Management initiative must be also recognised as being
subject to the strategies of unions and workers. Union strategies might frustrate
management’s attempts to modify contextual effects on the operation of the organisation
(Streeck 1987). Thus, managers’ behaviour in managing employees might not reflect their
ideology because of constraints, which impact on managerial domination of the workplace.
Thus, in the context of intense competition during a time of sustained economic, legal,
technological and product market changes, ideological considerations and the predilections
of key individuals within the firm could be significant in motivating, say, anti-union
tactics. Likewise, government policy on industrial relations might encourage managers to
abandon collective elements in their managerial practices. Industrial relations strategy,
business or marketing strategy, and financial management strategies might be equal but
separate domains of the organisation's focus, integrated to facilitate the implementation of
‘first level strategies’, that is, corporate or business unit strategies (Anderson 1989).
Gospel (1983b) likewise distinguished between choice of strategy and structure at the firm
level and choice of strategy and structure at the labour management level. Around the
same period, Kochan et al. (1984) and Kochan et al. (1994) distinguished between three
tiers of industrial relations strategy: long-term strategy at the corporate level; the functional
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processes of collective bargaining or personnel policy-making; and the day-to-day playing
out of policies at the workplace.
Some organisational theorists treat the organisation as actor, arguing, for example, that the
interdependence and interactions between strategic choice and environmental determinism
define organisational adaptation, that is ‘change that obtains as a result of aligning
organizational capabilities with environmental contingencies’ (Hrebiniak & Joyce 1985, p.
337; Lawless & Finch 1989). Problems with ascribing ideology to organisations are
discussed above in sub-section 2.7.1. Such studies fail to address the dynamics of the roles
of managers and employees in the decision-making process, in particular, the values and
beliefs subscribed to, or taken for granted by, managers who might determine what choices
they might perceive and whether or not action taken is consistent with such perspectives.
Outside the Marxist tradition, Therborn (1980, p. vii) took another tack entirely by defining
ideology broadly, in terms of social processes. Sartori (1987, p. 500) spoke of ideology in
terms of the 'conversion of ideas into social levers'. Beyer (1981, p. 166) regarded
ideologies as 'relatively coherent sets of beliefs that bind some people together and that
explain their worlds in terms of cause-and-effect relations'. Ideology, however, is not
necessarily a systematic compilation of ideas about the world as industrial relations writers
have noted (see sub-section 2.7.4, below).
In general terms ideologies perform three functions: that of simplifying the adherent's view
of the world; generating demands for change (when out of power) and resisting change to
social order (when in power); and attempting to justify both action taken in conformity
with the world view and the world view itself (Ingersoll & Matthews 1991, p. 7). In
Berger and Luckman’s terms
The distinctiveness of ideology is rather that the same overall universe is interpreted in different
ways, depending upon concrete vested interests within the society in question.
Frequently an ideology is taken on by a group because of specific theoretical elements that are
conducive to its interests (Berger & Luckman 1971, p. 141, emphasis in original)
While Berger and Luckman referred to ideology in terms of a ‘particular definition of
reality’ becoming ‘attached to a concrete power interest’, Abravenal (1983, p. 274)
observed that an ideology comes to be attached to a group or an organisation. Abravenal
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argued that this attachment is not to individuals, who might exhibit a common ideology
only because they belong to the managerial group, but the attachment is to the group or
organisation. This argument is familiar in organisational theory, as we have seen above,
and reflects the problematic attachment of ideology to organisations rather than their
managers.
Ideology, according to Seliger, may be multi-dimensional, consisting of a dimension of
‘fundamental principles’ and an ‘operative ideology’. In the first dimension, ‘fundamental’
ideology determines ‘the final goals and the grand vistas in which they will be realized’.
The second dimension - an operative ideology - relates to ‘the principles, which actually
underlie policies and are invoked to justify them’. These dimensions operate with an
interacting tension that generates conflict between the principles in the fundamental
dimension and the process of devising and justifying the policies which have been
executed or recommended, regardless of whether or not they deviate from the
fundamentals (Seliger 1976, p. 109). It would seem to follow from this perspective that
managerial ideology would refer to an operative rather than a fundamental ideology since
the latter might relate to managerial strategies rather than the ideologies which lead
managers to adopt them.
If ideology is action-related and constitutes a process of defining reality attached to the
concrete power interest of managers and owners, it also has implications for organisational
structure, in terms of work design, the structure of control and the employment relationship
(Littler 1982, p. 49). Ideology, therefore, is more than a mere framework for analytic and
descriptive statements, on the one hand, and moral and technical prescriptions, on the
other. Ideology provides its adherents with the goals, motivations, prescriptions and
imperatives with which to guide their action (Eagleton 1991, pp. 45, 47) and the form that
managerial behaviour adopts.
The focus of this thesis is on the ideology of managers and it does not explore the diverse
tracks on ideology beyond these references relating to organisation and ideology such as
Alvesson (1991) and Weiss & Miller (1987).
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2.7.4 Management and ideology
The application of the concept of ideology to management moves from a basic assumption
that ‘the practices and discourses that comprise organizations are never politically neutral’
where ‘top management is routinely privileged in decision-making and agenda-setting and
in defining and shaping human needs and social reality’ (Alvesson & Willmott 1992, p.
12). Nor are they value-free (Merkle 1980, p. 279), an oxymoron for, as Bendix (1956, p.
2) argued, the function of management, or managerial, ideology is to explain and justify
managerial authority in enterprises and, according to Weiss and Miller (1987, p. 493), to
reinforce the manager’s position in the social (and political) structure of the organisation.
Individuals and collectives, Godard (1992, p. 239) argues, draw upon ideology ‘in order to
assess the functioning and legitimacy of established institutional arrangements and the
desirability of institutional reforms’. Those taken-for-granted values and beliefs, brought
to bear in building group cohesion and identity or in strengthening the social base of
managers in other ways (Alvesson 1991, p. 212), are applied to the running of an
organisation and the management of its employees. In other words, managerial ideology
consists of the assumptions - which are constituted by the beliefs and values of the subject
- adopted by managers in their management of employees.
It was suggested in section 2.7 above, introducing this discussion, that ideology involved
more than the assumptions underpinned by values and beliefs. Managerial ideology
provides ‘the frame of reference for organizational action’ (Goll & Zeitz 1991, pp. 191-2),
relates to the stability of organisations, and managers’ role ipso facto is to maintain that
stability and order. Thus managerial ideologies are centrally about power and control in
shaping the power relationships and processes, which constitute a work organisation, in
such a way that these power relationships are maintained in the form desired by those who
exercise power and control in the organisation and the employers. As such, managerial
ideology is not a managerial tool of analysis in forming relationships and establishing
processes but, rather, generates a body of normative precepts for the running of an
organisation. According to Goll and Zeitz, its action-impelling quality provides
legitimation, shapes strategic choices and determines organisational practices. While the
exercise of power and control is neither value free nor neutral, it may not necessarily be the
subject of reflection on the side of managers in exercising their prerogative.
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The scope of managerial ideology is reflected in what Whittington (1989, p. 105) calls
‘local ideologies’, that is ‘beliefs concerning the organization and its relation to its
environment that both embody the objectives held by dominant actors and serve to secure
the compliance of other actors important to achieving them’. However, these might extend
to broader perspectives as some human resource management writers suggest. Schuler,
Dowling, Smart and Huber (1992, p. 16), for example, argue that the scope of HRM
extends to altruistic social objectives where HRM should also benefit society generally
(see also sub-section 2.7.7 below).
There is some difficulty in ascertaining any details of managers’ ideology in work
organisations. Ideological frameworks are not rigid and may not necessarily take the form
of a consistent and related body of ideas and values. Ideologies might change across time
so that there are patterns of alternating managerial ideologies (Evans 1999, p. 326) and
contradictions between ideologies variously described as competing values, dilemmas,
dialectics, and dualities (Evans 1999, p. 328). Thus, Fox reflected, an ideology may
constitute ‘a ragbag of assorted notions’ rather than a ‘consistent and related body of ideas’
(Fox 1971, pp. 124-5), or, as Nichols (1969, p. 219) put it, lack ‘self-contained and
internally consistent idea systems’. Mere expediency in management's rationale for how
employees are managed might disguise an unsystematic set of values and beliefs (Anthony
1977, p. 73), or managers might merely be pragmatic in adopting any strategy (Dunlop
1971, p. 18). It might be, where there appear to be ideological inconsistencies, that there
exists no common rationale for managerial behaviour in dealing with either means or ends
at all. Furthermore, the management of employees is merely one of a number of other
managerial functions, which form a complex set of issues of which a manager needs to
take account when making decisions. The ideological underpinnings of decisions affecting
managerial behaviour towards employees might, then, be difficult to identify. Mannheim
(1936, p. 65) raises the possibility that pragmatism is an ideology in itself. Or, to add to
Mannheim's point, inconsistency may be a characteristic of a pragmatic ideology, or a
‘fragmented consciousness’ (Habermas 1987 in Oliga 1996, p. 263; Larrain 1994, p. 129).
Ideology can also undergo a ‘constant process of formulation and reformulation’ (Bendix
1974, p. xii) especially in an environment where culture change programmes attempt to
reconstruct organisational meaning and reconstitute employee identities (Keenoy et al.
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1997, p. 147), although attempts at changing organisational culture will of themselves be
underpinned by ideological norms.
Managers might never develop a coherent ideology because their objective is not the
development of a ‘philosophy’ of management but to address power and control in the
maintenance of organisational stability (a pre-eminently ideological task) particularly
within the context of a hostile external environment. Peters and Waterman (1982, pp. 280-
1; 288), however, advocated the achievement of excellence through assumed ‘shared
values’ of ‘basic beliefs, overriding values’. They saw successful leadership in terms of an
‘obvious, sincere, sustained personal commitment to the values the leaders sought to
implant, coupled with extraordinary persistence in reinforcing those values’, relating
organisational performance to the development of ‘a well-defined set of guiding beliefs’.
Drucker (1961, p. 133) likewise advocated ‘a principle of management that will give full
scope to individual strength and responsibility, and at the same time give common
direction of vision and effort, establish team work and harmonize the goals of the
individual with the common weal’. These are mainstream examples of unitarist ideology.
Whittington (1989) observed that managerial ideology ‘is an instrument of control, not of
consensus’. This reflects the implications of Peters and Waterman's language of implanted
values. However, within an organisation, there may be limits to the imposition of an
ideological framework precisely because the unitary framework critically fails to recognise
the diversity of value, beliefs and interests of the individuals within the organisation.
Whittington (1989, p. 107) argued that any managerial ideology will rarely be hegemonic
and there will always be occasion for contest of managerial legitimacy and dissent from
managerial directions. However, if managers’ approaches to managing employees
consistently prevail, little modified by employees’ strategic resistance, one would have to
consider managerial ideology as hegemonic9.
Rose and Jones (1985, p. 99) argue that the execution of practice arising from managerial
ideology can also be ‘piecemeal, uncoordinated and empiricist’. Managers can see no
inconsistency ‘in simultaneously promoting teamwork, delayering, commitment,
9 See discussion on hegemony in section 2.7.5 below.
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flexibility, loyalty, individualism, greed, empowerment and surveillance’ (Keenoy et al.
1997, p. 147). Such inconsistencies might be conditioned by managers’ ambiguous
position within the prevailing structure of power relations in work organisations in relation
to the processes of strategic decision-making, which are developed to deal with changes in
product markets, labour markets, technology and other societal factors (Knights & Wilmott
1986, p. 9). It may well be that inconsistency in strategy occurs where there are
inconsistencies in ideological attachments. Hyman (1987, p. 30) suggests that the lack of
internal coherence in managerial ideology may be inherent in the labour process of
management. Others argue that the assumption that management is a labour process
obscures the contradictions of managerial work and the class connotations of management,
where the social relationships within the management hierarchy define management
processes. Management as a set of actions furthers the aims of more senior managers and,
ultimately, the owners (Armstrong 1989, p. 308; 311).
Ideology is an unexplored, but implicit, factor in writings on management style. Purcell
(1987 p. 538), for example, identified two key dimensions of management style:
individualism and collectivism, which are alternative ideologies of managing employees.
The latter may refer on the one hand to union recognition and collective bargaining and, on
the other, to industrial democracy. McDonald and Wiesner (2000) have developed a
management style construct around the inclusion or exclusion of employees from
management decision-making by considering both the range of issues on which managers
consult employees and the degree to which they involve them in decision-making.
Ideology is implicit in these different approaches to management style. Are such
management ‘styles’ the product of ‘conscious’ approaches to industrial relations? There
certainly is an inference of management motives behind their deliberate cultivation (Miller
1987, p. 356). However, on the one hand, it does not necessarily follow that actions taken
in the management of employees are adopted as an outcome of managers’ reflection on
those values and assumptions. On the other hand, motives are tied to fundamental
questions regarding the values and beliefs held by managers.
There may be a variety of strategic choices to be made, but the objectives which various
managers adopt, the options they perceive as available for dealing with employees or trade
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unions, and the manner in which they may deal with them reflect a range of available
ideologies. Among these is the unitarist ideology, which is the subject of the next sub-
section.
2.7.5 Ideology and unitarism
In Marx's class analysis the ideas imbued in the relations of production are linked to the
interests of the ruling class and take on a universal application, where an ideology is
expressed as the common interest of all the members of society, and is represented as the
only rational, universally valid one (Marx 1969b, pp. 47-8). Some Marxists have applied
this universality to the dominance of a social group in social, cultural and other values in
terms of hegemony. Hegemony refers to the ideological pre-eminence of a class whose
‘interests and consciousness enable it to organise the whole of society in accordance with
those interests’ (Lukács 1971, p 52), and has a converse element: the consent of the
population in response to the dominant group which holds its power because of its position
and function in the world of production (Gramsci 1971, p. 12). That consent can be traced
to material domination by the economically powerful (Hyman 1975, p. 128). According to
Marx (1969b, p. 47), the ‘ideal expression of the dominant material relationships’ belongs
to ‘the class which has the means of material production at its disposal’. Managers play a
key role in the control of material production within organisations, whether that is of goods
or services, which is why the notion of ideology is important for Fox and in this thesis.
Marx’s definition of ideology in The German Ideology encompasses normative
perspectives which, when propagated in work organisations, support the interests of
employers and, by implication, managers acting as their agents. Ideology thus may be used
as ‘weapons for social interests’ (Berger & Luckman 1971, p. 18). Engels linked the
Marxist analysis of ideology as a feature of class to notions of ‘false consciousness’. He
asserted that ideology ‘is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is
true, but with a false consciousness’. The consciousness is false because the individual
‘works with mere thought material, which he accepts without examination as the product
of thought, and does not investigate further for a more remote source independent of
thought’ (Engels 1970, p. 496). Fox does not refer to managerial or unitarist ideology as a
case of false consciousness, but he does assert that it is 'incongruent with reality and
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useless for purposes of analysis' by managers. It is rational only in terms of its purposes: to
reassure managers, as an instrument of persuasion, and as a legitimation of authority (Fox
1966a, pp. 371-2).
For Lukács, ideology does not necessarily involve the deliberative application of a value
system. Relating consciousness to society as a whole, Lukács (1971, p. 51) imbues it with
an element which transcends the individual and which is derived from relations in the
process of production. He argued that class consciousness and false consciousness are not
the same as ideology, although elsewhere McLellan (1986, pp. 26, 28) suggests that
Lukács does appear to equate consciousness with ideology. Mannheim regarded ‘class
ideology’ as a more accurate term than class consciousness. Class ideology for Mannheim
is
on the one hand, … a synthesizing and integrating process through which the concept of
consciousness comes to furnish a unitary centre in an infinitely variable world; on the other, there is
a constant attempt to make more pliable and flexible the unitary conception which has been too
rigidly and too schematically formulated in the course of the synthesizing process (Mannheim 1936,
p. 60).
The unitary conception has universal application, and Mannheim refers to the Hegelian
assumption that the world is a unity, albeit in the process of a continual historical
transformation, whereas Fox's unitarism specifically applies to managers in work
organisations. Indeed, according to Mannheim, ideology varies in accordance with history,
national characteristics, and social classes. This raises the issue that at any one time there
may be a number of ideologies within an organisation, which underpin the social relations
of work (Mannheim 1936, p. 59; 61).
In the context of attempting to avoid a normative response to the pejorative connotations of
ideology (see, for example, McLellan 1986, p. 8), Mannheim rejected notions of distortion
and falsification in ideology. He replaced the term ‘ideology’ with ‘perspective’, by which
he meant ‘the subject’s whole mode of conceiving things as determined by his historical
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and social setting’ (sic), which arises ‘out of the collective purposes of a group which
underlie the thought of the individual’ (Mannheim 1936, pp. 239, 240-1)10.
The boundary of the research reported in this thesis is determined by its focus upon
managerial beliefs and values, that is their assumptions about managing employees, insofar
as managers might or might not adopt a unitarist perspective on their roles. The notion of
ideology as distortion and falsification is not the aspect of ideology that is central to this
thesis. The exclusion from the analysis in this thesis of both distortion and falsification, on
the one hand and also the universal class characteristic elucidated by Marx in The German
Ideology, on the other hand, represent neither a rejection of Marxist analysis of ideology
nor an adoption of Mannheim's position. It is intended that the discussion will avoid
entanglement in the problematics of class or a theory of class in organisations,
notwithstanding that the ownership and control of productive resources (this control is also
exercised by managers) can be taken as the starting point of class analysis (Connell 1977,
p. 39). Connell argued that it might be difficult to formulate the concept of a dominant
ideology, which serves the interests of the powerful through social control structures, or to
apply the notion to management (1977, p. 14).
The task in this thesis, however, is concerned with what values and beliefs emerge in an
ideology belonging to SME managers. Fox's use of ideology is non-Marxist.
Fundamentally, the research focus in this thesis is on what constitutes the unitarist
ideology, and whether a unitarist catalogue of ideas, beliefs and values derived from Fox’s
account can be established through empirical investigation. However, the discussion does
serve to focus on the beliefs and values of managers in SMEs, which are inherently the
subject of Marxist discourse on ideology. Poulantzas (1973, p. 206), for example, defined
ideology in terms of 'a relatively coherent ensemble of representations, values and beliefs',
which includes, among other characteristics, 'their relations to society, to other men and to
their own economic and political activity' (sic).
One of the elements of Fox's unitary ‘frame of reference’, whether subscribed to by either
employers or managers, emphasises an essentially harmonious world-view. In Marxist
10 The term, perspective, has been used as a synonym for beliefs and values elsewhere in this chapter, but
this does not represent any adherence to Mannheim.
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terms such a perspective might accrue to ‘the owners of money, the means of production,
means of subsistence, who are eager to increase the sum of values they possess, by buying
other people's labour-power’ (Marx 1969b, p. 101) with the purpose of harnessing such
labour power in the production of surplus value. Although Fox’s frame of reference might
be adopted by managers who identify with their employers’ interests, the role of
managerial control within the organisation and the structures and means by which control
is achieved are socially produced and their continued existence is conditional upon
managers continuing to reproduce them.
An investigation of the values and beliefs of managers draws attention not only to the place
of ideology and how managers view their role in managing employees, but also to those on
behalf of whom managers perform those functions. For Marx in The German Ideology,
this is about the ‘ideas of the ruling class [which] are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e.,
the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling
intellectual force’. These ‘ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the
dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas’
(Marx 1969b, p. 47). For Poulantzas (1973), managers are the bearers of these 'relations of
possession' in representing the owners of a business.
Ideology arises from the detachment of ideas from individuals and world conditions, which
are the source of those ideas according to Marx (1969b, p. 48). This detachment leads to a
broad conception of ideology as ‘a system (with its own logic and rigour) of
representations (images, myths, ideas or concepts, depending on the case) endowed with a
historical existence and role within a given society’ (Althusser 1969, p. 231). Definitions
are possible around a nexus of the rationality or irrationality of ideology and explanations
for ideology based on criteria of truth or falsehood. These factors can be found in various
combinations among ideology theorists (Boudon 1989, p. 53).
Since managers in SMEs are either the owners of the work organisation or agents of
employers, they are clearly associated with control over the means of production. Fox's
unitarist ideology serves three purposes in this managerial context: first, as a defensive
reassurance against managerial failure and frustration; second, as an instrument of
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persuasion of employees; and, third, as a legitimation of management through the
propagation of the idea that the interests of management and managed are identical (Fox
1966a, pp. 372-3). The role of ideology in management also constitutes ‘a resource in the
struggle for power’ (Fox 1971, p. 124). It therefore contributes to the establishment of
legitimacy in the exercise of management (Fox 1971, p. 124), a point taken up by some
other industrial relations scholars (for example, Storey 1983, p. 101) and, as Hill (1981, p.
21) observed, managerial ideology supplements the authority contained in the employment
contract. Thus, the normative dimension of unitarist managerial ideology justifies
managerial behaviour, is designed to evoke the loyalty and commitment of all participants
in the organisation, and serves as a support for those norms and values, which are
congruous with the goals of management and the organisation. These characteristics of
managers’ beliefs and values, furthermore, provide the basis for a unitary conception of the
organisation (Fox 1971, p. 126), which, Bendix (1974, p. 199) observed, is closely related
to the economic interests of the employer, defining and advancing the core interests of
managers and employers.
According to Bendix (1974, p. 13), it is the basic social relation between employers who
exercise authority and the workers who follow managers' directions, which forms the
context of the beliefs and values of managers within work organisations. Since a
managerial ideology focuses on the role of the manager, it represents a common effort to
interpret the exercise of authority in a favourable light. It sets out to ‘interpret the facts of
authority and obedience so as to neutralize or eliminate the conflict between the few and
the many in the interest of a more effective exercise of authority’, or ‘to support those in
control in a given system’, justifying their membership of a group with power. From the
observer's perspective, managers’ ideology explains their activities (Anthony 1977, p. 2).
The worth of the unitary ideology to managers and owners is that, by virtue of ownership
and management, the employer and the manager can always lay claim to a moral
superiority, which legitimises the imperative of management prerogative. Management
prerogative is established in a unified authority and loyalty structure in the organisation.
This is underwritten by the emphasis upon the common values and objectives, which are
said to bind all the participants in the organisation and which inspire the use of ‘family’ or
72
‘team’ metaphors. Any challenge to the exercise of management or attempt to change the
structure is therefore regarded as irrational, dysfunctional and an aberration in the work
organisation, ‘due to failure to understand a situation, a breakdown in communications
and/or a deliberate invention of agitators, trouble-makers, subversives, etc. Conflict can
and must be eliminated and the “team spirit” will prevail’ (Ford & Hearn 1987, p. 6). Such
an orientation provides justification for the use of coercion against malcontents, especially
in times of special stress, crisis, or emergency. At the same time the ‘patience-straining
process of “winning consent” through consultation may appear not only burdensome in
practice but even pusillanimous in principle’ (Fox 1973, pp. 186-7). Some managers might
therefore abandon any attempt at winning over employees, instead adopting a unilateral
and exclusionist management style.
Weakness in managerial performance perceived by the employer might be seen to
undermine managerial legitimacy and reflect negatively on the performance of managers in
the eyes of the employer. This suggests that managers and employers are not necessarily
of a single mind and purpose. This issue is discussed in the next sub-section.
2.7.6 Managers and employers
The application of ideological analysis to managers’ assumptions and values, based on ‘the
dominant material relationships grasped as ideas’, is problematic insofar as the interests of
managers and employers do not necessarily coincide (Nichols 1969, pp. 31-6). The
separation of ownership and management is a feature of modern organisation (Callus et al.
1991; Dufty and Fells 1989; Salamon 1987). In addition, Callus et al. (1991, p. 75)
observe that ‘the patterns of decision-making on workplace issues are inherently more
complex when owners are not present at the workplace’. It cannot be assumed that all
employers regard their own interests and the beliefs and values, which underpin them, as
being held in common (for example, between employers in large corporations and a small
family business), let alone the interests of managers and employers. This finds current
expression in the accountability for performance demanded of senior executives by
shareholders. The divide between small and large businesses is also frequently expressed
in public policy debate. Thus, employers, especially those in small or medium sized
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enterprises, would not necessarily be attached to any ruling class. In any case, a dominant
class may not have homogenous interests (Eagleton 1991, p. 45).
Armstrong argues that the ‘real question of management’ concerns the contradictions and
tensions within an agency relationship between employer and manager. In his view, an
agency relationship exists in which a principal engages someone to take decisions on
behalf of the organisation. This is a defining relationship from ownership to the lowest
levels of management (Armstrong 1989, p. 312, emphasis in original). Bendix takes a
different view. In his account of ideology, Bendix equates management and employers11,
arguing that every ‘class is more or less heterogeneous in its social composition’ and that
in the case of employers, ideology provides organisational cohesion in a hostile
environment (Bendix 1974, p. 199). Nevertheless, he affirms, ideologies are ‘reiterated
endlessly and are essentially ambiguous’, changing and spreading, and there is
considerable ideological diversity among managers (Bendix 1974, p. 342). Thus, as
Fletcher (1973, p. 143) argues, it would be erroneous to treat management as a unified
group: each manager, who is not also an owner, might be both dominated by higher levels
of managers, such as the CEO, as well as being dominant over subordinate employees.
The role of managers of the same functional type may also differ between organisations.
Human resource managers, for example, may have a number of contradictory functions in
serving the ends of coercing and manipulating labour, on the one hand, and of developing
‘welfare’ functions to achieve the same ends, on the other. Where HRM practices have a
manipulative character in one organisation, the different social context in another might
bring about a different form of human resource management (Hyman 1989, p.23).
While managers and employers may have diverse interests between them, management as
a collection of employees is ‘structurally dependent’ on employers rather than inclined to
any collaboration with the workers. Within organisations, managers’ ideology, imbued
with notions of professional autonomy or managerial prerogative, ‘will always be deployed
against developments which may lead towards more egalitarian relations in production’
(Clegg, Boreham & Dow 1986, p. 169). This again implies a normative dimension in
11 Elsewhere in Work and Authority in Industry, Bendix (1974, p. 228) distinguishes between
entrepreneurs and bureaucrats: ‘At the climax of their careers entrepreneurs are substantial owners of a
firm, while bureaucrats are typically salaried executives’.
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management control (Hill 1981, pp. 16-17). Clearly such tendencies do not mean that
employee participation, for example, will be excluded from organisations of necessity.
However, where management autonomy and prerogative are a predominant focus,
participative aspects of organisation will operate primarily as control mechanisms
governing the behaviour of workers. Broadly speaking, the presence within organisations
of a management group and a management structure rests upon ideological presuppositions
about control of the work process, regardless of the degree to which employees participate
in, or are excluded from, decision-making.
Fox’s view of the ‘unitary conception’ was one of an ideology ‘which seeks to legitimize
the traditional assertion of an employer prerogative and leadership unqualified by any
organized employee challenge’ (Fox 1971, p. 272; 1973). At the same time, the unitarist
ideology is historically rooted in the master-servant tradition within which the employer
alone determined the ends and the means of the organisation and the employee’s
unqualified loyalty and obedience legitimised the manager’s role (Fox 1974a, pp. 204-5).
According to Fox (1973, p. 191), this link with the master-servant act is associated with a
conservative social and political philosophy.
Managerial prerogative, which is enshrined in master-servant common law, is the primary
element of unitarism from which all other values and beliefs (on conflict, collective
workplace arrangements and trade unions) follow. This is why managerial prerogative is
considered in the context of ideology separately in the following sub-section.
2.7.7 Ideology and managerial prerogative
Managerial prerogative and legitimacy are interlinked in notions of control. Control, or
dominance, is sustained, according to Thompson (1984), in three ways. In the first, the
managers’ dominance in the employment relationship is represented as a legitimate
condition of work organisations.
Second, dissimulation features in those relationships in which the interests of some are
served at the expense of others and, intentionally or otherwise, this is concealed
(Thompson 1984, p. 131). An example of this was the strategy, hidden from middle
managers, of individualising work relations at Comalco (McDonald & Timo 1996). Others
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conclude that the extent of the ideological nature of the management process is thus
‘frequently mystified, disguised and denied’ (Clegg, Boreham & Dow 1986, p. 237). This
raises further questions including a possible explanation for the acquiescence of the
dominated in their subordination: that their acquiescence is borne of ignorance of the
hidden interests of the dominating class or group. This explanation is, however,
inadequate to explain why characteristically, as Hyman (1975, p. 197) put it, ‘Management
commands, employees obey’ and employees usually exercise what amounts to self-control
(Thompson 1983 in Dufty & Fells 1989, p. 32; Bennett 1995). Graham (1980, pp. 17-20),
in questioning the use of ideology, argues that even if the interests of one particular class
were expressed in a form which disguised the advantage to owners or the most senior
managers from the ‘victim of ideology’ (in this case, the workers) the dominated may act
rationally for a range of reasons including prudence or acceptance of a view of what is
right and proper to do. If these are the motivations for acceptance of management
direction then they in turn will be based upon a set of ideological values and beliefs. The
foundation of workers' consent or acceptance of management's legitimacy therefore may be
as much pragmatic as normative (Hyman & Brough 1975, p. 234), or prudential and
moralistic (Graham 1980). The question of whether workers adhere to a separate ideology
or are caught up in a hegemonic response to the power structure, where much of
managerial ideology is a key component of the socially dominant ideology might also be
shared by the workforce (Armstrong et al. 1981, p. 56), lies beyond the scope of this thesis.
A third way in which ideology operates is by means of reification in which relations are
presented as immutable and natural (Thompson 1984, p. 131), and the only rational course
which employees might perceive is to accede to the authority and directions of
management, in other words, to submit to managerial prerogative. At an ideological level,
managerial prerogative will be central to managers’ role perceptions. At an operational
level, the power relations between employees or unions might result in managers
compromising on the scope of managerial prerogative. The process of management is
rooted in an interactive relationship with employees and the right of managers to manage
can be, at the very least, modified by the response of the managed to actions from those in
the organisation who have authority from ownership to take decisions. Furthermore,
managerial prerogative might be limited by legislation and the decisions of the courts.
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Anthony distinguishes between the ideologies of managers and ideologies of work, which,
he argues, are inter-dependent. With Fox and Bendix, he identifies managerial ideology as
expressing a requirement ‘to defend or disguise the authority of those in whose interest
work is controlled’. Managerial ideology, he argues, is complemented by an ‘ideology of
work’, which is primarily directed at upholding subordination and influencing the beliefs
and behaviour of subordinates (Anthony 1977, p. 3). Here Anthony appears to be
attributing ideology to work – which we might consider to be what employees ‘do’ in the
production of goods or services – whereas ideology in this discussion has been attributed to
employees and managers and their activities within the organisation. The ideology of
managers includes the work they do. Anthony discerns in the work of the neo-human
relations school of Argyris, McGregor, Blake and Mouton, Hertzberg and others a
managerial ideology, which constitutes ‘the strongest bid for legitimate control that has
ever been made’. In theory Y, for example, McGregor argued that the success of an
organisation requires the integration of the individual’s goals with that of the organisation
so that ‘the members of the organization can achieve their own goals best by directing their
efforts to towards the success of the enterprise’. The most significant of such rewards
include ‘the satisfaction of ego and self-actualization needs’, but these depend upon
‘management’s ingenuity in discovering how to realize the potential represented by its
human resources’ (McGregor 1960, pp. 48-9, original emphasis). In other words, for
McGregor, these satisfactions are management-dependent.
This argument may be extended to the view that what benefits capital is good for everyone
(Brown 2000). And that has a moralistic overtone. Neo-human relations analysis,
Anthony argues, provides an ethical framework for management ‘in promoting the
psychological health of the employee’ by satisfaction of basic needs through the medium
of work. Hyman (1987, p. 43) makes the link between the satisfaction of such needs and
managerial control by commenting that ‘The pursuit of consent through contentment
remains an important element in personnel policies’. This, Anthony argues, is based upon
a premise that
those who are in a controlling position in work are the only ones able to provide psychological well-
being for their subordinates, the workers. Management thus comes to be presented as controlling
the allocation, not only of material comfort, but of sanity (Anthony 1977, pp. 239-40)
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The logical extension of the psychological and moralistic claims of a managerialist
ideology is that any challenge to management prerogative is irrational and pathological.
Mann (1973, pp. 41-2) derided forms of ‘diffuse paternalism evident in almost all
managerial ideologies, though usually in its watered-down “happy family” version’,
describing it as ‘more an appeal for fellowship than a demand for obedience’. The BCA’s
approach to industrial relations reform, for example, reflects such paternalism. It is
‘dominated by the idea that management is the font of all wisdom and knowledge’, where
management determines how the organisation is to be run (Dabscheck 1990, p. 3). This
attitude extends to questions of employee representation. The third report of the BCA’s
‘study commission’, established to advise the BCA on industrial relations reform,
advocated removing ‘guaranteed representation rights for occupational and craft unions’:
In the circumstances, managers will have a strong incentive to work towards representation
arrangements which maximise common purpose. These are more likely to arise in workplaces with
fewer unions – ideally no more than one – rather than more. There will be no gains to enterprises in
leaving employee representation arrangements to chance, allowing employee choice to be
determined willy nilly and potentially undermining common purpose. Unlike the current
arrangements, employees will have a choice of representation and the arrangements we propose will
enable managers to influence that choice, just as they do with many other aspects of employees’
work (Hilmer et al. 1993, p. 110, emphasis added).
In other words, management’s control is perceived by the BCA and Hilmer et al. to extend
legitimately not only to the achievement of common purpose but in determining both
directly and indirectly the forms of employee representation, while at the same time
advocating a system with ‘employees being able to decide who can best represent their
interests in dealings with employers’ (Hilmer et al. 1993, p. 109). Such approaches rest on
clear assumptions about the role of managers: employee choice may be available, but
managers may legitimately limit the scope of those choices.
Another aspect of managerial ideology identified by Watson (1987, p. 205) consists of its
close links to organisational culture (see also Evans 1999). At the level of values and
assumptions, organisational culture is ‘the system of meanings which are shared by
members of an organisation and which defines what is good and bad, right and wrong and
what are the appropriate ways for the members of the organisation to think and behave’. In
these terms ideology provides an ethical basis for behaviour, which has emerged in the
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discussion earlier in this sub-section. But, notions of ideology and culture are not
necessarily linked. Watson argues that organisational culture can, in practice, have clarity,
comprehensiveness and coherent expression, or it can be ‘muddled, loose and vague’.
Where it is the expression of management’s involvement in, and control over, the creation
of meanings for organisational members, culture reflects a unitarist ideology. Where it
functions as ‘an oppositional ethos encouraging a clash between the expectations and
purposes of senior members and the rest’, organisational culture resembles a pluralist
model.
What empirical research on managerial ideology is there in industrial relations? This is
considered next.
2.8 Empirical studies of management ideology
Empirical studies of managerial ideologies have been rare. One study in Australia which
goes to the ideology of managers is Spillane's (1980, pp. 321-4) analysis of managers' and
union leaders' attitudes towards industrial relations. He found a single factor he labelled a
'Socio-economic ideology', which contained many of Fox's elements of a unitarist
ideology, including the belief that conflict arises from faulty communication, negative
attitudes towards militant unionism, a positive view of employers, defence of the status quo
and a growing emphasis upon individualism. It was not surprising that Spillane also found
a strong ideological divide between management and labour groups.
Another study in Australia addressed the characteristics, attitudes and leadership styles of
specialist industrial relations and personnel managers (Deery & Dowling 1988), but not of
senior or line managers. In a survey of approximately 1,400 personnel managers and
industrial relations practitioners, Deery and Dowling addressed the issue of the different
frames of reference to which managers might subscribe in managing employees. They
specifically sought to identify whether the respondents held different ideologies, or frames
of reference, which shaped their attitudes or behaviour in industrial relations. Three
statements were put to the specialist managers, the first of which was characterised as a
unitary view: ‘Employers and employees share common objectives because they are each
part of the same team’. They concluded 45 percent of managers held to a unitary frame of
reference against 44 percent who subscribed to a pluralist view (‘Conflict is inevitable in
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an organisation because employers and employees have divergent interests and objectives’)
and 11 percent had adopted a radical view that there is ‘a fundamental conflict of interest
between employers and employees which reflects the nature of class conflict in capitalist
society as a whole’ (Deery & Dowling 1988, pp 24-5).
The problem with this approach is that an ideology purported to be held by specialist
managers was determined on the basis of a choice of only three statements representing
each of the divergent unitarist, pluralist and radical perspectives, while two key elements of
such ideologies - the attitudes of managers towards trade unions or employee participation
and industrial democracy - were then identified separately. Deery and Dowling concluded,
after addressing a number of managerial attitudes towards trade unions, that the findings
suggested managers’ views were consistent with another of the key characteristics of
unitarism: that is, an antipathy to the presence of third parties such as trade unions. The
finding that hostility to trade unions was similar between those managers who identified
with the unitarist statement and those who identified with the pluralist and radical
statements (Deery and Dowling 1988, pp. 25-6) is based on methodology which has
questionable validity. Each of Fox’s three ‘frameworks’, and unitarism in particular, has a
range of characteristics. The use of two characteristics – attitudes towards trade unions and
attitudes towards employee participation - as proxies to establish whether a unitarist
ideology applies to managers is an inadequate test of a unitarist ideology, and militates
against establishing an adequate explication of a unitarist or any other managerial ideology,
for, in developing the unitarist framework, Fox had developed four key aspects of the
unitary frame of reference. These aspects were outlined in section 2.4 above.
In a later, historical study of employee management in Australia, Wright (1995, pp xiii)
analysed labour management practices in manufacturing across a range of functions: in
recruitment, selection and training; how managers sought to achieve employee compliance
with management goals; how work was organised and planned; and how trade unions and
the collective interests of employees were managed. Wright applied the unitarist ideal-type
to his findings, and concluded that most employers adopted a unitarist approach towards
the management of labour. He adopted the elaboration of Fox (1974b) in which unitarist
management is said to fall into two camps with ‘low trust’ or ‘high trust’ strategies and
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Friedman’s (1977; 1986) distinction between ‘direct control’ and ‘responsible autonomy’
strategies. Low trust strategies constitute an essentially authoritarian or coercive approach
to the management of the workforce, backed by demands for employee obedience, strict
disciplinary codes and the threat of dismissal for non-compliance. According to Wright, a
‘low trust’ or ‘direct control’ approach has been a relatively common and ongoing feature
of labour management in Australia, depending upon ‘traditional notions of master and
servant and the sanctity of management prerogative’ (Wright 1995, p. 6). The second
approach attempts to get employees on side through the adoption of ‘a softer, more
consultative approach in an attempt to win over employees and gain their consent to
management objectives’ (Wright 1995, pp. 5-6). However, Friedman (1986, p. 113)
argued, Taylorism, job redesign or human relations of themselves do not constitute
responsible autonomy or direct control, but are likely to lead to practices characteristic of
either end of a managerial practices continuum.
Wright observed that, despite the simplicity of the above distinctions, the reality of
employers’ approaches to the management of labour have been both complex and
contradictory, with Australian employers adopting elements of both high and low trust
strategies simultaneously within the same organisation, and sometimes in relation to the
same groups of employees (Wright 1995, p. 6). In response to criticisms, Friedman
emphasised the point that responsible autonomy and direct control were conceived of as
part of a continuum of management behaviour rather than a dichotomy. Taking into
account the external and internal factors which may come into play in influencing
management strategies, he observed that different strategies may be pursued by different
managers: ‘lower level managers will be more sensitive to shop floor worker resistance.
Top managers and sales managers will be more sensitive to product market conditions.
Personnel managers and lower-level line managers will be more sensitive to labour market
conditions’ (Friedman 1986, p. 115).
As Wright (1995, p. 6) observed, the institutional, economic and market contexts of
management control over labour costs and the application by workers to the labour
required by the work process can make management strategy less predictable than the
application of Friedman's model might otherwise suggest. Thus, practices in the
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management of employees are constrained by a number of factors: the interaction of
market forces and political and institutional environments; company size and ownership;
technology and workforce composition; workplace trade union organisation; and employer
attitudes and ideology (Wright 1995, p 11).
In another, rare example, a British case study systematically applied the various aspects of
unitarism to management strategies and ‘the ideological premises of action’, that is, a
shared set of values where the cultures of the organisation are integrated into a single,
consistent, uniform whole (Jones 2000). Among the unitarist characteristics Jones
identified were, first, a managerial imperative to integrate the diverse orientations and
interests within the organisation to establish a single, common orientation; second an
emphasis on common values; and, third a focus on managerial leadership. He concluded
by recommending the adoption of a 'more unitarist strategy' while retaining some pluralist
characteristics, taking a normative step beyond the observation by Fox (1974a, p. 272) that
a unitarist conception of organisation and management may be constrained by pluralist
notions of a limited prerogative which are implicit in collective arrangements.
2.9 Summary
There are two key contexts of this thesis. The first is research in the industrial relations
field on management. A research focus on institutions, in particular on trade unions and, in
Australia, on wage fixation, conciliation and arbitration, saw a general neglect of
management in industrial relations. In the last twenty years, industrial relations scholars
have developed a greater interest in the role of managers in industrial relations.
The second context is the placement of this research on industrial relations and human
resource management in small and medium sized enterprises. This is still a developing
area of interest among industrial relations researchers. The focus previously had been
predominantly upon industrial relations in large organisations despite large studies such as
the Australian Workplace Relations Surveys drawing out differences in industrial relations
between large and smaller organisations.
There are three problems with the notion of a unitarist ideology, which led to the research
initiated in this thesis. The first is that Fox did not base his account upon systematic
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empirical research. The second is that attempts to draw out the construct were not
comprehensive. Finally, despite these failings, unitarism has been iterated as a managerial
ideology in industrial relations and human resource management books and journals.
While there are problems with the empirical basis of the unitarist ideology, the concept
does have a firm intellectual tradition in the classical notions of management, the scientific
management movement, and in human relations and neo-human relations. In this account,
two principal characteristics of unitarism were identified: the assumption of consensus and
harmony as the natural state of work organisations and the notion that power is neutral.
The relevance of the unitarist ideology is reflected in the claim of a growing number of
industrial relations writers who observe a resurgence and pervasiveness of unitarism in
public policy and in the management of work organisations both in Australia and the
United Kingdom.
Applying ideology to industrial relations and the workplace is problematic because of the
diverse uses (or abuses) of the concept of ideology. Ideology is often applied without a
definition, used loosely, without comprehension of the scope of the term’s meaning, or
pejoratively. Although the concept applies to the values and beliefs to which an actor
subscribes - with or without acknowledgement, whether consciously or not – writers,
including industrial relations scholars, refer to such concepts as the ideology of regulation.
Nevertheless, a study of managers’ ideology can lead to a better understanding of the basis
of managerial behaviour in the management of employees.
One significant work that incorporates ideology into an industrial relations model is
Dunlop’s theory of industrial relations systems. This is dismissed as an inadequate
explanation of the values and beliefs managers bring to the management of employees,
because his concept of shared understandings has contradictions, which are unresolved.
The definition of ideology adopted in this thesis refers to ideology as consisting of both
beliefs/values and action. This has been variously interpreted by non-Marxists as action-
related systems of ideas and in strategic choice theory, on the one hand, and by Marxists in
the concept of praxis, on the other hand.
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Even if managerial ideology were to be inconsistent, contain internal contradictions,
change over time, and be applied expediently to managerial action, the concept remains
useful for researching management behaviour in work organisations. Managers might use
managerial ideology to justify and sustain their position within work organisations,
addressing questions of legitimacy, power and control. How this occurs in practice might
suggest whether the manager subscribes to a unitarist ideology or to some other set of
assumptions about the employment relationship. SME managers are clearly involved in
control over the means of production. The function of ideology in defending the role and
performance of management is intended to reinforce employee acceptance of managerial
roles and to legitimate management by promoting the idea that the interests of management
and managed are identical, thus minimising conflict, raising questions about the role of
third parties such as trade unions, and providing an ethical framework where failure to
concur with management is morally indefensible.
While managers might have a role in exercising control over the means of production, it is
not clear that they have identical interests with employers. It cannot be assumed, therefore,
that managers share a common ideology with employers. Managers, in Armstrong’s terms,
are in an agency relationship with employers. The values and beliefs about the special
position of managers in control over the means of production and employees are expressed
in notions of managerial prerogative, a primary element of the unitarist ideology. Often,
this might be obscured and, while ideology is managerially self-sustaining, the behaviour
of managers can be modified in an interactive relationship influenced by the strategies
adopted by employees, or by legislation and other regulatory frameworks. Thus managers’
behaviour might not reflect truly their ideological adherence.
Nevertheless, the life of an organisation – or even the totality of human resource
management strategy - might be infused with ideologically driven, paternalistic metaphors
such as family and teams, while employers, managers and legislators pursue individualised
workplace arrangements that eschew collective representation. The reality of paternalism
is the accession of managerial rights to limit employee choices, even while promoting the
rights of individuals through concepts such as empowerment.
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There have been few studies of ideology in Australian industrial relations. Of those that
have been conducted, they have been limited in delineating the scope of ideology in
general or of unitarism in particular. This thesis seeks to provide a detailed analysis of
management ideology by applying a comprehensive breakdown of the components of the
unitarist framework and testing them against the responses of SME managers and their
management actions and proclivities. In chapter 3, the specific sources for each of the
items in the specific questions relating to each of the four aspects of Fox's development of
the unitarist ideology are set down.
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CHAPTER 3 THE DIMENSIONS OF UNITARISM
3.1 Introduction
Managers' values and beliefs about managing employees, which derive from the traditional
sources of unitarism, and which may reflect some or all of its characteristics, can be
distilled into four key dimensions of Fox's construction of unitarism. This chapter
examines each of the four dimensions of Fox's unitarist ideal-type, and presents the sources
for each of the questions developed for the survey questionnaire employed in the empirical
research.
The four dimensions are outlined in section 3.2. In each of the subsequent sections
(sections 3.3 to 3.6), there is a discussion of each of the dimensions followed by an account
for each question in the survey questionnaire. The basis for the survey questions referring
to managers’ attitudes towards managerial prerogative are discussed and set out in section
3.3. The second unitarist dimension reflects managers’ attitudes towards conflict. This is
found in section 3.4. Managers’ attitudes towards collective workplace arrangements
constitute the fourth dimension of unitarism (section 3.5). The final dimension of
unitarism is constituted by managers’ attitudes towards trade unions. This is discussed and
the source of the questions delineated in section 3.6. The four unitarist dimensions are
followed by references to managers’ perspectives on the limitations they encounter in
managing employees (section 3.7). This is followed by an examination of the sources for
each of the items in Part C of the questionnaire, which deals with the range (section 3.8)
and extent of consultation (section 3.9). The final substantive section of this chapter refers
to the source of questions designed to establish the extent to which managers are satisfied
with the performance of the SME and its employees. The chapter concludes with a
summary of the material.
3.2 The four key dimensions of Fox’s unitary frame of reference
The four central dimensions of Fox's unitarism are, first managerial attitudes towards
managerial prerogative. Second, an implication of a unitary model of organisation is the
concern that conflict raises for managers. Third, flowing from the focus on managerial
prerogative is an implicit set of attitudes with respect to collective workplace relations in
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general. Finally, there is a set of specific attitudes towards trade unions, which forms a
significant focus in the account of unitarist management perspectives on the workplace.
These four dimensions of managerial attitudes will form the proxies for analysing
managers' ideology and determining whether it is a unitarist ideology, which underpins
their management of employees. In each sub-section are presented the sources for each
statement in the survey. These statements were designed to test the managers' views.
Managerial prerogative is the pre-eminent element of unitarism, which is considered first.
3.3 Attitudes towards managerial prerogative
The first characteristic of a unitarist perspective on management rests in attitudes towards
the exercise of managerial prerogative (Fox 1966b p. 407; 1974a, p. 249). As such,
managerial prerogative is central to a unitarist ideology (Wright 1995, p. 5). A unitarist
ideology ‘consists of those patterned and selective self and structural representations put
forward by businessmen which pertain to its distribution’, is ‘both of a strictly economic
kind and in the perpetuation of a given authority structure’ (Nichols 1969, p. 208-9) and
emphasises order and stability (Hyman & Brough 1975, p. 233), which posits and upholds
managerial prerogative.
Managerial prerogative was used in chapter 2 without definition. Narrowly applied to
industrial relations, it refers to ‘the traditional authority of the employer unilaterally to
determine wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment’. More generally,
the term refers to management’s ‘inherent right to operate its business as it sees fit’
(Perline & Pointer 1990, p. 180; 182). This is an ‘unfettered right’ if its scope is not
negotiated between managers and employees. One of the contestable issues, therefore, is
whether room can be made for employee and union participation and joint regulation
through bargaining without compromising management prerogative. Bargaining and other
forms of joint regulation and employee participation involve managers committing
themselves to compromise and to abandoning some aspects of their claim over managerial
prerogative (Fox 1971, p. 157).
Managerial prerogative has within the unitarist framework an inherent legitimacy, which is
reflected in management’s responsibility to exercise their authority in decision-making.
Managers rely on it for reassurance, persuasion and legitimation of their authority (Fox
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1966b, p. 395). The need for justification in this sense harbours an inherent contradiction.
If an organisation really were a unitary construct, such justification for managerial
prerogative would not be necessary. That is, of course, why challenges to managerial
prerogative might be regarded by managers as lacking legitimacy and, at worst, subversive.
Managerial prerogative is a powerful concept involving a set of values and beliefs about
dealing with employees and unions. This set of values and beliefs are operationalised in
the establishment of structures and processes within the organisation. Managers have a
vested interest in the maintenance of their position in production or service provision,
which extends to asserting and defending their place within organisations, not only in the
face of challenges to, or resistance against, managerial control from other employees, but
also against the aspirations and objectives of owners (whether an individual, a family, or
that rather broader and less well defined group, shareholders). At the same time, the goals
of accumulation and profit through efficiency, order and rationality are assumed by
managers into an ideology, which emphasises managerial autonomy (a synonym for
managerial prerogative) as a necessary condition for the establishment of legitimacy
(Clegg et al. 1986, pp. 161-2). Managerial decision-making as the exercise of authority
thus lies beyond legitimate questioning or bargaining (Sutcliffe & Callus 1994, p. 114).
The establishment of legitimacy is not a once-and-for-all condition of the employment
relationship. Littler (1982, p. 39) argued that ‘managers face a recurrent task of re-
establishing their legitimacy’. He posited a pattern of concepts of legitimacy, first, in
terms of cultural norms, such as the formal subordination of labour, which create
overarching patterns of legitimacy orientations. Second, legitimacy is organisation-based,
especially the ‘ideology of technocracy’ which shores up the ‘essential role of
management’ in organisations. Legitimacy, in this case rests in the acceptance of property
rights and management expertise. However, he argues that the achievement of employee
consent, which might flow from this notion, may have nothing to do with the process of
legitimation and more to do with trade-offs and other aspects of the employment exchange.
These processes would indicate that the acquiescence imputed in the brief discussion in
chapter 2 on employees’ responses to domination might in other cases be rather less
passive under certain circumstances. Nonetheless, the legitimation of authority is one of
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the defining aspects of managerial ideology, which consists of those ‘ideas which are
espoused by or for those who exercise authority in economic enterprises, and which seek to
explain and justify that authority’ (Bendix 1974, p. 2). Child (1969, p. 27) likewise applies
the term ideology to ‘a legitimatory function on behalf of management’. Legitimation is
not only asserted through structures and processes. Storey (1983, p. 101) argued that
legitimacy denotes those ideas and statements, which serve to justify management
prerogative.
Those legitimating functions may be quite indirect and implicit in the lexicon of employee
management. Such terms as ‘leadership’ and ‘team spirit’ may be developed to ‘suit the
democratic ethos of the age’ (Fox 1971, p. 205), a reflection, which has resonance in
contemporary business school courses on leadership and teams12. But, they do not
necessarily involve democratic processes within the work organisation. Specifically, such
notions as leadership and work teams are developed within a framework designed to
validate management’s procedural norms with a view to promoting agreement on the ideas
and values, which underpin its modus operandi (Fox 1971, p. 39). It is not just agreement,
or the different conditions of consent or acquiescence, which constitute the objective.
These are management ideologies that seek both to justify the subordination of employees
and affirm employers’ (or managers’) authority (Bendix 1974, p. ix) and managerial
prerogative. The metaphors of ‘leadership’ and ‘teams’ imply that the organisation
constitutes a unified body. Leadership is often presented as the ideal management model,
while work teams replace the hierarchical order of the bureaucratic organization in an
attempt at changing organisational culture (Alexander et al. 1994, pp. 28-9). As Sinclair
(1992, p. 612) notes,
… teams are frequently used to camouflage coercion under the pretence of maintaining
cohesion; conceal conflict under the guise of consensus; convert conformity into a
semblance of creativity; give unilateral decisions a co-determinist seal of approval; delay
action in the supposed interests of consultation; legitimise lack of leadership; and
disguise expedient arguments and personal agendas.
12 Some examples of leadership courses in Australia universities are: Leadership [MGMT13-320], Bond
University; Leadership and philosophy [MBA9056], Monash University]; Leadership and Motivation
[MGSM87], Macquarie University; an undergraduate major in Management & Leadership, University of
Southern Queensland; Graduate Diploma of Business (Leadership and Management), Edith Cowan
University. An example of a course in teamwork is Team Leadership [MGT8037], University of Southern
Queensland. The Australian Catholic University offers short courses in teamwork.
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This depiction – while perhaps overstating the possibility of manipulation in order to
maintain managerial prerogative – serves to illustrate how the use of teams creates what
Sinclair calls the ‘tyranny of a team ideology’. Managerial prerogative is ultimately a
question of power and there is many a case of managers putting in place consultative
mechanisms, which effectively operate as sounding boards while the key decisions
continue to be made irregardless by managers.
Management’s prerogative in issuing directions is based upon claims of technical
competence or expertise and a scientific knowledge of behaviour. Technical competence
or expertise in management might be learned in business school or arise from an accretion
of experience in directing people. Either route also provides ‘a set of impressive and
comforting ideas’ in a doctrine, which explains and justifies what the manager thinks and
does. Such managerial doctrines provide legitimacy and self-justification, explaining the
managerial role favourably to employees (Rose 1988, p. 16). In the workplace, this might
consist of a quite strenuous effort to gain the consent of employees and to transform their
reactions to being managed. The control of work involves an attempt to influence the
‘meanings, values and sentiments given to work by workers, as well as programming and
disciplining their behaviour directly through work organization and supervision’ (Rose
1988, p. 11).
The securing of managerial legitimacy and employee commitment arises from the
underlying characteristic of the employment relationship as a transaction in which the
parties attempt to maximise their returns from the exchange process (Keenoy 1991, p.
318). An example of this can be seen in general managerial attitudes to employee
participation schemes such as Quality of Work Life or Quality Circles. Bradley and Hill
(1987, p. 74) identified two strongly anti-participative elements widely reflected among
western managers. The first rests in a ‘technocratic belief in managerial professionalism’.
This identifies managers as the only competent and legitimate decision-makers in the
organisation. The potential contributions to the firm of other employees are consequently
(but not necessarily) devalued. The second element is a rationale for dealing with
employees which is based upon the ‘privileged position of trust’ accorded managers who
act on behalf of capital and serve its interests. From this perspective, labour is regarded ‘as
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a factor of production with a specific contractual relationship to the firm and is seen as
being essentially untrustworthy’.
The question of managing employees does not necessarily fall within such a framework:
managers are faced with competing models for dealing with the role of employees. First,
Taylorist and neo-Taylorist work schema, for example, eliminate or reduce employees’
discretion over work processes. Thus managers may limit the capacity of employees to
‘interfere in the achievement of management targets, by locating the control of employee
effort in management itself’. Second, management may ‘encourage and channel the
potential intelligence and creativity of employees in the service of efficiency and quality’.
Third, management may adopt a position where a balance is found between these
imperatives (Salaman 1989, p. 87).
These considerations of managerial prerogative lead to a general research question: what
are SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial prerogative? A range of sub-questions
follows that deals with various aspects of the exercise of managerial prerogative.
If this research is to ascertain whether or not there is an identifiable set of values and
beliefs, which constitute a unitarist ideology, the survey needed, first, to examine the
attitudes of managers towards their own role. Participants were asked as follows: Please
tick the box which most closely reflects your view on the following statements about
management. The references listed have typically given rise to the form of the statements
in each of the questions on managerial prerogative.
1. It is a manager’s primary role to direct employees
From the classical perspective, managers give orders and expect them to be obeyed
(Hyman 1975, p. 197; Robbins et al. 1994, p. 619). Fox (1974, p. 250) referred to this
issue in terms of the 'constantly asserted and enforced "right" of the master to demand
unquestioning obedience from his servants'. According to Blandy, Dawkins, Gannicott,
Kain, Kasper and Kriegler (1985, cited in Drago, Wooden & Sloan 1992, p. 42), the role
of management involved planning, measuring and directing the mode of production.
Conversely, according Keough and Doman (1998, p. 33), many chief executive officers
see their primary role as ‘no longer to exert direct control, but to educate their people’.
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2. A healthy organisation is unified around management as the central source of
authority
This issue extends Fox’s (1966a, p. 370) reference to ‘a view of industrial social structure
which combines the single source of authority postulated by the scientific management
school with personal leadership skills urged by the human relations approach’ (see also
Wright 1995, p. 5).
3. Managers’ principal responsibility is towards the employer/shareholders
This item is the converse of the Berle and Means argument that managers have a neutral
role in balancing the competing interests of organisational stakeholder including
shareholders and labour (1932 cited in Dufty & Fells 1989, p. 64). Blair (1995) subscribed
to the view that managers should be accountable to stakeholders other than shareholders.
The concept of shareholders monitoring managers (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer &
Vishny 2001) contains within it an assumption of responsibility back to the shareholders.
Wallman (1999), in the American context, but applying the principles to other national
corporation laws, argues that there is a responsibility not only to maximize current and
future shareholder interests but also to balance the interests of differing constituencies
whose multiple and changing interests must be continually balanced. In a separate
argument, Deakin, Hobbs, Konzelmann and Wilkinson (2002, p. 336) propose that a key
role of senior managers ought to be to mediate between the stakeholder groups rather than
simply acting as the agents of the shareholders. Finally, Margolis and Walsh (2003, p. 271)
note that economic theory ‘instructs’ managers to focus on maximizing shareholders’
wealth and argue that this assumption has come to dominate the curricula of business
schools.
4. Individual employee agreements such as Australian Workplace Agreements restore
managers’ rights to manage
The Full Bench of the High Court provided the general context of specific legislative
industrial relations provisions such as individual contracts (Australian Workplace
Agreements). The Full Bench noted of the limitation on managerial prerogative of
legislation in the industrial relations arena: 'Many management decisions, once viewed as
the sole prerogative of management, are now correctly seen as directly affecting the
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relationship of employer and employee and constituting an "industrial matter" ' (Australian
Labour Law Reporter 2002, 2-520; Creighton and Stewart 1990, p. 81; see also Deery and
Plowman 1991, p. 469 on the 1984 Termination, Change and Redundancy decision of the
Full Bench of the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission). Campbell and
Brosnan (1999) have argued that labour market deregulation in Australia - of which
individual contracts as set down in Australian Workplace Agreements are a key element -
has indirect impacts which extend managerial prerogative. As Fox (1974, p. 250)
observed, managerial prerogative in particular and unitarism as an ideology are rooted in
the common law development of the Master-Servant Acts, which focussed on the
individual employment contract.
5. Managers have more commitment to the company than other employees
In a Finnish study of the impact of human resource management policies on organisational
commitment in the metal and retail industries, Vanhala and Tuomi (2003) found that
managers were more committed than white collar and blue collar workers, reinforcing the
validity of the question. It is also implicit in the following statement from a study report
commissioned by the Business Council of Australia:
Managerial leadership creates the circumstances in which all employees volunteer their best. It
has four elements:
 The existence, among the leadership of a business, of a clear vision of the values
and behaviours that should characterise employment relationships within the
business.
 The manifestation of those values and behaviours by managers to build the
confidence, trust and commitment of employees.
 Organisational structures and systems that drive and support high-standard,
consistent leadership and behaviour.
 Actions that increase the capability and performance of all employees and their
preparedness to embrace the values and behaviours that characterise the business.
To CEOs, “managerial leadership” is not “management prerogative”. The latter has long had
currency as a way of defining the distribution of power in the workplace in the world of industrial
relations. Leadership is about creating the circumstances in which all the employees of the
business are prepared to align their behaviours voluntarily (Angwin 1999, pp. 8-9).
If employees are encouraged to ‘align their behaviours voluntarily’ with managerial
leaders, presumably there is an assumption of the superior quality of the leaders, and their
manifested behaviours that build, amongst other qualities, the commitment of employees,
would likewise only occur where the manager had superior commitment.
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6. Negotiating trade-offs in agreements compromises effective management
The sentiments behind this statement lie in the public arena. According to Comalco
management, collective agreements and awards encourage a ‘trade-off’ mentality
(McDonald & Timo 1996). In putting the case against collective bargaining, the company
argued, ‘individual contracts have a number of advantages in that they specify the terms
and conditions of employment and are consistent with the company’s desired workplace
culture’ (Industrial Relations and Management Letter 1994). Conversely, Fox, in his
original paper on unitarism, observed that ‘Mistrust of collective bargaining is sometimes
expressed precisely because it is said to encourage the “two sides” mentality’ (Fox 1966b,
p. 405). Peterson (1947, p. 48), in the first edition of the Industrial & Labor Relations
Review, observed that ‘collective bargaining was generally held to be inimical to “sound”
business and economical principles’, and said it presented ‘unique problems in the art of
management’.
7. Involving shopfloor employees in major decisions is necessary for effective
management
This item reflects the joint CAI, BCA, ACTU statement, Issues Related to Productivity
Improvements: ‘The parties acknowledge the need for developing more effective employee
participation based on improved information sharing, developing more effective
communications between all levels of the enterprise and encouraging more active
employee involvement’ (cited in Davis & Lansbury 1996, p. 8). According to
Marchington and Armstrong (1981, p. 11), efficiency (an outcome of effective
management) is one of the objectives of involving workplace representatives through
consultation.
8. Individual employee agreements such as Australian Workplace Agreements reinstate
managers’ primary responsibility towards the employer/shareholders
This item combines the issue of managers' responsibility towards owners and/or
shareholders and individual contracts, referred to in items 3 and 4 of this question set.
Gregg (2001, pp. 34-5) argued, first, that shareholder value is not only the priority for
directors, it is also the principal responsibility of managers and other employees, and,
second, that the duties that directors and managers owe to other groups undermines this
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accountability. If individual contracts extend managerial prerogative (Campbell &
Brosnan 1999), then arrangements such as Australian Workplace Agreements would assist
the reinstatement of the primary responsibility, which, Gregg asserted, overrides all other
obligations. The company, NCR, for example, ‘believes that a cooperative, respective (sic)
working relationship among NCR people without the intervention of third parties is in the
best interest of all our stakeholders’ (quoted in Nissen 1998).
9. Effective managers involve employees in key decisions affecting the organisation
Vaughan (1991, pp. 420-1) noted that one of the advantages advocated for employee
participation was that it creates an improved rationality and legitimacy leading to greater
effectiveness of management decision-making. This statement reflects this rationale.
Walls (2003, p. 26) argued in an engineers’ magazine that ‘most effective managers have
adopted a management style that is characterized as bottom-up problem solving’.
10. Empowering employees will improve the company’s performance
Collins (1998, p. 88) observed that the 'subject of empowerment has been one of the
central motifs of management thought for a little over a decade'. According to Bowen and
Lawler (1992) empowerment has some worker-related advantages and a number of
performance outcomes in providing customer service, which is one aspect of performance.
Simons’s (1995, p. 88) perspective was that empowerment added value to the organisation.
11. Self-managing teams are the way of the future for successful companies
The emphasis in this item is on self-managing teams, often advocated as a key element of
socio-technical production systems which are variously advocated as ‘high performance’
or ‘high commitment’ strategies (for example, see Mathews 1994, p. 51), upon which the
success of companies is dependent.
12. One key to successful management of employees is to put in place up-to-date systems to
monitor employee performance
In exploring the rationale for electronic monitoring of call centre employees' interaction
with callers, for example, Halachmi (1992) identified arguments relating to the
management of complex operations, quality assurance, flexibility, managers' right to know
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what employees do on company time or by using company resources, and policing the
work force with respect to employee policy in the use of electronic resources.
13. Employee resistance to change must be met by firm management action
This question adapted an item from research by Goll & Zeitz (1991, p. 204) on 'corporate
ideology', originally worded, 'Resistance to change should be met by issuing orders and
warning employees of the serious consequences of resisting management'.
14. Involving employees in key decision-making is impractical
Adams (1992) argued that despite the moral imperative of universal participation in a
democratic society, North American managers have adopted anti-democratic behaviour in
the absence of laws requiring joint workplace regulation. The argument against
participation, he stated, is that participation is impractical. Hilmer et al. (1993, p. 98)
criticised the industrial relations system, before the Coalition changes in 1996, for
requiring ‘considerable management time – they often lead to protracted delays and a slow
pace of change….’ Boatright (2004, p. 2) argues that the reason for the absence of forms
of employee participation in organisations is its ‘relative inefficiency’.
15. Managers must set the goals shared by all of the members of the organisation
This statement reflects one aspect of a fundamentalist approach to managerial prerogative
and flows from 'direct control' strategies in which managers constrain the scope of
individual discretion and provide close supervision (Friedman 1977). This would not be
possible without managerially controlled goal setting.
16. Third parties such as unions, government, and the Commission undermine
management’s legitimate authority
This statement partly reflects comments by the then federal Minister for Workplace
Relations that the ‘new Act is built on: commitments to a more direct relationship between
employers and employees with a much reduced role for third party intervention’ (Reith
1996; 2000). ‘Third parties’ included unions: ‘The role of unions in Australian industrial
relations is a classic example of third party intervention’ (Reith 1997). These are examples
of a unitarist perspective on unions (for example, Deery et al. 1998, p. 1.4). The statement
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is consistent with Fox’s observation of the unitarist view of organisation as an isolated
community, a ‘private “unified” structure’ or a team which stands alone, ‘its members
owing allegiance to their own leaders but to no others’ (Fox 1966a, p. 368; 1966b, pp. 392,
403). In such a model of organisation, all other parties are 'third parties' which intrude
upon the legitimate exercise of managerial prerogative. This extends to concerns about
government regulation.
17. Consultation with employees on major issues leads to decisions which are less than
optimal for the efficient functioning of the firm
This may constitute a reason for managerial reluctance about employee participation which
‘dilute(s) substantially their decision making power or erode(s) managerial prerogative’
(Gardner, Palmer and Quinlan 1988, p. 338; see also Callus et al. (1990, p. 136), Davis and
Lansbury (1996, pp. 11-14), Morehead et al. (1997, p. 244). The assumption of managerial
prerogative is that efficiency rests in the exercise of management skills.
In the first set of questions, on managerial prerogative, some of the links between the
source and the wording of the items are implicit rather than explicit, and sometimes they
are adaptations of comments (for example, item 6). This applies to many of the items in
the subsequent sub-sections.
3.4 Attitudes towards conflict
The second key characteristic of unitarism is managerial attitudes towards conflict. Fox
identified a link between the notion of the organisation bound together by harmony and
common interest and a denial of the validity of conflict. Managers do not deny the reality
of conflict but ascribe it to marginal characteristics such as personal friction, managers'
failure in communication, employee incomprehension of organisational aims and
objectives, their failure to understand common interest or the result of deliberate agitation
(Fox 1966b, p. 404).
Managers’ concern with the distribution of power (or its concentration), which underpins
managerial prerogative, is also linked to concepts of management interests and conflict
(Nichols 1969, pp. 209, 212), notwithstanding managerial discomfort with the idea of
conflict. This is consistent with a focus of industrial relations scholarship on questions of
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control and conflict. Nevertheless, it has been argued that the major concept in shopfloor
conflicts and compromises is not power and control but legitimation. This focus arose
from an interest in the substance of rule generation and change, that is, the ends to which
power is directed rather than the roots of power itself. In this context, legitimation has two
aspects. It makes possible the mobilisation of power resources on an issue. At the same
time, legitimation serves to undermine opposition and so achieve the desired results for a
minimum outlay (Armstrong et al. 1981, p. 15).
Survey participants were asked in the third question set13 to tick the box which most closely
reflects your view on each of the following statements about conflict (by conflict is also
meant disputes & grievances in the workplace). Fox (1966b, p. 399) applied Kornhauser,
Dubin and Ross's definition of conflict as 'the total range of behaviour and attitudes that
express opposition and divergent orientations between industrial owners and managers on
the one hand and working people and their organizations on the other.' Conflict in the
unitarist construct, as expressed in terms of divergent orientations, is symptomatic of short-
sightedness and incompetence (Fox 1966b, p. 367). The items in this question are designed
to elicit the values and beliefs of managers about conflict.
1. Conflict in the workplace is inevitable whatever management structures are put in
place
Fox (1966a, p. 375) admonished unitarist managers with the need to accept the reality of
work-group interests which conflict, quite legitimately with their own. The statement is
consistent with pluralist concepts of organisations (Gahan 1990, pp. 64-5).
2. Conflict would be eliminated if management’s legitimacy was recognised by all parties
The statement clearly reflects that aspect of Fox's unitary framework in which one of the
aspects of conflict or ‘oppositional behaviour’ by employees is that it lacks legitimacy
(because it fails to acknowledge managerial legitimacy). Furthermore, legitimacy is
invested in the view that the interests of managers and employees are identical. If
13 The second question in the survey questionnaire was about collective workplace relations. The order
has been changed in this chapter and in other chapters of the thesis to reflect the closer logical relationship
between managers' attitudes towards collective workplace relations generally and towards trade unions in
particular.
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conflict does emerge in an organisation - undermining that unitary characteristic - it
arises from 'stupidity, wrong-headedness or out-dated class rancour', which undermine
managerial legitimacy (Fox 1966b, p. 405; 1974, p. 249). In other words, conflict is
incompatible with the recognition of legitimacy. Long, Sitkin and Cardinal (2004, p. 12)
argue that conflicts, especially those between managers and employees, threaten
managerial legitimacy and authority. The question represents the converse of that
proposition.
3. Unions contribute significantly to the presence of conflict in the workplace
In 1994, an internal Comalco document entitled, ‘Staff Contracts of Employment - A
Discussion Paper’, one of the central arguments for rejecting trade union legitimacy was
that trade unions maintained conflict in the workplace because they owed their very
existence to conflict between management and workers (Industrial Relations and
Management Letter 1994, p. 11). Bramble and Heal (1997) describe the linkage
between unions and conflict as a unitarist view ‘that unions and conflict are essentially
illegitimate, dysfunctional or the sign of an underlying pathology in what is essentially a
harmonious relationship between employer and employees’. While this does not
indicate the contribution of trade unions to conflict in the statement, it does suggest a
linkage.
4. Conflict is symptomatic of employees’ inability to understand the complexity of work in
today’s organisation
Characterising unitarist attitudes towards conflict, Salamon 1987 (pp. 26-27) observed that
‘conflict…(arises) from a lack of understanding on the part of employees that
management's decisions and actions are made for the good of all within the organisation’.
Ford and Hearn (1987, p. 6) likewise identified employee’s failure to understand a
situation, as characteristic of a unitarist explanation for conflict. These observations build
on one of Fox's unitarist characterisations of conflict: that it might arise as ‘the result of
stupidity in the form of failure to grasp the communality of interest’ (Fox 1966b, p. 405), or
‘shortsightedness or incompetence among the parties’ (Fox 1966a, p. 367).
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5. Where conflict occurs it reflects a failure on management’s part to manage competently
Fox (1966a, p. 369) referred specifically to the classical management school perspective
that conflict is an outcome of 'managerial incompetence'. Conflict is not intrinsic to work
organisations but the outcome of managerial incompetence in the failure to apply scientific,
rational principles to the planning and coordination of work. It is a failure of leadership
and social skills in managers, for example, through a breakdown in effective
communication between management and employees.
6. If managers could deal with employees face to face without the intervention of third
parties, conflict would be reduced
This statement reflects a fundamental position on industrial relations reform of the Business
Council of Australia, which advocated an informal industrial relations whose 'processes are
informal, involving direct dealing, eyeball to eyeball, between the parties concerned. In
this world, diversity can be more readily tolerated’ (BCA 1989, p. 27). As Henderson
(1986) put it: ‘the key to industrial relations reform is to make it legal for employees and
employers to reach their own agreements about work conditions and work practices - free
from the interference of trade unions or industrial tribunals’. The assumption here is that
conflict would reduce in the absence of trade unions, in particular. The assumed reason for
this is that union officials ‘see the world chiefly in terms of conflict over the shares of a
"cake" over whose size they have little influence’ (Gorringe 1987).
7. Conflict is mostly the product of individual employees’ reactions to grievances
One unitarist explanation of conflict is that it is caused by incidental factors such as clashes
of personality within the organisation (Salamon 1987 pp. 26-27). At the individual level,
conflict can arise from a ‘failure to understand a situation, a breakdown in communications
and/or a deliberate invention of agitators, trouble-makers, subversives, etc.’ (Ford & Hearn
1987, p. 6). Fox (1966b, p. 405) likewise identified the 'merely frictional' characteristic of
conflict as a unitarist perspective.
8. Conflict is irrational because managers and employees share common objectives
The sharing of common objectives is one of the salient features of unitarism. According to
Fox (1966b, pp. 391-2) the unitary system has ‘one source of authority and one focus of
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loyalty, which is why it suggests the team analogy’, in which there ‘are no oppositionary
groups or factions’ (see also Deery & Plowman 1991, p. 5). The team analogy imputes
common objectives. Fox specifically referred to the irrationality of employee-generated
conflict. He drew the conclusion from a human relations perspective, in which managerial
behaviour is characterised as being guided by the logic of cost and efficiency, and workers
display 'a non-logical, emotional, and sentimental nature (Miller & Form 1964, cited in Fox
1973, p. 186), that ‘It is only a short step to the triumphant conclusion that the workers'
irrational behaviour is and that irrationality of conflict flows from this conception of the
employment relationship’ (Fox 1973, p. 186).
9. Conflict between managers and employees is usually stirred up by third parties
The third party source of conflict is an assumption, which underlies the BCA’s criticism of
industrial relations as ‘largely focused outside the enterprise, adversarial in nature, and
conducted by intermediaries positioned between management and other employees’ (BCA
1987). Fox (1974, p. 271) referred to the unitary view that unions 'play an essentially
mischievous role by inducing their gullible fellows to take up a conflict stance towards the
management function'.
10. There will be no conflict when all employees consider themselves team players
Deery and Dowling (1988, pp 24) characterised the unitarist perspective where ‘employers
and employees share common objectives because they are each part of the same team’.
That scenario would obviate conflict, as is argued with respect to item 8. Fox (1966b, p.
391) referred to the unitarist picture of a 'successful and healthily functioning team', in
which the members will 'strive jointly towards a common objective', each pulling their
weight to the best of their ability, accepting their place in the organisation and their role,
and following managerial leadership.
11. Individual contracts would eliminate conflict
This is another issue, which is in the public arena. Comalco management argued that
collective bargaining ‘put control of important workplace systems (particularly pay and
termination for poor work performance) outside the business and put it in the hands of third
parties whose existence is based on the premise of conflict between ‘management’ and
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‘employees’ and who may have very different objectives from ours’ (Industrial Relations
and Management Letter, 1994). Removing the role for third parties by imposing individual
contracts was seen to remove a major source of conflict.
12 Management failures in communication and leadership are the most significant causes
of conflict
Salamon (1987) identified poor communication by management of its plans and decisions
as one of the unitarist explanations for the presence of conflict in the workplace. This was
based on Fox's delineation of the aspects of unitarism. Fox (1966a, p. 369) linked
breakdown in 'effective communication' with failure of leadership, and specifically
identified 'faulty "communications", for example "misunderstandings" about aims or
methods' as a feature of unitarist attitudes towards conflict (Fox 1966b, p. 405).
13. Conflict and loyalty to the firm are incompatible
Fox (1974, p. 249) discussed loyalty and conflict together. Although he dealt with loyalty
to management rather than the firm, the statement is consistent with his depiction of the
unitary construct. He referred critically to the unitarist perspective on
'the failure of some groups of lower, and sometimes even of middle, rank participants to
acknowledge management's prerogative and its call for obedience, loyalty and trust…. Employees
should stop defining their situation in conflict terms of divergent goals, repose trust in their
superordinates, accept their leadership, and legitimise their discretionary role.
The incompatibility of conflict and loyalty is clearly implicit in this characteristic of
unitarist attitudes.
The third set of attitudes constituting the unitarist perspective goes to managers' attitudes
towards collective relations in the workplace.
3.5 Attitudes towards collective workplace relations
Fox referred in his initial essay to collective relations in a broad but short discussion of the
dissonance between managerial practice in, and managers’ attitudes towards, collective
negotiations, dispute resolution, and consultation (Fox 1966b, p. 396). Although this
discussion was set in the general context of managers’ attitudes towards trade unions, the
absence of trade unions from many workplaces suggests that the more general topic of
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managerial attitudes towards collective workplace arrangements is also pertinent to this
study of a unitarist ideology. According to Fox, managerial ideology contains conflicting
notions of ‘self orientation and group orientation’. Group orientation is constructed in
terms of ‘undivided loyalty’ to the organisation and expressed in team metaphors (Fox
1974a, p. 125). The unitary focus of a workforce with these characteristics is at odds with
those workplace practices, which recognise implicitly the plurality of interests.
For example, collective bargaining was to play no role in management’s plans for a
‘desirable workplace culture’ at Comalco, a Rio Tinto company (Inside Enterprise
Bargaining 1994, p. 7). Organisational culture is beyond the scope of this study, however
the perspective offered by Comalco management that collective bargaining is inappropriate
for the corporation raises the question whether SME managers have similar views on
collective bargaining and other collective arrangements.
Leadership and work teams are often posited as alternatives to collective bargaining. This
latter process is the lynch pin of pluralist industrial relations process, providing a channel
through which the differing interests of management and employees may be resolved on a
collective basis (Salamon 1987, pp. 266-267). Collective relations may be critically
viewed from a managerial perspective as interposing ‘third parties’ such as unions on the
employment relations between employers (or managers) and employees. This issue leads
to the general research question: what are managers’ attitudes towards collective workplace
relations?
This set of statements, addresses management views on collective relations in the
workplace, the items also come from a range of sources. Items 1, 3, 4, and 5, for example,
are derived directly from, or are paraphrases of, comments on this topic made by managers
at Comalco, a Rio Tinto company, and reported in a case study on the individualisation of
employment by McDonald and Timo (1996).
1. Negotiations and bargaining encourage an adversarial 'them and us' culture in the
workplace
There is a view that ‘traditional collective bargaining is rejected as reflecting an
adversarial “them and us” view of the world at odds with the principles of cooperation
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and “common purpose” ’ (Hamberger 1995, p. 5). The employer association, the
Australian Mines and Metals Association (AMMA 2005), for example, directly makes
this link, referring to the ‘traditional award system which fostered an attitude of
resistance to change, of “them and us” – classic adversarial traits’. The AMMA went on
to claim that the introduction of individual contracts led to ‘positive changes in attitude
and behaviour displayed by those who signed workplace agreements’.
2. Negotiations and bargaining encourage a 'trade off' mentality that works against the
role of management in achieving organisational goals
In a dispute over the introduction of individualised contracts in Comalco, the company's
advocate told the Australian Industrial Relations Commission that the disadvantage of
collective bargaining is that ‘improvements in work have a tradeable value … to be hoarded
up and sold in the collective negotiations’ (AIRC 1995, CRA, Weipa Dispute Hearings, C.
no. 20166 of 1994, Transcript, p. 92; Hamberger 1995, p. 5).
3. Employees on individual contracts will be better team players than employees on
collective agreements
This statement is similar to the view expressed by Comalco Smelting’s managing director
before the federal Industrial Relations Commission that ‘workers who go onto individual
contracts will always be more productive than workers who are covered by collective
agreements’ (Davis 1996).
4. Collective agreements and awards encourage employees to view third parties as the
source of improved employment terms and conditions rather than management
Comalco management argued that collective arrangements ‘encourage employees to view
third parties (union and AIRC) as the source of improved employment terms and
conditions. This makes it difficult for employees to understand that improved terms and
conditions can only be introduced and sustained as a result of achieving improved business
competitiveness and can lead to conflicting loyalties’ (Industrial Relations and
Management Letter 1994, p. 11, emphasis in original).
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5. Management is best placed to determine what is best for the employees
Anthony (1977, pp. 239-40) critically addressed this view, pointing out that the neo-human
foundations of management led to a conclusion that managers are the only ones in the
workplace able to provide for not only employees' material needs, but also their
psychological well-being. It is also another perspective on managerial prerogative,
appropriated from the economic efficiency argument that it is in everyone’s interests ‘that
managers be left alone to manage as they see fit’ (Storey 1983, p 104).
6. The presence of unions generally reflects a history of poor management in an
organisation
Fox (1966b, p. 402-4) summarised the unitarist explanation for the existence of trade
unions at all: they arose through the 'misdeeds and foolishness of employers in the past' and
exist in workplaces because of 'surrendering' or 'capitulating' to unions, a 'situation which is
fundamentally improper'. Lawler (1990, p. 65) observed that management absolves itself
of poor management by identifying unionism as a 'visible symbol of inefficiency and
external threat'.
7. The presence of a union in the workplace enhances our ability to deal with the difficult
external environment of the 1990s
Hilmer et al. (1993, p. 31) argued that necessary reforms had not occurred in workplaces
because the then legislation supported the ‘current pattern of union representation which, in
turn, unfavourably affect the performance of enterprises’. This item is the converse of that
opinion and the assumptions behind it. Union-enhancement perspectives focus on the
argument that unions 'shock' management into adopting more productive techniques
focussed on, for example dynamic efficiency and functional flexibility rather than
employing other routes to profitability, built on low wages and sweating (Freeman &
Medoff 1984; Nolan & Marginson 1990). More recent research suggests that
improvements in quality and productivity are considerably more successful where unions
are present (Juravich 1996).
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8. Collective agreement-making enhances employee commitment to shared goals
This item is related to the issue of employee commitment. As such it represents the
antithesis of a statement by Comalco Smelting’s Managing Director that people in
collective relationships would always work less productively than those in an individual
relationship (Davis 1996). Cully, Woodland, O'Reilly and Dix (1999 cited in Edwards
2000) noted that in United Kingdom 'an active and strong union presence' - and thus a
collective system - 'is compatible with the broad suite of high commitment management
practices', which are both associated with a range of measures of economic performance.
9. The achievement of management goals is compromised when organisational objectives
are modified for the sake of getting agreement with a union or employees
This matter was dealt with by Deery and Plowman (1991, pp. 159-60). The role of
management in achieving organisational goals through the realisation of labour power is
problematic because, where employees are collectivised, managers will be forced to adjust
employment practices through bargaining
10. Agreement-making is a necessary evil which impedes the process of managing the
organisation
This item reverses a question asked in the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations
Survey 1995 (AWIRS 1995): ‘Management here believe that the negotiation of a workplace
or enterprise agreement is important in achieving the organisation’s goals’ [69 percent
agreed with the statement] (Morehead et al. 1997, p. 133).
11. There is too much third party interference in management from government and unions
Both AWIRS 1990 and AWIRS 1995 addressed the basis of this view in terms of why
significant changes cannot be made, identifying among other impediments, unions and
government rules/regulations (Callus et al. 1991, p. 204), unfair dismissal laws/legislation
and union/delegate resistance. In both cases, only a small percentage of workplaces overall
believed that they were impeded by either issue (Morehead et al. 1997, p. 597).
The final dimension of Fox's unitary ideal-type, managers’ attitudes towards trade unions,
is considered in the next sub-section.
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3.6 Attitudes towards trade unions
Those subscribing to a unitarist framework reject the presence of a role for third parties
including government, tribunals and trade unions. Trade union presence in the workplace
overtly challenges the unitary perspective on organisation. Fox characterised the
management perspective as one in which unions intrude into a firm, compete illegitimately
for control over employees and undermine the loyalty of employees to the organisation.
As Fox indicated, though, management might participate in collective behaviours but only
in pragmatic acquiescence with collectivist processes such as negotiation and consultation
(Fox 1966a, pp. 373-4). At the same time, management may indulge in ideological power
plays to undermine collective representation. At ‘Intermotors’, a large automobile
manufacturing company in the United Kingdom, management openly attempted to
‘relabel’ the independent role of the union and the industrial relations process:
The Company recognises Union membership and intends to work closely with our associates'
elected representatives ... There is also a requirement for Representatives to influence our thinking
on matters concerning terms and conditions of employment and to take a proactive role discussing
issues of change affecting the Company and our associates. We do not intend to engage in
adversarial negotiation on such issues but instead will seek to ensure that the Senior Reps receive
appropriate information to enable them to influence in a meaningful way (McCabe 2000).
These perspectives on trade unions have contemporary expression in Australia. For
example, executives at Comalco adopted and executed a planned anti-union campaign
aimed at sending ‘clear signals to employees that union activities are incompatible with our
desired workplace culture’. This was to be achieved by cutting the unions out of the
workplace and dissuading employees, especially new employees, from union involvement:
... (W)e believe active unionism and commitment to Bell Bay are mutually exclusive; replacing the
union presentation at induction with a presentation on the freedom of association and our view of
the role of unions; and taking every opportunity to lead employees to question the value of union
membership (Industrial Relations and Management Letter 1994, p.11).
Collective bargaining was to play no role in management’s plans for a ‘desirable
workplace culture’ at Comalco (Inside Enterprise Bargaining 1994, p. 7). The perspective
offered by Comalco management that collective bargaining is inappropriate for the
corporation raises the question whether SME managers have similar views on collective
bargaining and other collective arrangements or trade unions. Similar attempts by BHP
Iron Ore to introduce individual contracts while the company claimed workers on
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individual contracts could remain trade union members, evoked the following response
from Justice Gray of the Federal Court:
The concept of union membership contemplated by the respondent would be a mere shell. It would
be devoid of any meaningful benefit to the employees who retained it, because they would be unable
to exercise their rights as members to engage in collective bargaining as to their terms and
conditions of employment (Federal Court of Australia 2000).
The presence of trade unions may indicate for a unitarist manager an unhealthy situation
(Fox 1973, pp. 186-7), and compromise with unions might be regarded as an abrogation of
managerial responsibility. A clear example of this mindset was expressed by management
during the 1992 APPM dispute in Burnie, Tasmania, when a spokesman for the company
stated, ‘I accept that in many ways management is to blame for the current state of affairs.
We abdicated our responsibility to manage properly when we went through a third party’
(Industrial Relations and Management Letter 1992, pp. 13-14). Another manager in that
dispute asked, ‘who has the right to run the operation, us or the unions? We’re happy to
consult with unions but what we’re not looking for is consensus. All we want our
employees to do is to work in accordance with their award and to recognise our right to
manage the operations’ (cited in Thompson 1992, p. 151).
The fourth research question, therefore, is about the values and beliefs SME managers hold
with respect to trade unions in their work organisations. One of the features of unitarism,
which Fox identified, is the rejection of rival sources of authority, in particular trade unions
and professional bodies (Fox 1966, p. 365). The statements in question B4 are designed to
flesh out managers’ attitudes towards trade unions and are sourced from examples,
Godard’s survey of Canadian managers, and other texts.
1. Unions are too powerful in Australia
This statement applies to Australia a question in Godard’s survey of Canadian managers’
ideology, 'Unions in Canada have too much power' (1997, p. 211). This is an ongoing issue
in the public arena with Australian opinion polls for decades having addressed the
questions of unions having too much power. For example, a Saulwick poll in 1992 found
that 62.9 percent supported that view (Social Science Data Archives 2002). It is likewise
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an ongoing issue in the United States (Kaufman 2001). Questions about union power have
been asked for decades in polls, such as the Gallop poll (Australian Gallup Poll, 1978).
2. Unions divide employees’ loyalty to the detriment of the organisation
Salamon (1987, p. 27) identified trade unions being regarded as an outside intrusion into
the organisation, and which competes with management for the loyalty of employees, as
characteristic of the unitarist perspective. This statement is an extension of comments
made by Comalco management: it was argued that ‘we believe active unionism and
commitment to Bell Bay are mutually exclusive’ and that employees ‘cannot be both
committed unionists and committed employees’ (Industrial Relations and Management
Letter 1994, p.11)
3 Management is at a disadvantage vis-à-vis unions/
4 Unions are unnecessary if management treats its workers properly
The sources of both these items are statements, verbatim, from Godard’s (1997, p. 211)
survey of Canadian managers’ ideology.
5. Ultimately, management has the right not to deal with trade unions
This item is likewise sourced from Godard's (1997, p. 211) Canadian managers’ survey, but
it has been amended from the wording, ‘Management should do everything legally possible
to avoid unions’. The Business Council of Australia (BCA) advocated a new system of
‘employee relations’ removing unions from the employment equation and directly dealing
with employees (BCA 1993, p. 14).
6. Without trade unions there would be no conflict of interest between employees and
management
This statement is a re-statement of a Comalco discussion paper view that trade unions
maintain conflict in the workplace because they owe their very existence to conflict
between management and workers. (McDonald & Timo 1996)
7. Trade unions are an impediment to change in dealing with today’s environment
Rio Tinto adopted this perspective (Stone 1998, p. 575). Hilmer et al. (1993, p. 19) argued
that negative effects of patterns of union representation affect worker productivity, capital
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productivity, skill development, adaptability, and ‘inhibit innovation, a productive culture
and the fostering of mutual interests’. This has been more broadly expressed in this item,
retained as being relevant to such commentaries on the need to reform unions. Likewise,
Drago et al. (1992, p. 95) concluded that there was no evidence of a positive net effective of
unions on performance in Australia.
8. Management does not have any moral obligation to deal with unions
During the 1992 APPM dispute a manager asked: ‘who has the right to run the operation,
us or the unions? We’re happy to consult with unions but what we’re not looking for is
consensus. All we want our employees to do is to work in accordance with their award and
to recognise our right to manage the operations’ (cited in Thompson 1992, p. 151). This
item is an extension of that perspective. Rights imply moral obligations.
9. Union recognition should be a matter for management and employees to decide
This statement is an extension of the argument mounted by Hilmer et al. for the Business
Council of Australia that ‘employees and their employers should be able to determine the
terms of their employment relationship’. The objectives of such arrangements were
transparent in their admission that under their proposals for reform employees ‘will have a
choice of representation and the arrangements we propose will enable managers to
influence that choice’ (Hilmer et al. 1993, p. 107; 110).
10. Management owes it to the owner/shareholders to do everything possible to avoid
unions
This is another adaptation of Godard's (1997, p. 211) statement, ‘Management should do
everything legally possible to avoid unions’ in his research on managerial ideology in
Canada. This wording specifies an obligation to owners or shareholders. It relates
generally to union avoidance strategies (for example, Anthony, Perrewe, & Kacmar 1996,
pp. 604-12).
11. Unions place unnecessary restrictions on effective management of the firm
12. Unions are an impediment to flexibility and productivity
These statements cover similar grounds. Drago et al. (1992, p. 237), in their study for the
Business Council of Australia, concluded from their analysis of the data that the reduction
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of restrictive work practices depended on reducing the influence of union officials in the
workplace unions promoted adherence to restrictive work practices. These statements
reflect that finding. In the neo-classical approach to trade unions and productivity, unions
are viewed as an impediment to productivity (Metcalf 1990).
13. Managers should try and find ways of getting the union out of the workplace
This an expression of union avoidance strategies (for example, Kochan et al. 1994, p. 56).
The reasons for adopting such strategies may be neo-classical approaches to the costs of
unionisation in terms of potential union wage gains and consequent loss in profits (Kleiner
2001). According to Rechtschaffen (1998, p. 3), a US labour lawyer, the goal of
management union avoidance strategies is not 'to convince employees that unions are bad,
but to demonstrate that unions are unnecessary in their workplace'.
14. Unions have their place but not in this company
This item reflects the observations of Kochan, Katz and McKersie (1994, p. 15) that there
was a prevalent view among US managers that unions were essential in a democracy, but
not necessarily ‘in my firm or on my property’.
In the next sub-section, the basis for question B5, which addresses managers’ perspectives
on the limitation on managing employees.
3.7 Managers’ perspectives on the limitations on managing employees
Question B5 asked managers to indicate the extent to which they believe they are limited
by a number of factors. Before conducting the data analysis of the question, it was clear
that there were both internal and external limitations canvassed by the survey questionnaire.
The internal limitations included corporate human resource policy, employee resistance to
human resource management and lack of resources. Keen and Vickerstaff (1997) identified
a number of constraints on middle managers in adopting human resource management
policies and practices in local government, which included lack of resources. Employee
resistance to human resource management is implicit in some HR functions such as
employee counselling (O’Connor 1999) and unions and their members may resist human
resource management initiatives (Kizilos & Reshef 1997). The external limitations
included awards, unions, and government legislation. Awards are often identified as
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impediments to organisational efficiency (eg, Lund & Wright 2001). Trade unions might
push the limits of management prerogative (Jones 1985; Clarke & Haiven 1999). Lund and
Wright (2001) argued that state intervention through compulsory arbitration legislation in
Australia had an impact on management autonomy within the workplace.
The items in Question 5B (table 3.1), To what extent do you believe you are limited in how
you manage your employees by the following factors, were derived and adapted from
questions dealing with the impediments to introducing efficiency changes asked in AWIRS
1990 and AWIRS 1995. These are relevant to managerial perspectives on the roles of
employees and third parties, especially unions, in the impeding the exercise of managerial
prerogative, one of the concerns central to the unitarist construct articulated by Fox (1966,
passim). This question was added after the interview programme and the conduct of the
pilot.
Table 3.1:The sources of items in the question relating to the limits on the exercise of the
management function
Question B5: To what extent do you believe you are limited in how you manage your employees
by the following factors?
Typical source of items, including adaptations
Items: Question B5
AWIRS 1990 (Callus et al 1991,
p. 204)
AWIRS 1995 (Morehead et al
1997, p. 256).
1. Human resource policy
from corporate
headquarters
‘Management or organisation
policy’ as a reason for why
managers feel they cannot make
efficiency changes at their
workplace
‘Management, head office or
government policy’ as a reason
why significant efficiency changes
could not be made
2. Awards Awards as an impediment to
efficiency changes
Awards/agreements as an
impediment to significant
efficiency changes
3. Unions Unions as an impediment to
efficiency changes
Employee/delegate or trade union
resistance as an impediment to
significant efficiency changes
4. Employee resistance to
your management
Employee/delegate or trade union
resistance as an impediment to
significant efficiency changes
5. Government legislation ‘Government rules and
regulations’ as an impediment to
efficiency changes
‘Management, head office or
government policy’ as an
impediment to significant
efficiency changes
6. Lack of resources ‘Lack of money or resources’ as an
impediment to efficiency changes
‘Financial/economic’ impediments
to significant efficiency changes
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3.8 Consultation Issues
All of the items in questions C1 and C2 (table 3.2) were used in the Queensland and
Australian surveys of SMEs conducted by Wiesner and McDonald. These consultation
items draw out the practice of managers and are used to measure the links between the
assumptions of managers and the practices actually conducted in the workplace. Change
issues were explored in AWIRS 1990 and AWIRS 1995 in more general terms. The
1990 items (Callus et al. 1991, p. 193) were:
1. Major change in product or service;
2. Major restructuring of how work is done;
3. New ownership of the organisation;
4. Reorganisation of management structure;
5. Change in management personnel;
6. Major new plant, equipment or technology;
7. Changes to the structure of the workforce.
In AWIRS 1990, specific efficiency and communication changes introduced in the previous
five years were delineated. The changes not included in this survey were staff
appraisal/evaluation, computer integrated management, and skills audit. Job redesign (item
1, changes to job design and work organisation) and a formal training scheme (item 6,
training and skills development) were included.
For the most part, each of the change categories in the Queensland SME survey replicated
the 1990 AWIRS items. The AWIRS 1995 categories of change were:
1. New office technology;
2. New plant, machinery or equipment;
3. Reorganisation of workplace structure;
4. Changes to work of non-managerial employees.
The items about which managers might consult with employees were expanded to reflect the
complexity of major issues, which confronted organisations in the 1990s. The issue of
whether or not a manager consults on a range of matters links directly with the assumptions
harboured by those managers about the management of employees.
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Table 3.2: The sources of items in the question on consultation with employees
Question C1: In the normal course of your work as a manager do you or would you consult with
employees on the following issues and changes?
Items: Question C1 Typical source of items1
1. Changes to job design and
work organisation
Only job redesign was mentioned in AWIRS 1990 (Callus et al. 1991, p.
193)
2. Quality and cost
improvement ‘Total quality control’, AWIRS 1990 (Callus et al. 1991, p. 193)
3. Plant layout or office design Combination of items from AWIRS 1995 (Morehead et al. 1997, p. 253)
4. Training and skills
development AWIRS 1990 & AWIRS 1995 (Morehead et al. 1997, pp. 112-13)
5. Reliable customer service
and on time delivery AWIRS 1990 (Callus et al. 1991, p. 193)
6. The financial state of the firm
and its market position
Item 6 was varied for clarity from the question in McDonald & Wiesner’s
Queensland and Australian SME surveys(‘The performance of the firm’)
7. Corporate planning The level of management involvement in change is discussed in Callus et
al (1991, p. 76) and Morehead et al. (1997, pp. 243-4). This item was
included to explore the limits of employee involvement
8. Reliable customer service
and delivery
Item 8 modified the original item in McDonald and Wiesner’s Queensland
and Australian SME surveys (‘Market performance’) for clarity.
9. Employee amenities
10. Personnel practices
Both of these items were used in the Australian SME survey (McDonald &
Wiesner 2000): they were not derived from any particular source.
11. Major change issues facing
the company
12. Major change decisions
13. Major policy decisions
Both AWIRS 1990 and AWIRS 1995 addressed specific aspects of
organisational change. As this thesis is not a study of organisational
change and the focus is on consultation in this question, these items refer
only in general terms to consultation on change issues and decisions, and
policy decisions
14. Securing enterprise
efficiency and productivity
This item was an objective of the Structural Efficiency wage fixing
principle from 1988 to 1993
15. Establishing work teams
with direct responsibility
for setting and achieving
targets
Item 15 was appropriated from a question on employment relations
practices. The item was omitted in error from the question in the survey on
the degree to which managers consult with employees (question C2)
1. All but one of these items (item 15) were part of a question on the degree SME managers consult with
employees in the Queensland and National surveys conducted by Wiesner and McDonald.
Question C 2 in the survey replicates the question as asked in McDonald and Wiesner’s
Queensland and national studies. These management styles are directly relevant to the
question of linkages between a unitarist ideology and the management of employees through
their involvement or otherwise in the decision-making process. McDonald and Wiesner
(1998) adapted Dunphy and Stace’s (1992) leadership styles to management. They
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categorised management styles as managerialist, participative or mixed, according to the
level of consultation on these 14 key issues. These levels as adapted, have been maintained
in this survey. They included the following methods of decision-making:
1. Involves widespread employee involvement in decisions
2. Employee consultation with possible limited involvement in goal setting
3. Managerial authority & direction is the main form of decision making
4. Managers initiate & implement change
The methods of consultation applied were those distinguished in the AWIRS 1995 study.
Question C3 asked respondents: ‘Please tick the relevant box(es) for one or more forms of
consultation to indicate the type(s) of consultation which took place if you consulted on the
matters in questions C1 and C2. If the matters in C1 and C2 did not apply to your
workplace, which form(s) would the consultation take if you did introduce them?’ All of
the options were utilised in AWIRS 1995 in a question on the types of discussions about
implementing organisational change (Morehead et al. 1997, p. 543):
1. Informal discussions with those employees affected by change
2. Formal meetings with those employees affected by change
3. Discussions with an established joint consultative committee
4. Discussions with a specially constituted committee established to consider
the particular change
5. Discussions with union delegates at this workplace
6. Discussions with full-time union officials from outside the workplace
7. Other discussions
8. No discussions
3.9 Management Practices in SMEs
The questions in table 3.3 are derived from two principal sources: Godard's (1998) survey of
Canadian managers and the 1990 and 1995 AWIRS. Both table 3.4 and table 3.5 represent
practices, which are largely participative in nature, although they were not identified to the
participants as such.
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Table 3.3: Sources of question on management practices in the workplace
Question C4: In your time as manager of this workplace have you initiated, increased or maintained
any of the following practices and processes in your organisation?
Items: Question C4 Typical source of items
1. An employee involvement/participative
programme
Godard (1998 p. 30)
2. Regular work or area meetings (for
example, quality circles)
Godard (1998 p. 30); AWIRS 1990 (Callus et al. 1991, p.
193); AWIRS 1995 (Morehead et al. 1997, pp. 190-1)
3. A joint worker-management committee
to discuss or implement workplace
change
Godard (1998 p. 30)
4. A committee to address specific
workplace issues other than safety and
health
AWIRS 1995 (Morehead et al. 1997, pp. 192-5)
5. An occupational safety and health
committee
AWIRS 1990 (Callus et al. 1991, p. 193); AWIRS 1995
(Morehead et al. 1997, pp. 123)
6. A quality management programme (eg,
ISO 9000 quality assurance, etc)
Godard (1998 p. 30) with explanatory comment added.
7. A Just-in-Time inventory system Godard (1998 p. 30); AWIRS 1990 (Callus et al. 1991, p.
193).
8. Work process re-engineering
(redesigning the company’s processes,
structure and culture)
Godard (1998 p. 30) with explanatory comment added.
9. Job or task rotation Godard (1998 p. 30)
10. Work in groups, teams, or cells Mathews (1994), ch 3.
11. A multi-skilling or cross training
programme
A cross training programme was added to Godard’s item,
‘Multiskilling’ (1998 p. 30)
12. Job enlargement (viz, increased scope or
responsibility level for employees)
Godard (1998 p. 30) with explanatory comment added.
13. Autonomous/semi-autonomous work
groups
A modification of Godard’s item, ‘Autonomous groups’
(1998 p. 30); AWIRS 1990 (Callus et al. 1991, p. 193);
AWIRS 1995 (Morehead et al. 1997, pp. 190-1)
In table 3.4, the SME managers were asked to rate the extent to which they employed a set
of practices, most of which were participative in nature. The questions are derived from
AWIRS 1995, Godard (1998) and McDonald and Wiesner's studies of SMEs.
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Table 3.4: Sources of question on participative practices in the workplace
Question C5 To what extent have you employed the following practices in the past 3 years
Items: Question C5 Typical source of items
1. A group incentive plan A more specific element of the AWIRS 1990 version of the
item(Callus et al. 1991, p. 193); Godard (1998 p. 30)
2. A profit or gain-sharing scheme Godard (1998 p. 30)
3. An employee share ownership scheme Godard (1998 p. 30) refers to an ESOP
4. A knowledge or skills-based pay
programme
Godard (1998 p. 30) refers to ‘Pay-for-Knowledge’
5. An individual performance based pay
system
A more specific element of the AWIRS 1990 version of the
item (Callus et al. 1991, p. 193);
6. A group performance based pay system In AWIRS 1995, respondents were asked: 'Do any non-
managerial employees at this workplace receive payments
based on some measure of performance…? One of the bases
was 'workgroup performance' (Morehead et al. 1997, pp. 221;
531).
7. A bonus system Bonus systems were included in a broader range of
performance related items in AWIRS 1995 (Morehead et al.
1997, p. 530).
8. Line manager makes employee selection
decisions (non-managerial employees
below leading hand/supervisory level)
9. More senior manager than line manager
makes employee selection decisions
(non-managerial employees below
leading hand/supervisory level)
10. Other employees (non-managerial
employees below leading
hand/supervisory level) have input into
selection decisions
Both AWIRS 1900 1995 specifically asked, ‘Who would
usually make decisions about recruitment of non-managerial
employees?’ The options included ’A first line supervisor or
line manager; ‘Most senior workplace manager’ and ‘Other
senior workplace manager’ (Moorehead et al. 1997, p. 434).
According to Nankervis, Compton & McCarthy (1996, p.
239), final decisions are usually taken by managers or
supervisors in the department, which has the vacancy.
11. Line manager conducts employee (non-
managerial, and below leading
hand/supervisory level) performance
appraisal
12. Peer appraisal is practiced at employee
level (non-managerial employees below
leading hand/supervisory level)
Options for performance appraisal include appraisal by the
immediate supervisor and peer appraisal (Dessler et al. 1999,
p. 472).
13. Negotiations and written agreements with
employees
14. Negotiations and written agreements with
unions
These two items were included in a question on workplace
negotiations in AWIRS 1995 (Morehead et al. 1997, p. 530).
The final series of questions in the survey questionnaire (Part D) referred to the extent of
managers’ satisfaction with various aspects of the performance of the organisation and
the performance of employees. This is considered in the next section.
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3.10 The Extent of SME Managers’ Satisfaction with Organisational and
Employee Performance
A Likert scale was applied to each of the items in this final question (table 3.5). The
managers were asked to rate their satisfaction with a number of aspects of the organisation.
These items were added after the panels had considered the questionnaire, and the section
had not been included in the draft. As Godard (1998, p. 35) observes with respect to the test
of workplace reforms, the issue is whether their benefits are perceived to exceed the costs.
This approach was applied to the issue of whether or not the managers in SMEs were
satisfied both with various aspects of the performance of the work organisation and of the
employees. The costs here are evaluated in terms of employees and their behavioural
outcomes (Godard 1997, p. 208) as well as in terms of immediate cost - profitability terms.
All but one of these questions were sourced or adapted from Godard’s Canadian study.
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Table 3.5: Sources of question on performance in the workplace
D1: How satisfied are you with the following aspects of your workforce and your firm’s performance?
Please tick the box under the appropriate heading
Items: Question D1 Typical source of items
1. Employee morale Godard (1998, p. 27) referred generally to 'worker attitudes'. This is one
of a number of related items
2. Employee commitment to
organisational goals
Godard (1998, p. 27) referred generally to 'worker attitudes'. This is one
of a number of related attitude items
3. Employee turn-over Questions regarding employee turn-over were asked of managers in
AWIRS 1995. Performance indicators identified by the federal
Department of Industrial Relations (DIR 1993, pp. 59-65) included
'human resource indicators', among which were specific cases of
employee turn-over
4. Employee attention to quality
of service or product
Godard (1998, p. 27) was less specific than this, referring to 'product
quality'.
5. Organisational profitability Godard (1998, p. 27)
6. Employee absenteeism Godard (1998 p. 27)
7. Accident rates
8. Employee stress
Questions regarding accident rates and stress were asked of employees in
AWIRS 1995 but not of managers. Performance indicators identified by
the federal Department of Industrial Relations (DIR 1993, pp. 59-65)
included 'human resource indicators', among which were specific cases of
employee absenteeism.
9. Employee loyalty to the firm Godard (1998, p. 27) referred generally to 'worker attitudes'. This is one
of a number of specific attitude items
10. Employee cooperativeness Godard (1998, p. 27) referred generally to 'worker attitudes'. This is one
of a number of specific attitude items
11. Employee willingness to
complete tasks on time
Godard (1998, p. 27) referred generally to 'worker attitudes'. This is one
of a number of specific attitude items; it is also a productivity issue.
12. Wastage rates (or damage to
equipment, if you are a
service organisation)
Godard (1998, p. 27) referred generally to 'worker productivity'. This is
one of a number of specific productivity items.
13. Necessity for reworking (or
re-doing tasks, if you are a
service organisation)
Godard (1998, p. 27) referred generally to 'worker productivity'. This is
one of a number of specific productivity items.
14. Employees’ customer
orientation
Godard (1998, p. 27) referred generally to 'worker attitudes'. This is one of
a number of specific attitude items
15. Employees’ interest in the
work
Godard (1998, p. 27) referred generally to 'worker attitudes'. This is one of
a number of specific attitude items
16. Employees’ pride in the firm Godard (1998, p. 27) referred generally to 'worker attitudes'. This is one of
a number of specific attitude items
17. Employees’ pride in their
work
Godard (1998, p. 27) referred generally to 'worker attitudes'. This is one of
a number of specific attitude items
This series was included because it rounds off the examination of managerial attitudes.
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3.11 Summary
This chapter followed on from the general discussion of ideology and that of the unitarist
ideology. Its purpose was to provide thoroughly and systematically for the four principal
dimensions of Fox's unitarist ideal-type, the sources in either the literature or the public
domain for each of the questions developed for the survey questionnaire and for each of the
series of questions on consultation, the perceived limitations on managing employees,
management practices in SME workplaces, and the extent to which managers were satisfied
with the performance of the organisation and of employees, in particular.
In chapter 4 the methodological aspects of the study are addressed.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY
4.1 Introduction
In chapter 2, industrial relations research was characterised as being problem-centred
practically oriented, and an applied field14. As such, industrial relations is a field, which
has been characterised by ‘epistemological anomie’ and there is no ‘safe house’ of a
general theory of industrial relations (although this statement could be applied to
sociology and economics where different schools adhering to different and often
competing paradigms are represented). The danger in this for industrial relations
scholars, according to Kelly (1991, pp. 2-3), is scholastic diffusion and ‘mere
description masked as analysis’. British industrial relations was criticised in the 1970s
for mere ‘fact-finding and description rather than by theoretical analysis and
generalization’ (Bain & Clegg 1974, p. 103). Similar criticisms were made of 1970s
industrial relations qualitative research, which, was said to be a-theoretical and
descriptive (Lewin & Feuille 1983, pp. 357-8).
In this thesis, the problematic of management is narrowed down to the question of the
values and beliefs which guide managers in small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs)
in dealing with employees, that is, their ideology, and whether that ideology is unitarist.
Managers’ perspectives on the management of employees may be rooted in class or
social relations. However, while recognising these factors might permeate the manager’s
construction of the relationship between management and employees, this thesis is
drawn to the ideology itself and the research question as to whether Fox’s (1966a;
1966b; 1971; 1973; 1974a; 1974b) conceptualisation of unitarism is to be found in SME
managers’ attitudes towards managerial prerogative, conflict, collective workplace
relations and trade unions.
Managers’ beliefs and values may be shaped by a number of social class and other
relations, not the least of which are the assumptions of employers and the functions of
capitalist institutions, including the firm. As indicated here and in chapter 2, the scope of
the research on SME managers’ ideology does not proceed to these wider, important
14 Section 2.4
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issues, beyond noting in chapter 215 that it is not safe to assume that the interests and
therefore the ideologies of managers are at one with those of employers or owners of
businesses. However, the research will draw some conclusions about the relationship
between such independent variables as the educational qualifications, gender, source of
management ideas, whether the manager is an owner, and the manager’s age.
Unitarist values and beliefs emerge within their socio-political environments and the
institutional contexts for management. Some managerial ideologies might be generated
in societies that value above all the application of democratic principles in all social
institutions. Where there is ambivalence about power sharing in decision-making or
limited perspectives on the scope of democracy managers could express a commitment
to democracy, but that commitment might not lead to incorporating democratic
processes into the organisation. Beliefs and values and the managerial behaviour, which
follows from their application, are a product both of individual managers’ perspectives
and socio-political ideology about work organisations. While recognising that managers
develop approaches to the management of employees, which are shaped by and within
these contexts, the thesis does not explore the socio-political and institutional
environment because of the focus on unitarism. This is a significant limitation on the
scope of the research.
4.1.1 Arrangement of the chapter
While the research for this thesis has been placed within a growing literature on
management in industrial relations research, the paradigmatic context of the work has
not been clearly identified, although the emphasis upon ideology might suggest a
number of possible directions which the thesis could take. The ontology and
epistemology of the study will explore in section 4.2 the issues associated with the
paradigm into which the research this thesis falls.
In section 4.3, research design is considered. The question of deciding on an appropriate
methodology is discussed and the quantitative-qualitative research issue explored. Both
qualitative and quantitative methodologies are applied in this study and the strengths,
15 Sub-section 2.7.6
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weaknesses and design are outlined. The validity of the quantitative data is reported in
section 4.4. Reliance for both content and construct validity is placed on the literature. In
chapter 3, the sources in the literature and the public domain for each question in the
survey were indicated thoroughly and comprehensively since the application of
Lawshe’s method for establishing content validity was problematic. The reliability of the
data is established using Chronbach’s method in section 4.5. The size of the sample is
found to be adequate for the analysis in section 4.6. The application of the statistical
package employed for the analysis is briefly described in section 4.7 and in section 4.8,
the statistical techniques applied in the analysis are indicated. The final section in this
chapter is a summary of the material.
4.2 The ontology and epistemology of the study
The purpose of this section is to explore and identify the ontology and epistemology of
this study. This is a key task in the development of the research design since the
‘researcher’, whether or not methodologically self-conscious, is guided by distinctive
ontological and methodological benefits (Hyman 1994, p. 167).
The discussion of the paradigmatic considerations of the research undertaken is
significant for five reasons. First, it is particularly relevant for an industrial relations
researcher in the context of the search for theory, which has characterised industrial
relations as a field. Second, it is especially pertinent because this study deals with
ideology. Social science, including the field of industrial relations, has its own sets of
ideological roots and dimensions (Gouldner 1970, pp. 40-1; Marsden 1982, p. 235;
Strauss & Whitfield 1998, p. 17).
Third, there has been a debate in industrial relations about whether there has been a
‘new’ industrial relations or a ‘paradigm shift’ in industrial relations (Dunn 1990, 1991;
Keenoy 1991; Sisson & Marginson 1995, p. 106-7). There is no agreement in the
industrial relations literature on the paradigmatic status of the field. Chelius & Dworkin
(1990, p. 16) argued that industrial relations appears to be in a ‘pre-paradigm’ phase.
Others suggest that there exists a number of competing paradigms in industrial relations.
Industrial relations theories are viewed by some as the application of one or more parent
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disciplines such as economics, sociology or psychology or three integrated ‘conceptual
frameworks’ based upon different fundamental concepts: a Marxian approach; the
concept of industrial government; and the concept of industrial relations systems
(Walker 1997, p. 110-11). This is not the only form that different paradigms might take.
Schienstock (1981, p. 170) applied three alternative theoretical approaches to industrial
relations: the systems model, action theory and politico-economic or Marxist
approaches. Cappelli (1985, p. 107) suggested that existing paradigms no longer provide
adequate explanations for the fundamental changes, which have been said to transform
industrial relations.
Fourth, it might be that since industrial relations as a field or discipline is not dependent
on any particular methodology it is characterised by a ‘diluted epistemology’ (Kelly
1991, p. 3). Kelly regards this a ‘great and unique strength’, whereas Marsden (1982, p.
236) placed industrial relations in a ‘curious “no-man’s land” within social science
territory’, while asserting that ‘an interdisciplinary approach is rarely in evidence’.
Alvesson (1991, pp. 208-9) raised a fifth significant issue, which can be applied to the
field of industrial relations. He argued that, if we are to have a deep understanding of the
knowledge produced in social science16, and are to have greater awareness of the
implications of our research, it is necessary to appreciate that ideology not only might
drive managers’ choices and practices in managing employees, but that it also fuels the
research questions, perspectives and focus of theoretical and empirical studies (also see
Lincoln 1990, pp. 81-2; Kelly 1991, p. 1). Keenoy (1991, p. 321) suggested that such
reflection was rare in industrial research.
The purpose of this section, therefore, is to explore in a reflective way the paradigmatic
‘home’ of this study.
4.2.1 Paradigmatic considerations
The term, paradigm, popularised by Kuhn (1996) in 1962, has been criticised for its
imprecision (Phillips 1987, p. 22; Deetz 1996, p. 191), and is often ‘used as some vague
16 In applying the term, ‘social science’, which Alvesson here uses, it is not my intention to subsume
industrial relations into a sociological framework; rather it represents a catch-all term, which includes
industrial relations research on work and organisations.
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justification for simply having a point of view rather than encouraging reflection on the
validity and sustainability of this opinion’ (Collins 1996, p. 14). By ‘paradigm’ is meant
a commonality of perspectives or way of thinking which reflects a set of fundamental
assumptions about the phenomena researched, and binds the work of a group of theorists
together (Burrell & Morgan 1979, p. 23; Smircich 1983, p. 360; Gioia & Pitre 1990, p.
585; Schultz & Hatch 1996, p. 529; Collins 1996, p. 14). From these beliefs and values
flow the research questions, methods and explanations (Smircich 1983, p. 360). Kuhn
(1996, p. 10), in summary, identified two key characteristics of a paradigm. First, a
research field attracts ‘an enduring group’ of researchers away from one or other
competing modes of research. Second, the research field is sufficiently ‘open-ended’ to
provide problems for the redefined group to resolve. Whether there is such a
paradigmatic community in industrial relations is a moot point. As Wood (1978, p. 49)
noted, ‘the subject still remains highly fragmented’. Over a quarter of a century on, this
observation still has currency. Theorists may have a set of ‘taken-for-granted,
unexamined assumptions shared by communities of scientists, who confine their
attention to small-scale puzzle-solving within the bounds of those assumptions’
(Giddens 1993, p. 149). While not referring to paradigms specifically, the organisational
writer, Smircich (1983, p. 340), caught the concept in Burrell and Morgan’s terms of
‘the range of assumptions about the ontological status of social reality — the
objective-subjective question and a range of assumptions about human nature — the
determinist-voluntarist question’. These dichotomies will be discussed further in sub-
section 4.2.2, below.
Paradigms are thus constructs subscribed to by the researcher in the field. The basic
belief systems and values of researchers determine the starting points, or the givens,
which determine what inquiries are to be made and how the research is to proceed.
These ‘boundaries’ of theory are based on an idiosyncratic production of ‘the theorist’s
creative imagination and ideological orientation or life experience’ (Bachrach 1989, p.
498). Paradigms for researchers thus consist of their responses to ontological questions
about the nature of knowledge or reality, epistemological questions about the nature of
the relationship between the inquirer and the known or knowable, and methodological
issues which go to how the researcher finds out the answers to the ontological and
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epistemological questions (Guba 1990, pp. 18-19). This discussion is thus singularly
significant for the development of the research design, and raises the question of
research and the both the values and beliefs of the researcher. Beliefs and values will be
subsumed into the term, values in the subsequent discussion in the next sub-section.
4.2.2 Research and values
Mannheim (1936, p. 72) addressed the methodological constraints arising from the
researcher’s ideological perspectives by urging researchers to attempt to overcome these
constraints with value free analysis because, he argued, value judgements can lead to
normative positions. A normative set of findings does not necessarily follow from the
researcher’s own assumptions, however Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. xiii) noted that it
is important that social theorists be fully aware of the assumptions upon which their own
perspective is based in order to understand alternative perspectives. This point is taken
further by Alvesson (1991, p. 213), who argued that better quality knowledge can also
come from the researcher’s recognition and awareness of the paradigm-bounded nature
and ideological dimension of the researcher’s own work.
Kochan (1998, pp. 37-39) observed that the primary feature which distinguishes
industrial relations from other disciplines lies in ‘the normative assumptions and
perspectives that underlie our conceptualisation of the employment relationship’ and that
this flows from the assumption of various perspectives on the employment relationship
that there is an underlying conflict of interests between workers and employers.
Of itself, a focus on any fundamental conflict that might imbue the relationship between
workers and employers does not necessarily lead to normative research. Nonetheless,
Strauss and Feuille (1978, p. 275) noted that ‘industrial relations’ founders were
reformers, if not radicals’17. Indeed, Barbash (1997, p. 17) observed that ‘Industrial
Relations as an academic field is best understood, I suggest, as problem solving on
behalf of equity in the employment relationship’, introducing an ethical concern in the
study of industrial relations. Other writers have taken up this point. Ackers (1994), for
example, argues that without a focus upon industrial democracy and employee rights and
17 This was discussed in chapter 2, section 2.4, ‘The intellectual traditions of unitarism’.
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‘fair shares’, industry and society will become despotic and amoral. He argues that
industrial relations should provide a challenge to the exploitative and inhuman features
of unregulated capitalism. For him, equity is a core value and he adopts a normative
stance, observing that ethical industrial relations must be conducted within a pluralist
social justice framework for employees, implicitly rejecting the trends towards
individualism in the employment relationship. This has led the author of this thesis to
reflect on the ethics of the Coalition Government’s Workplace Relations Act 1996
(McDonald 1997).
Not all industrial relations scholars would accept that industrial relations is, or should be,
normative. Dabscheck (1995, pp. 4-5), for example, warns against the negative impact of
normative industrial relations. He argues that it is possible to construct positive
statements, which are concerned with change without being normative. He warns against
research bias as an impediment to developing an understanding of how ‘the real world
operates’, and asserts that such an understanding of the problematic of bias enhances the
ability to realise a desired objective.
However, this thesis proceeds on the assumption that value-free research is impossible
and that methodological or theoretical neutrality is illusory (Morgan 1983a; p. 14;
Mészáros 1989, p. 233; Alvesson 1991, p. 209). Mészáros (1989, p. 234) would further
argue for research which acknowledges ‘the legitimacy of contesting the given order of
society in substantive terms’ in the construction of research instruments (emphasis in
original). Marsden, in a critique of empiricism in industrial relations, argued that
observed facts do not have an independent existence. They are the product of a
theoretical framework:
Empiricists tend to assume that theory will somehow arise from the facts like ‘steam from a
kettle’. But facts are never given they are selected or produced by theory. Facts might not be
given to observation, but ideology is … There is an empiricist process of knowledge and it takes
place in ideology. Immediate, non-theoretical knowledge is a central aspect of commonsense
knowledge or ideology (Marsden 1982, pp. 234-5, emphases in original).
Later he argues that ‘A-theoretical observation only serves to reproduce ideology’ (p.
235). Breuer, Mruck and Roth (2002) note that there is much evidence in the history,
philosophy, sociology, and psychology of science that personal, social, and local factors
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influence the research process and its results. Their sub-text is that standardised methods
of data collection and interpretation cannot eliminate subjective and local influences in
research and the analysis of findings. The question of how data is collected and analysed
raises the issue for the appropriateness of the methods employed in research. The next
sub-section addresses the question of what methods are appropriate for critical research.
4.2.3 Critical research
Harley (1999, p. 2-3) argued that there is a place for quantitative analysis in ‘critical
organisation studies’. He defined critical organisational studies, following Clegg and
Hardy (1996 cited in Harley 1999), as ‘involving the study of organisations with
reference to empirical features, theoretical discourses and social processes’. He proposed
critical organisational studies as an alternative to orthodox organisation studies which,
he argued, are characterised by both a perpetuation and legitimisation of managerialism
in work organisations and positivism in the study of workplaces. Certainly, this
industrial relations research on managers in SMEs does not seek to perpetuate and
legitimise managerialism from a positivist perspective. The study does seek to identify
and explain what underwrites management behaviour through investigating the
applicability of the unitarist ideology.
Whatever course the researcher adopts will depend upon the perspectives that he or she
brings to the research task. Those perspectives may arise in the personal context of
social and political commitments to which the research adheres (Gouldner 1970, p. 41)
and which influence the determination of the frame of the research problematic. The
study of the ideology of managers is as much a reflection of the author’s wider research
interests in industrial relations and in the study of management practices in SMEs as it is
borne out of twenty years of union activism, including a decade of actively dealing with
managers from the ideological perspectives of a union official. As Turner (1996, p. 1)
puts it: ‘Social theory is made with the heart as well as the head’.
Nevertheless, personal history is not sole driver of this research. An industrial relations
perspective on management and organisations also broadly informs the design and
analysis of the research reported in this thesis. The genesis for the research questions is
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the established unitarist framework of Alan Fox (1966a; 1966b). Fox’s categories of
managerial behaviour – unitarist, pluralist and radical - constitute are an influential
framework for analysing management behaviour field as evidenced by the iteration of
unitarism in industrial relations and human resource management texts in Britain and
Australia. This categorical framework also has a critical underpinning. Fox observed
(1969, p. 390) that ‘unrealistic frames of reference exist which distort reality and thereby
prejudice solutions’ to the problems of industrial relations, and asked:
… why employers and managers commonly supposed to be hard-headed and practical
should subscribe to a ‘unitary’ view of industrial organization which is so much at
variance with demonstrable facts. Why do so many of them retain an ideology which
seems mere sentimental illusion? (Fox 1969, p. 394).
An empirical instrument, such as the survey employed in this study, exploring the
attitudes of SME managers and utilising a Likert scale, forces the articulation of values
and beliefs, but within the limited framework established by the researcher. As theory is
being tested the questions are guided by the constructs being tested. The researcher’s
perspectives in this way mediate the questions asked and put in place the boundaries on
the scope of the research. The ‘background assumptions’ provide some of the bases of
choice linking together ‘postulations’ (explicitly formulated assumptions), which
influence a theory’s formulation and research (Gouldner 1970, p. 29). Likewise, the
problem-centred, practical orientations of industrial relations will influence the research
questions.
So, in practical terms, the selection of any research focus — in this case, Fox’s construct
of the unitarist ideology — will be influenced by the assumptions harboured by the
researcher about the research question. For example, the point of view that the way
managers think about and enact the management of employees is problematic for
workplace industrial relations will be significant for what questions the researcher asks
about the ideology of managers. Contrast this with human resource management
(HRM), which proceeds from the assumption that the behaviour of employees is
problematic. Consequently, HRM writers provide a set of normative frameworks for
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dealing with employees18. Assumptions about power and control could lead to
contradictory conclusions about negotiating power, for example. One of the key
emphases in industrial relations is the issue of control. This is not the only industrial
relations perspective, but the one, which is assumed by many industrial relations
researchers – including this author – to be a salient aspect of relations in the workplace
(Hyman 1975, p. 12; Dabscheck 1991, p. 8; Kochan 1998, pp. 37-9).
Studies of managerial ideology on the one hand might invite the researcher to take a
critical position with respect to the management of employees. On the other hand, the
researcher might endorse normative solutions to management problems from a
managerial perspective. Alternatively, a normative industrial relations can be
characterised by either pluralist or Marxist variations on critiques of the employment
relationship, producing an ‘unresolvable debate’ among the different adherents about the
‘enduring conflict of interests … between workers and employers in employment
relationships’ and their practical implications (Kochan 1998, pp. 37-39).
The industrial relations researcher, therefore, can approach the study of the assumptions
of managers in SMEs about managing employees with the objective of identifying a
problematic and drawing conclusions which legitimate the status quo or by both
explicitly and implicitly identifying the need for change to the way managers think about
and actually manage their employees. Either course has implications for the researcher’s
approach to any study of management. Much managerial and human resources literature
normatively legitimates management and organisational structures. The researcher is,
therefore, confronted by a real choice of which the researcher in the industrial relations
of management, as Alvesson (1991, p. 213) argues, needs to be aware. The language of
human resources, employing terms such as ‘best fit’ and ‘best practice’ in the
management of labour, for example, is inherently normative (Boxall & Purcell 2000),
contains prescriptions for success (Gibb 2001), and is positivist (Townley 1993).
Keenoy (1999) criticised HRM as constituted by ‘normative-descriptive discourses’,
which applied alternatives to pluralistic industrial relations about how employees ought
18 Stone (2002, p. 4), states, for example, ‘HRM is either part of the problem or part of the solution in
gaining the productive contribution of people.’
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to be managed. For Godard and Delaney (2000), the normative thrust of high
performance work practices and HRM is to replace unions and collective bargaining as
mainstays of management-employee relations, what Rose (1994) called a normative
breakdown. Organisational research can also be openly positivistic and normative by
being ‘pervasively concerned with the promulgation of practical knowledge’, having a
preoccupation which reveals itself in the widespread concern with organisational
effectiveness (Bryman 1989, p. 4).
Normative solutions and prescriptions will be based upon foundations, which may
support or reject collective arrangements in the workplace. Rimmer (1995, pp. 73-4)
argues that the adoption of a normative role is not the researcher’s function, ‘whose task
it is to explain the actual behaviour of management, unions and employees’. Such a
research emphasis carries with it the danger of an industrial relations which projects
unitary characteristics. Deetz (1996, p. 203) observed that
deeply embedded, and often uncontested, in functionalist/normative studies has been the
acceptance of managerial bias in conception of the organization and articulation of
organizational goals. The justification for this approach to research has often been
grounded in a conception of corporations and management as a kind of value-neutral
tool which scientific study can improve without attention to the uses to which this tool
has been applied.
The pervasiveness of managerially oriented studies of work organisations and solutions
to work problematics, which are based upon unquestioned assumptions about the value-
ridden nature of power relations, clearly point to the need for a reflective researcher to
examine and evaluate his or her assumptions about the field of management-employee
relations.
Are the choices the researcher needs to make mutually exclusive? Some researchers
such as Gioia and Pitre (1990, p. 591) and others (eg., Schultz & Hatch 1996, pp. 529-
30) argue that multi-paradigmatic approaches offer the possibility of fresh insights.
Lincoln (1990, p. 81), however, asserts that accommodation between paradigms is
impossible since the rules for action, process, discourse and what is considered
knowledge and truth differ substantially, leading to diverse, disparate, distinctive and
antithetical ends. This perspective reflects Burrell & Morgan’s (1979) position on
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paradigmatic ‘incommensurability’, although Morgan (1983b, p. 379) later advocated ‘a
theoretical pluralism in which organizations are studied on the basis of different
paradigms and metaphors’. Black (1993, p. 3) referred to complementary paradigms
whereas Frenkel talked about these issues in terms of ‘single-strand’ and ‘multistrand’
schools of thought on theory and methodology:
The multistrand approach rejects the view [eg., of positivists] that any one theory or
methodology is inherently superior, rather it contends that different theories and
methodologies can be judiciously combined to throw light on, and explain, designated
aspects of society (Frenkel 1986, p. 117).
For Deetz, paradigms are both commensurable and incommensurable. He argued that it
is the struggle to maintain coherence that separates paradigms, but as researchers deal
with an ‘ultimately indeterminate outside world’ their paradigms are brought together
(Deetz 1996, p. 193). However, elsewhere in that paper, critically referring to the
adoption of different perspectives across different forms of discourse, he concluded that
‘Good scholars have deep commitments”. He added that applying a range of
perspectives ‘often leads to shallow readings and uses of alternative orientations, since
unexamined basic assumptions have unexpected hidden qualities’ (Deetz 1996, p. 204).
The author’s subjective decisions about the selection of the research topic, his personal
academic interests, which have given rise to the consequent research questions, and his
assumptions about the world, which generate those interests, are all significant in the
research directions of this thesis. Thus, the fundamental orientation of this research on
managers in work organisations (SMEs) is not to address how employees might be
managed in order to sustain the management structure and satisfy managerial interests
and the ideology, which underpins that interest. It is the very purpose of the management
task itself and the managerial processes adopted by SME managers that are the objects
of this research rather than an ideological objective to uphold the management task. In
summary, the research topic of this thesis addresses managers and how they manage
employees from a critical perspective. Critical perspectives on management are
considered in the next sub-section.
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4.2.4 Critical perspectives on management
In this thesis, the author does not intend to iterate managerialist perspectives on the role
of managers through the employment of quantitative techniques in surveying a
population of SME managers. Indeed, by testing for Fox’s unitarist framework, this
author assumes a critical mantle with respect to forms of management which fit
unitarism, both at the level of values and beliefs and at the level of process in managing
employees. This reflects Fox’s and others’ concerns about managerial ideology, and
leads to an analysis which seeks to identify and explain managers’ taken-for-granted
assumptions in the management of employees. Indeed, in considering managers’
underlying beliefs and values, which provide the subjective context for managerial
actions, managers’ ideology becomes the subject of this research. The directions of the
critical undercurrents of this research on the assumptions of managers, addressed by this
study, take on Smircich’s (1983, p. 355) dictum that ‘an appropriate role for both those
who study and manage organizations is not to celebrate organization as a value, but to
question the end it serves’.
If this research on managerial ideology is to approach the management of employees at
the level of values and beliefs (ideology), where does this research fit in Burrell and
Morgan’s account of the major paradigms in social research? In their paradigmatic grid
(figure 4.1), the vertical axis focuses on issues of conflict and domination as opposed to
the maintenance of order. Horizontally, the concern in these quarters is for subjective
interpretation, as opposed to objective facts (Collins 1996, p. 14). The focus on ideology
concentrates on the subjective interpretation of managers, particularly with respect to the
assumptions assigned to the processes of managing employees. Thus, in general terms,
there is a concern with managers’ interpretations of their role in managing employees
and their social actions within the organisation from a perspective which is represented
on the left hand side of the grid (Collins 1996, pp. 14-15). At the same time, the vertical
axis reflects the concern of industrial relations with control and conflict in the upper
sections.
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Figure 4.1: Burrell and Morgan’s Paradigm Grid
Sociology of radical change
Radical Humanist RadicalStructuralist
Subjective
Interpretative Functionalist
Objective
Sociology of regulation
Source: Burrell, G. & Morgan, G. (1979), Sociological Paradigms and Organisational
Analysis, Heinemann, London, p. 22.
The answer to the question - Into which paradigm does this thesis fall? - might be
partially reached by exclusion. The author’s rejection of the possibility of value-free
research suggests that this work is not functionalist in intent (Gouldner 1970, pp. 333-
37).
Determinism does not challenge the concepts of the immutability of managerial and
organisational power relationships, or questions of authority and legitimacy, which
might be addressed in a focus on the ideational foundations of managerial and
organisational perspectives. A challenge to the taken-for-granted assumptions about
management in work organisations is implicit, if not explicit, in the selection of the
unitarist ideology for theory testing in this thesis.
The wish to avoid a functional perspective does not, of itself, exclude the research from
being functional or positivist. What excludes this study from that paradigm is, first, its
avoidance of affirming the assumptions of the status quo. Second, the rejection of a
functionalist perspective arises from the topic selection. Fox, and Ross before him,
referred to unitarism within a critical perspective within which they advocated an
alternative ideological framework for managers and their organisations to the unitarist
framework. There remains, nevertheless, some difficulty in fitting this thesis into Burrell
and Morgan’s ideal type of the paradigmatic choices available to social researchers. Is a
concern with managerial ideology interpretative, or does it fit the radical humanist
paradigm, or even the radical structuralist quadrant; or does it contain elements of all
three? To squeeze the values and assumptions underlying this research into Burrell and
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Morgan’s paradigm grid may lead to misrepresentation of the underlying meaning of the
research effort (Deetz 1996, p. 192).
Gioia and Pitre (1990, pp. 595-7) suggested a solution for the paradigmatic complexities
and ambiguities suggested in this discussion. They referred to an alternative notion that
researchers might ‘bridge paradigms’ at a ‘metaparadigm(atic) level’, suggesting that
there are ‘blurred transitions’ between each of the paradigms in the social sciences. They
argued that a researcher takes up elements of each. This leads to a consideration of the
possibility of a ‘multi-strand’ adoption of characteristics of different paradigms, as
Frenkel (1986, p. 117) suggested. This might have some relevance for industrial
relations, which involves influences from a number of disciplines, raising diverse
questions and applying different methods, including psychology, sociology, economics,
institutional industrial relations and labour history (Strauss & Whitfield 1998, pp. 16-
17). However, as the subsequent discussion indicates, this is not merely a matter of the
philosophy and ideology of research as captured in Burrell and Morgan’s paradigmatic
grid (figure 4.1). Before further considering their perspectives or the options for research
paradigms, some alternative approaches towards Burrell and Morgan’s approach will be
considered. Deetz (1996) found Burrell and Morgan’s categorisation of research
paradigms problematic and suggested an alternative reading of research choices.
According to Deetz, the subjective/objectivist dichotomy of Burrell and Morgan’s
construction of research paradigms constrains the conception of ‘objective’ science
characterised by codified and quantified studies (Deetz 1996, p. 193). Deetz argued that
other topics are more interesting: ‘What warrants exploration is the subjectivity and
implicit desire to dominate others and nature, rather than the objectivity, of the
“objective” research programs’. The ideology of managers, addressed by this thesis, is
an all encompassing subjectivity. The use of survey methodology in this work is not an
attempt to be objective of itself, but to ascertain the degree to which a given managerial
ideology - unitarism - permeates the values and beliefs in a population of managers.
There are competing perspectives on epistemology arising from Burrell and Morgan’s
depiction of paradigms. In a critical analysis of Burrell and Morgan’s contribution to the
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discussion on social science paradigms Deetz further argued that the subjective-
objective orientation itself reproduces a neo-positivist philosophy of science (Deetz
1996, p. 194). Morgan and Smircich (1980, p. 492) developed another alternative. They
were critical of the limitations of the interpretive and functionalist paradigms, and
produced a subjectivist-objectivist continuum based on a range of six ontological
assumptions and assumptions about human nature. Each approach has a particular
epistemological stance ranging from the objectivist construction in positivist science
where reality is regarded as a concrete structure to subjective phenomenological insight
and revelation.
Deetz’s alternative to Burrell and Morgan’s paradigmatic grid distinguishes between
agreement/disagreement and unity/difference as forms of consensus and dissent19
respectively. Rather than the axes of subjectivity/objectivity and regulation/radical
change, the consensus/dissent axis in his paradigmatic model reflects the functionalist
concern with order and regulation. He explained that consensus and dissent should not
be understood as agreement and disagreement respectively. His intention was to
emphasise unity or differentiation (Deetz 1996, p. 197). Deetz describes research
consensus in the following terms:
The consensus pole draws attention to the way some research programs both seek order and treat
order production as the dominant feature of natural and social systems. With such a conception,
the primary goal of the research is to display a discovered order with a high degree of fidelity or
verisimilitude. The descriptions hope to “mirror” entities and relations that exist out-there in a
relative fixed state reflecting their “real” character. Language is treated as a system of
representations to be neutralized and made transparent, used only to display the presumed shared
world. Existing orders are largely treated as natural and unproblematic. To a large extent through
the highlighting of ordering principles, such orders are perpetuated. Random events and deviance
are downplayed in significance in looking at norms and the normal, and attention is usually to
processes reducing deviance, uncertainty and dissonance. In most cases where deviance is itself
of attention it tends to be normalized through looking at the production of deviant groups (i.e.,
other orders). Conflict and fragmentation are usually treated as system problems, and attention is
given to how orders deal with them in attempts at maintenance (Deetz 1996, p. 197).
Not only does this description of this research orientation fall clearly within the concerns
of functionalist quadrant of Burrell and Morgan’s typology, but also it closely reflects
Fox’s characterisation of the unitarist framework itself. To analyse the values and beliefs
of managers from such perspectives would serve only to reinforce the normative
19 I cannot bring myself to accept Deetz’s corruption (‘dissensus’) of the word ‘dissent’.
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managerialism implicit in unitarism. Deetz (1996, p. 203) also notes that ‘in
functionalist/normative studies [there] has been the acceptance of a managerial bias in
conception of the organization and articulation of organizational goals’. From an
industrial relations perspective, which acknowledges the processes of control over work
relations (Hyman 1975, p. 12), and the struggle, conflict, tension, and domination (Deetz
1996, p. 197-8) inherent in the power relations in the workplace, such a research
orientation would be logically inconsistent.
The difficulty of placing this research in its paradigm can be seen when one looks at the
organisational culture literature. The relevance of this field in the discussion is only that
concepts such as ideology or culture are in the ideational realm of organisational life.
Analytical metaphors such as organisational culture, for example, are said to be rooted in
a dominant concern for the problem of social order in organisations (Smircich 1983, p.
341), which would place organisational culture in either the functionalist or interpretive
paradigms. Research runs the risk of normative iteration of the status quo if the
researcher’s dominant focus is on the maintenance of order in the organisation. This risk
also arises if the ‘guiding aim and abiding concern’ or corporate culture ‘is to win the
“hearts and minds” of employees and to define their purposes by managing what they
think and feel, and not just how they behave’ (Willmott 1993, p. 516), through
organisational rituals, corporate myths and stories, and arcane jargon (Gregory 1993, p.
359).
The functionalist or interpretive approaches are consonant with what Fox (1966b, p.
395) referred to as the three purposes of ideology. The first is a form of ‘defensive
reassurance’ in the managerial role. The second purpose of ideology is to persuade
employees in particular of the unitary nature of organisation. Third, ideology legitimises
the status quo of organisation: that, despite the question of the domination of employees
by management, the interests of managers and employees are identical. Insofar as
Willmott’s (1993, p. 517) account of the objectives of organisational culture refers to a
managerialist and ideological phenomenon, this point is pertinent to the thesis. While
this orientation would suggest this thesis could be adopting a functionalist characteristic
of organisational culture, Denison (1996, p. 619) argues that cultural studies represent a
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‘rebellion’ against the functionalist/‘scientific’ paradigm. Schultz and Hatch (1996, p.
531) noted the presence of such paradigmatic disagreements in organisational culture
studies.
The differences in theory-building for the interpretive and functionalist paradigms are to
be found in the researcher’s goals, their theoretical concerns and theory-building
approaches. Theory building in the interpretive paradigm aims to describe and explain in
order to diagnose and understand with a theoretical concern about the social construction
of reality, reification, process, and interpretation. The functionalist paradigm consists of
a search for regularities and testing in order to predict and control (Gioia & Pitre 1990,
p. 591; Collins 1996, p. 16). In not including a focus on the historical, social and
political contexts of management ideology, the study runs the risk of falling into a
structural-functional framework, which emphasises the rationality of management goals
for the organisation and the impact of irrational human factors on the management
function (Gregory 1983, pp. 361-2).
While the view of industrial relations set down in this thesis would be inconsistent with
models emerging from the functionalist paradigm, it does not appear to be inconsistent
with the interpretative paradigm. On the one hand, Morgan and Smircich (1980, p. 492)
suggest that ideological perspectives emphasising order and regulation at the expense of
ignoring modes of domination, conflict and radical change are shared by both
functionalist and interpretive paradigms. It is difficult to fit a study of the ideology of
managers within the domain of industrial relations into either the functional or
interpretive paradigm. On the other hand, this study is concerned about the social
construction of reality (ideology) and managerial process (managing employees). The
managerial process from an industrial relations perspective is about the structures and
socially produced means of control, which managers reproduce (Storey 1985, p. 197).
As indicated, the selection of unitarist managerial ideology as a topic suggests the
adoption of a critical perspective. This further suggests that the thesis is consonant with
the radical humanist goals of describing, to critique and to understand (Collins 1996, p.
16), with a focus in common with a critical concern for the social construction of reality,
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distortion (not considered in this thesis, as indicated in chapter 2), and managerial
interests (Gioia & Pitre 1990, p. 591; Collins 1996, p. 16). The selection of managers’
ideology as a topic for research is to identify a subjectivist ontology, which emphasises
the values and beliefs of some SME managers about their task of managing employees
and the choices they make in running the organisation. This favours an epistemology
emphasising the importance of understanding how social reality is created (Morgan &
Smircich 1980, p. 492). However, while this author might subscribe to a need for
persuading and guiding managers towards radical changes in employee management
practices and in the structure of organisations (Gioia & Pitre 1990, p. 591), this is not the
objective of this research and normative recommendations are not part of its design.
Deetz refers not only to a consensus-dissent dimension in social research, but also to
addressing where and how research concepts arise. Differences are drawn between a
research orientation in which the experiences of the researched become coded into the
researcher’s language system (an ‘elite/a priori dimension’) upholding the status quo
through the research process, and a research orientation in which concepts are developed
about organisational parties (Deetz 1996, pp. 195-6). His alternative grid identifies
different approaches according to which dominant social discourse the research is
oriented and the origins of the concepts and problems being researched. Thus critical
studies are oriented towards dissent and ‘elite/a priori’ dimensions. He says of critical
‘discourse’ that
Either explicit or implicit in critical work is a goal to demonstrate and critique forms of
domination, asymmetry, and distorted communication through showing how social constructions
of reality can favour certain interests and alternative constructions can be obscured and
misrecognized (Deetz 1996, p. 202)
However, he proceeds to note that critical research aims at producing dissent. Dissent in
research ‘aims at challenging mechanisms of order maintenance to reclaim conflicts and
tension’. ‘The existing orders,’ he explains, ‘indicate the suppression of basic conflicts
and along with the domination of people and their full variety of interests’ (Deetz 1996,
p. 197). A study of an ideology in which there is a unitary perspective of organisation
that neglects such aspects of the dynamic of organisational relationships would appear to
be setting up the grounds for critical research. A critical perspective is implicit in much
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industrial relations research: industrial relations is both about ‘the management of labor
problems’ as well as being problem-based (Barbash 1984, p. 3). It is, therefore, also
solution-oriented. This is the underlying focus for Fox in developing his account of
unitarist ideology which, he argued, is incongruent with ‘organizational reality’ (Fox
1966a, pp. 374-5), and he proposed (and later repudiated) an alternative pluralist model
of management.
Fox’s approach is critical because it sought ‘to identify weaknesses, limitations and
ideological functions of approaches’ (Harley 1999). To what extent, however, is this
research critical? This question is discussed in the next section.
4.2.5 Limitations on the critical approach to the research topic
If this work is neither functionalist nor interpretive, where are its paradigmatic origins?
In Deetz’s terms, this research implicitly constitutes a critique of domination in the
examination of managerial ideology. For Deetz,
Critical researchers see organizations in general as social historical creations accomplished in
conditions of struggled and domination. A domination that often hides and suppresses
meaningful conflict. Organizations are described as political sites … (Deetz 1996, p. 202).
That is as far as this thesis goes with respect to its claim to a critical study and this
research does not seek either an activist nor a normative approach to the study of
managerial ideology. In the terms utilised by both Gioia and Pitre (1990, p. 591) and
Collins (1996, p. 16), who modified Burrell and Morgan’s paradigm types, the thesis and
its focus on managers’ ideology has elements of radical humanist research which aims to
describe, to critique and to understand. But it also contains elements of the radical
structuralist perspective, which would aim to identify sources of domination, but with
the limitation of not providing guidance for action. That is for later work, which might
emerge from this research. It reflects the radical humanist concern for the social
construction of reality, but is not so interested in the issue of overcoming distortion. And
it reflects a concern about domination, but not alienation. This is not a reflection of a
multi-paradigmatic approach, but is symptomatic of a topic that does not fit easily into
the Burrell and Morgan paradigm grid, and their grid is inadequate, as Deetz suggests.
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While the principal methodology chosen for this thesis is often equated with positivism,
the topic is not typical of a structural-functionalist, or positivist, interest in the study of
management. It does not try to explain managerial behaviour or to test Fox’s ideal-type
construct of unitarist ideology in terms of universal psychological forces, non-social
factors, or reified social constructs (Silverman 1970, p. 140). It focuses, rather, on
unitarism as a framework of meanings, which managers might assign to their role to the
organisation, and to their relationships with employees. The study is phenomenological
in the sense that it does not seek to explain managerial attitudes and practices in terms of
contingency factors (Berger & Luckman 1966, p. 34). It is phenomenological also in the
sense that it concentrates on managerial subjectivity. Unitarist ideology involves a
subjective interpretation of organisation and power relationships. However, as Fox and
others note the unitarist ideology is problematic from an industrial relations perspective.
The ideology is problematic in another sense. While Fox elucidated the unitary construct
from broad generalisations about managerial beliefs and values and it continues to be
applied to analyses of managerial behaviours, the ideal-type itself has yet to be subject to
verification. To re-state the central research question: is the unitarist ideology as a social
construction of organisational reality and of organisational relationships reflected in the
subjective beliefs and values expressed through SME managers’ attitudes towards
managerial prerogative, conflict, collective workplace relations, and trade unions?
In conclusion, Burrell and Morgan’s ‘radical humanist’ paradigm most closely
circumscribes the paradigmatic focus of this question. This conclusion is assisted by the
industrial relations context of conflict, power relations, and work processes within which
the study is conducted.
4.3 Research design
Some of the literature on paradigms appears to conflate notions about methodology and
paradigms (Strauss & Whitfield 1998, p. 24). Thus, the debate between adherents to
quantitative and ethnographic or case study methods, Bachrach (1989, p. 512) argued, is
false. The inextricability of method from paradigmatic assumptions and purpose seems
to constitute one of the foundations of positivism. Burrell and Morgan also challenged
this perspective, arguing that quantitative methods do not necessarily equate with
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positivism (Burrell & Morgan 1979, p. 5). Harley (1999) likewise questions the notion
that certain methodologies are determined by a particular paradigm. Whipp (1998, pp.
52-3) observed that qualitative and quantitative methodologies are not antithetical and
that researchers are in practice pragmatic in their adoption of methods, often using both
in industrial relations at different stages of the research. Qualitative or quantitative
methods are merely the means of gathering data relative to a problematic (Bryman 1989,
pp. 253-4). Collins (1996, p. 20) takes this point further, noting that paradigms, positivist
or otherwise, are more than a simple collection of research techniques: it is the ideas and
values of the researcher, which underpin the use of research techniques such as surveys.
Thus, the utilisation of an empirical tool - for example, the survey - is not of itself
positivist. The significant issue, hinted at earlier in this section, lies in the intent of the
researcher and how the researcher uses the techniques (Morgan & Smircich 1980, pp.
498-9; Deetz 1996, p. 194).
The research design for this thesis was founded on both quantitative and qualitative
methodologies, although the principal research methodology in obtaining data about
SME managers’ ideology was undoubtedly the survey questionnaire. In the next three
sub-sections, the issues and purposes in adopting both quantitative and qualitative
methods employed in this research are considered within the context of these
paradigmatic considerations.
4.3.1 Quantitative methodology
Harley (1999, p. 20) mounted an argument for the adoption of quantitative methods of
research, while acknowledging the limitation of statistics, in particular the implicit
assumption of positivism that ‘statistics can of themselves tell us everything we need to
know about the phenomena under consideration’. However, he added, ‘the conflation of
positivism with the empirical is to do a disservice to the critical project by denying the
legitimacy of a potentially powerful tool in the emancipatory project’ (Harley 1999, pp.
22-3), hinting at an alternative normative agenda to that of the majority of organisational
and management theorists.
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Some researchers would disagree with this perspective, finding the adoption of certain
methodologies incompatible in certain areas of research. Denison (1996, p. 620), for
one, found the application of quantitative methodology to another ideational domain
(organisational culture) ‘curious’ and ‘perplexing’ given the epistemological foundations
of the study of organisational culture. In an essay on qualitative method, Morgan and
Smircich (1980, p. 498) likewise were critical of quantitative methodologies in
objectivist research, which ‘freeze the social world’ and ‘reduce the role of human
beings to the influence of a more or less deterministic set of forces’ (what they called the
voluntarist-determinist question). They argued that any research method that ‘merely
contents itself with the production of narrow empirical snapshots of isolated phenomena
at fixed points of time, does not do complete justice to the nature of the subject’,
committing themselves to reliance on a diachronic perspective on the research subject.
While the desirability of employing qualitative methods for topics such as the ideology
of managers is accepted, the unease expressed by both Denison and Morgan and
Smircich is not shared here in the application of quantitative methods to the ideational
realm of manager’s ideology. Notwithstanding the ‘difficulties [in social research] of
data contamination and imperfect research methods and evaluation of complex
interactions between factors’, Frenkel (1986, p. 117) asserted that empirical
methodologies have value for industrial relations research. Plowman (1991, p. 19) noted
that the scientific method is a useful adjunct to, rather than the indispensable tool of,
social science research where deductive thinking has the potential for differing value
systems to influence outcomes.
The selection of a survey as the principal research instrument in this thesis is a pragmatic
quantitative strategy, appropriate for ascertaining a broad-brush picture of the
ideological preferences of SME managers in managing their organisations. According to
Strauss and Whitfield (1998, p. 14), quantitative methods are not necessarily deductive,
nor are qualitative methods necessarily inductive. Induction and deduction may also co-
exist in a single research project (Whitfield & Strauss 2000, p. 142). They observed that
research by industrial relations researchers reported in the major industrial relations
journals has tended to be primarily concerned with theory building or theory testing. It
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is, they concluded, primarily inductive, directly concerned with policy problems, and
focused on quantitative deductive research. This ‘discipline orientation’ characterises the
nature of the research in this thesis, which empirically tests Fox’s unitarist ideology, a
task that industrial relations scholars have failed to do comprehensively, except in a
superficial manner. One of the dangers of the quantitative approach, according to
Whitfield and Strauss (2000, p. 148), is that there could arise a disjunction between the
ideology, which this thesis investigates, and the proxies deployed in the study. The large
number of items in each of the questions directed towards identifying the respondent
managers’ assumptions was designed to overcome this problem.
Quantitative analysis is increasingly apparent in industrial relations research (Whitfield
1998, p. 65; Strauss 1998, p. 188). This is partly because of the growth of large scale
surveys, in particular the workplace industrial relations surveys in the United Kingdom
and Australia, and the meta-analyses which followed. Whitfield and Strauss (2000) have
catalogued a significant growth in the proportion of deductive articles and quantitative
articles in six of the main journals in industrial relations. The proportion of articles based
on data collected by industrial relations researchers changed very little, from 35 percent
in 1967 to 38 percent in 1997.
Surveys and the analysis of data collected from self-administered questionnaires can be
utilised to address issues of meaning and interpretation (Bryman 1989, p. 253). Broadly
speaking, the social subject matter of surveys may yield a set of data providing for the
analysis of patterns in the data matrix (de Vaus 1995, p. 5). The survey method involves
systematic measurement addressing, among the plethora of available topics in social
research, the attitudes and beliefs of respondents (Moser & Kalton 1971, p. 5;
Tourangeau 1987, pp. 151-8; Schmitt & Klimorski 1991, p. 326; Oppenheim 1992, pp.
174-8; de Vaus 1995, p. 47; Graziano & Raulin 1997, p. 143). In this case, what is
surveyed are the values and beliefs or ideology of a sample of SME managers in
managing employees. As indicated in chapter 2, few industrial relations researchers after
Fox, other than Godard (1997; 1998) have systematically dealt with managers’ ideology.
In dealing quantitatively with the attitudes, values and beliefs of managers, which are
abstract phenomena (Oppenheim 1992, p. 175), the research runs the risk of reducing
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managers’ ideology to merely another organisational variable, as Denison (1996, p. 620)
reflects in a paper on quantitative research methods in organisational culture studies.
However, ideology is a priori integral to the choices managers adopt in managing
employees and, therefore, of interest in studying the attitudes of managers and the
choices they make in the management of employees.
This thesis involves the administration of a mailed survey and analysis of its resultant
quantitative data, as well as analysis of the qualitative data from an interview program.
The choice of the survey methodology as the principal component of the research design
was determined by the possibility of obtaining a broad picture across the eastern
seaboard of managers and their assumptions in Australian small and medium sized
enterprises. A mail survey supported by interview data has the advantage of limiting the
cost implications of interviewing a large sample (Goode & Hatt 1952, p. 230; Moser &
Kalton 1971, p. 257; Dillman 1978, pp. 2-3; Bryman 1989, p. 42; Schmitt & Klimorski
1991, p. 327; Oppenheim 1992, p. 82).
How does the researcher measure something as intangible as the ideology, or in other
terms, the values and beliefs, of managers? Values and beliefs, because they cannot be
directly observed, can be inferred by indirect means (Zikmund 1997, p. 352) through a
series of questions designed to measure them (Moser & Kalton 1971, p. 351). According
to Rossi and Anderson (1982, p. 28) the ‘dimensions’ of social phenomena can be talked
about in terms of the quality of social ‘objects’ or ‘a variable characterising such objects
that can vary in kind or amount’. While this approach can be operationalised by question
sets in a survey, there is a danger of reifying values and beliefs.
The problem indicated by Millward, Marginson, and Callus (1998) and Buchanan (1999)
may not be an issue with respect to ascertaining the ideological underpinnings of
management views. While ideological perspectives might be subject to sudden reversal
— the analogy of St Paul on the road to Damascus occurs as a metaphor — what matters
is not that a manager might be converted from a unitarist perspective on management
and organisation, but whether a set of values and beliefs might be switched at all.
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The more significant issue is whether surveys or interviews can be employed to access
managers’ ideology. From a broad theoretical perspective, Waller, Huber and Glick
(1995, p. 951) note that there is no wholly satisfactory research protocol for identifying
what people perceive, especially in complex natural settings. Furthermore, it has been
argued that quantitative methods of social research may be inappropriate once the
ontological view of the world as a concrete structure is rejected and substituted by
concepts of the social construction of reality where human beings actively contribute to
its creation (Morgan & Smircich 1980, p. 498).
Attitude scales in a series of questions nevertheless do provide a technique for
measuring the intensity of the value or belief about the various items (Oppenheim 1992,
p. 176). Thus, since the objective of this research is to address the ideological basis of
managing employees, questions can be utilised for flushing out the subjective
assumptions managers apply to the business of managing employees.
Multiple indicators, such as attitude scales, have a number of advantages: first, to deal
with broad concepts by providing a number of items; second, to offset an incorrectly or
inappropriately answered question; third, the presence of more than one indicator can
offset a poorly worded item; and, fourth, to draw finer distinctions between respondents
(Bryman 1989, p. 38). The four sets of questions covered in the survey used for this
research correspond to the four key aspects of Fox’s construction of the unitarist
ideology. These questions were designed to ascertain managers’ assumptions in
managing employees, and managers were asked to identify for a number of items the
intensity of their ‘view’ (the actual term used in the questionnaire) on each of the
questions in each of the four sets (Oppenheim 1992, p. 176).
Interviews are not immune from the problems suffered by any other methodology
(Sutcliffe 1999, p. 147). Specific issues might include interviewer bias, response errors,
and the effects of the interviewer’s expectations (Moser & Kalton 1971, pp. 385-8).
Conversely, this appears to provide credence to the argument that there is no single,
exclusively valid methodology, which legitimately could be employed in studying an
industrial relations phenomenon (Connell, Lynch and Waring 2000, p. 13). The
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introduction of the interview program conforms to the radical humanist categorisation of
the approach taken towards this research project on managers’ ideology. Distinctive
characteristics of the interview program as a qualitative methodology are considered
next.
4.3.2 Qualitative methodology
Qualitative material was obtained by semi-structured, face-to-face interviews of 19 SME
managers, 16 of whom were in the Brisbane metropolitan area and three outside
Brisbane. These managers were selected from a sample frame of approximately 260
managers. They had previously responded to a Queensland SME survey (McDonald &
Wiesner 1998), and had indicated their willingness to participate further in the SME
project by providing the researchers with their names and contact details. The further
basis for selecting these managers was the proximity of their firm’s location to other
firms within a suburb or group of suburbs in the City of Brisbane and surrounding
districts. Thus, travel times were minimised and the number of interviews maximised in
the available time (26-30 October 1998)20.
The interviews served a dual purpose. The primary reason was to assist in the
development of the survey questionnaire. The second reason was to provide some
complementary data to the principal research instrument, the survey of SME managers.
Thus, the heuristic purpose of these exploratory interviews was to enhance and check the
ideas for development of the questionnaire; any quantitative data was a bonus
(Oppenheim 1992, p. 67).
The questions, modified where it was necessary in the context of the interview, for
example, to elicit further details, were designed to follow the unitarist framework around
managers’ attitudes towards issues of managerial prerogative, conflict, collective
workplace relations and trade unions:
1. Where do you get your ideas about management from?
20 As indicated in section 2.1, this research project is part of a larger project on employee management and
organisational chance practices in SMEs in which the author is a principal researcher. That project had
developed from a small regional pilot survey with 32 respondents in 1996 and a state-wide (Queensland)
survey with 432 respondents in 1997, to a national survey with 1412 respondents in 1998.
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2. If you had to summarise your management philosophy about managing
employees what would you say?
3. What do you think the basic principles are for managing employees?
4. To what degree do you think employees can or should be involved in
business decisions, eg, major change to your product, restructuring work;
reorganising management structures; introducing new plant, equipment or
technology; changing the structure of the workforce?
5. What are your views on negotiating with employees, unions?
6. Do you think that unions or employee associations distract you from the
process of management?
7. If you have disputes/grievances/conflict in the workplace, what, in general
terms, do you think could be the (underlying) reasons?
8. What do you think about individual contracts, such as Australian Workplace
Agreements (AWAs)? What impact do you think they would have on
employee commitment; employee performance (firm performance)?
9. Do you think that unions have outlived their usefulness?
10. Do you think that negotiations and bargaining encourage a ‘them and us’
culture?
11. Do you agree that bargaining is a necessary evil?
12. Tell me what you think about the scope of your right to manage. How far can
other people encroach on the right to manage?
13. What is your principal responsibility as a manager?
14. What do you think about self-managing teams?
15. How would you deal, in general terms, with employee resistance to change
necessary for your company to maintain its competitive edge?
16. Do you think that managers have common interests with employers? If so,
what are they?
17. What do you think makes a good manager? and
18. Is there anything you would like to add about your beliefs as a manager that
we have not covered?
The interview program enhanced the collection of data (Whipp 1998, p. 54) because
these questions were developed around a matrix of Fox’s characteristics of unitarism.
The questions dealt with the participants’ views on management and managerial
prerogative generally (questions 1, 2, 12, 13, 17), managing employees generally
(questions 3, 4, 8, 15), trade unions (5, 6, 9), collective relations in the workplace (5, 10,
11), employee participation (4, 14), conflict (7, 15) and shared interests (16). During the
programme, question 17 - What do you think makes a good manager? - was added to the
questions. Question 18 was a ‘clearing house’ question (Minichiello, Aroni, Timewell,
& Alexander 1995, p. 96), designed to flush out any further reflections on the subjective
nature of managers’ beliefs about their roles. Thus, the interview questions were
designed to cover each of the principal dimensions of Fox’s unitarist ideology. The
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analysis of the quantitative data arising from the interviews, which encompassed these
questions, will be dealt with in chapter 5.
This set of questions constituted an aide-memoire (David & Sutton 2004, p. 88). It did
not exercise a standardised control over the direction that respondents’ answers might
take as in a structured interview, but provided a framework for the topics to be covered,
focussing on the key themes central to the research (Bouma 1993, p. 171; Minichiello,
Aronis, Timewell & Alexander 1995, p. 65; Crano & Brewer 2002; David & Sutton
2004, p. 87). The questions, for the most part, were therefore open-ended. Questions 4
and 8 suggested areas of discussion in their wording but did not constrain the scope of
the respondents’ answers. Open-ended questions give the interviewee freedom about the
scope and extent of an answer (Moser & Kalton 1971, p. 341) and an opportunity to
respond in their own words (Crano & Brewer 2002, p. 162). This brings with it the
advantage of providing richer data (Minichiello et al. 1995, p. 64). Minichiello et al. call
this a ‘recursive model’ of interviewing, which merely refers to a ‘conversational
interaction’ between interviewer and respondent, which is flexible and adaptive both in
dealing with the uniqueness of each situation in which the interview is conducted and
the individual participating in the interview. This adaptability extends to how the
interviewer relates one remark made by the respondent to the next one (Minichiello et al.
1995, pp. 80-81).
The program thus constituted a set of ‘qualitative interviews’. Qualitative interviews are
characterised by open-ended questions (Babbie 2005, p. 254). They are guided by a
general plan of inquiry but the questions are not necessarily asked in the format
suggested in the aide-memoire, nor necessarily in the particular order. The interaction
between researcher and respondent might lead to a variation in the wording and the
order of questions (Babbie 2005, p. 314). Each of the sessions with the respondents
lasted an hour or more and could therefore be regarded as in-depth interviews (Bouma
1993). In-depth interviews are a purposeful ‘conversation’ between the researcher and
the informant. Within the scope determined by the questions, the interviewees gained an
opportunity to express their ‘perception of self, life and experience’ as it applied to
management of the workplace (Minichiello et al. 1995, p. 61).
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In this semi-structured interview program, the sequence of the questions was not always
followed in each of the interviews. This was possible without jeopardising the quality of
the data because the questions were framed around the key characteristics of the unitarist
ideology in no particular order. Furthermore, the directions of an interview cannot be
known in advance for sure (Undheim 2003, p. 122). Occasionally, asking supplementary
questions in order to elicit further responses than those offered, or to bring the
interviewee back to the topic of the question, would modify this sequence through
prompts and probes (David & Sutton 2004, p. 88).
Each interview depended upon the interviewer (who was the author) establishing
credibility with the manager (Whipp 1998, p. 54), rapport (Sutcliffe 1999, p. 146) and
overcoming reticence about revealing business information (Whipp 1998, p. 54)21.
Minichiello et al. (1995, p. 80) call this, ‘setting the tone’ of the interview. This usually
occurred before the recording of the interview commenced. The interviewer told them
something about his own background and the background of the research. Participants
were reminded of the research project (each interviewee had previously filled out a
survey questionnaire for McDonald and Wiesner’s national survey of employee
management and organisational change in SMEs and indicated their willingness to
participate in further research). Confidentiality was assured. While the interview process
included a period, during the initiation of the interview itself, of establishing dialogue in
order to achieve credibility and rapport, this was the only period where there might have
been an exchange of information. Research interviews tend to reflect a situation of
asymmetrical exchange (Undheim 2003, p. 111). Turning on the tape recorder signalled
the commencement of the substantive stage of the interview.
Using a previously developed question framework minimises the possibility of observer
bias (Sutcliffe 1999, p. 147), and of suggesting answers by asking leading questions
(Patmore 1998, p. 222). Nevertheless, this researcher determined the questions asked
and the structure of the interview based upon his own ‘interpretation and presentation of
reality’. The interviews did not probe the managers’ backgrounds in depth and the data
21 One manager was concerned about information getting back to head office and another offered only
very short responses and appeared reluctant to participate.
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were thus ‘deprived of the “ethnographic context” of the informant’s life’ (Minichiello
et al. 1995, pp. 64; 72). Such were the implicit limits on the scope of the information
provided by the interviewees. However, the structuring of the questions around the key
characteristics of Fox’s unitarist ideology was a necessary, determining factor in shaping
the interview (Minichiello et al. 1995, p. 64). Accuracy of responses was not an issue
since the objective of both the interview programme and the survey questionnaire was to
obtain indications of the underlying assumptions of the participants about managing
employees. Ideally, each organisation could have included interviews with employees
and other managers. This would have applied in the adoption of a case study
methodology, which was not adopted in this research project, since one of its objectives
was to ascertain whether and to what extent a broader population of SME managers
reflected Fox’s unitarist ideology. Adopting a case study approach to provide a
qualitative dimension to the research was rejected as being too resource costly.
The interviews were taped and subsequently transcribed, limiting the chance of
forgetting or losing comments and providing a complete set of records of the interview
program (Friedman & McDaniel 1998, p. 124) and how it was conducted (Moser &
Kalton 1971, p. 281). This provided the opportunity to analyse the responses (Bouma
1993, p. 180-1) within the context of the identified dimensions of unitarist ideology. One
of the tapes was misplaced in the transcription process and was, therefore, unavailable,
reducing the data from 20 managers to 19.
The interview programme revealed that managers in the sample generally had little
difficulty in articulating answers to questions on management, trade unions, collective
versus individual relations, conflict and various employee management practices such as
forms of employee participation.
4.3.3 Complementary methodologies
Whipp (1998, p. 53) argues that bringing together quantitative and qualitative
approaches in the same study can generate new questions and suggest hypotheses to test
quantitatively. This approach suggests that the researcher might sequentially arrange
qualitative and quantitative tasks, and the interview program preceded the administration
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of the survey in this thesis. This is not an integration of methodologies as suggested by
Gable (1994), although Gable focussed on case studies rather than interviews. Such
methodological triangulation has the potential to provide cross-data validity checks
(Buchanan 1999, p. 153; Schur 2003, p. 597) and improve the quality of the data
collected (Buchanan 1999, pp. 155-6). According to Buchanan (1999, p. 151), using a
single research technique is inadequate for dealing with most industrial relations
research questions because of the complexity of the field of study.
In employing a complementary mix of survey questionnaires and semi-structured
interviews, the researcher is not mixing methodologies that are innately unrelated or
incompatible. Semi-structured interviews can be used as part of a quantitatively oriented
research methodology (Minichiello et al. 1995, p. 65). Plowman (1999, p. 41) suggested
that interviews are a form of survey and recommended the development of a structured
set of questions for obtaining consistent data. Millward, Marginson and Callus (1998, p.
139) also identified face-to-face interviews as a form of survey. Nevertheless, Buchanan
(1999, p. 160) observed that by the late 1990s there had been few studies (in industrial
relations) where multiple methods were employed.
4.3.4 Design of the survey questionnaire
The purpose of the survey questionnaire was to establish whether the views of managers
on a range of statements covering the four dimensions of Fox’s unitarist ideology and
certain managerial processes in SMEs reflected Fox’s unitarist ideology. The
questionnaire addressed three central issues: whether there exists a set of beliefs and
values about managing employees; the extent to which managers in SMEs subscribe to a
managerial, unitarist ideology; and the extent to which these assumptions are reflected in
employee management practices within the organisation. Thus it contained four sections
(see Appendix A): a demographic set of questions; a set of questions headed ‘views on
employee management’ which were determined by Fox’s unitarist construct; a section of
questions on ‘structures and process’; and a final section on the respondent’s satisfaction
with various aspects of the workforce and the firm’s performance. Each question set
dealing with views on employee management contained a range of statements designed
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to ascertain the congruence or otherwise of attitudes to various items with Fox’s
construct (Moser & Kalton 1971, p. 351).
Demographic questions were based on the details sought in the Queensland and national
surveys conducted earlier by Weisner and McDonald with some omissions and one
significant addition. Questions regarding franchise operations, the age of the
organisation, its principal product or service, whether it exported, whether there was a
specialist manager or human resources department, aspects of strategic planning, the
period of the respondent’s employment in the company, and questions on email access
and whether the organisation has a human resource information system were omitted.
Two questions were added to this questionnaire, which were not utilised in the earlier
surveys. The first was whether a union was active at the workplace. Secondly, following
a question on whether the organisation was a family business, respondents were asked if
they were an owner and whether or not they were also a family member.
The development of the questions has undergone a number of influences from other
surveys. The initial questionnaire for the regional pilot survey in the SME project and
the Queensland survey contained questions from the organisational change survey
conducted by Prof. Craig Littler from University of Southern Queensland and Dr Tom
Bramble from University of Queensland in March 1995. Other sources were the 1990
Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey, and a University of Queensland
Labour and Industry Research Unit survey on enterprise bargaining in Queensland.
Those influences have been considerably modified for this survey. While there is an
intuitive basis for many of the question items, as well as the elements of Fox’s unitarist
construct, they do have typical geneses in the literature and in industrial relations
sources, which were identified in detail in chapter 3.
Following the establishment of validity (see section 4.4, below), a pilot survey of 6
managers in SMEs was then conducted utilising an amended survey form. This phase of
pre-testing also asked the participants to evaluate the time taken to fill out the
questionnaire, whether they understood each question clearly, their views on the length
of the instrument, and whether the issues raised in the survey were realistic. The survey
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was filled out in the author’s presence. The questionnaire did not require further
amendment as a result of this testing process, and was mailed to the population sample
on 7 December 1998. However, some questions relating to the limitations managers
might experience in managing employees and certain human resource practices linked
with employee participation were added.
The sample frame for this thesis was derived from a systematic selection of every
second respondent to the national survey conducted by Wiesner and McDonald (1998)
on employee management and organisational change practices. The sample consisted of
500 managers in small and medium sized businesses selected from a stratified sample of
SMEs in Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria22. This was composed of 300
respondents to McDonald and Wiesner’s national survey of SME managers’ employee
management and organisational change practices, who had indicated their willingness to
participate further in the national research project by providing their contact details. A
further component of the sample was made up of 200 respondents who had not indicated
their willingness to participate further. Every second respondent in both categories was
selected until a sample of 500 participants was identified. The full sample of respondents
to the national survey was not used because of cost limitations.
The use of respondents to an earlier survey has been found in another study of
managerial ideology to provide a high response rate (Godard 1998, pp. 21-2). The
selection of respondents who had provided their details was designed to enhance this
possibility of higher response rates. Roth and BeVier (1998) found that there was a
strong relationship between advance notice and response rates. The national survey form
had asked for the name of the respondents, their position, the name of their organisation,
address, telephone and facsimile numbers and email address. The request for details was
expressed in the following terms:
We would like to follow up this research with some individual organisation with their
cooperation. If you would be willing to participate in any further extension of this project, would
you please fill out the details below, so that we might contact you. We reiterate that all
information provided on this form will be kept confidential. The research findings will not
directly or indirectly identify any particular organisation.
22 The original sample for the Australian Study was stratified according to industry, size and state from a
Dun and Bradstreet database.
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On the face of it, the respondents who had furnished their details were more likely, all
things being equal, than respondents who had not, to fill out the questionnaire for this
thesis and provide a higher response rate, having indicated a willingness to participate
further in the research project. There are two riders to this assumption. The first is that
those doing so may have certain characteristics, as managers, which distinguish them
from those respondents who did not furnish their details. The second is cautionary: the
respondents may have filled the details out as a reflex to the space provided for their
details, without consciously committing themselves to further involvement. To minimise
the possibility of bias on the first account, 200 respondents who had not furnished their
details complemented the sample of 300 respondents who had provided details. The
weighting toward respondents who had indicated their willingness to participate further
was a recognition of Godard’s experience. A third set of possible negative effects on
response rates related to the timing of the survey. The proximity of the administration of
the survey for this thesis to the completion in late November 1998 of the national survey
on employee management and organisational practices might have generated some
resistance to filling out another detailed questionnaire. A second timing factor was the
closeness of the return date to the Christmas holidays (22 December 1998).
In the event, clerical errors resulted in 100 mailings being duplicated and a second
mail-out to a further 100 SME managers was conducted with a return date of 5 February
1999. Two hundred and six managers filled out the survey forms, a response rate of
41.2 percent. This result bore out Godard’s observation: the response rate to McDonald
and Wiesner’s national survey was only 36 percent (McDonald & Wiesner 1998).
The questionnaire was distributed by mail reducing the time involved in data gathering,
with the advantage of mailed questionnaires of avoiding interviewer bias (Moser &
Kalton 1971, p. 257; Bryman 1989, pp. 42-3; Oppenheim 1992, p. 40; Shaughnessy &
Zechmeister 1994, p. 125), and limiting costs (Moser & Kalton 1971, p. 257; Berdie,
Anderson & Niebuhr 1986, p. 14). The mail survey also allowed for the collection of
responses dispersed across three states on the eastern seaboard (Moser & Kalton 1971, p.
257; Oppenheim 1992, p. 40). The smaller states and territories were abandoned as were
Western Australia and South Australia.
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Reminders were sent to non-respondents to the first mail-out, extending response rate
and response time. Follow-up communication has a relationship with response rates
(Roth & BeVier 1998). This was not done for the second mail-out conducted on account
of the errors in the original mail-out and the schedule for data entry. This omission
might have lowered the response rate. Reply-paid envelopes were supplied. This has
been found to encourage a higher response rate (Moser & Kalton 1971, p. 265).
Ordinal scales were employed for the principal questions relating to Fox’s ideal type on
a five point scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. A mix of nominal
scales and ordinal scales was utilised for the demographic questions and the questions in
Section C, ‘Structures and Process’ and Section D, ‘Outcomes’.
4.3.5 Limitations of survey methodology
Survey research has some reservations attached to it as a methodology. Marginson
(1998, p. 370) refers to the limitations in the ability of surveys to discover the processes
that lie behind the structures and processes surveyed. This applies especially to surveys
addressing the ideological realm, which might be elusive and which in this project relies
heavily upon proxies. In that sense, the resultant data from any survey need to be treated
cautiously. However, if it is possible to survey participants about the intentions that
orientate their actions (Marsh 1982, cited in Marginson 1998, p. 370), then it is possible
to extend the methodology to managers’ ideology.
Bendix (1974, pp. 442-3) raises the question whether it is possible to ascertain
managers’ ideology from a questionnaire if ideology involves a ‘constant process of
formulation and reformulation’. A further question is raised by whether surveys can
reveal the real attitude of managers or distinguish actual practices, which might disguise
the true ideological perspectives of the respondent (Nichols 1969, p. 250). There is a
problem with inferring management motives (and management assumptions and values)
from observation of management behaviour (Miller 1987, p. 354).
According to Millward et al. (1998, p. 137), surveys are ‘blunt instruments for
understanding the social processes that underlie employer-employee relationships’ or to
detect changes occurring within industrial relations structures and institutions. Buchanan
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(1999, p. 155) advanced surveys as a good research instrument for ascertaining the
prevalence of the phenomena being studied. The weakness, he argued, was the difficulty
in revealing the processes that generate them. De Vaus (1995) disagrees, arguing that
while data from a survey may describe the phenomena, which are the topic of a survey,
it may also provide an understanding of such phenomena. A single survey has the
limitation of providing a ‘snapshot’ of a research issue with the danger of failing to seize
upon the dynamics of social phenomena. However, a survey does have the potential of
its findings being applicable to a broad population, in this case SME managers, provided
the sample is representative (Callus 1999, p. 109).
With respect to the core focus of the research – the ideology of SME managers – these
problems are not insurmountable. Constructing the questions around four of the key
dimensions of Fox’s unitarist ideology, and focussing on the responses of managers to
the statements in each question, was designed to reflect typical unitarist attitudes. This
provides a range of proxies for managerial ideology not found in industrial relations
research on managers that is pertinent for analysis. It does not solely rely on reporting
of managerial practices, but on managerial attitudes, although asking respondents to
indicate their responses to questions dealing with the range and extent of certain
practices in managing employees and a number of other features of the manager-
employee relationship enhances the collection and analysis of data on the ideological
phenomena not directly observable.
Limitations of the use of a questionnaire as a survey instrument include the preclusion of
explanations to responses, difficulty in testing reliability, the degree of accuracy of self-
reporting responses, and validity refers only to the survey sample (Edwards & Thomas
1993; Lefton, 1997). Over-claiming can occur (Bacon et al. 1996; Duberly & Walley
1995). Respondents may interpret terms such as ‘agreement’, strategic planning and
business plans in diffuse ways (McDonald & Wiesner 1997). The accuracy of responses
to a self-reporting instrument is another consideration (Shaughnessy & Zechmeister
1994, p. 125). Furthermore, an employee interview programme and a selection of case
studies might have provided a greater wealth of data. These limitations are a function of
resources, which constrain the research boundaries in any case.
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Self-reporting through the medium of a mailed questionnaire provides standardised
responses and may not be appropriate for the acquisition of attitudes (Wass 1994, p. 98).
The task of ascertaining the value and belief assumptions of respondents is also limited
by the questions asked in the survey form. These may, in addition, hinder the collection
of data unforeseen by the research (Wass 1994, p. 98). A reservation about analysis of
data obtained by the survey method is a ‘tendency to overstretch their explanatory power
by some statisticians’ (Brown & Wright 1994, p. 162). While this comment refers to
meta-analyses of large-scale surveys, it provides a cautionary note for the conduct of any
survey.
Specific problems with mailed survey questionnaires might occur. Moser and Kalton
(1971, pp. 260-1) identify six issues. The first requirement is sufficiently simple and
straightforward questions backed by instructions and definitions. In the survey
developed for this research, where necessary explanations were added in parentheses to
statements and each questions provided directions, using emphases. The second issue is
that returned questionnaires have to be accepted as final. Third, the use of mailed
questionnaires might not generate immediate or considered responses. Fourth, there is no
control over the respondent’s pattern of responding, thus the answers to different
questions cannot be regarded as independent. Fifth, there is no guarantee that the survey
questionnaire will be completed by the targeted persons, in this case the most senior
manager, or CEO. Finally, there may be no opportunity — particularly where anonymity
is retained — to obtain supplementary information on participants’ responses by
observational data or by an interview program.
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4.4 Validity
Validity refers to the success of the scale ‘in measuring what it sets out to measure, so
that the differences between individuals’ scores can be taken as representing true
differences in the characteristic under study’ (Moser & Kalton 1971, p. 355; Oppenheim
1992, p. 160). It is a multi-faceted concept in the sense there are a number of different
forms of validity (Whitfield & Strauss 1998, p. 290). According to Moses and Kalton
(1971, p. 355) validity is concerned with the question of whether the scale measures
what it sets out to measure.
Approaches to validity vary between disciplines. This is a particular issue for industrial
relations where researchers may come from different disciplines. Whitfield and Strauss
(1998, pp. 292-3) distinguished between construct, internal and external validity. There
is a range of approaches. Moser and Kalton (1971, pp. 355-7) referred to other forms of
validity, including content validity, construct validity, predictive validity and concurrent
validity. Strauss and Whitfield (1998, p. 13) note that different forms of validity are
traded off against each, often reflecting the researcher’s resources, the rationale for the
research, and the disciplinary tradition. In this thesis content and construct validity will
be tested because the survey targets SME managers’ ideology and tests existing
constructs.
4.4.1 Content validity
Content validity for the questionnaire was required to evaluate whether the survey
measures the features of management assumptions built around Fox’s unitarist concept
(Zikmund 1997; de Vaus 1997, p. 56). Content validity was tested through its review by
two panels (Dilman 1978, pp. 156-7; Schmitt & Klimorski 1991, p. 102), the first an
expert panel consisting of academics and the second a managers’ panel comprised of
respondents to a Queensland survey of SMEs conducted by Dr Retha Wiesner and the
author.
The expert panel consisted of four academics in human resources and industrial relations
from the Department of Human Resource Management and Employment Relations at
the University of Southern Queensland and the School of Industrial Relations at Griffith
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University. The participants were contacted by email. The email contained the question-
by-question pre-test document for problem identification and suggestions for revision
(Czaja & Blair 1996, p. 95), as well as readability and item content (Schmitt & Klimoski
1991, p. 354).
Each member of both panels was asked, following Lawshe (1975, p. 567), whether each
of the questions designed to measure managers’ assumptions were essential, useful but
not essential, or not necessary. The academic panel was advised about the research
context of the survey as follows:
This survey attempts to ascertain managers’ assumptions (values and beliefs) about the
management of employees (by looking at their views on management and managerial
prerogative, trade unions, collective vs individual relations, and conflict), as well as their
practices (I’ll be looking at the link between assumptions and strategic choice in managing
employees).
The managers’ panel consisted of the 17 managers from the interview programme, who
had already agreed to further participation. These were contacted by mail and pre-paid
envelopes supplied for the responses. The task was explained in a covering letter to the
managers in the following terms:
You may recall that I mentioned I was developing a questionnaire which is aimed at ascertaining
manager’s assumptions about the business of managing employees. Instead of sending you a full
draft, I would like your assistance in assessing the content of the questionnaire by filling out the
attached form.
I need to know what you think whether the collection of beliefs and values you might hold about
various aspects of your job in managing employees is adequately catered for in these questions.
The usual way in which the validity of the questionnaire is tested is by a sample of potential
respondents indicating whether each question is sensible and relevant. Therefore, for each of the
questions could you please indicate whether in your view the item designed to measure one or
other aspects of managers’ assumptions about management is “essential”, “useful but not
essential”, or “not necessary” by ticking the relevant box.
In addition, I would be pleased to receive from you any issues you think should be covered by the
questionnaire, but which are not in the survey, and which you believe would enhance my
understanding of managers’ assumptions about managing employees.
Two of the 20 managers interviewed had indicated that they would not be available for a
further survey at short notice and one interviewee excluded during the programme was a
group human resources manager and not from the targeted group of CEOs and senior
managers. The response rate for the content validity test was 13 from 17, or 82 percent,
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partly justifying the anticipation of a higher response rate from respondents who had
already participated in the project, although this was a very small sample.
Other formats for testing the utility of questions in a survey include questions which
refer to whether most respondents will have the information to answer a specific
question, whether they understand the question, and whether they will be willing to
answer it (Czaja & Balir 1996, p. 61). Since the questions were mainly directed to
respondents’ beliefs and values, the issue of not having information did not arise. Even
those questions, which referred to practices in the firm, enabled respondents to indicate
what they would do as well as their actual methods in dealing with issues and changes in
the organisation. For example, the question — Please look at the different approaches to
the making of decisions … Then indicate which of these decision-making methods you do
apply or would apply to the introduction of the changes and issues below — allowed
respondents to speculate on how they would deal with various issues and changes within
the organisation if they had not arisen.
The possibility of unwillingness to answer questions, was also reduced by the fact that
the sample was constructed from a sample of respondents to the Australian national
survey on organisational change and employee management which Wiesner and
McDonald conducted in 1998. Finally, incorporating, where possible, explanatory
clauses and phrases and attempting to avoid ambiguity addressed the problem, identified
by McDonald & Wiesner (1997), of respondents interpreting terms such as ‘agreement’
in idiosyncratic ways.
In testing content validity, the survey questions were scored by utilising Lawshe’s
(1975, p. 567; see also Schmitt & Klimoski 1991) formula for a ‘content validity ratio’
(CVR),
2
2
/
,/(
N
N
enCVR 
where ne is the number of panel members indicating that the question is essential and N
is the total number of panel members. Simply put, any item which was perceived by
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more than half the members of the panel to be essential has some degree of validity; and
the greater the number of panellists who perceive an item is essential, the greater the
extent or degree of its content validity (Lawshe 1975, p. 567). This measure was applied
only to the managers’ panel as the expert, or academic, panel did not adhere to filling
out the survey of content validity, and the responses of members were rather more
qualitative.
When fewer than half of the respondents identified an item as essential, a negative score
results.
Table 4.1: Items from the draft questionnaire related to the four dimensions of unitarism scoring a
negative CVR.
Question Item CVR
Statements related to
managerial prerogative
It is a manager’s primary role to direct
employees -.07
Individual employee agreements such as Australian
Workplace Agreements restore managers’ rights to
manage
-.23
Individual employee agreements such as Australian
Workplace Agreements have reinstated managers’
primary responsibility towards the employer
-.23
Agreements compromise effective management -.23
Negotiations and bargaining are constraints against
effective management -.07
The key to successful management of employees is
to put in place up-to-date control systems to
monitor employee performance
-.07
Statements about conflict Conflict would be eliminated if all parties
organisational management’s legitimacy -.23
Unions contribute significantly to the presence of
conflict in the workplace -.07
Conflict is symptomatic of employees’ inability to
understand the complexity of work in today’s
organisation
-.23
Where conflict occurs it reflects a failure on
management’s part to manage competently -.23
Conflict is usually stirred up by third parties -.23
There will be no conflict when all employees
consider themselves team players -.23
Individual contracts would eliminate conflict -.07
Management failures in communication and
leadership are the most significant causes of
conflict
-.07
Conflict and loyalty are incompatible -.07
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Question Item CVR
Statements about collective
workplace relations
Management’s primary responsibility is to the
employer not to employees -.23
Negotiating with unions or employee associations
undermines managers’ responsibility to the
employer
-.69
Negotiations and bargaining create barriers to
achieving organizational improvements where
employees “hoard” trade offs in exchange for
wages increases
-.07
Management is best placed to determine what is
best for the employees -.23
The presence of unions reflects a history of poor
management in an organisation -.38
Agreement-making is a necessary evil which
impedes the process of managing the organisation -.23
Statements about trade
unions
Unions are too powerful -.23
Responsible trade unions should help sustain the
economy by facilitating companies like ours in
achieving profits
-.23
Trade unions are a challenge to management’s
legitimate authority -.38
Trade unions cause conflict in organisations which
otherwise would not exist -.38
Trade unions are an impediment to change in
dealing with today’s environment -.23
Trade unions undermine managerial leadership -.38
Management does not have any moral obligation to
deal with unions -.23
Unions too often place unnecessary restrictions on
management -.54
Unions are an impediment to flexibility and
productivity -.38
In Table 4.2 there are seven items, which less than half the management panel scored as
essential. Two items in question C4, Practices and Processes, received a zero score,
indicating half the managers in each case believed the items were essential.
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Table 4.2: Items in the draft questionnaire related to specific matters on which managers might
consult employees with a negative CVR score
Question Item CVR
The financial state of the firm and its market position -.23
Major change decisions -.23
Consultation with employees
on specified issues and
changes Major policy decisions -.07
Plant layout -.07
Training and skills development -.23
Consultation with employees
on specified issues and
changes The performance of the firm -.38
Major policy decisions -.23
Practices in the organisation Work process re-engineering .00
A multi-skilling or cross training programme .00
On the basis that 38 percent of the questions put to the panels raised validity problems,
the survey’s usefulness was, on the face of it, limited. If content validity proved
problematic for the survey instrument, were there any other grounds on which the survey
might be validated? Notwithstanding Lawshe’s formulaic approach, Moser & Kalton
(1971, p. 356) observed that the assessment of content, or face, validity is a matter of
judgement. In this case, some marginal changes were proposed to the wording of some
items by the academic panel and adopted. The solution to establishing the validity of the
survey lay in relying on the literature that provided the source for each of the items in
each question and which was presented in chapter 3. The other question of validity
relates to the four dimensions of Fox’s unitarist ideology, which were identified in order
to set up the proxy variables for analysis of SME managers’ ideology. The construct
validity of the research is discussed in the next sub-section.
4.4.2 Construct validity
The decisions on whether or not each question would be retained or culled relied
primarily on whether each item could be justified in terms of the literature. This is a
matter of both construct and content validity. The theoretical and practical sources of
statements — either from the industrial relations and related literature or from examples
in the public domain, such as comments by managers — were systematically reported in
chapter 3. These sources will not be reiterated here. The sourcing of the items (other
than the demographic questions) in this manner offers both content validity and
construct validity. This comprehensive application of sources for each question
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establishes validity for each of the items related to the four key dimensions of unitarism,
which are central to the research question, and all of the other items.
Construct validity is concerned with the measurement of abstract concepts and traits
(Black 1993, p. 68) and is therefore of relevance to the utilisation of a survey on the
beliefs and values of SME managers in managing employees. It deals with the problem
of inferring, in this particular instance, the ideology of managers from their scaled
responses to a series of statements designed to test Fox’s unitarist construct. As
abstractions, managers’ assumptions cannot be directly measured (Moser & Kalton
1971, p. 356). Thus, the items in each of the four questions relating to Fox’s construct
were designed to reflect the factors that constitute unitarism (Strauss & Whitfield 1998,
p. 13).
How well do the questions link up with the elements, which make up an abstraction
(Oppenheim 1992, p. 162), such as Fox’s unitarist construct? As indicated in the
previous section, this is largely a matter of judgement on the researcher’s part (Schmitt
& Klimorski 1991, p. 112). There is no ideal way of determining the validity of a
measure (de Vaus 1995, p. 57). The practical task was to design the B series of questions
in the survey (‘Views on employee management’) under the heading, ‘Views on
employee management’ to reflect Fox’s framework.
The generation of the content of the questions from the literature, and in this way -
particularly with respect to the ideological dimensions – to cover the full range of the
definition of ideology (Moser & Kalton 1971, p. 356) - validates the survey
questionnaire. The sourcing of the items likewise serves to reflect the factors composing
the unitarist ideal-type (Whitfield & Strauss 1998, p. 13; Moser & Kalton 1971, p. 356).
The validity of the survey is therefore addressed by identifying the source of each of the
questions either in Fox’s construct, or in the literature generally, or in other sources for
the statements.
4.5 Reliability
Reliability addresses the consistency and stability of measures (O’Leary-Kelly &
Vokurka 1998, p. 394) and the degree to which measures are free from error and yield
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consistent results (Zikmund 1997, p. 340). The various scales, which had been selected
to represent the characteristics of unitarism, were subjected to reliability analysis and
exploratory factor analysis to establish the underlying structure of the data.
Cronbach’s  tests were used to establish the reliability of the data. This is significant in
that the  coefficient represents the probability of concluding that the specified value of
the parameters being tested (in this case, the four central characteristics of unitarism)
under the null hypothesis may be plausible (Berenson & Levine 1996, p. 388). The 
coefficient ranges from 0-1, with the reliability of the findings being greater as the
coefficient approaches 1, although there is no agreement among researchers as to the
acceptable size of the coefficient. Generally, Cronbach’s  with values of .60 to .70 are
deemed to be at the lower level of acceptability (Hair Anderson, Tatham, & Black 1998,
p. 88). This varies according to the type of research conducted with .60 considered by
some as acceptable for exploratory research (Robinson et al. 1991).
With the response rate of 41.2% (n. = 206, see section 4.6 below), and 8 independent
variables, the sample size is large enough to reduce the probability of not finding a
result. Following the conversions for significance at  = 0.05 and power set at .80
(Cohen & Cohen 1983), the sample size more than doubles the minimum size for
avoiding type II errors.
The reliability of each of the questions in the survey is tested in the following sub-
sections.
4.5.1 The managerial prerogative scale
In examining the reliability of the managerial prerogative scales, the individual items,
overall scale and relationship between the overall items and the individual scale were
examined. Statements B1.7, B1.9, B1.10 and B1.11, whose positive responses
(agree/strongly agree) indicated a non-unitarist perspective towards employee
participation were re-coded (B1.7R, RB1.9R, B1.10R and B1.11R) to reflect consistency
with the other items in the question, where positive responses indicated a unitarist
response. The reliability test of the ‘managerial prerogative’ scale indicated that the
166
Cronbach coefficient of 0.7888 would be improved only marginally by the removal of
any other item. Therefore, no item was removed from the managerial prerogative scale.
4.5.2 The conflict scale
The second key dimension in the unitarist ideal-type consisted of managers’ attitudes
towards conflict. This scale in question 3B contained 13 variables. Item B3.3, ‘Unions
contribute significantly to the presence of conflict in the workplace’ was removed and
added to the Trade Unions scale (subsection 4.5.4 below). The reliability coefficient
(Cronbach’s ) for the summated scale was 0.7197, however the analysis indicated that
removing B3.1 (‘Conflict in the workplace is inevitable whatever management structures
are put in place’) would enhance the reliability of the scale to .7554, which was
acceptable for further analysis. Further analysis indicated that removing B3.1, B 3.12
and B3.5 enhanced the reliability of the scale to .8012, leaving nine statements
acceptable for further analysis.
4.5.3 The collective workplace relations scale
The third dimension of the unitarist ideal-type referred to collective workplace relations.
Cronbach’s  reliability coefficient for the scale, after eliminating items B2.6 (added to the
managerial prerogative scale), and B2.7 and B2.8 (both added to trade union scale) was
0.7316. The reliability analysis showed, in addition, that removing B2.9, ‘Collective
agreement-making enhances employee commitment to shared goals’, would enhance the
reliability coefficient to 0.8065.
4.5.4 The trade union scale
Two variables, items B2.8 (‘The presence of a union in the workplace enhances our ability
to deal with the difficult external environment of the 1990s’) and B3.3 (‘Unions contribute
significantly to the presence of conflict in the workplace’) were items excluded from
previous scales and were deemed to fit with this section. They were therefore included in
the reliability analysis. Item B2.7 (‘The presence of unions generally reflects a history of
poor management in an organization’) was excluded from the Collective Workplace
Relations scale because of improved reliability for that scale after its exclusion. This item
was included for testing in the Trade Union scale. Cronbach’s  coefficient improved from
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.8777 to .9021 with the removal of B2.8. However, the removal of any other variables
produced only a marginal improvement in the coefficient and the correlation coefficient
was already excellent, thus, all other items the item were retained.
4.5.5 Limitations on management of employees
Question B5 asked participants in the study to indicate on a four point scale the extent to
which they believed that they were limited in managing their employees. Six limitations
were specified. These variables were corporate human resource policy, awards, unions,
employee resistance and government legislation. The optimum reliability coefficient for
the scale was 0.6510, which could not be improved by the removal of any of the 6
variables.
4.5.6 The degree to which managers consult employees
Question C2 referred to the degree to which employees consulted employees in
decision-making on a four point scale derived from Dunphy and Stace (1992). The four
point scale was re-coded into a two-point scale reflecting participative and exclusionist
styles. The reliability coefficient was .8169. With the removal of C2.12R this improved
to a Cronbach  of.8209 and a further improvement to .8250 was predicated by the
removal of C2.2R (‘major policy decisions’). However, since this improvement in the
coefficient was marginal this variable was retained.
4.5.7 The degree of managers’ satisfaction with employee performance
In question D1, SME managers were asked to identify their degree of satisfaction with
employee and firm performance. While some of the items might have referred to both
employee and firm performance, they all related to the performance of employees. The
reliability test provided a Cronbach  of .8895 on the first run. The deletion of any
variable would not have improved that outcome.
In the next section, the issue of the adequacy, or size of the sample is briefly discussed.
4.6 Size of the sample
Roth & BeVier (1998) in scanning the literature on surveys in human resource
management and organisational behaviour found variable advice with adequate response
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rates varying from 50 percent to 80 percent. Heverlein and Baumgartner (1978 in Roth
& BeVier 1998) found that the salience of the issues raised in a survey was associated
with higher-response rates. Salience was discussed in terms of functional issues such as
addressing worker satisfaction with pay and benefits. An example of a non-salient issue
given was a survey addressing norms about feedback. This is ideational in scope, as is
the survey in this thesis on managerial ideologies. The average response rate for non-
salient surveys was 42 percent, which suggests that the response rate of 41.2 percent for
this study is satisfactory.
4.7 Data coding
Coded questions and structured answers were designed to facilitate data entry. SPSS
software was utilised for data entry, generating the descriptive data in Chapter 6 in
frequency and percentage distributions for the identification of trends (Healy 1991;
Moore 1995) and in preparation for data analysis.
4.8 Data analysis
There are ten features of the data analysis in this thesis. The first refers to the conduct of
the reliability tests of the questions in the survey questionnaire. These were reported
previously in section 4.5. Reliability tests discarded some of the variables in each of the
four dimensions of unitarism where it was necessary to improve the reliability of the data.
The second was the presentation of the descriptive data for each of the variables. This is
done in chapter 6. Frequencies throughout that chapter refer to the treated data.
The third involved the identification of organisational variables, the personal variables, and
the independent variables from survey question B5. The last of these were called
limitations variables. Question B5 in the survey questionnaire reflected an extension of
attitudes towards managerial prerogative and the role of third parties. Those dimensions
include notions about the limitations that are implicit in many of those statements.
Principal components analysis, the fourth analytical process, reduced the data in survey
question B5 to four variables.
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Exploratory factor analysis was the fifth analytical process in treating the data, classifying
the latent variables from the four questions related to the unitarist dimensions and
managers’ satisfaction with employee performance (survey question D1). This was a
matter of identifying homogenous groups of variables from those constituting each of the
questions (O’Leary-Kelly & Vokurka 1998, p. 391), and selecting a subset of the variables
in each of the questions for further analysis (Hair et al. 1998, p. 95). These were labelled
the unitarist variables for questions B1-B4. SME managers’ satisfaction with a number of
aspects of the workforce’s performance (question D.1) is subjected to factor analysis to
identify the latent satisfaction variables.
The sixth task was to identify a range of consultative, participative and collective practices
from questions C1 to C5. Following McDonald and Wiesner (2000), survey questions C1
and C2 provided a set of statements dealing with a range of matters on which managers
might consult employees (consultation range variables) and question C2 additionally
provided information about the degree to which managers consulted employees on most of
those matters. The substantive content of items in these two survey questions suggested
categories that referred to consultation on workplace efficiency and consultation on
organisational strategy. In this case, the data were set up according to these categories
since they could be applied consistently to both question C1 and C2. Question C5 was re-
coded into yes/no values consistent with questions C1, C3 and C4. There was no need to
treat the data from C3 and C4 other than to select appropriate items for this analysis. The
statements about consultative, participative and collective practices in questions C1-5 were
called managerial practice variables.
Since the unitarist variables contain ranked data, nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis tests for
one-way analysis of variance were appropriate for testing the significance of the impact of
the independent organisational and personal limitations variables on the unitarist variables.
Spearman’s rank correlation was used for the limitations variables. These nonparametric
tests constituted the seventh set of analyses.
Eighth, the Spearman test for correlation was used to identify whether there were any
significant relationships between the unitarist variables and the managerial practice
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variables, which reflected a unity of values, beliefs and managerial action in accordance
with the notion of ideology defined in chapter 2. Ninth, the Spearman test was also applied
to explore the relationship between the unitarist variables and SME managers’ satisfaction
with employee performance, and, tenth, to identify whether there was a significant
relationship between managerial practices and managers’ satisfaction with employee
performance.
The forms of analysis described here, apart from the reliability tests, are reported in chapter
6.
4.9 Summary
This study has been grounded in the unitarist ideal-type developed by Fox, and has
produced an ordering of the concepts discussed by him and others after him. Theory is
tested, rather than being developed. The survey contains a large number of variables
designed to ascertain, first, the underlying beliefs and values which managers in SMEs
apply to management and, second, whether the patterns of the responses to the questions
reflect the unitarist ideology.
The paradigmatic implications of the study led to a reflective discussion on its ontology
and epistemology. This was considered necessary since the industrial relations literature
suggests, first, that there is no agreement on whether there is an industrial relations
paradigm at all and, if there is, what the nature of such a paradigm might be. Second,
the debate about the transformation thesis (Kochan et al. 1984) generated questions
about whether there has been a ‘new’ industrial relations or a ‘paradigm shift’ in
industrial relations.
The stance adopted in this thesis is that research is cannot be value-free; theoretical
neutrality is impossible; and that any single methodology does not, of itself, reflect the
values of the researcher but the use to which the research and the analysis of its results
does reflect those values. There is some debate about whether the field of industrial
relations is, or should be, normative. Although Fox developed the unitarist model within
the context of his critical appraisal of the unitarist managerial framework and his
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advocacy for a pluralist industrial relations, the scope of the thesis does not extend to
providing recommendations for managerial behaviour in managing employees.
The author’s personal history as an industrial relations practitioner, working in unions,
his research interests in industrial relations generally and in the study of management
practices in SMEs, were significant in the selection of the research topic. The topic itself
suggests a critical approach towards managerial ideology by focussing on unitarist
characteristics. In rejecting a normative role in which the researcher upholds or debunks
the role of managers, the objective of this thesis was set to investigate managerial
attitudes towards the four key elements of Fox’s unitarist ideology and manager’s
practices in managing employees. The critical perspectives on management in this thesis
were further analysed by considering where the research fitted into Burrell and
Morgan’s ideal type of the paradigmatic choices available to social researchers. While it
is difficult to assign the research to any of Morgan and Burrell’s paradigms, the
conclusion was that the critical emphasis most closely fitted the radical humanist
paradigm. However, since this thesis is primarily a study of ideology in which a long-
iterated concept was being tested, the normative recommendations that would normally
accompany a radical humanist approach were rejected.
The position of the researcher leads to an implicit critique of the structures of
domination within work organisations, in this case SMEs, in the examination of
managerial ideology. It was suggested that the approach to the topic resembled the
radical humanist approach. Because the study deals with ideology, it aims to identify the
ideational foundations of managerial behaviour towards employees. That occurs in the
context of the organisation’s management structure, which is built on notions of
prerogative that have to do with domination. A focus on domination is consonant with
the scope of industrial relations research into conflict, power relations, and work
processes. The paradigm thus resembles key aspects of the radical structuralist
perspective without providing normative solutions. It is also phenomenological because
the study of ideology is concerned with managerial subjectivity.
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The conclusion is that the topic and the approach to it reflect the radical humanist
concern for the social construction of reality without addressing the issue of ideological
distortion, and a concern about domination, but not alienation. In other words, this
research does not fit easily into Burrell and Morgan’s paradigm grid. The topic is not
typical of a structural-functionalist, or positivist, interest in the study of management.
The discussion of the research design addressed the issue of conflating methodology and
paradigms and took up the view of a number of authors who argued that quantitative
methodologies were neither inconsistent with a critical study nor solely the preserve of
positivist research. It was noted that quantitative analysis is increasingly apparent in
industrial relations research. Oppenheim (1992) warned of the risk of reducing
managers’ ideology to merely another organisational variable by applying a quantitative
research tool to ascertain the attitudes, values and beliefs of managers. Ideology is an
abstract phenomenon. However, this risk has been limited by a thorough mounting of
questions in the questionnaire survey around key elements of the unitarist construct. This
provides a range of proxies for managerial ideology not found in other industrial
relations research on managers that is pertinent for analysis.
The survey data were complemented by semi-structured, face-to-face interviews of 19
SME managers, selected from a sample frame of approximately 260 managers, who had
responded to an earlier SME survey, and had indicated their willingness to participate
further in the SME project. The interviews were tape recorded and transcribed for
collation of data and its analysis. The interview program preceded the administration of
the survey. The questionnaire addressed three issues: whether there exists a set of beliefs
and values about managing employees; the extent to which managers in SMEs subscribe
to a managerial, unitarist ideology; and the extent to which these assumptions are
reflected in employee management practices within the organisation.
An expert panel and a managers’ panel reviewed the content validity of the survey
questionnaire according to Lawshe’s method. Although all of the questions had been
adopted or adapted from other published research or statements in the media, the
findings from applying Lawshe’s approach raised significant problems for the conduct
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of the survey. Lawshe’s formula was therefore abandoned. Instead, content validity was
determined by referring each question to the literature. Retaining or culling questions
relied primarily on whether each item could be justified in terms of the literature, as was
reported in detail in chapter 3. This is a matter of both construct validity for each of the
questions and content validity for each of the items.
The reliability of the data prior to the analysis was tested by applying Cronbach’s  tests
to each of the scales derived from questions in the survey, which represented the key
characteristics of unitarism. Thus, no items were removed from the question addressing
managerial prerogative; nine statements were retained for the conflict scale; and four
items were removed from the collective workplace relations scale. After adding 3 items
from other scales, the trade union scale lost only one item; the limitations on
management scale retained all 6 items. Reliability testing was not appropriate for
question C1. No item was removed from the C2 scale, the degree to which managers
consult employees. Finally, no item was culled from the question dealing with the
degree of managers’ satisfaction with employee performance. Given the 41.2% response
rate (n. = 206), the sample size is large enough to reduce the probability of not finding a
result, and significantly exceeds the minimum size for avoiding type II. The subsequent
data were analysed using SSPS, version 11.
The principal statistical tests after establishing the reliability of the data were factor
analysis of the four key dimensions of the unitarist ideology, The statements in questions
C1 and C2 of the survey questionnaire were not suitable for factor analysis or non-
parametric analysis. They were therefore categorised according to their substantive
meaning, creating two consultation variables.
In the next chapter, the findings from the interview program are presented.
174
CHAPTER 5: INTERVIEW RESULTS
5.1 Introduction
In chapter 4 the interview programme and its purpose was outlined. In this chapter, the
responses of managers to the interview questions will be reported. Table 5.1 sets out the
questions, which constituted the semi-structured format of the interviews. Those questions
formed the framework around the discussions with SME managers in and around
Brisbane. They related to the keystones of Fox’s unitarist construct: attitudes about
management, conflict, collectivism and trade unions.
There were 18 questions23, which guided the structure of the interview programme. The
questions covered the four key dimensions of unitarist ideology. The questions dealt, first,
with managers’ views on managerial prerogative (questions 1, 2, 12, 13, 16, 17) and
managing employees (questions 3, 4, 8, 14, 15). Second some questions addressed the
interviewees’ attitudes towards conflict (questions 7, 15). The third theme of the semi-
structured interviews focussed on collective relations in the workplace (5, 10, 11). The
final aspect of managerial attitudes referred to managers’ views on trade unions (questions
5, 6, 9).
Transcripts for 19 interviews were available for analysis. The list of managers’ businesses
are set out in table 5.1
23 These were listed in chapter 4, sub-section 4.3.2.
175
Table 5.1: Managers’ businesses in the interview programme
Interview Number Manager’s business
1. Garment manufacturer
2. Printing
3. Film and television post-production
4. Spectacles lens manufacturer
5. Hardware retailing
6. Furniture Manufacturer
7. Abattoir manager
8. Agricultural engineering
9. Metals engineering firm
10. Transcript unavailable
11. Steel fabrication plant
12. Steel fabrication firm
13. Tile Retailer
14. Metals industry
15. Paint manufacturing
16. Metals industry manufacturer
17. Metals manufacturer
18. Seed crushing plant
19. Electronics firm
20. Biotechnology
The material in this chapter is organised around these four dimensions of unitarism,
which are summarised in sub-sections 5.1.1 to 5.1.4.
5.1.1 Questions about managerial prerogative
The questions about management asked where they got their ideas about management
from and their philosophy about managing employees. The results regarding the source
of management ideas are addressed in section 5.2. Attitudes towards managerial
prerogative, section 5.3, refers to interviewee responses to questions about the basic
principles for managing employees, the principle responsibility of a manager and a
question added during the programme on what they considered makes a good manager.
Other questions explored the limits on managerial prerogative in terms of the scope of
the right to manage, the limits on how far others can encroach on the right to manage,
and the degree to which the interviewees believed employees can or should be involved
in business decisions. A final aspect of the nature of management examined, in the
context of Fox’s construct, was the question whether managers have common interests
with employees.
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5.1.2 Questions about conflict
Conflict was addressed by asking managers what they thought were the underlying
reasons for disputes, or grievances, or conflict in the workplace. A second aspect related
to how they would deal with employee resistance to changes, which the manager
considered necessary for the company to maintain its competitive edge. The results of
the SME managers’ views on conflict are reported in section 5.4.
5.1.3 Questions about collective workplace relations
Collective aspects of the workplace were canvassed in the interviews. These included
asking about their views on negotiation and bargaining and their response to individual
contracts, specifically in the form of Australian Workplace Agreements, and their impact
on employee commitment, and firm and individual performance. The results of
managerial responses to collective aspects of the workplace will be reported in section
5.5.
5.1.4 Questions about trade unions
Managers were asked directly whether they considered unions have outlived their
usefulness. Some aspects of managers’ attitudes towards trade unions cross into the
other themes of the questioning. For example, they were asked whether they think that
unions or employee associations distract them from the process of management.
Managers’ views on trade unions are reported in section 5.6.
5.2 SME managers’ source of ideas about management
The purpose of the questions about the source of management ideas was to establish
whether a clearly articulated ideology emerged during the course of the interviews. Does
discussion of the source of ideas about management reveal a set of beliefs and values,
which fit the managerial prerogative dimension of unitarism explicated in chapter 3?
Intuition will, by definition, be guided by the underlying beliefs and values, which
constitute an ideology. Experience may reinforce the assumptions applied to the
managerial process, even where the manager has received formal management education
or training. The interview programme confirmed this reliance on experience. In some
cases this was a matter of applying ‘experience, feelings as you go’ (interview 1, an
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owner/manager in garment manufacture), or ‘seeing what works and what doesn’t’
(interview 3, a manager in a media services firm). This ad hoc approach to management
was reflected in other cases. In a metals fabricator for the petroleum industry, the
manager expanded on the development, personal and collective application of
experience as the industry changed:
Ideas of management … come from experience, I guess, mainly because of our
background [which] is more or less into construction. Since 1959, we worked in the old
industry and we just learned as we went along (interview 11).
In one case, a family firm, which was jointly managed by a husband and wife team,
management was a matter of trying out various techniques:
We tend to discuss a lot of things, we do things as we fell they will hopefully work and
if they don’t work quite right then we will change them a week later because they are
not working … But neither of us have studied anything. No management degrees
(interview 19, owner-manager in an electronics firm).
However, this learn-as-you-go approach can be quite deliberative and experimental,
rather than ad hoc. Managers can collect ideas from print and from networking and
apply them ‘to see if they work’ (interview 18, manager in a seed crushing plant).
Some managers are self-taught, such as the two metals industry managers, one of whom
(an experienced manager in his early 60s) advised that he ‘just came out of the workshop
and, to be honest, I have just learned as I have gone along’ (interview 14) and the other
in a family-managed metals industry firm who observed that ‘Generally managing
comes from experience — mainly from experience, mainly from self learning’
(interview 16). Experience might be modulated by formal management education, as in
the case of a manager in an abattoir who depended on ‘experience over the years and
that has been topped up in recent times by my studies at university studying HRM and
production and operations management … (interview 7). Likewise, managerial
experience is perceived as going hand-in-hand with technical expertise as in this case
from a metals manufacturer:
In the office here, myself, being the Manager, the Assistant Manager and one of my
chief estimators, between the three of us we have something like 100 years experience
in the trade. So we are able to recognise things that would be of benefit to us. With the
laser machine, for example, it cost $650,000, but we had been planning that for about
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three or four years. We made sure that we had the finances there to back it up. We just
waited for the dollar to go up and it did’ (interview 17).
Nevertheless, on the one hand, experience is something, which a manager might draw on
in applying management techniques, but it also might prejudice the handling of a current
issue (interview 20, manager in a biotechnology firm). Experience, on the other hand,
can lead to a change in the manager’s approach:
I think years ago I used to be more always wanting my way. My way was best in
everything. But now, I have learnt to listen to the employees, listen to their ideas. As I
said earlier, they are the ones at the coal face so they’re the ones doing it 7 or 8 hours a
day and they generally have got good ideas on how to improve their own work area and
processes and I’ve got to basically feed off that information (interview 7).
In family businesses, experience may also be gained through mentoring and observation
of a parent or relative manager. In two of the four cases in the interview programme, the
most significant influence may have been the parent (interview 16). A combination of
the respondent’s ‘own sensibilities’ and the parent’s managerial expertise (interview 5,
an experienced hardware retail manager) led to the development of the manager’s
personal modus operandi. In a third example, the respondent’s father was still actively
managing the company and the interviewee was being mentored by a newly-appointed
General Manager. The respondent had previously held that position (interview 8, an
engineering firm in the agricultural sector). Learning from predecessors, however, is not
solely a characteristic of family firms (interview 5).
While the survey indicates that the manager’s own experience provides the most
significant source of ideas (see chapter 6, sub-section 6.4.2), this may sometimes be in
the context of other sources of knowledge about management gained through
networking with other managers, reading management literature, attending seminars and
courses, the employment of consultants and human resource management or other
specialists such as accountants, and membership of general management organisations
such as the Australian Institute of Management.
Three of the interviewed managers identified networking with other managers as a key
element in the development of their ideas about management. Two belonged to small,
self-help organisations (interviews 12; 13):
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… it’s like Alcoholics Anonymous for business owners, we’re a sort of self help group.
And that’s probably the main area I get the management ideas from. And someone has a
new book or a new idea and we look at that (interview 13).
Other managers belonged to management organisations such as the Australian Institute
of Management (interviews 2 [manager in a printing firm], 4, 19) and the Australian
Institute of Company Directors (interview 20). Membership of such organisations
provides networking potential if members attend meetings and training opportunities
through seminars.
The interview programme confirmed the finding in the survey results that managers
primarily rely on experience for their ideas about management. What is the significance
for questions designed to ascertain whether managers in SMEs apply a unitarist ideology
to management? The interview programme did not reveal any propensity for a unitarist
perspective in response to inquiries about the source of managers’ ideas about managing.
5.3 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial prerogative
Managers were asked to summarise their management ‘philosophy’ during the
interviews. Ostensibly, and so it was intended, this took the interview programme
directly to the question of managerial ideology, since among the questions, the SME
managers were asked both to articulate their ‘philosophy about managing employees’
and to indicate what they thought were ‘the basic principles for managing employees’.
The interview programme demonstrates that it is difficult to get managers to articulate
their management philosophy in open-ended questions at a high level of abstraction.
They tended to respond to this question in operational terms relating to such matters as
communication (eg, interview 8) and, in general terms, employee involvement (eg,
interview 8). When asked what they thought were the basic principles for managing
employees, the level of abstraction was likewise low, with managers also, for the most
part, seeking operational explanations. Combined responses to these specific questions
are set out in table 5.2. Some of the elements, such as communication, in these responses
may also be found in responses to other interview questions.
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Table 5.2: Operational responses to the interview questions asking managers to summarise their
management philosophy and the ‘basic principles’ for managing employees (n. = 19)
Operational Responses Number of
Interviews
Interviews
(%)
Interview
number
Communicating with employees/providing
information 5 26.3
8, 9, 15, 18,
19
Keeping employees happy 3 15.8 1, 9, 12
Creating a sense of belong to the enterprise 3 15.8 3, 9, 14
Providing opportunities for employee initiative 2 10.5 1, 9
Maintaining empathy and sympathy with employees 2 10.5 3, 16
Having an ‘open door’ policy 2 10.5 4, 14
Management makes the decisions 2 10.5 2, 5
Involving employees in decision-making 2 10.5 2, 8
Dealing with employees on an individual basis 2 10.5 1, 15
Directing/supervising employees 2 10.5 18, 20
Demonstrating technical competence 1 5.3 7
Paying above average wages 1 5.3 10
Giving clear directions 1 5.3 12
Goal alignment for employees 1 5.3 15
Employee task ownership 1 5.3 3
Seeking employee views on decisions 1 5.3 4
Providing opportunities for employees’ financial
participation 1 5.3 5
Supportive of employees 1 5.3 12
Maximising employees’ capacity 1 5.3 13
Understanding employees 1 5.3 14
Taking the emotion out of management decisions 1 5.3 16
Providing motivation 1 5.3 18
Setting clear objectives 1 5.3 20
Table 5.2 indicates a broad spectrum of operational objectives, which the interviewed
managers said guided their tasks as managers. However, no single factor appears to
provide guidance for managers in this sample. Of the interviewed managers, five (26
percent) mentioned communication or provision of information when considering their
management philosophy or the basis for managing employees, three (16 percent)
identified keeping employees happy and creating a sense of belonging to the enterprise
as key elements of their approach to management.
There was a limited element of abstraction when the interviewees considered their
philosophy. It was expressed singly or in combinations of concepts. These included
fairness (26 percent: interviews 1, 3, 7, 12, 16), reasonableness (interview 16), being
firm (interviews 5, 7), friendliness (interview 5), being ‘very democratic’ (interview 4),
maintaining an ‘open door’ policy (interviews 4, 14), leadership (interviews 12, 14),
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equality with employees (interview 12), and trust (interview 2). These mainly related to
the operational aspects of managing employees.
The interview programme revealed no single foundation or set of common bases upon
which managers’ prerogative appeared to be established across the sample. The
rationales claimed for managerial prerogative included a strategic perspective (interview
1), managerial expertise (interviews 4, 8), knowledge (interviews 4, 8), the need for
survival (interview 5), leadership (interview 20) and meeting acceptable returns on
capital (interview 2). Two managers whose companies were part of a larger consortium
perceived managerial prerogative as inherent in the position held (interviews 6, 7). One
saw the manager’s right to manage as resting upon the ability of the manager to
convince people (interview 9).
Some managers were prepared to involve employees in the decision-making process
through discussions, explanations, seeking advice and opinions, or integrating
employees into the actual decision-making process (interviews 1, 3, 7, 9, 14, 16, 17, 18),
whether this was actively seeking out opinions (eg, interview 19) or through a leadership
process (interview 20). Ultimately, though, many managers saw it as their prerogative to
enforce a final decision whether or not employees supported it (42 percent: interviews 2,
5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19) or to step in with a decision because decisions were
not being made further down the line (interviews 3, 20). For the manager in paint
manufacture, who encapsulated the contradictions of employee involvement in the
statement ‘You can’t run a business on democracy, but some things you are democratic
in’ (interview 15), managerial prerogative ultimately rules any tendency for involving
employees in decision-making. While the interview sample is quite small, this
qualitative material tends to conform to a unitarist profile on managers’ attitudes
towards managerial prerogative.
Views of managerial prerogative reflect an exclusionist perspective on the question of
employee involvement were expressed by some of the sample. For a retailer, times were
difficult: ‘At the moment I’m not into team building. At the moment I’m into survival
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mode, not into warm feelings’ (interview 5). The manager in a steel fabrication plant put
firm limits on employee involvement:
Well, if it comes to the crunch, I make the decisions because I’m ultimately responsible
all the way for the company. Naturally, anybody can make suggestions, which they
could be implemented, but if I think I’m right there is no way I would change (interview
11).
Another manager in the metals industry resisted the notion of others encroaching on his
right to manage, and put clear limits on the role of employees in management decision-
making:
They can’t. It’s as simple as that. As far as I see, at the end of the day, I will make a
decision and that’s it. I will listen and that, I suppose, is where they have an influence
on my management. I will listen, but at the end of the day I will make the decision and
that’s it. It may be the wrong decision. It may not be lawful, but I will live by the
decision. And that’s it. Someone has to (interview 16).
Similarly, the manager in a seed crushing plant saw his decision-making as final:
We make decisions which we hope, at the end of the day, are in the best interests of
everyone, mainly the decisions I have made to keep the group afloat, make certain the
group is profitable (interview 18).
These three examples, however, were not the norm, where most managers in the sample
indicated a preparedness to moderate their prerogative with some concessions to
involving employees. The involvement of employees is not without problems from a
managerial perspective. For example, a manager in a steel fabrication firm concluded
that there was great difficulty in making decisions that satisfy all the stakeholders in a
firm, especially where employees challenge the decisions made. According to this
manager, the employees’ lack of perspective creates managerial difficulty:
It is a constant battle. The people understanding that, I suppose, my job is to keep the
shareholders happy and obey this company. And the decisions we make, or I make at
this end, are what we believe at the time are in the best interests of those shareholders
and the employees. But they don’t understand that: that if decisions made here and our
customers as well say that if we need to change our starting times around because of
daylight saving, and as a manager I think that is the best thing we can do for our
shareholders and customers, then okay tomorrow we are going to do that. The reaction is
just so bad because I have made a decision that they believe I am not entitled to. But I
could go and get the award book and put it in front of them and say that I can do
whatever I bloody well like about how you come here, providing it is no more than 38
hours a week. Within that span of hours, you’ve not got a leg to stand on. But they
don’t understand that (interview 12).
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While two of the questions directly addressed issues of belief and values with respect to
management, managers tended to respond in operational terms and none of these
responses applied to the sample as a whole. However, there was a stronger tendency to
draw a line, guided by managerial prerogative, limiting employee participation.
5.4 SME Managers’ attitudes towards conflict
SME managers’ responses towards conflict can be categorised in terms of the causes of
conflict and the nature of conflict, which emerges in the workplace. Within a unitarist
framework conflict is not regarded as belonging to the inherent nature of work
organisations, but is a characteristic of a breakdown in organisational characteristics,
management failings or the personal failings of, or malfeasance by, employees or
unions. The question of whether this is reflected in the response of managers can be
addressed by examining the comments made by managers in the panel and set down in
table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Management Attitudes Towards Sources of Conflict
Response to questions on conflictInterview No.
Cause Characteristics of conflict
1.  personality.
2.  personality
3.  80% of the time it’s a management
related issue.
 more conflict in the workplace
when they’re [viz., employees] not
as busy;
 is about June/July and it just
happen to correlate with the cold
and flu season. People get tired;
people get sick; and there tends to
be a few conflicts then.
4.  remuneration is an issue in today’s
environment.
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Response to questions on conflictInterview No.
Cause Characteristics of conflict
5.  human nature;
 misapprehensions;
 different people who all think
differently;
 you might get staff who couldn’t
give a shit and there’ll be conflict
there because you will be saying I
want more.
 you have legitimate expectations
one way or another and the other
party let the team down;
 either we forget to reward staff
because they may have put in extra
work or done higher level jobs or
didn’t get a pat on the back.
6.  personal unhappiness; people are
in different situations basically.
7.  two different goals, employees
trying to obviously earn more
maybe work less and the employer
wanting them to work more and
earn less so there are conflict goals
between the two
 money in the pocket
 I notice when we kill quite regular
— which we are doing right now
— we seem, the issues seem to
drop right off. Everyone seems to
be happy getting their work, their 7
or 8 hours in, and getting their full
day’s and week’s pay packet and
the issues aren’t as bad [an
abattoir].
8.  lack of communication;
 people have either misunderstood
what you have said; or
 misread; or
 don’t know the full circumstances.
9.  if they are not listened to the
anxiety builds up until it reaches
that stage where they say I want
you to do something about this.
10. Transcript and tape unavailable.
11.  individual mischief.
12.  lack of knowledge;
 lack of understanding.
13.  poor communication.
 if management never sees
employees and they have a chance
to harbour up all these things, they
fester up. Everyone gets shitty.
14.  we would lose contract with the
men’s problems and I do that.
 these men have got a grievance
because the wages are not
commensurate with the skills that
they are showing.
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Response to questions on conflictInterview No.
Cause Characteristics of conflict
15.  unclearness of our working
relationships;
 an individual case … and it comes
from both sides, either
management or an individual
employee has a personal grievance
born about by a personality
conflict;
 Someone bringing their values to
work or the politics to work which
do not align with the business …
personal conflict masked as
discrimination, unfair treatment or
bullying.
 the real relationship that you have
with your employees is a lot of
unwritten practices and codes and
expectations and from time to time
those expectations and or that thing
is tested;
 these are just a natural and actually
I think quite a positive thing
because people are then testing is
this the best way to do something;
 This often relates itself in a lot of
union problems where you will
bring out political ideals that people
have in the workplace and you’ll
end up with that sort of
confrontation. That comes from
both sides.
16.  lack of communication; a
misinterpretation of our actions or
our misinterpretation of their
actions
17.  they got their hands on conflicting
information, the whole thing blew
up;
 where we may have slipped up in
interpreting the award or whatever;
 blow ups are normally about
money.
18.  rumours going around the shop;
 sometimes I think jealousy.
 a lot of it is petty.
19.  personality clashes  some people can get a bit of an ‘us
and them’ attitude.
20. Not addressed Not addressed
Table 5.3 indicates that the single most common category of explanation for workplace
conflict according to these managers lies at the personal level or as part of human nature
or interpersonal conflict (interviews 1, 2, 5, 6, 15, 19). Other employee failings
identified were jealousy (interview 18), unhappiness (interview 6), employees’ lack of
understanding or knowledge (interview 12), and different perspectives or even
indifference (interview 5). One manager ascribed the cause of conflict to employee
mischief (interview 11) and another saw conflict as arising from values and politics,
‘which do not align with the business’ (interview 15). Employees’ failure to meet
management expectations can likewise lead to conflict (interview 5).
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Management failures in communication were also identified as a key cause of conflict
(interviews 3, 8, 13, 14, 16, 17), sometimes arising from not listening to employees
(interview 11), and sometimes leading to employees’ misinterpretation of management
action or vice versa (interview 16) and the growth of anxiety among workers (interview
9). Problems can also occur where there is conflicting information and sometimes as a
result of managers misinterpreting employee rights (interview 17). One manager
identified the different goals of employees and employers as being the source of conflict
(interview 7). Four managers put conflict down specifically to wages issues (interviews
4, 7, 14, 17). Failure to recognise extra work and higher level work performed by
employees was also identified as a management failing (interview 5).
The interview questions on conflict did not distinguish between the causes of conflict,
on the one hand, or the nature of conflict, on the other hand, and the distinction did not
emerge from the interviews. Two managers noted that conflict arises when the
workplace is not as busy as usual, or going through a seasonal slack in work (interviews
1, 7), or when people get tired and sick (interview 1). There is an implied causal
relationship in these observations, but there is also an implication that conflict is a
distraction from work tasks and that workers will become conflictive when they are not
kept busy in the workplace. Only one manager implied conflict is a natural and positive
element of the employment relationship, where unwritten codes, practices and
expectations will from time to time be tested. But, he argued, this also triggers union
problems and activates ‘political ideals’ on both employee and management sides
(interview 15). This is characterised as an ‘us and them’ attitude (interview 19).
However, much of conflict is petty, according to one manager (interview 18). Overall,
the unitarist perspective was much more in evidence in the attitudes of managers in the
sample towards conflict than in their answers to questions dealing with managerial
prerogative.
5.5 SME managers’ attitudes towards collective workplace relations
In the interview programme, the managers were asked three questions about their
attitudes towards collective workplace relations. The first was an open-ended question,
which dealt with their general views on negotiating with employees or unions. The
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second raised the issue of whether or not negotiations and bargaining encourage a ‘them
and us’ culture. Third, they were asked whether or not they agreed that bargaining is a
‘necessary evil’. Managers, unsurprisingly, have a managerial perspective on the
negotiation process when asked their views on having to negotiate with employees or
unions. However, there is little that is common in the managers’ responses to this
question.
For a garment manufacturer, negotiation was ‘Not a problem: the employees decide
what they want. If they’re happy then we’re happy, we’re satisfied.’ Citing an example
of harmonious bargaining relations, she said the
union wanted to formalise our training, our working time … They changed it rather
dramatically and … in a way it meant flexible hours, which the girls planned. They were
then, they were to take their consenting amount of hours …’
According to the manager, this proposal involved increases in the quantum of paid
overtime. ‘We said, well we couldn’t afford that; no way we could afford that. And with
that they [the employees] said no we want it to stay as it is’ (interview 1).
The manager in interview 2 admitted to negotiation being a personal problem because he
enjoys negotiation and finds it a bit of a game. ‘When you’re dealing with someone’s
wages they probably take it a bit more personal than that, so no’ [it is not a problem].
In interview 3, the manager talked of negotiation in the context of having ‘a very open
door policy to that’ and the success of the business made him feel a ‘little bit self
indulgent.’ Admitting the possibility that ‘maybe I haven’t got as good an idea as I think
I have, he was, nevertheless ‘happy to consult on a lot of issues … with them and take
submissions and negotiate with them.’ However, he drew a firm limit on consultation
and negotiation with employees: ‘I also have a fairly good idea of where I would like to
see it stop too, because there is a line drawn’.
In the fourth case, the manager considered negotiation in the context of there never
having been negotiations in his workplace. His perspective was on negotiating with
individuals, rather than collective agreements, and saw individual contracts such as the
188
then Queensland Workplace agreements as being better than negotiated (collective)
agreements for his industry (a spectacles lens manufacturer, interview 4).
Some perspectives on negotiation are narrowly focused on the achievement of
managerial objectives. On the one hand, the manager in interview 5 saw a ‘fair sharing
of concerns’ as being a primary condition of negotiations. On the other hand, he
admitted: ‘we don’t get involved in it all that much; it’s a case of when I need
somebody’ to perform in some aspects of the business. In introducing a change — in this
case, a retailer who decided to open his business on Sundays — he offered incentives.
This is not negotiation, except in the most peripheral and informal of senses:
I make it worth their while … I dream up something and if they don’t like it they tell
me. Now, is there any duress or any pressure? No! I think [it is] the case of saying,
‘guys, we need to do it — dire straits. Are we here or not? Are we in the game or not?
Generally I pick people I know will want to anyway. It’s a case of juggling balls
(interview 5).
Negotiation was seen by an abattoir manager as a necessary part of management
‘probably because between management and employees you’re coming from two
different [positions]’, ‘where you are trying to reach that happy agreement, common
ground’: it is ‘never always comfortable but that’s something you’ve got to do’
(interview 7).
In another case, negotiation was perceived as matters which managers raise with
employees: on ‘most things you try and discuss with the employees what try and get
agreement on whatever whether it’s wages, RDOs [rostered days off] … sometimes a
group sometimes one to one it all depends really … There’s no enterprise bargaining
agreement, but we are looking at it for early next year so that will be another interesting
issue’ (interview 8).
A manager in a metals engineering firm dismissed negotiation as inappropriate for ‘this
type of organisation’ on the grounds that his organisation is small and that management
is ‘in constant communication with individuals here’. Where there is negotiation, it is on
an ‘individual sort of basis’. With this approach, he claimed, ‘we end up with a suitable
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policies that are in place such as how we work the overtime, regular time off, people
take their holidays …’ (interview 9).
Negotiation has attendant operational difficulties from a managerial perspective. This
was the emphasis of one manager who had just completed negotiating an enterprise
bargaining agreement.
We found communication was the problem. How we as managers communicated to
employees … Is it a good thing or not, because they don’t trust you? As soon as you
mention the word EBA [enterprise bargaining agreement] and we are going to do this,
it’s going to be good for you, it’ll give everybody use and stability, because you will
know what you are going to earn for the next two years, the company is going to get
stability because we know what we are going to pay you for the next two years — they
don’t trust that. That’s a load of rubbish. You show them growths of what the current
CPI [cost price index] ratings are. Nothing to do with me. I don’t care what the CPI is,
this is the money I want (interview 12).
A retail manager openly admitted that negotiation played a very minor role in his
business, and it ran on an individual basis:
I guess you have to classify me as a benevolent dictator type manager. I think I am
really nice guy and I think I am looking after everyone, but I am a bit of a dictator. Do it
my way or piss off … So, I’ve never had to negotiate [collectively?]. I negotiate with
individuals. I say, you will do this job for that and they say, well I would like a bit more.
So minor negotiating, but never had to do any bulk negotiating (interview 13).
A manager in a manufacturing concern, which was part of a larger corporation, did not
see negotiating with employees ‘whether they are union members or non union
members’ as a difficult issue. However, he argued, problems arise with the different
agendas of ‘a third party’, and this included both unions and ‘from the corporate level’.
‘At the end of the day’, he concludes, ‘you get a compromise situation which is never
the best situation. Whereas employee/management group I think you get the best chance
of the getting the best deal’ (interview 15).
Collective negotiations are a novel experience for some managers and their employees
within the context of the development of collective bargaining during the 1990s. A
metals industry manufacturer observed, ‘We lack knowledge, we lack experience. I lack
it, but I don’t deny that at all, and the men totally lack it’ (interview 16). In this case, the
manager was ‘comfortable’ with the process and the outcome. According to this
manager, negotiations had occurred without any bargaining agents:
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On the basis that they didn’t want the union involved or they didn’t want to go to the
union, they felt comfortable, I decided not to go to my organisational body. I wanted to
show them a balance. Okay, well, you’re doing it on your own, I’ll do it on my own. In
other words, I’m not going to go out and get someone sitting on my shoulder feeding me
with bullets to fire at you guys. But we certainly lacked any guidance, any experience in
doing it (interview 16).
Some managers have little difficulty in accommodating the principles of representative
and collective relations, although dealing with individual representatives might involve
some skills in managing individual representatives:
I might have a few problems, like I said, with a new shop steward for the first six
months, but you start sort of taming him down, well, not taming him down but give him
a bit of confidence in what he is dealing with, where he’s not going to have to fight you
tooth and nail for every little thing. A bit of cooperation from both sides and it’s not a
difficult situation. It’s not difficult. I think in 26 years I can’t remember one time the
boys have been out on strike even when the union, and of course this is confidential,
even when the union have their stop work meetings … We have an arrangement where
the shop steward, he can go off to a meeting. He can hear everything that goes on, and
all the rest of the workshop come to work. He can come back and he can report to the
guys exactly what’s gone on. All the guys are kept up to date and I pay him to go to the
meeting. So we try to work in with each other rather than against each other. We don’t
have any troubles here at all (interview 17).
Negotiation can be an informal process on a pragmatic group basis to avoid conflict
between individuals, especially with respect to wages:
We go more on the group level. We would operate group rate like a leading hand or
tradesman rate. You would have a million rates otherwise and everyone wants to be paid
more than the next bloke because he is better than him in this area. So with negotiation,
we come up with a basis and we put it out for discussion, saying, well, this is what we
are aiming at, we’re going to offer this type of percentage and you give us some
feedback. There’s a bit of to-ing and fro-ing. I suppose everyone throws in a few red
herrings. You get them either a bit agitated. Oh, they can’t take that one and they’ll want
something back and they, you come to some mutual ground (interview 18).
Managers may, however, simply respond to demands:
Yes, we sit down and talk to them. If they are looking for something whether it be an
increase in wages or a new vehicle or they want to go a different tack in their jobs, so we
are willing to sit down and talk to them about it (interview 19).
In a non-unionised workplace in biotechnology with a workforce largely composed of
professionals, there was little formal negotiation, but the manager regarded employees
stakeholders and the emphasis was upon fairness in balancing the interests of
shareholders and the employees (interview 20).
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Do managers regard negotiations as representative of diverse or common interests? In
the interview programme, 65 percent (11 out of 18 responding to this question) regarded
negotiation as encouraging a ‘them and us’ culture; 23 percent disagreed (4
interviewees) and two (12 percent) were equivocal.
The interview questions took this issue further by asking whether or not the respondents
or interviewees believed that bargaining was a ‘necessary evil’. Managers agreeing with
this proposition would be supporting negative implications for negotiations, but not
necessarily opposing negotiations as such. Of 12 interviewees who were asked and
answered this question, three-quarters agreed with the statement, two disagreed, and one
response could not be categorised. Most of the responses included reasons for adopting
the position taken. For one manager, negotiation provided an opportunity to explain the
firm’s situation to employees (interview 1). Two others saw negotiations as an inherent
part of a relationship with employees (interviews 8, 15). A third manager expressed the
view that the presence of a shop steward and an active union created the situation where
he had no choice but to negotiate (interview 14). One admitted, ‘I would rather not have
to do it’. However, he preferred to get involved in negotiations rather than ‘sit back and
do nothing’ (interview 16). Labour market pressures provided another rationale
(interview 18). The other manager in a metal fabrication plant agreed that there were
problems with some elements in negotiation, specifying some of the formalities. He
preferred to ‘be able as a company [to] deal with our employees and not have to worry
about going through the industrial commission, have [the agreement] approved and
stamped’ (interview 12).
Managers, however, were concerned about the adversarial aspects of collective
workplace relations. The manager of a garment manufacturing was apprehensive about
what the union was telling employees (Interview 1, garment manufacturer) and the
manager in a furniture factory regretted losing ‘the one on one to be in touch working
together in harmony’ (Interview 6). The abattoir manager regretted the ‘too different
goals [of] employees trying to obviously earn more, maybe work less, and the employer
wanting them to work more and earn less so there are conflicting goals between the two’
(Interview 7). One manager observed that ‘even though you do work closely with [some
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employees] sometimes you don’t have any disputes with them or anything like that.
There’s some people not really aggro but still to see the them-and-us whether it’s from
past experiences or past employment and it just takes a while to work that out of the
system. You still get that; some people are some people aren’t’ (Interview 8,
Agricultural engineering). Another felt that adversarialism had declined: ‘the work
force, it's not as hostile anymore as it was’ (Interview 11, Steel fabrication plant).
Another thought that ‘maybe it’s not the case today, but up until 20 years ago, a lot of
union reps were absolutely ignorant people’, blaming union officials for adversarial
relations. Reflecting the low visibility of unions in SMEs, he commented that ‘I haven’t
seen too many of the new union men but I’m sure they are a lot more affable than the
guys of the past. The guys of the 60’s and 70s had a lot of dirt on their chest that they
wanted to get off.… I don’t want to get this down to a union bashing thing but unions
certainly have got a place and I will do my best to have an open door policy here with
them, but I don’t like the insults that are unsolicited (Interview 14, Metals industry).
According to one manager, negotiation ‘draws an inevitable line between them [and
management]…. People say you’re anti-union. I say, we are not anti-union, I’m just
anti-third party’ (Interview 15, Paint manufacturing).
Concern about adversarialism in collective arrangements was not universal:
‘… take our recent enterprise bargaining agreement. I think when you first start, you
know, the first couple of times you sit down and start to negotiate these things I think
there is a little bit of culture like that. But I really do believe once you get into the
bargaining and you talk to the blokes, things going backwards and forwards a bit it
settles down and I really do believe that eventually you get to the stage where, okay, you
know, we would like a wage rise and the company would like this. We know how the
work has been for the last 12 months. And the blokes I really do believe cooperate with
the company. And the company cooperates with them. (Interview 17, Metals
manufacturer).
In that case the manager addressed diverse interests. However, the manager in a seed
crushing plant took a typical unitarist perspective on adversarial aspects of collective
relations. Workers, he argued did not ‘realise the effort in running the place and what
you get out of it at the end of the day sometimes. Not that I’m about to tell them but all
they are interested in is what’s in it for them’. He sheeted problems home to trouble-
makers: ‘Most of them and they are normally the ones that are the stirrers’ (Interview
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18, Seed crushing plant), whereas the manager of an electronics firm denied that her
firm had ‘a them-and-us [culture] at all’ (Interview 19). Differences were regrettable
according to the manager in a biotechnology firm: ‘I see it most the them-and-us and
wish it wasn’t that way but it’s there between manufacturing people…. There are little
things that they lobby for that they would like to get done and they think in terms of
management and unfortunately we think in terms of staff. It’s a pity (Interview 20,).
The converse of collective relations is the establishment of individualised arrangements.
According to the manager of a film and television post-production company, individual
contracts have the advantage of ‘reward[ing] highly people that we can see are real stars
in the organisation. We target the people that we think are the most beneficial to the
organization and pay them accordingly’ (Interview 3). Another argued that neither he
nor his employees ‘are sophisticated enough to enter into [collective bargaining] with
enough upside. I don’t need any more drama in my life. I reckon we can achieve as
much on a one to one employee employer basis either renegotiating things but salary
arrangements - hours dollars, responsibilities - I don’t need to formalize it. I can
formalize it on a one on one basis but I don’t want to have to deal with it on an en masse
basis’ (Interview 5, Hardware retailing). This respondent and the manager from a
furniture factory thought that individualised arrangements had advantages in enabling
employers and employee manage the situation on a one to one basis and resolve the
problem of collective bargaining ‘not necessarily representing the true statement of
affairs’ or arriving at the best solution (Interview 6). In the same industry, another
manager admitted that he would use individual contracts if he could get away with it,
‘but whatever suits you, it always come out’ if individual agreements are made
clandestinely. ‘An individual award in our organisation or in any organisation it makes
a lot of discontent’. Overall, he felt individual contracts can ‘create a problem’
(Interview 11, Steel fabrication plant).
Some managers who supported individual contracts based their argument on
exceptionalism. One manager felt that negotiation was unsuitable ‘because we are a
small organisation in constant communication with individuals here I think to sit down
at a meeting they try and negotiate I don't think it sits so well with this type of
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organisation’ (Interview 9, Metals engineering firm). Negotiation with highly qualified
employees on an individual basis was regarded as being necessary in an electronics firm
(interview 19).
Most managers found negotiation problematic, a process that needed to be endured.
Some of those concerns were about the technicalities and legalities of negotiating
enterprise bargaining agreements under the legislation. Commitment to negotiation was
rare but an adherence to individualism was not commonly overt. The adversarial aspects
of negotiation were a concern for most, but not all, managers.
5.6 Managers’ attitudes towards trade unions
Managers’ responses to questions designed to ascertain their attitude towards trade
unions are set out in this section. In the interview programme managers were asked two
questions which were directed towards their views on trade unions. These were: Do you
think that unions or employee associations distract you from the process of
management? And Do you think that unions have outlived their usefulness? Both
questions were designed to elicit the presence of any unitarist perspectives on trade
unions. The first question was designed to link in with notions of managerial
prerogative; the second provided an opportunity for managers to comment on what they
saw as the role of trade unions. Responses to the first question are reported in column
two and responses to the second question in column three. The results from a third
question - What are your views on negotiating with employees, unions? - are reported in
section 5.5 above. Additional comments made in response to this and other questions,
which are directly relevant to managers’ views on trade unions, have been included in
the third column. Because the managers were rather more forthcoming in their
comments on trade unions than on some of the other topics, this information has been
presented in tabular form (tables 5.4 - 5.6). It encapsulates the views of managers across
the two questions and any additional references the interviewees made about unions in
the course of the interview.
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Table 5.4: SME Managers attitudes towards the view that unions & employee associations distract
from management
Inter-
view
No.+
Unions & employee associations distract from management
1. Yes, they have, although I can’t complain because I had that problem solved by the union [an
example provided in the course of the interview]. So, therefore, probably, but I think that probably is
still a need for them, yes.
2. I think they do distract managers from the process of management.
Not addressed
Not addressed
Not addressed
6. No, not in this situation.
7. Yes, sometimes they can complicate the process. I myself I was the union organiser for 11 years so I
can tend to see both sides of the story
8.
9. No, I think they are of value to resource to a small enterprise such as ourselves and I think very
important to have the maybe the umpires on either side when required
10. Transcript not available
11. Not addressed
12. Yes. Well, I mean, as I said with the EBA as well we didn’t communicate very well to start off with.
That’s why we now have a union member who is in our organisation.
13. I would be delighted. I think I am telling the truth, if people wanted to put in a workplace agreement.
14. It can be yes. It can be. But if any approach is made to me they are certainly given the courtesies of
the day.
15. Yes, I think so, I think that both those things, and it’s difficult to say because there were certainly
some good benefits about the employees’ association that has some guidelines that allow you to have
some discussions. Employees’ associations really do not have the strength in the site negotiations as
the unions for example.
16. Not these days … Now, whether that is a change in our management style and therefore our
professionals and the way we deal with it, or whether that is a change in the union’s attitude or the
men’s attitude. I don’t know. All I know now is we have less discussions with the unions than we
ever did. I mean, I haven’t seen a union guy here for years.
17. No. Not at all. Really, as far as dealings with the unions are concerned, it wouldn’t take really more
than a couple of hours a month out of my time and I wouldn’t class that as a distraction. It may take a
little bit more time. We have enterprise bargaining agreements I place here and if it’s ever going to
take up a bit of time, that’s when it does … But, in the main, we are able to come to an agreement
that suits both sides …
18. Yes, they are very formalised in how they want to do things. Whereas being a small company, we are
not formalised.
19. I don’t know. I don’t think so. A diversion from it? Well, I mean, as a manager you have to guess to
negotiate different things with your staff at different times.
20. Having to negotiate with people? No, no, I see that as totally integral. It’s part of it.
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The interviewed managers who were asked and responded to the first question, ‘Do you
think that unions or employee associations distract you from the process of
management’ were evenly split between those who did believe that unions and employee
associations distract them from the task of management and those who did not. The
answers were, in some cases, modified by referral to their own experience. A manager in
garment manufacture, who answered in the affirmative, referred to an example where
the union had solved a problem with a difficult employee, admitted that ‘probably’ there
was a need for the union (interview 1). Another in metal fabrication agreed that union
relations was a distraction and that part of management’s problems with an enterprise
agreement had been management’s failure in communication (interview 12). A paint
manufacturing manager agreed with the statement and referred to some of the benefits of
dealing with employee associations, observing that management does not have the
strength in negotiations with trade unions (interview 15).
The reasons provided for disagreeing with the proposition (that is, where managers
expressed positive or neutral attitudes towards trade unions) included the value of unions
to a small enterprise, especially as an ‘umpire’ (interview 9), that a workplace agreement
was welcome (interview 13), that there is no significant union presence (interview 16),
and that relations with unions and employee associations ‘wouldn’t take more than a
couple of hours a month out of my time’ (interview 17). Managers in two non-union
workplaces accepted negotiation as an integral part of management (interviews 19, 20),
although in neither case was there a collective context to their answers to other
questions.
When asked whether they believed unions had outlived their usefulness, only 22 percent
(4 out of 18 interviews) agreed they had. These results are summarised in table 5.5.
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Table 5.5: SME Managers’ attitudes towards the view that unions have outlived their usefulness
Inter-
view
No.+
Unions have outlived their usefulness
1. They just make extra work …when something is working perfectly fine … it’s just an extra an
extra complication … They are at the moment trying to do something about the black economy
out there and for that we commend them.
2. No, not all I think form a political point of view I think it’s disgraceful thing now with the
MUA24 where we saw some very bad people we saw bosses at their worst … it’s a terrible
union and it’s terrible employers …
3. No, not at all … the bloke … on the factory floor has certainly got to have someone with a
voice speaking for him; that’s a collective; that’s otherwise single action taken on his part could
be no more effective than him having a week off sick.
4. The role for them is certainly not the way it was a few years ago.
5. Not addressed
6. Well, I think these days shops not having the other offer to negotiate and I think that it is very
sad and that is putting us in a problem situation where unions just demand they just demand …
7. I don’t know I think they are in a bit of a transition stage where they’ve obviously had to shed
off some of the old skin that they’ve had over the last 50 or 60 years
8. I mean, if employees and employers can sit down and talk and agree on terms and conditions
and whatever else, as far as I can see the union is just a third party …
9. No, not at all I think they’re very important part of the process … I think that, say, from the 70s
the unions have become a lot more aware of the importance of their role and less of the
antagonistic approach and I think the community in general sort of have some form of respect
for them these days, they went through a bad stage in those days … metal trades always in the
paper. But I think that’s gone. Most people were sympathetic towards the unions and their
involvement very important.
10. Transcript not available
11. Could be
Why is that?
Well, enterprise bargaining and a lot of people I find now want to work on individual contracts
12. No. … The attitude of coming in saying well, ‘I’m pulling everybody out tomorrow because
you didn’t clean the toilets’ probably are gone. The union rep who helped us with our EBA was
excellent … I would hope that just the radicalness of the union movement continues to be
worked on. I think they do play an important part, but it is communication again and often the
ground floor, the roots of the people on the ground floor need somebody else to talk to and to
trust besides the management.
24 This comment refers to the 1998 waterfront dispute involving the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA).
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Inter-
view
No.
Unions have outlived their usefulness
13. When employers get too much power, they turn into a bunch of pricks and we need each
other for balance. And I don’t see that you need it for our size as much as the big coal
companies, maybe. Although their bloody terms and conditions look pretty good to me. Some
employers can screw people and I despise people who abuse people in that way — take
advantage of them or screw them or hurt them. I just don’t think unions protect from that.
14. No, I think with these workplace agreements, there is a change back the other way … I don’t
think the unions have quite the power they once had … but I think unions have got to realise
that there is more in life than being a political force. I think you have to look after your men
as well.
15. I think that they are struggling with the changes that are coming. I think the change range in
management and industry is enormous. I think management itself is struggling with people
developing ideas. Personally, I think the whole society is struggling with the rate of change.
… Management or business I think end up being free of that arm hold and able to move
because their objectives are far clearer. Whereas I think the union has a great lot of debate to
be done and for them to survive some of their political ideals have to be compromised. That’s
their challenge.
16. No, I still think there are employers out there who will rip the employees off blind and they
definitely need protection. Now whether that comes from the union or whether that comes
from another body, I definitely think they are a necessary evil.
17. No, I definitely don’t. I think there is a place for unions and I think there always will be. I
really do believe that unions have become a lot more modern in the last 10 years. To me, well
especially the union that I deal with, I don’t believe they’re vindictive, sort of, type of people
anymore. Every time they come in here they’re prepared to talk quite sensibly. At times,
they’ve even surprised me. They’ve backed me.
18. Not that we have much to do with unions at all here. I think they look after the big companies
and that’s what they are geared to do. And the small business: I don’t think they know what
to do.
19. I do … within our industry, our business. What they do out there you only ever see what you
see on the news and read in the newspapers is that they tend to cause havoc and lots of upset
to lots of people so I’m not interested in them. … That’s just not where we see any need.
20. It’s totally as an observer. Yes, as an individual, not that I have had anything to do with
unions, but I think that in a lot of industries they probably have, but maybe I am looking at it
as an employer and think that employers are willing to be fair balanced and that there are
other control mechanisms in the community to make sure that there is this balance. I think
they have achieved a lot for individuals in the past, so I have that view … I’m not in any large
industries where maybe there isn’t that good negotiating power that I know individuals have
in our organisation. They can come up to us anytime.
One manager inferred that unions, as ‘just a third party’, were not relevant ‘if employees
and employers can sit down and talk and agree on terms and conditions’ (interview 8).
Fifty percent (9) disagreed with the proposition. Another 28 percent provided answers
that could not easily be categorised as agreement or disagreement. The reasons given for
agreeing with the proposition were diverse: the growth of individual contracts (interview
199
11); union powerlessness (interview 13); the specific characteristics of the business and
industry, and because unions ‘tend to cause havoc’ (interview 19); and the presence of
‘other control mechanisms in the community to make sure there is balance’ (interview
20).
There was a wide range of reasons given by those managers disagreeing with the
proposition. The garment manufacturer praised the clothing industry union for ‘trying to
do something about the black economy’ of sweated outwork (interview 1). The manager
in a printing firm condemned the activities directed against the union in the waterfront
dispute of 1998, notwithstanding he regarded the Maritime Union of Australia as ‘a
terrible union and its terrible employers’ (interview 2). Three managers held the view
that employees needed representation (interviews 3, 12, 16), notwithstanding that unions
might be a ‘necessary evil’ (interview 16). A complementary perspective was offered by
those managers referring to the power of employers. A retail manager believed there was
a need for balance because ‘When employers get too much power, they turn into a bunch
of pricks’, while unions could not protect employees against being ‘abused’ or
employers who ‘screw people’ (interview 13). A manager in the metals industry noted
that the individual arrangements in Australian Workplace Agreements have turned the
power balance back towards employers (interview 14). Another manager in the metal
industry (an engineering firm) saw unions as ‘an important part of the process’, in
particular because they now take a less antagonistic approach (interview 9). Changes in
union strategies received comments in a number of other interviews (interviews 7, 12,
17).
Some SME managers in non-union environments also take an exceptional approach to
trade unions: that is, that trade unions are relevant for larger organisations, but do not
belong in the smaller business environment (interviews 19, 20 and interview 9).
The question on the managers’ attitudes towards negotiating with unions and employee
associations and other comments about unions throughout the interviews raised a
complex set of responses. These are summarised in table 5.6.
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Table 5.6: SME Managers attitudes towards unions
Inter-
view No.+
General comments about unions in the course of the interview
1. … we have a good relationship with the union … they still have to come back all the time.
2. You’ve got to have some sort of watchdog … I don’t think we should trust management the
same as we don’t trust governments.
3. Not addressed
4. Not addressed
5. I’m lucky we are not unionised. We’re lucky we’re a single side.
6. There should be more negotiation rather than demand
7. It’s never always comfortable [having to negotiate with employees] but that’s something
you’ve got to do.
… In July ’97 we had a lot of union trouble here which culminated here in sacking of 35
employees … and basically they were given wrong advice by their union and they breached
all industrial relations laws and they were thrown out by the Commissioner and from that
day on most of the employees voluntary, with no pressure from the management … getting
little support from their union they all relinquished their union membership.
8. Not addressed
9. I must admit we are a bit more reluctant to ring the union about issues because we have
found in the past, even though I find the union movement far better to deal with in modern
days, where they had a more aggressive approach that to these matters instead of a
conciliatory approach.
I think because we are a small organisation in constant communication with individuals
here I think to sit down at a meeting they try and negotiate I don’t think it sits so well with
this type of organisation.
10. Transcript not available
11. … we have hardly have a talk to the unions in our case while they’re all in the union
because of the refinery. See, the refinery was more or less like a closed shop, nobody could
look unless it was in the union. But now this all has changed since the enterprise bargaining
side of it. The people who say they want to be in the unions — we don’t enforce it. I say
it’s entirely up to the individual if he wants to join a union or not. But we never had any
problems with a union and we never had really any tough negotiations with them …
12. Well let me put it this way. When I first got started in DIY [do it yourself] in 1977, I had
been in the bank, the Commonwealth Bank Officers’ Association — which was hardly a
union — and within a week of me, as a bank person, taking over this tile importing
company, our company got black-banned by the Storemen & Packers Union … If people
want to be in the union, they can join, if they don’t want to join, they don’t have to. And I
have had a very good association with the Storemen & Packers Union over the years, only
because I learnt the rules real quick. But the only people I resent: I hate bullies on either
side.
13. Unions, I have troubles with, big trouble with because of experiences I have had and not
because of antagonism towards unionism …
I asked everybody to be in the union. And I stick strictly to awards. There is no such thing
as these agreements and what have you. I asked everybody to be in the union. There would
two or three out there that are not in the union, but I am not pressing it.
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Inter-
view No.+
General comments about unions in the course of the interview
14. People say you’re anti-union. I say, we are not anti union. I’m just anti third party.
I see that negotiating with your employees whether they are union members or non union
members is not a difficult thing … the difficulty I believe with a third party is that they’ve
been on different agendas. Whether they’ve been on a union agenda and they have to
represent wider than your site and your business and they have other pressures and
objectives and needs that they when they sit down to negotiate the EBA be mindful of what
other members are representing outside your site.
15. Q. You didn’t think of perhaps getting a facilitator in?
A. Didn’t want to. We wanted to do it on our own. My preference would have been to deal
with the unions.
Q. Why is that? A. Professional understanding. And as it is turning out I think these guys
came from the workshop floor. The three on the EBA committee, they were selected from
the workshop floor, but it is now at the stage, I can see, that there is a rift happening
between them and the men. They start with so, hang on, you’re one of their goonies, you’re
one of their boys. Had it been the union, it would have taken that out all together. And we
still would have achieved what we achieved I think.
16. I think they [unions] are an important part of the workshop. I tell you how unions go
around here. Initially you might start off with a new shop steward on the workshop floor.
He’s just been elected by the blokes on the workshop floor and he’s all fired up and rearing
to go and he’s ready to tear you apart. He’s ready to have fight on any issue. But where the
challenge comes in there is that you’ve got to break him down and bit by bit you can break
him down. So where you have confrontation you have to turn that into discussion and you
can turn that around very easily. It’s not difficult. You know where every guy on the
workshop floor is on the union out there. Hey, we don’t have any problems with it.
17. Negotiation is to a point. But it’s more in a group on our levels of employees.
18. Yes, we sit down and talk to them [employees]. If they are looking for something whether
it be an increase in wages or a new vehicle or they want to go a different tack in their jobs,
so we are willing to sit down and talk to them about it.
19. I’ve not had to negotiate ever with unions so I don’t have that experience.
Q. So this is a non-unionised workplace?
A. Yes, it is a non-unionised workplace with professionals. There are codes of conduct and
principles, I guess, and fairness has to come into it and trying to make sure that in any
decision or any negotiation that I clearly understand, the motivation is on both sides. And
then you’ve got the issue of doing the best for the shareholders, but you really look at the
stakeholders and the employees have a big stake in this company.
20. Not addressed
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Only five of the interview sample (29 percent) gave a response supportive of unions in
the workplace (interviews 1, 2, 11, 16, 17). The first referred to relationships with the
union. The second referred to unions in terms of general principle: ‘You’ve got to have
some sort of watchdog’ (interview 2). Another preferred to deal with the unions because
employees and management generally do not have sufficient experience to negotiate
agreements (interview 16). Two others accepted the presence of unions as part of the
industrial landscape (interview 11, 17).
A majority of the managers in the interview sample (65 percent) were negative about
trade unions or trade unions did not figure in their perspectives about dealing with
employees. One manager openly admitted, ‘I’m lucky we are not unionised. We’re lucky
we’re a single side’ (interview 5), a mainstream unitarist perspective on the organisation.
Another denied being anti-union, saying, ‘We are not anti-union. I’m just anti-third
party’ because ‘the difficulty … with a third party is that they’ve been on different
agendas’ (interview 15). Some of the interviewees, when asked to talk about negotiation
with unions or employee associations, spoke in terms of negotiating with a ‘group’ or
talking to employees (interviews 18, 19) or non-union negotiation (interview 20). This
approach was also inferred by a manager in a non-unionised workplace who, in the
context of talking about unions, observed that ‘if we don’t look after our employees
they’re going to go and they’re going to make a huge, potentially a huge dent in our
business’ (interview 3).
Previous, difficult experiences with unions governed the negative approach to unions
subscribed to by some managers. In one such case the manager regarded negotiating
with unions as necessary, but uncomfortable (interview 7). Another would only contact
the union reluctantly (interview 9). Two spoke of incidents with antagonistic union
officials, one of which occurred 20 years previously. In both of these last two cases, the
manager tolerated, but did not promote, union membership (interviews 13, 14). A
manager in a unionised workplace complained of union demands replacing negotiation:
‘unions do not allow someone to negotiate. They demand, but what I feel sorry is to see
what they are demanding and how it will effect [the company] in the long run. They’re
not interested’ (interview 6).
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The overall picture of this sample of SME managers’ attitudes towards trade unions is
summarised in table 5.7. The table indicates three patterns of responses in managers’
articulation of their attitudes towards trade unions in the interviews.
Table 5.7: Attitudes towards trade unions, summary of responses
Interview No.
Unions
distract from
management
Unions have
outlived their
usefulness
General
comments on
unions.
Summary1
1. NEG POS POS 1N 2P Positive
2. NEG POS POS 1N 2P Positive
3. N/A2 POS NEG 1N 1P Indeterminate
4. N/A NEG NEG 2N Negative
5. N/A N/A NEG 1N Negativeindication
6. POS NEG NEG 1P 2N Negative
7. NEG N/A NEG 2N Negative
8. N/A NEG N/A 1N Negativeindication
9. POS POS NEG 2P 1N Positive
10. Transcript not available
11. N/A NEG POS 1N 1P Indeterminate
12. NEG POS N/A 1N 1P Indeterminate
13. POS POS NEG 2 P 1N Positive
14. NEG POS NEG 2N 1P Negative
15. NEG NEG NEG 3N Negative
16. POS POS POS 3P Positive
17. POS POS POS 3P Positive
18. NEG NEG NEG 3N Negative
19. POS NEG NEG 1P 2N Negative
20. POS NEG NEG 1P 2N Negative
1. In some cases where the response was difficult to categorise, the attitude was inferred from the total
context of the interviewee’s responses.
N. = Negative attitudes towards trade unions. In both the second and third columns this is reflected in
response in which the manager agrees with the proposition.
P. = Positive attitudes towards trade unions. In both the second and third columns this is reflected in
responses in which the manager disagrees with the proposition.
N/A = the respondent made no comment on this issue.
Where the responses in the interview indicate more than one positive or more than one
negative characteristic, the interviewee was identified as demonstrating the respective
attitude towards trade unions. In the case where there was only one response, that
response (in the two cases where this occurred, the negative) is characterised only as an
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‘indication’. Managers for whom there were only two answers and they demonstrated
one negative and one positive attitude, it was not possible to conclude at this level of
analysis whether they were more or less antipathetic than sympathetic towards trade
unions. They were, therefore, categorised as ‘indeterminate’.
The results indicate that around half of the respondents (10) expressed either negative
attitudes towards unions across the three sets of answers or they had a single negative
indication. Six managers (32 percent) reflected positive responses and three (16 percent)
demonstrated an indeterminate picture of their attitudes.
Question 6 in the interview schedule asked whether the managers thought that unions or
employee associations distract them from the process of management and was designed
to elicit negative comments of the sort which are expressed in question B4 of the survey.
Only six of the respondents agreed that unions did distract managers from the
management process. However, of these, two of them qualified their answer with a
positive observation about trade unions. In response to the proposition that unions had
outlived their usefulness, most of those managers who agreed modified their comments
with a positive union statement or a neutral observation. There was a clear disagreement
with the statement from eight of the participants in the interview programme.
5.7 Summary
Across each of the topics there was no overriding unitarist ideology evident among the
SME managers in the interview programme, although there were isolated statements,
which sat comfortably with those characteristics of the unitarist delineated in chapter 2,
and the managers’ attitudes towards conflict tended to reveal a unitarist character.
In considering the nature and ideology of management, the respondents tended towards
operational rather than abstract contemplation and there was little common guidance for
management apparent across the sample. Where managers did address the ideational
aspects of management it was limited to concepts of fairness, reasonableness,
friendliness, democracy, accessibility, leadership, equality and trust. All of these,
however, were limited both in scope and in the extent to which they applied to managers
in the sample. Where the SME managers indicated tendencies towards inclusion such as
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employee participation, its scope was curtailed by falling back on managerial
prerogative. Some respondents were inclined to exclude employees from significant
participation.
None of the managers in the interview programme denied the presence of conflict in
SMEs. The explanation of conflict did reflect aspects of the unitarist model of conflict,
especially the attribution of various failings to employees and managerial failures.
However, this was not overwhelming in any respect.
Unitarist characteristics were quite evident in attitudes towards collective workplace
arrangements with almost two-thirds regarding negotiation as encouraging a ‘them-and-
us’ character. Three-quarters agreed with the proposition that negotiation was a
necessary evil. Few of the managers appeared comfortable with having to enter into
collective bargaining.
Managers had much more to say about trade unions. The scope of their answers to the
two questions they were asked about their attitudes towards trade unions suggested that,
in some cases, their experience was significant in shaping their attitudes. These varied
from rejection of unions to positive acceptance of a role in their workplaces. What was
quite unexpected was the view that unions had a place in industry but not in their
businesses, and especially in small and medium sized businesses: A little more than one-
fifth of the sample agreed with the proposition that unions had outlived their usefulness.
However, nearly two-thirds of the managers subscribed to negative perspectives about
trade unions.
In chapter 6, the findings from the survey data are reported and analysed.
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CHAPTER 6: SURVEY RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS
6.1 Introduction
SME managers’ responses to the questions on managerial prerogative, collective workplace
relations, conflict, trade unions and some other descriptive data derived from the survey
questionnaire provide the variables for the data analysis in this chapter. There was a
generally low level of support for the statements in each of the four questions, designed
specifically to reflect the characteristics of unitarism.
There are several possible responses to this observation. One response is that managers
might apply a mix of unitarist and pluralist frameworks and strategies, as Wright (1995)
suggests. Another is that managerial behaviour might not reflect managers’ subjective
beliefs and values because of various constraints placed on them by unions, other third
parties, and government regulation (Kochan et al. 1994). Yet again, there might be no
consistent body of ideas and action constituting an ideology and managers pragmatically
deal with the problems and challenges at hand in managing the employment relationship,
using whatever strategy seems most likely to achieve organisational objectives.
6.1.2 Arrangement of Chapter 6
In chapter 4, section 4.8, the features of the data analysis were outlined. These provide the
basis for conclusions to be discussed in chapter 7 about whether SME managers subscribe
to an identifiably unitarist ideology.
In section 6.2 the arrangement of the data according to the questionnaire is outlined. The
independent contextual variables (the A series of questions) are developed around the
organisational characteristics of the small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), presented
in section 6.3 and the personal characteristics of the respondents in section 6.4.
Questions B1 to B4 are the salient questions addressing the four central dimensions of
Fox’s unitarist ideology. The descriptive data for the unitarist dimensions are found in
section 6.5. Question B5 reflected an extension of attitudes towards managerial prerogative
and the role of third parties. Those dimensions include notions about the limitations that
are implicit in many of those statements hence they were called the limitations variables
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and were included with the organisational and personal characteristics. Principal
components analysis reduced the data in survey question B5 to four variables. Section 6.6
presents the limitations variables from question B5.
Exploratory factor analysis treats the data derived from questions B1 to B4, classifying the
latent variables from the four questions related to the unitarist dimensions. This was a
matter of identifying homogenous groups of variables from those constituting each of the
questions (O’Leary-Kelly & Vokurka 1998, p. 391), and selecting a subset of the variables
in each of the questions for further analysis (Hair et al. 1998, p. 95). These were labelled
the unitarist variables for questions B1-B4. The results are reported in section 6.7.
The C-series of questions referred to managerial practices. Questions C1 to C5 identified a
range of consultative, participative and collective practices. Descriptive data for these
practices are reported in section 6.8. In this section, questions C1 and C2 refer to the
categorisation of the range and degree of managers’ consultation with employees in SMEs.
Following McDonald and Wiesner (2000), survey questions C1 and C2 provided a set of
statements dealing with a range of matters on which managers might consult employees
(consultation range variables) and question C2 additionally provided information about the
degree to which managers consulted employees on most of those matters. The substantive
content of items in these two survey questions suggested categories that referred to
consultation on workplace efficiency and consultation on organisational strategy. In this
case, the data were set up manually according to these categories since they could be
applied consistently to both question C1 and C2. Section 6.9 presents the descriptive data
for the practices identified in questions C3, C4 and C5. Question C5 was re-coded into
yes/no values consistent with questions C1, C3 and C4. There was no need to treat the data
from C3 and C4. Only the descriptive data are provided for questions C3, C4 and C5.
Factor analysis of managers’ satisfaction with employee and organisational performance
(question D1) is reported in section 6.10 to identify the latent satisfaction variables. Then,
in section 6.11 the significance of the relationship between the organisational
characteristics, personal characteristics and the limitations variables and the unitarist
variables is analysed. Since the unitarist variables contain ranked data, nonparametric
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Kruskal-Wallis tests for one-way analysis of variance were appropriate for testing the
significance of the impact of the independent organisational and personal limitations
variables on the unitarist variables. Spearman’s rank correlation was used for the
limitations variables. The Spearman test was used in section 6.12 to identify whether there
were any significant relationships between the unitarist variables and the managerial
practice variables, which reflected a unity of values, beliefs and managerial action in
accordance with the notion of ideology defined in chapter 2. The Spearman test was also
applied in section 6.13 to explore the relationship between the unitarist variables and SME
managers’ satisfaction with employee performance. The same tests were applied to
identify whether there was a significant relationship between managerial practices and
managers’ satisfaction with employee performance. The chapter concludes in section 6.12
with a summation of the analysis.
In section 6.2, the arrangement of the data are reiterated.
6.2 The arrangement of the data from the survey questionnaire
The data fall into four sections corresponding to the four sections of the questionnaire:
Section A: ‘You and your organisation’;
Section B: ‘Views on employee management’;
Section C: ‘Structures and processes’; and
Section D: ‘Outcomes’.
In Section A, there were two sets of variables: those referring to the organisations and those
referring to the respondent. Organisational characteristics included questions on
organisational size, industry, the principal product or service, unionisation, union presence,
and whether the business was family-owned. Personal characteristics included the
management level of the respondent, highest level of education, source of ideas about
management, whether the respondent is an owner, age, and gender.
Proxies for the unitarist ideology were designed around four questions corresponding to the
key dimensions of unitarism: managers’ attitudes towards managerial prerogative, conflict,
collective workplace relations and trade unions. These four questions and managers’
responses form the core of the analysis in this chapter. In addition, questions addressing
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managerial practice and SME managers’ perspectives of the outcomes will be incorporated
into the analysis.
Question B1 tested the first of the four dimensions of unitarism, which relates to SME
managers’ views about managerial prerogative. This latter term was not used among the 17
variables that originally constituted the question on SME managers’ attitudes towards
management. Collective workplace relations were the subject of managers’ views in
question B2. There were 18 variables in the survey questionnaire dealing with collective
arrangements and processes (the third dimension discussed in chapter 3). Managers’
attitudes towards conflict were the subject of question B3. This item was the second
dimension of unitarism discussed in chapter 3. Thirteen items were included in the list of
statements to which SME managers responded. The final set of questions, among those
dealing directly with the dimensions of unitarism (B4), consisted of 14 statements about
trade unions on which SME managers were asked to express their attitude.
The final question in the B-series referred to the SME managers’ perceived limitations on
the management of employees. This was treated separately from the other B questions,
which related to managerial practice, as a contextual characteristic because the limitations
arise from factors with which the manager has to deal.
Questions in the series C1-C5 explored managerial practices with respect to consultation
with employees and employee participation. Question C1 dealt with a range of matters on
which managers might consult employees and the degree to which managers might involve
employees in decision-making was explored in question C2.
Questions C3-C5 dealt with forms of consultation. The first of these questions (C3) dealt
with eight methods of consultation, which might be applied to the issues in questions C1
and C2. The second (C4) asked managers to indicate whether they had ‘initiated, increased
or maintained’ any of 13 practices and process. Question C5 canvassed a further range of
practices, which the manager might have employed in the previous three years.
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Finally, the survey concluded with a question on organisational outcomes, which asked on
a four-point scale whether or not the SME manager was satisfied with 17 aspects of
workforce performance.
6.3 Organisational characteristics of SMEs
The organisational characteristics selected for further analysis included five variables.
These are set out with their labels in table 6.1, and include size, industry sector,
unionisation, union presence and family business.
Table 6.1: Characteristics of the organisation
Survey
Question
Label Characteristic Categories
A1 SMESIZES SME size  Small:  100
 Large: 101-200
A2 INDUSTRY Industry  Manufacture, construction, resources,
primary industry.
 Service
A7 UNIONISN Managers’ perceptions of the
percentage of union
members in the organisation
 0-10%
 11-50%
 51-75%
 >75%
A8.1-A8.3* UPRESENC Union Presence
A9 FAMLYBUS Organisation owned by a family
* A8.1, A8.2 and A8.3 had been entered as separate variables and subsequently computed into a single new
variable for the analysis.
The descriptive data for each of these variables are presented in sub-sections 6.3.1 to 6.3.5
below.
6.3.1 SME size
The number of employees in an organisation is obviously one of the criteria commonly
applied to definitions of small and medium sized businesses (Barrett 1998a, p. 1), as
discussed in section 2.3 of chapter 2. Curran (1990, p. 129) argues that size plays some
part in the functioning of organisations, but only if it is considered in relation to other
factors. Other factors such as turnover may be taken into account in defining SMEs.
Notwithstanding that a number of elements might be utilised in the definition of an SME, in
McDonald & Wiesner’s studies of SMEs in Australia size was utilised as the sole criterion
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because of their principal interests in organisational change and employee management
practice (McDonald & Wiesner 1998). They defined small firms as those firms with up to
100 employees and medium sized firms employing between 101 and 200 employees. This
study, as part of that project, continues the application of those size categories. Although
smaller ranges were used in the survey questionnaire, the number of size categories has
been compressed into small and medium sizes for this thesis.
Dunn and Bradstreet had provided the original sample frame used in the research by
McDonald and Wiesner on managers in Australian SMEs. One of the criteria was
organisations employing between 21 and 200 workers, so at some point the SMEs had
satisfied the size criterion. Although the sample was designed to capture firms in this size
range, 12.1 percent were smaller and 3.4 percent were larger than the target range. This
might be accounted for in the first instance by firms downsizing in the period between the
establishment of the database by Dun and Bradstreet and the conduct of the survey. Larger
firms may have expanded. There is no definite information from the survey results
available on upsizing or downsizing in this sample. However, in other studies based on
downsizing in Australia and New Zealand, Wagar and Gilson (1996, p. 92), also using a
Dun and Bradstreet database, found that 36.1 percent of Australian firms had downsized in
the previous three years. In the national survey conducted by Wiesner and McDonald in
the same quarter in 1998 as this survey was conducted, 42.6 percent of SMEs reported they
had reduced their workforce over the previous two years. Likewise 56.8 percent of SMEs
reported they had made no reductions at all. It is not unreasonable to assume that some of
the latter would have actually increased employment, the assumption applied here being
that the size of these businesses could still be very close to the cut-off point of 20
employees at one extreme and the 200 employee cut-off for medium sized businesses.
There was no question on increases to employment numbers in the survey developed for
this thesis.
The distribution of SMEs among the size categories is set out in table 6.2. Eighty-one
percent of SMEs in the sample were small businesses, and 19 percent were medium sized
businesses.
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Table 6.2: SME Size (n. = 206)
Size Category Frequency Percent
Small 167 81.1
Medium 39 18.9
In response to the question, A1: How many employees are in your organisation?
Twenty-five SME managers (12.1 percent) reported they employed fewer than 20
employees. These were included in the count.
6.3.2 SME industry sectors
Question A2 asked respondents to identify the industry in which their business was located.
Table 6.3 sets out the compressed sectors for manufacture, agriculture, resources, power
and construction, on the one hand, and service industries, on the other.
Table 6.3: SME industry sector (n. = 184)
Industry Sector Frequency Percent
Manufacture, agriculture, resources,
power and construction, 102 55.4
Service 82 44.6
In response to the question, A2: Is your business in [ABS industry categories]
The largest proportions of respondent organisations in the industry categories were in
manufacture (39.6 percent), followed by community service (10.9 percent), finance (9.4
percent), construction (7.8 percent), wholesale (7.8 percent), retail (5.7 percent), and
transport (4.7 percent).
6.3.3 SME managers’ estimates of unionisation in SMEs
Managers were asked to estimate the percentage of union members in their workplace.
While their estimates may or may not be reliable in presenting an accurate picture of union
membership, it does reflect SME managers’ perceptions of union membership. For this
study, managers’ social construction of the characteristics of the workforce is more
pertinent to the ideology of managers than the actual level of unionisation. Almost three-
quarters of the sample claimed either no employees or less than ten percent of workers
belonged to unions. This is reflected in table 6.4.
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Table 6.4: Managers’ estimates of percentage of union members in SMEs (n. = 206)
Estimated Percentage of Employees
who are Union Members
Frequency Percent Cumulative
Percent
0-10% 153 74.3 74.3
11-50% 29 14.1 88.3
51-75% 13 6.3 94.7
>75% 11 5.3 100.0
In response to the question, A7: To your knowledge, what is the percentage of union members?
Other features of union presence in the workplace may be ascertained by the presence of a
union delegate or shop steward, visits by full-time union officials, or the raising of issues
from a union perspective. This is considered in the next sub-section.
6.3.4 Union presence in SMEs
In designing the questionnaire and the organisational demographics of SMEs, attention was
paid to unions in the workplace both in terms of managers’ perceptions of the unionisation
of the workforce and whether or not they were aware of a union presence. Three measures
of union presence were used: the presence of a union delegate, visits at least once a year by
union officials, and whether or not employees raised issues ‘from a union perspective’.
This last term was not explained to the respondents. The rationale for not explaining the
term was that there might be a number of ways in which it could be apparent, from a
manager’s point of view, that employees either were influenced by a union or were used to
dealing with workplace management issues from the perspective of union representations.
The question, therefore, was left open to interpretation by the respondents.
Only one quarter of managers reported a union delegate in the SME, 41.2 percent were
visited by union officials at least once a year, and just over a quarter had experienced issues
being raised from a union perspective. These results are set out in table 6.5.
Table 6.5: Managers’ perceptions of union presence in SMEs
Aspect of Union Presence Frequency Percentage ofSMEs n.
Presence of union delegate 39 25.8 151
Full-time official visits at least once a year 56 41.5 135
Union members raise issues from a union perspective 35 26.9 130
In response to the question, A8, Is the union active at your workplace? 1. There is a union delegate on site; 2.
A full time official visits at least once a year; 3. Union members raise issues with me from a union
perspective.
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Respondents who had advised that there were no union members had been invited to skip
this question (A8). Notwithstanding that 74.3 percent of managers (153) had advised there
were no union members or less than 10 percent unionisation, 73 percent (151) of the sample
indicated there was a union delegate in the workplace. One hundred and thirty-five (65.5
percent) advised that a full-time official visited at least once a year, and 63 percent of the
sample (130) claimed union members raised issues with management from a union
perspective. The possible inconsistencies between answers to questions A7 and A8 were
not considered as threatening the integrity of the relationship between respondents’
perceptions of characteristics such as unionisation and union presence and their attitudes
towards the items in questions B1 to B6. The perception is also more important for the
question of the ideology to which SME managers might subscribe. For the purpose of
further analysis, the three elements of union presence were combined into a single variable
with the label, UPRESENC.
6.3.5 The SME as a family business
The first part of the survey also addressed the issue of whether or not the work organisation
was a family business. Two questions related to this issue from an organisational
orientation. The first question addressed whether the SME was a family owned business
(FAMLYBUS). The second question referred to whether or not family members actively
manage the business. The final organisational characteristic to be considered in the
analysis therefore is family ownership. This latter characteristic is not considered in this
analysis, since question A11, ‘Are you an owner of this company?’ was included among the
personal variables. Family management is reported in table 6.6, however, which
summarises the results of the organisational questions relating to family ownership.
Table 6.6: Family ownership and management of SMEs
Family Characteristic Frequency Percentage of SMEs n.
Organisation owned by a familya 99 48.1 206
Family members actively manage the businessb 89 74.2c 120
a. In response to the question, A9: Is this organisation owned by a family? b. In response to the question A10,
Do the family members actively manage the business? c. That is, in 74.2% of businesses, which are owned by
a family, the business is also actively managed by family members.
Ownership by the manager could refer to a characteristic of the firm as in the family
business literature (for example, Riordan & Riordan 1993; James 1999). However, since
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this thesis is concerned with managers’ values and beliefs, it was deemed more appropriate
to include this feature as a characteristic of the manager in order to explore the relationships
between ownership and attitudes towards the unitarist variables, which the factor analysis
identified. As table 6.6 illustrates, just under half the SMEs surveyed were family-owned
businesses.
6.4 Personal characteristics
The second set of questions in Section A of the survey questionnaire consisted of certain
personal characteristics of the respondent managers. Of the six characteristics of managers
in Section A of the questionnaire, five were retained for the analysis and are listed in table
6.7. The question excluded was A4, ‘What is the management level of your current
position?’ Since the survey had a 95 percent success rate in achieving responses to the
CEO, manager reporting directly to the CEO, or a senior manager, this became a redundant
question, and was abandoned for further analysis.
Table 6.7: Characteristics of the SME manager
Survey Question Label Characteristic
A5 MANQUALS Manager’s qualifications
A6.1 MANIDEAS The source of managers ideas about management
A11 MANOWNER Whether the manager is an owner or not
A12 AGE Age classification of the manager
A13 GENDER The manager’s gender
Each of these independent variables is considered in sub-sections 6.4.1 to 6.4.5.
6.4.1 SME manager’s qualifications
The survey contained a question on the highest level of formal education obtained by the
respondent manager. Managers’ formal education was split evenly between a secondary
school certificate, an undergraduate degree, and postgraduate diplomas or certificates. In
all, 60.3 percent of SME managers in the sample had a tertiary qualification. TAFE
qualifications and trade certificates were less common. Question A5 contained six levels of
formal education. The levels of formal education of SME managers is set out in table 6.8.
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Table 6.8: SME manager’s highest levels of formal education (n. = 206)
Levels of Formal Education Frequency Percentage of Respondents
Secondary school certificate 49 24.0
TAFE qualification/formal trade certificate 23 11.3
Undergraduate degree 50 24.5
Postgraduate qualification 73 35.8
Other 9 4.4
In response to the question, A5: What is your highest level of formal education?
For further analysis, all postgraduate qualifications were combined into a single variable.
Sixty percent of the respondent managers had undertaken tertiary education.
6.4.2 The source of SME managers’ ideas about management
Managers were asked to identify and rank the three most significant of the major sources of
their ideas about management from a range of options. Table 6.9 sets out these options,
which were: managers in their network (such as a chamber of commerce, Rotary, the
Australian Institute of Management), their own experience, management books, business or
management training, their religious beliefs, their political affiliations, industry association
advice or publications, and government publications. Only the first ranked choices will be
used in the analysis
Table 6.9: SME managers’ major sources of ideas about management (n. = 205)
Source Frequency Percent
Managers in a network (eg., chamber of commerce, Rotary, AIM) 15 7.3
Experience 153 74.6
Management books 6 2.9
Business or management training 17 8.3
Religious beliefs Nil Nil
Political affiliations Nil Nil
Industry association advice or publications 7 3.4
Government publications Nil Nil
Other 7 3.4
In response to the question, A6: Please indicate the major source of your ideas about management (rank from
1-3, the most significant influences..
The outstanding feature of the source of manager’s ideas about their work is their self-
reliance on experience. Training in business or management is important for only a small
minority. Since this question was included primarily to identify the source of any unitarist
ideology, SME managers’ denial of any reliance on the ideational realms of religious
beliefs and political affiliations warrants further research. Finally, government attempts to
encourage various work practices are insignificant for all but two SME managers who
nominated this as a third ranked source.
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6.4.3 Ownership status of SME managers
A set of questions (A9, A10, A11) related to the ownership of the organisation: whether the
company was family-owned, family-managed, and whether the respondent was an owner.
As indicated in sub-section 6.3.5, this issue could be regarded as either a characteristic of
the organisation or the manager. Since this thesis is focusing on the ideology of managers,
the issue here is whether managers are more likely to adopt unitarist principles in the
management of employees if they are also owners of the company. Just under half of the
SMEs in the sample were family owned and a slightly lower percentage was managed by
family members. Slightly more than one-third of the respondent managers were also family
members and half of them did have significant shareholdings. Table 6.10 sets out the
findings.
Table 6.10: Ownership status of SME managers (n. 206)
Family Characteristic Frequency Percentage of SMEs n.
Respondent manager is family member and has
significant shareholding 75 36.4 206
Respondent manager is not a family member but has
significant shareholding 29 14.0 206
In response to the question A11, Are you an owner of this company (ownership includes significant
shareholding)? Yes (family member) Yes (non-family member) No.
This table combines organisational characteristics of SMEs and a characteristic of the
manager - whether or not managers are family members or owners. These characteristics of
the organisation and the managers were not the subject of any further research questions in
this thesis.
6.4.4 SME managers’ age and gender
Almost all the managers responding to the survey were between 31 and 65 years of age.
Table 6.11 sets out the distribution of age groups, with the largest group being 46-55 years.
Table 6.11: SME Managers’ Age Groups (n. = 204)
Age Groups Frequency Percentage of Respondents
Under 30 years 4 2.0
31 — 45 years 57 27.9
46 — 55 years 93 45.6
56 — 65 years 44 21.6
More than 65 years 6 2.9
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In response to the question, A12: What is your age group?
Only 5 percent of SME managers in the sample were female.
6.5 SME managers and unitarism
The B series of questions, headed ‘Views on employee management’ in the survey
questionnaire, provide a framework for examining SME managers’ attitudes towards a
range of statements, which covered the four dimensions of unitarism already identified.
These dimensions consisted of managers’ attitudes towards managerial prerogative,
conflict, collective workplace arrangements, and trade unions. A fifth element, which
extends the scope of managerial attitudes for the study, dealt with the limitations which
managers perceived to affect their managerial functions
It is possible to obtain an indication of whether or not SME managers exhibit unitarist
tendencies by examining the responses of each manager to each of the statements to which
each respondent agreed in each of the four key questions relating directly to Fox’s unitarist
construct (table 6.12). This is followed by presenting the findings in similar form to
questions relating to the practices in place in the surveyed SMEs (section 6.9 below).
Table 6.12 summarises the findings with respect to the number of items related to Fox’s
unitarist construct for each respondent to the survey. There are 49 of these unitarist items,
excluding questions B1.7, B1.9, B1.10, B1.11, B2.8, B2.9, and B3.1, which do not clearly
fit a unitarist perspective. Each of these latter statements are deemed not to be consistent
with a unitarist ideology. The responses ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ were re-coded into a
single response of agreement. Likewise, ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ were
combined.
The conclusions about whether or not the descriptive data indicate a prevailing unitarism is
based upon the assumption that the larger the number of the 49 items to which the
respondents agreed, the greater the propensity towards a unitarist management perspective.
Individual items might not, of themselves, indicate anything more than a pragmatist
outlook on a particular problematic.
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Table 6.12: Case by case tendency to unitarism (No. of unitarist items = 49)
Case
No.
Unitarist
responses
Items
(%) Case No.
Unitarist
responses
Items
(%) Case No.
Unitarist
responses
Items
(%) Case No.
Unitarist
responses
Items
(%) Case No.
Unitarist
responses
Items
(%)
120 3 6.1 360 13 261 19 182 24 157 29
533 4 8.2 508 13 239 19 200 24 185 29
134 5 528 13 161 19 59 24 301 29
18 5 544 13 109 19 173 24 369 29
201 5 30 13 426 19 208 24 313 29
299 5 44 13 250 19 530 24 248 29
106 5
10.2
35 13 592 19
38.8
580 24
49.0
559 29
521 6 238 13 230 20 525 25 310 29
59.2
16 6
12.2
549 13
26.5
551 20 357 25 511 30
515 7 554 14 257 20 193 25 206 30
225 7 231 14 286 20 297 25 84 30
94 7 156 14 277 20 291 25 535 30
61.2
101 7 415 14 454 20
40.8
557 25 223 31
71 7 403 14 68 21 300 25
51.0
411 31
63.3
229 7 481 14 255 21 534 26 278 32 65.3
517 7
14.3
478 14 9 21 578 26 442 33 67.3
139 8 83 14 305 21 195 26 87 34
271 8 507 14 2 21 181 26 302 34
204 8 584 14 162 21 350 26 562 34
69.4
4 8 31 14
28.6
199 21 125 26 96 35
509 8
16.3
74 15 282 21 523 26 482 35
224 9 7 15 473 21 506 26 407 35
71.4
21 9 292 15 526 21
42.9
590 26
53.1
3 36
155 9 397 15 585 22 0 27 256 36
73.5
338 9 259 15 543 22 77 27 146 37 75.5
260 9 222 15 510 22 89 27 480 39 79.6
288 9 141 15
30.6
599 22 235 27 86 40
151 9 545 16 122 22 245 27 164 40
81.6
430 9
18.4
37 16 66 22 536 27 568 41 83.7
262 10 212 16 436 22 555 27 216 43
44 10 422 16 70 22 582 27
55.1
65 43
87.8
53 10 192 16 304 22 323 28
560 10 589 16
32.7
209 22 514 28
213 10
20.4
398 17 176 22 52 28
72 11 406 17 570 22 258 28
444 11 145 17 603 22 309 28
189 11 437 17 537 22
44.9
67 28
73 11 602 17
34.7
556 23 131 28
424 11 518 18 268 23 553 28
57.1
572 11
22.4
586 18 330 23
569 12 320 18 36 23
236 12 104 18 318 23
183 12 102 18 573 23
179 12 33 18 595 23
281 12
24.5
175 18 516 23
46.9
46 18
36.7
Responses from questions B1, B2, B3,
and B4, excluding items B1.7, B1.9,
B1.10, B1.11, B2.8, B2.9, and B3.1.
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Table 6.12 demonstrates that 63 (30.6 percent) of SME managers responded positively to
more than half of the unitarist items in the questions about management, collective
workplace relations, conflict, and trade unions. In descriptive terms, they could be said to
have a high propensity for a unitarist approach to management. If the results are broken
down further into quartiles according to the range of responses, the different degrees in the
propensity towards unitarist management can be identified. Table 6.13 illustrates this
break-up.
Table 6.13: Responses to unitarist items in each quartile
Range of
responses
Number of
responses
Percentage of
SME managers
(N. = 206)
Cumulative
percent
1st Quartile 1 – 12 45 21.8 21.8
2nd Quartile 13 - 24 98 47.6 69.4
3rd Quartile 25 – 36 56 27.2 96.6
4th Quartile 37 - 49 7 3.4 100.0
_
X = 19.9; standard deviation 8.7.
Only a small minority of managers (3.4 percent) are very highly oriented towards a
unitarist perspective with 27.2 percent having a high propensity based on the number of
items which they affirmed. Of the 47.6 percent who responded in the range of 13-24
items, 53.1 percent responded affirmatively to between 19 and 24 unitarist items. These
could be said to have moderately unitarist tendencies. The rest in the second quartile can
be described as low-level unitarists. Where managers responded affirmatively to 12 or
fewer items, they may be said to be not unitarist (21.8 percent).
Thus, a taxonomy of unitarist manager emerges as follows:
 Managers with low unitarist tendencies (21.8 percent)
 Managers with moderate unitarist tendencies (47.6 percent)
 Managers with high unitarist tendencies (27.2 percent)
 Managers with very high unitarist tendencies (3.4 percent)
This provides a clearer picture of management assumptions than by concluding, as do
some other researchers such as Wright (1996), that managers employ a mix of unitarist
and pluralist approaches.
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The descriptive data for the B-series of questions refers to the mean ( ) of the five point
ranks for each question from strongly agree to strongly disagree.
6.5.1 Managers’ attitudes towards managerial prerogative
Managers were asked to indicate whether they agreed with a number of items, which were
designed to ascertain their attitudes towards management. Each of the questions asked
managers to indicate the scale of their agreement or disagreement with the item. The
items in managers’ attitudes towards managerial prerogative are as follows:
B1.1 It is a manager’s primary role to direct employees;
B1.2 A healthy organisation is unified around management as the central source
of authority;
B1.3 Managers’ principal responsibility is towards the employer/shareholders;
B1.4 Individual employee agreements such as Australian Workplace Agreements
restore managers’ rights to manage;
B1.5 Managers have more commitment to the company than other employees;
B1.6 Negotiating trade-offs in agreements compromises effective management;
B1.7R25 involvement of shop floor employees in major decisions is necessary for
effective management;
B1.8 Individual employee agreements such as Australian Workplace Agreements
reinstate managers’ primary responsibility towards the employer/
shareholders;
B1.9R effective managers involve employees in key decisions affecting the
organisation;
B1.10R empowering employees will improve the company’s performance;
B1.11R self-managing teams are the way of the future for successful companies;
B1.12 One key to successful management of employees is to put in place up-to-
date systems to monitor employee performance;
B1.13 Employee resistance to change must be met by firm management action;
B1.14 involving employees in key decision-making is impractical;
B1.15 Managers must set the goals shared by all of the members of the
organisation;
B1.16 Third parties such as unions, government, and the Commission undermine
management’s legitimate authority;
B1.17 consultation with employees on major issues leads to decisions which are
less than optimal for the efficient functioning of the firm.
B2.626 Management is best placed to determine what is best for the employees.
25 Statements B1.7, B1.9, B1.10 and B1.11 were re-coded to reflect consistency with the unitarist direction of
the other statements in the whole of the B series. This is indicated by the designation ‘R’.
26 Item 2.6 was added from question 2B, since it was consistent with managerial prerogative rather than
the collective workplace variables.
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Table 6.14 indicates the arbitrary descriptions designed to assist the interpretation of the
mean of agreement or disagreement with each statement27, and they apply to the descriptive
data for the unitarist dimensions in this chapter, where appropriate.
Table 6.14: Interpretation of mean scores
Mean score Degree of support
Less than 2.000 strong support
2.001 - 2.500 moderate support
2.501 - 3.000 weak support
3.001 - 3.500 weak opposition
3.501 - 4.000 moderate opposition
More than 4.000 strong opposition
The descriptive data are for the statements on managerial prerogative from the B1 series
of statements are presented in table 6.15.
27 During data entry, a value ranging from 1.000 for ‘strongly agree’ to 5.000 for ‘strongly disagree’ was
assigned.
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Table 6.15: SME Managers Attitudes towards Managerial Prerogative (n. = 206)
Managerial Prerogative Variable _X SD SK Kur. Frequency
B1.1 It is a manager’s primary role to direct employees 2.4265 1.0502 .467 -.774 204
B1.2 A healthy organisation is unified around
management as th225e central source of authority 2.3010 .9610 .696 -.074 206
B1.3 Managers’ principal responsibility is towards the
employer/shareholders 2.3835 1.0138 .534 -.547 206
B1.4 Individual employee agreements such as Australian
Workplace Agreements restore managers’ rights to
manage
2.9510 .9084 -.022 -.117 204
B1.5 Managers have more commitment to the company
than other employees 2.8293 1.0734 -.062 -1.002 205
B1.6 Negotiating trade-offs in agreements compromises
effective management 3.2732 .8764 -.475 -.553 205
B1.7R Involving shopfloor employees in major decisions is
necessary for effective management 2.4146 .9594 .734 -.123 205
B1.8 Individual employee agreements such as Australian
Workplace Agreements reinstate managers’ primary
responsibility towards the employer/ shareholders
3.0390 .7333 -.136 .355 205
B1.9R Effective managers involve employees in key
decisions affecting the organisation 1.9171 .7657 .936 1.189 205
B1.10R Empowering employees will improve the
company’s performance 1.9171 .7970 .795 .516 205
B1.11R Self-managing teams are the way of the future for
successful companies 2.3317 .8673 .439 .235 205
B1.12 One key to successful management of employees is
to put in place up-to-date systems to monitor
employee performance
2.2913 .8161 .667 .322 206
B1.13 Employee resistance to change must be met by firm
management action 2.7961 1.0108 .161 -1.134 206
B1.14 Involving employees in key decision-making is
impractical 3.8058 .8330 -.900 .957 206
B1.15 Managers must set the goals shared by all of the
members of the organisation 2.5340 1.0152 .528 -.717 206
B1.16 Third parties such as unions, government, and the
Commission undermine management’s legitimate
authority
2.8932 .9719 -.009 -.466 206
B1.17 Consultation with employees on major issues leads
to decisions which are less than optimal for the
efficient functioning of the firm
3.5777 .8272 -.747 .255 206
B2.6 Management is best placed to determine what is
best for the employees 3.0936 .8766 -.273 -.604 203
In response to the question, B1, Please tick the box which most closely reflects your view on the following
statements about management, items B1.1, B1.2, B1.3, B1.4, B1.5, B1.6, B1.8, B1.12, B1.13, B1.15, B1.16; and
B2.6.
Around two-thirds of SME managers believe that managers’ primary role is directing
employees, a healthy organisation is unified around management as the central source of
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authority, managers’ principal responsibility is towards the employer or shareholders, one of
the keys to successful management of employees is the establishment of up-to-date systems
to monitor employee performance, and managers must set the goals shared by all members of
the organisation. On the face of it, this represents a moderately strong emphasis among SME
managers on a management-centred organisation, a characteristic that would place their
beliefs and values about managing employees within Fox’s unitarist framework. However,
an examination of the strength of SME managers’ support or opposition to each of the
statements suggests that this is not so.
A high percentage of SME managers believe that effective management entails involving
employees in key decisions affecting the organisation (86.3 percent), and nearly all (90.7
percent) reject the notion that involving employees in key decision-making is impractical.
However, only 66.8 percent would extend that principle to shopfloor employees.
Nevertheless, most managers (82.9 percent) subscribe to employee empowerment as a means
to improve company performance. This extends to self-managing teams for less than two-
thirds of SME managers (60.5 percent).
SME managers did not strongly support any of the statements in question B1. They gave
moderate support to the views that managers’ primary role is directing employees; that a
healthy organisation is unified around management as the central source of authority;
managers’ principal responsibility is towards the employer or shareholders; and that one of
the keys to successful management of employees is the establishment of up-to-date systems
to monitor employee performance. Managers weakly opposed five propositions. The first of
these was that individual agreements such as Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs)
restore managers’ rights to manage. Second, support was weak for the view that managers
have more commitment to the company than other employees. The third weakly supported
statement was that they must meet employee resistance to change with firm management
action. Fourth, there was weak support for the view that they must set the goals shared by all
members of the organisation, and, finally, managers weakly supported the view that third
parties undermined management’s legitimate authority. They strongly opposed the views
that negotiating trade-offs compromises effective management, meeting employee resistance
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to change with firm management action, and AWAs reinstate managers’ primary
responsibility towards the employer or shareholders.
Managers in the sample overall strongly supported the links between effective
management and involving employees in key decisions affecting the organisation. They
also strongly supported the concept that employee empowerment would improve the
performance of the company. These are quite general precepts. Managers seemed less
committed to involving employees in major decisions for effective management or that
self-managing teams are linked to successful companies. They gave only moderate
support to these propositions, but moderately rejected the views that involving employees
in key decision-making is impractical. There was also moderate objection to the
statement that consultation with employees on major issues leads to decisions, which are
less than optimal for the functioning of the firm.
The second dimension of the unitarist ideology consists of managers’ attitudes towards
conflict. This is set out in the next sub-section.
6.5.2 SME managers’ attitudes towards conflict
The third element of Fox’s unitarist framework tested in this research consists of
managers’ beliefs and values with respect to conflict. The conflict variables are as
follows:
B3.2 Conflict would be eliminated if management’s legitimacy was recognised
by all parties
B3.4. Conflict is symptomatic of employees’ inability to understand the
complexity of work in today’s organisation
B3.6. If managers could deal with employees face to face without the
intervention of third parties, conflict would be reduced
B3.7. Conflict is mostly the product of individual employees’ reactions to
grievances
B3.8. Conflict is irrational because managers and employees share common
objectives
B3.9. Conflict between managers and employees is usually stirred up by third
parties
B3.10. There will be no conflict when all employees consider themselves team
players
B3.11. Individual contracts would eliminate conflict
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B3.12. Management failures in communication and leadership are the most
significant causes of conflict
B3.13. Conflict and loyalty to the firm are incompatible
In the reliability tests (sub-section 4.5.2 of chapter 2), items B3.1, B 3.12 and B3.5 were
removed. One item - B3.3, ‘Unions contribute significantly to the presence of conflict in
the workplace’ - was added to the trade unions scale before the reliability test.
Table 6.16: SME Managers’ Attitudes towards conflict (n. = 206)
Conflict Variables _X SD SK Kur. Frequency
B3.2 Conflict would be eliminated if management’s
legitimacy was recognised by all parties 3.3932 .8921 -.444 -.607 206
B3.4 Conflict is symptomatic of employees’ inability
to understand the complexity of work in today’s
organisation
3.1699 .8584 -.335 -.677 206
B3.6 If managers could deal with employees face to
face without the intervention of third parties,
conflict would be reduced
2.3155 .7001 .766 1.043 206
B3.7 Conflict is mostly the product of individual
employees’ reactions to grievances 2.5805 .8630 .419 -.820 206
B3.8 Conflict is irrational because managers and
employees share common objectives 3.2767 .8813 -.400 -.696 206
B3.9 Conflict between managers and employees is
usually stirred up by third parties 3.0728 .8996 -.388 -.572 206
B3.10 There will be no conflict when all employees
consider themselves team players 2.9951 1.0049 -.311 -1.262 206
B3.11 Individual contracts would eliminate conflict 3.4683 .8015 -.473 -.233 205
B3.13 Conflict and loyalty to the firm are incompatible 3.4903 .8539 -.705 -.188 206
In response to the question, B3, Please tick the box which most closely reflects your view on each of the
following statements about conflict (by conflict is also meant disputes & grievances in the workplace)
Complementing their responses to third party intervention in question B2 where 57.3
percent agreed that there was too much third party interference in the workplace
(including government and trade unions), 68 percent agreed with the statement that face-
to-face dealing with employees without the intervention of third parties would reduce
conflict. Nevertheless, only 26.7 percent agreed that conflict between managers and
employees was stirred up by third parties.
Managers in SMEs did not support a number of other characteristics of unitarist attitudes
towards conflict, including the recognition of management legitimacy as a foil to conflict
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(item B3.2), the inability of employees to comprehend the complexity of work (item
B3.4), and the irrationality of conflict (B3.8). Only 16.5 percent supported the view that
conflict and loyalty to the firm were incompatible. There was moderate support for the
view that conflict would be reduced without the intervention of third parties. The rest of
the statements were moderately opposed, apart from B3.10 (There will be no conflict
when all employees consider themselves team players), which they weakly opposed.
The third dimension of Fox’s unitarist ideology, addressed in the next sub-section, is
constituted by managerial attitudes towards collective arrangements in the workplace.
6.5.3 SME managers’ attitudes towards collective workplace relations
The second set of survey questions, which dealt directly with the characteristics of Fox’s
unitarist ideology, addressed SME managers’ views on collective workplace relations.
The questions relating to managers’ attitudes were as follows:
B2.1. Negotiations and bargaining encourage an adversarial ‘them and us’
culture in the workplace;
B2.2. Negotiating with unions or employee associations interferes with
managers’ responsibility to the employer;
B2.3. Negotiations and bargaining encourage a “trade off” mentality that works
against the role of management in achieving organisational goals;
B2.4. Employees on individual contracts will be better team players than
employees on collective agreements;
B2.5. Collective agreements and awards encourage employees to view third
parties as the source of improved employment terms and conditions rather
than management;
B2.7. Management is best placed to determine what is best for the employees.
B2.8. The presence of unions generally reflects a history of poor management in
an organisation;
B2.9. The presence of a union in the workplace enhances our ability to deal with
the difficult external environment of the 1990s;
B2.10. Collective agreement-making enhances employee commitment to shared
goals;
B2.11. The achievement of management goals is compromised when
organisational objectives are modified for the sake of getting agreement
with a union or employees;
B2.12. Agreement-making is a necessary evil which impedes the process of
managing the organisation;
B2.13. There is too much third party interference in management from
government and unions.
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Four items were removed from this scale. First, Item B2.6 was re-allocated to the
managerial prerogative scale. Second, items B2.7 and B2.8 were removed and added to
the trade union scale. To improve reliability, B2.9 was excluded. The results are set out
in table 6.17.
Table 6.17: SME Managers’ attitudes towards collective workplace relations (n. = 206)
Collective Relations in the Workplace Variable
_
X SD SK Kur. Frequency
B2.1 Negotiations and bargaining encourage an adversarial
“them and us” culture in the workplace
3.0000 .9752 -.224 -.957 205
B2.2 Negotiating with unions or employee associations
interferes with managers’ responsibility to the
employer
3.0686 .9599 -.374 -.624 204
B2.3 Negotiations and bargaining encourage a “trade off”
mentality that works against the role of management
in achieving organisational goals
3.0244 .9312 -.122 -.880 205
B2.4 Employees on individual contracts will be better team
players than employees on collective agreements 2.9412 .9024 -.005 -.792 204
B.2.5 Collective agreements and awards encourage
employees to view third parties as the source of
improved employment terms and conditions rather
than management
2.8030 .8447 .089 -.575 203
B2.10 The achievement of management goals is
compromised when organisational objectives are
modified for the sake of getting agreement with a
union or employees
2.6275 .8472 .404 -658 204
B2.11 Agreement-making is a necessary evil which impedes
the process of managing the organisation 3.3073 .8154 -.511 -.839 205
B2.12 There is too much third party interference in
management from government and unions 2.4510 .9430 .339 -.514 204
In response to the question, B2, Please tick the box which most closely reflects your view on each of the
following statements about collective workplace relations.
Around one-third of managers (32.3 percent average over the 12 items) did not express a
view either way with respect to issues raised about collective workplace relations. Just
over one-half of the respondents agreed that collective agreement-making enhances
employee commitment to shared goals (51.7 percent) and that the achievement of
management goals is compromised when organisational objectives are modified for the
sake of getting agreement with a union or employees (51.2 percent). The final item,
B2.12 There is too much third party interference in management from government and
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unions, introduced the additional element of third party government interference (57.3
percent agreed). On the face of it, this clouds the response with respect to attitudes
towards collective relations. However, the factor analysis firmly ensconced the variable
in the scale (see table 6.25 below). In the survey, a fraction under half of the respondents
(49.8 percent) disagreed with the statement that bargaining was a necessary evil.
However, almost one-third (30 percent) opted for a neutral response. Twenty percent
agreed that bargaining was a ‘necessary evil’.
In aggregate, there was weak opposition to the three statements about negotiation (B2.1,
B2.2 and B2.3) and to the proposition that agreement is a necessary evil impeding
management (B2.11). Weak support was expressed for the three statements on collective
bargaining (B2.4, B2.5 and B2.11): that employees on individual contracts will be better
team players; collective bargaining encourages employees to view third parties rather than
management as the source of improved employment terms and conditions; and that
agreement seeking compromises management goals. The managers in the survey
moderately supported the view that there is too much third party interference in
management.
6.5.4 SME managers’ attitudes towards trade unions
The fourth dimension in Fox’s unitarist construct is composed of managers’ attitudes
towards trade unions. The statements in table 6.16 were designed to flesh out these
attitudes.
B4.1. Unions are too powerful in Australia
B4.2. Unions divide employees’ loyalty to the detriment of the organisation
B4.3. Management is at a disadvantage vis-à-vis unions
B4.4. Unions are unnecessary if management treats its workers properly
B4.5. Ultimately, management has the right not to deal with trade unions
B4.6. Without trade unions there would be no trade unions of interest between
employees and management
B4.7. Trade unions are an impediment to change in dealing with today’s
environment
B4.8. Management does not have any moral obligation to deal with unions
B4.9. Union recognition should be a matter for management and employees to
decide
B4.10. Management owes it to the owner/shareholders to do everything possible
to avoid unions
B4.11. Unions place unnecessary restrictions on effective management of the firm
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B4.12. Unions are an impediment to flexibility and productivity
B4.13. Managers should try and find ways of getting the union out of the
workplace
B4.14. Unions have their place but not in this company
B2.7 The presence of unions generally reflects a history of poor management in
an organisation
B2.8 The presence of a union in the workplace enhances our ability to deal with
the difficult external environment of the 1990s
B3.3 Unions contribute significantly to the presence of conflict in the workplace.
Two variables, items B2.8 from the collective workplace relations scale and B3.3 from the
conflict scale were imported to this scale and included in the reliability analysis. This
analysis removed items B2.7 and B2.8.
Table 6.18 indicates that a majority of managers (60.5 percent) did not agree with the
statement that union presence enhances the organisation’s ability to deal with the
difficulties of the external environment in the 1990s. A similar proportion of SME
managers (62.8 percent) believed that trade unions in Australia are too powerful and 46.1
percent regarded management as being at a disadvantage compared with trade unions.
While these issues of union power are not explored further in the question, three specific
negative effects of trade unions are addressed. A majority of managers (70.6 percent)
agreed that unions divided employees’ loyalty to the detriment of the organisation. A
smaller majority (46.8 percent) considered trade unions as an impediment to dealing with
the contemporary environment. The issue of unions being an impediment to the
organisation revealed some inconsistency in respondents’ answers. In an earlier, related
item, 60.5 percent rejected the view that unions enhance the organisation’s ability to deal
with the ‘difficult external environment of the 1990s’. When the question of flexibility
and productivity was raised, however, only 53 percent of managers felt unions to be an
impediment. These perspectives were also explored from the viewpoint of whether or not
unions place unnecessary restrictions on the management of the firm: 52.9 percent of
SME managers agreed with this standpoint.
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Table 6.18: SME Managers’ Attitudes towards Trade Unions (n. = 206)
Union Variables
_
X SD SK Kur. Frequency
B4.1 Unions are too powerful in Australia 2.3707 .9284 .606 .094 205
B4.2 Unions divide employees’ loyalty to the
detriment of the organisation 2.2892 .8243 .750 .370 204
B4.3 Management is at a disadvantage vis-à-vis
unions 2.6961 .9499 .085 -.822 204
B4.4 Unions are unnecessary if management treats its
workers properly 2.2696 .9369 .780 .349 204
B4.5 Ultimately, management has the right not to deal
with trade unions 2.7108 .9874 .267 -.899 204
B4.6 Without trade unions there would be no conflict
of interest between employees and management 3.7291 .6969 -1.348 2.530 203
B4.7 Trade unions are an impediment to change in
dealing with today’s environment 2.6995 .9766 .248 -.666 203
B4.8 Management does not have any moral obligation
to deal with unions 2.9261 .9593 -.123 -1.127 203
B4.9 Union recognition should be a matter for
management and employees to decide 2.0980 .6949 1.111 2.544 203
B4.10 Management owes it to the owner/shareholders
to do everything possible to avoid unions 3.2941 .9683 -.587 -.103 204
B4.11 Unions place unnecessary restrictions on
effective management of the firm 2.6225 .9774 .339 -.682 204
B4.12 Unions are an impediment to flexibility and
productivity 2.5441 .9536 .337 -.399 204
B4.13 Managers should try and find ways of getting the
union out of the workplace 3.1324 .9027 -.387 -.280 204
B4.14 Unions have their place but not in this company 2.8333 .9984 .011 -.616 204
B2.7 The presence of unions generally reflects a
history of poor management in an organisation 3.0634 1.0483 -.153 -.734 205
B2.8 The presence of a union in the workplace
enhances our ability to deal with the difficult
external environment of the 1990s
3.6488 .8538 -.544 .610 205
B3.3 Unions contribute significantly to the presence of
conflict in the workplace 2.4951
In response to the question, B4, Please tick the box which most closely reflects your view on each of the
following statements about trade unions.
The topic of trade unions raises a number of related managerial prerogative issues, which
are also explored in this question. Just over half (50.5 percent) of SME managers believe
that management has an ultimate right not to deal with trade unions. When this is
expressed in ethical terms (a ‘moral obligation [not] to deal with unions’), however, only
38.9 percent agreed with 35.5 percent disagreeing. While managers’ duty to owners
and/or shareholders is one basis for managerial prerogative, which 64.6 percent of SME
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managers supported, only 19.6 percent extended this to union avoidance on behalf of
owners and shareholders. A minority of respondents (23 percent) felt that managers
should adopt union avoidance strategies in getting unions out of the workplace. Finally,
38.2 percent believed that unions have a place in industry but not in their company.
A high percentage of respondents (73.9 percent) disagreed with the view that without
trade unions there would be no conflict of interest between employees and management.
A similar percentage (72.1 percent) agreed with the statement that unions are unnecessary
if management treats its workers properly.
Other questions also dealt with views towards unions. In Question B4.5 respondents were
asked to identify the extent to which they believe they are limited in how they manage
employees by, among other factors, unions. Most did not see unions as a limitation, with
44.4 percent claiming that they were not limited at all, 22.4 percent that unions were an
impediment to a minor degree, and 20.9 percent that they were partly a problem for the
management of employees. Of those managers who claimed that unions were no
limitation in how they managed their employees, three-quarters (74.7 percent) reported no
union members at all, 91.2 percent of these SMEs did not have a union delegate, and 16.1
percent estimated that union membership was less than 10 percent (all these results were
significant at p. = <0.05).
In aggregate, SME managers moderately supported the views that trade unions were too
powerful, divided employees’ loyalty, unnecessary if management treated its employees
properly, contributed to the presence of conflict and that union recognition should be a
matter for management and employees to decide. They opposed all other statements. The
management sample weakly opposed the view that management is at a disadvantage
compared with unions. There was weak opposition to the view that they have the right or
a moral obligation not to deal with trade unions. Similarly, SME managers weakly
disagreed with the perspectives that trade unions are an impediment to change; place
unnecessary restrictions on the effective management of the firm and impede flexibility
and productivity. Likewise, the response to the statement that unions have their place, but
not in the manager’s company, was weakly opposed. Moderate disagreement was
expressed with the view that managers owe it to the owners, or shareholders, to do
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everything possible to avoid unions or to try and find ways to get unions out of the
workplace. They also moderately disagreed with the statement that the presence of unions
generally reflects a history of poor management. There was strong opposition to the
suggestion that there would be no conflict of interest between employees and management
if there were no trade unions or that union presence enhances managers’ ability to deal
with the difficult external environment of the 1990s.
6.6 Principal components analysis of the limitations variables
A further two independent variables were identified by principal components analysis of
question B5, which dealt with the extent to which managers in SMEs believed their
management of employees was limited. Managers were asked to indicate the extent to
which they believed they were limited by corporate human resource policy, awards, unions,
employee resistance and government legislation. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin MSA was
mediocre at .609, barely satisfying the minimum requirement for further analysis.
Bartlett’s test of sphericity scored an approximate Chi-square of 151.282 (df=15),
significant at p<.001. Oblimin rotation provided two components for further analysis. The
first component (labelled, INTERNAL) included three internal factors: employee
resistance, lack of resources, and corporate HR policy. The second limitation on
management of employees included unions, awards, and government legislation, which
managers might perceive as external factors (labelled, EXTERNAL). These two
components are referred to as the limitations variables. The results are in table 6.19.
Table 6.19: Components matrix for limitations on employee management
Variables
Component 1:
Internal limitations
INTERNAL
Component 2:
External limitations
EXTERNAL
B5.4 .765
B5.6 .726
B5.1 .679
B5.2 -.857
B5.3 -.752
B5.5 -.577
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser
Normalization.
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Table 6.20 presents the means for each of the statements constituting both components. For
all but B5.1, the limitations arising from human resource policy from corporate
headquarters, the results indicate that, overall, managers feel constrained only partly, or to a
minor degree, by either internal or external factors. The results for B5.1 suggest that
human resource policy from corporate headquarters, where the SME was part of a larger
group, is not problematic for the management of employees. Unions (B5.3) and employee
resistance to management were both seen only as minor impediments. External factors are
more likely to be perceived as an impediment than internal ones.
Table 6.20: Mean values - limitations on employee management
Variables
Component 1:
Internal limitations
INTERNAL
Component 2:
External limitations
EXTERNAL
B5.4 3.9552
B5.6 3.6011
B5.1 4.3266
B5.2 3.2900
B5.3 3.9796
B5.5 3.2200
_
X 3.9730 3.4983
The next section presents the dependent variables identified by factor analysis.
6.7 Factor analysis of the four key dimensions of unitarism
The question arose about how to deal with the data regarding the four dimensions of
unitarism in the early stages of determining whether the factors should be set up according
to theory or according to the data. When the data were collected and entered, the
statements in the question on managers’ attitudes towards management (B1) were divided
between those relating directly to managerial prerogative and those items, which referred to
employee participation. While there may have been a clear substantive differentiation
between managerial prerogative (which reduced to three factors in the original analysis)
and employee participation, a similar procedure was not possible for all of the other
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questions. The decision was, therefore, to rely on the data and employ exploratory factor
analysis for each of the dimensions represented in questions B1 to B4.
Factor analysis reduces the number of variables to a set of constructs that explain the
variability between the various items (Ferguson 1971; Schmitt & Klimorski 1991; Coakes
& Steed 1999; Pallant 2001), which in the case of this research, constituted each of the B
series questions in the survey questionnaire and some other non-demographic questions.
Sample size may be absolute or determined according to a formula, but statisticians do not
agree about sample size for factor analysis. Hair et al. (1998) set the minimum number for
factor analysis at 100 observations, which is clearly satisfied by the sample with 206
respondents. The SME manager sample size also satisfies another measure: a requirement
for 200+ for factor analysis (Coakes & Steed 1999). Comrey and Lee (1992, in Tabachnick
& Fidell 1996, p. 640) regard such a sample size as only ‘fair’ for analysis. Tabachnick and
Fidell (1996, p. 640) suggest that, as rule of thumb, the minimum sample size for factor
analysis ought to be 300. According to that criterion, the sample is inadequate. Others
recommend no less than a ratio of five observations to each independent variable for
regression analysis, a ratio that also applies to factor analysis (Bartlett, Kotrick & Higgins
2001, pp. 48-9). After reliability analysis, the largest number of variables in any of the four
unitarist dimensions, or any other question, was 16. The sample, therefore, also satisfies a
conservative, ‘optimal’ ratio of ten observations for each unitarist variable, with 206
responses easily satisfying this requirement for 160 observations (Bartlett et al. 2001).
Factor analysis involved two steps. The first step of the procedure assessed the suitability
of the data in questions B1 to B4 for factor analysis. In the second step, the principal task
was to determine the number of factors emerging from the variables (Pallant 2001) in each
of the questions. The purpose of this part of the analysis is to reduce the number of
variables.
In the first step, Principal Axis Factoring determined the appropriateness of the factors
relating to Fox’s unitarist ideology by involving the investigation of the number of factors
necessary to represent the data, and to make the factors constituting each aspect of the
ideology more interpretable (Coakes & Steed 1999, p. 155). Three other requirements must
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be satisfied in evaluating the appropriateness of factor analysis of these data. First,
coefficient values in the correlation matrix for the variables in each question must show at
least some correlation with the value exceeding .300. Factor loadings of less than .300 are
generally considered not to be of practical significance (Hair et al. 1998, pp. 99-111).
Second, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) should exceed
.600 to clearly indicate the appropriateness of factor analysis. According to Hair et al.
(1998, p. 99), a score of .600+ is characterised as ‘mediocre’; at .700+ it is ‘middling’;
.800+ ‘meritorious’; and .900+ ‘marvellous’; whereas a score of .500+ is ‘miserable’.
These benchmarks were followed in this study. The objective in measuring sampling
adequacy will be to obtain as high a MSA score as possible without losing the integrity of
the original question sets. Maintaining the integrity of the sets of statements in each
question is important because each of the statements relates to the theoretical literature in
two ways. The elements in each of the four questions are both derived from Fox’s and
others’ accounts of the unitarist ideology and from specific sources for each statement.
These were set out in chapter 3. The third requirement was to ensure that Bartlett’s test of
sphericity should be significant at p<.05 (Pallant 2001). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin MSA
and Bartlett’s test of sphericity are two measures indicating the strength of the relationships
between variables.
In the second step, factors were rotated using Varimax rotation, assuming that the factors
are not related. Kaiser's Varimax is the most widely accepted method for analytical
rotation of orthogonal data to increase interpretability of factors and is an option accessible
on the SPSS factor analysis procedure (Tabachnick & Fidell 1996, p. 666; Pallant 2001, p.
162). The Kaiser rule, where the eigenvalue is 1.0 or greater, was retained in all
calculations. The results of the factor analysis for unitarist ideology, the degree of
consultation, and managers’ satisfaction with employees are reported in sub-sections 6.7.1
to 6.7.7.
6.7.1 Factor analysis of the managerial prerogative scale
The initial test for reliability, reported in chapter 3, ‘Methodology’, resulted in the deletion
of none of the 18 statements in the question on managerial prerogative after re-coding items
B1.7, B1.9, B1.10 and B1.11, as well as adding the variable, B2.6, which was adjudged to
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relate to the question of managerial prerogative rather than the question of collective
workplace relations.
The correlation matrix table indicated that were sufficient correlation coefficients
exceeding .300 to satisfy the first test of the appropriateness of proceeding to a full factor
analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin MSA was .779. This was ‘middling’, and confirmed the
suitability of the variables in this question for factor analysis (1974; Hair et al. 1998, p. 99).
Bartlett’s test of sphericity had an approximate 2 of 973.331 (df=136) and p<.05, which
also established the suitability of the data. Five components in the scale had an eigenvalue
of >1.0 accounting for 43.3 percent of the variance. The factor matrix for the management
scale is set out in table 6.21.
In the second step, principal axis factoring was used with Varimax rotation to obtain the
constructs from the data that were meaningful in terms of Fox’s construct (Hair et al. 1998).
The resultant factors are set out in table 6.19. Factor 1 is labelled ‘employee participation’
(PARTICIP). The statements which composed this factor addressed various aspects of
employee participation: first, the notion that involving shopfloor employees in major
decisions is necessary for effective management (B1.7R); second, the relationship between
the effectiveness of managers and their involvement of employees (B1.9R); third, the
assertion that employee empowerment improves company performance (B1.10R); fourth,
the relationship between self managing teams and company success (B1.11R); and, fifth,
the idea that employee involvement in key decisions is impractical (B1.14).
Factor 2 included statements, first, that managers had higher levels of commitment than
employees (B1.5). Item B1.6 referred to the negative effects of negotiation and
consultation. The managerial objectives of effectiveness and efficiency were addressed in
B1.17. The issue of third parties undermining managerial legitimacy was addressed by
B1.16. Finally, a statement addressed managers being best placed to determine what is best
for the other members of the organisation over which they exercise their prerogative (B2.6).
Managerial legitimacy was the concept underlying each of these views and the variable was
labelled, MANLEGIT.
238
Three variables composed the third factor: the question of managers’ primary role in
directing employees (B1.1); their principal responsibility towards employers and
shareholders (B1.3); and the unification of the organisation around managerial authority
(B1.2). This factor was labelled, ‘Managerial responsibility’ (MANRESPY).
The fourth factor contained two statements referring to Australian Workplace Agreements,
on the one hand, and the restoration, through individual contracts, of managerial
responsibility, on the other hand. This factor was labelled ‘individualisation of the
employment contract’ (INDIVIDU). It referred to managerial prerogative because both its
components referred to individual employment contracts such as Australian Workplace
Agreements and the restoration of managers’ primary responsibility to shareholders (B1.4)
and owners and their right to manage (B1.8).
The fifth factor was labelled, ‘control of employees’ (CONTROLS), since B1.12 related to
monitoring employees and B1.13 was about firmly dealing with resistance to change.
Table 6.21: Factor matrix for SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial prerogative
Managers attitudes to managerial prerogative
Managerial
prerogative
Variables a
Factor1:
Employee
Participation
PARTICPN
Factor 2:
Managerial
Legitimacy
MANLEGIT
Factor 3:
Managerial
responsibility
MANRESPY
Factor 4:
Individualism
INDIVIDU
Factor 5:
Control over
employees
CONTROLS
B1.7R .645
B1.9R .795
B1.10R .623
B1.11R .341
B1.14 .652
B1.5 .511
B1.6 .618
B1.16 .480
B1.17 .428
B2.6 .500
B1.1 .729
B1.2 .667
B1.3 .461
B1.4 .704
B1.8 .673
B1.12 .472
B1.13 .564
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 7 iterations.
a. SPSS provided no value for B1.15 after rotation. It was therefore excluded
’R’ indicates the item was re-coded.
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Table 6.22 reports the mean for each of the new variables.
Table 6.22: Mean values - SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial prerogative
Managers attitudes to managerial prerogative
_
(X)
PARTICPN MANLEGIT MANRESPY INDIVIDU CONTROLS
3.8451 3.1334 2.3703 2.9950 2.5437
The means indicate moderate disagreement with the variable addressing managers’
attitudes towards employee participation and weak opposition to the managerial legitimacy
variable. SME managers expressed moderate support for managerial responsibility. There
was overall a weak level of agreement with the view that the individualisation of
employment contracts through AWAs restored managerial prerogative. There was also
marginally weak agreement with views on control of employees.
The second dimension of Fox’s unitarist ideology, considered in the next sub-section,
consists of managerial attitudes towards conflict. Conflict was the third question relating to
the ideology in the survey questionnaire, however, SME managers’ attitudes towards
conflict constituted the second dimension of unitarism considered in the literature survey,
chapter 3.
6.7.2 Factor analysis of the conflict scale
Question B3 of the survey questionnaire asked SME managers to indicate their views on
each of the statements about conflict. An explanatory statement was added at the head of
the question to the effect that conflict included the notion of disputes and grievances in the
workplace. This section of the questionnaire was designed to examine what SME managers
viewed as the causes and nature of workplace management conflict. Before conducting the
reliability analysis, item B3.3, ‘Unions contribute significantly to the presence of conflict in
the workplace’ was removed and added to the Trade Unions scale (subsection 6.7.4 below).
After testing for reliability, it was decided to remove B3.1, B 3.12 and B3.5, leaving nine
statements acceptable for further analysis.
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The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin MSA was .856 and therefore ‘meritorious’ for analysis. Bartlett’s
test of sphericity returned an approximate Chi-square of 453.341 (df=36) with significance
at p<.005, indicating that there were significant correlations among some of the variables.
Two components in the scale had an eigenvalue exceeding 1.0, accounting for 51 percent of
the variance. The rotated factor matrix (Varimax rotation) derived two factors from the
data. The scree plot confirmed a two factors scenario. The dominant factor contained
seven items, the second only two after the deletion from the second factor of B3.9 and
B3.2. Both variables had a higher value in the first factor. Two of the components
accounted for 51 percent of the variance. Table 6.21 sets out the results of the factor
analysis.
Three variables in the first factor referred to the elimination or reduction of conflict (B3.2,
B3.6, B3.10 and B3.11), and three related to the nature of conflict (B3.8, B3.9 and B3.13).
Underlying each of these items was an affirmation of managerial prerogative and an
assumption that the failure to affirm managerial prerogative created conflict. This carried
with it a notion of conflict being dysfunctional for managerial prerogative and, therefore,
the organisation. Three components in the scale had eigenvalues of >1, accounting for 39
percent of the variance. This factor was labelled, ‘Organisational dysfunction’
(DYSFUNCT). In the second factor, B3.9 and B3.2 were excluded because their value was
less than the values for these items in the first factor. Both of the remaining variables
referred to employees as a cause of conflict. In the first statement (B3.7), individual
employee grievances were said to mostly be the cause of conflict. The second (B3.4)
referred to employees’ inability to understand the complexity of work in today’s
organisation (B3.4). This was labelled, ‘Employee inadequacy’ (INADEQCY), although
there is not a clear link to employee inadequacy in the first item (B3.11). Table
summarises the results.
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Table 6.23: Factor matrix for SME managers’ attitudes towards conflict
Conflict
Variables
Factor 1:
Organisational
dysfunction
DYSFUNCT
Factor 2:
Employee
inadequacy
INADEQCY
B3.11 .797
B3.10 .748
B3.8 .681
B3.9* .655
B3.13 .634
B3.2* .626
B3.6 .378
B3.7 .824
B3.4 .718
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Varimax
with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.
* These variables were retained in the factor where the highest coefficient was found.
How strongly did managers in aggregate support the statements about conflict? Applying
the descriptions in table 6.12 to table 6.24 indicates that SME managers as a group did not
have strong views on conflict. There was weak disagreement with the view that conflict is
organisationally dysfunctional and weak support for the view that employee inadequacy
causes conflict.
Table 6.24: Mean values– SME managers’ attitudes towards conflict
Managers’ attitudes towards conflict
_
(X)
DYSFUNCT INADEQCY
3.1422 2.6256
The third dimension of unitarism to be tested referred to collective workplace relations.
This was the second question in the survey questionnaire, and is reported next.
6.7.3 Factor analysis of the collective workplace relations scale
Question B2 asked SME managers to respond to the question, ‘which statement most
closely reflects your view about collective workplace relations?’ The following statements,
with the exception of B2.6, which had been added to the question on SME managers’
attitudes towards management, and B2.7 and B2.8 which were both added to the trade
union scale, constituted this scale in the questionnaire. During reliability analysis, B2.9 was
removed.
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In the first phase of the factor analysis of the collective workplace relations scale, the
correlation matrix indicated that all of the remaining variables had values exceeding .300.
The MSA value was .833, indicating that proceeding with the factor analysis was
‘meritorious’. Bartlett’s test of sphericity revealed an approx Chi-square of 440.250,
df=28, which was significant at p<.001, indicating that significant correlations existed
among at least some of the variables. Examination of the scree plot revealed that two
factors were possible for the question on collective workplace relations. However, the
extraction using Principal Axis Factoring produced only a single factor (labelled
‘COLLRELS’), as reported in table 6.25. Only one component reported an eigenvalue of
>1, accounting for 38 percent of the variation.
Table 6.25: Factor matrix for collective workplace relations
Variables Collective workplace relationsCOLLRELS
B2.3 .807
B2.2 .768
B2.1 .646
B2.11 .573
B2.10 .532
B2.12 .510
B2.5 .420
B2.4 .397
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method:
Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.
The descriptive data for attitudes towards collective workplace relations indicate that SME
managers generally did not believe that collective processes have a negative impact on the
management of organisations by interfering with managers’ responsibility roles and goals.
The exceptions were that the achievement of management goals is compromised when
organisational objectives are modified for the sake of getting agreement with a union or
employees (52 percent) and the notion that there is too much third party interference in
management from government and unions (57.4 percent). There was not a strongly held
belief among SME managers that collective arrangements turn employees to third parties,
such as unions. Only 20 percent agreed that bargaining was a ‘necessary evil’.
SME managers exhibited only weak support for the variable COLLRELS with the mean at
2.9061.
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The final question relating directly to the four dimensions of unitarism was about
managers’ attitudes towards trade unions.
6.7.4 Factor analysis of the trade unions scale
Question B4 was developed to measure SME managers’ attitudes towards unions. The
question asked the respondents to identify their response to statements about third parties.
However, every item referred to unions. Additional statements were imported from the
other three unitarist ideology questions: B2.7, B2.8 and B3.3. B2.8, however, was removed
during the reliability analysis
The correlation matrix revealed that all of the variables in the trade unions scale had more
than one correlation exceeding .300. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin MSA was excellent at .904
and the Bartlett test produced an approximate Chi-square of 1420.760 (df = 120),
significant at p<.001. The question was therefore suitable for factor analysis. Three of the
components accounted for 48 percent of the variance. The scree plot suggested up to four
factors. Rotations were run for both three and four factors. Since there appeared to be a
substantive crossover between two of the factors in a four factor analysis, creating
difficulties for differential labelling, three factors were considered suitable for further
analysis.
The first factor was called ‘union intrusion’ (INTRUSIN). This covered eight statements
directly or implicitly relating to the question of unions intruding on management and
organisations. The first concerned a general statement about the power of unions (B4.1).
The second referred to union power and the relations between unions and management
(B4.3). B4.9 dealt with the question of management and employees deciding union
recognition, which is also a power issue. The final group involved incursions into the
organisation by the union, which were seen to have a negative impact on management and
the performance of the organisation (B4.2, B4.7, B4.9, B4.11 and B4.12). Although three
of the items referred to aspects of union power, it was decided to label the factor according
to the majority of items, which constituted the new variable. The second factor contained
three statements referring to the avoidance of unions (AVOIDANC). Two specifically
referred to avoiding and getting rid of unions (B4.10; B4.13), and one drew the conclusion
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that there would be no conflict without trade unions, providing an implicit reason why
unions ought to be avoided. The third factor, labelled ‘union relevance’ (RELEVANC),
contained a general statement that unions have their place but not in the respondent’s
organisation (B4.14). This was a statement about the relevance of unions generally, but
questioning their relevance for the manager’s firm. Two of the statements dealt with the
dependence of unions on management failings for relevance (B2.7 and B4.4) and two dealt
with managers’ rights not to deal with unions at all (B4.5 and B4.8). The results are set
down in table 6.26.
Table 6.26: Factor matrix for SME managers’ attitudes towards trade unions
Variables
Factor 1:
Union intrusion
INTRUSIN
Factor 2:
Union avoidance
AVOIDANC
Factor 3:
Union relevance
RELEVANC
B4.2 .721
B4.1 .650
B4.3 .591
B4.11* .587
B4.12* .583
B3.3* .513
B4.7* .502
B4.9* .452
B4.10 .750
B4.13* .682
B4.6 .459
B4.14* .585
B2.7 .512
B4.4* .507
B4.5 .441
B4.8* .402
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser
Normalization. Rotation converged in 19 iterations.
*. These variables were retained in the factor where the highest coefficient was found.
The descriptive data in table 6.27 indicate that there was moderate support for the view that
unions are an intrusion into the organisation (INTRUSIN), weak opposition to the view that
unions ought to be avoided (AVOIDANC) and weak support for views about the relevance
of unions (RELEVANC).
Table 6.27: Mean values- SME managers’ attitudes towards trade unions
Managers’ attitudes towards trade unions
_
(X)
INTRUSIN AVOIDANC RELEVANC
2.4754 3.3892 2.7542
245
The findings of the factor analysis of the unitarist dimensions are summarized in the next
sub-section.
6.7.5 Summary: the unitarist dimensions
Factor analysis produced eleven variables for further analysis. These were called the
unitarist variables, although taken individually they might not necessarily have such a
connotation, if managers were to agree with them. However, those statements in question
B1, which might have indicated a countervailing tendency away from a unitarist
perspective – that is, those referring positively to employee participation (B1.7 B1.9, B1.10
and B1.11) – were re-coded. Similarly, the conflict scale was closely tied to the standard
unitarist litany of attitudes towards conflict, which is to be found in industrial relations
accounts of the unitarist framework. Some of those statements did not survive the
reliability test and factor analysis. A single factor emerged from the question on collective
workplace relations, after transferring two trade union related variables, and removing
during reliability analysis a statement positively linking collective bargaining to shared
goals in the work organisation (B2.9). Eight statements remained which were critical of
collective workplace management arrangements, reflecting unitarist perspectives on
collective bargaining. The most significant results resulted from the reliability analysis and
the factor analysis in the trade union scale. No variable from the original set of statements
was removed and only B2.8, added because of its substantive meaning, was removed from
consideration during the reliability tests.
Since the four questions (B1-B4) reflected the key dimensions of the unitarist construct,
and the surviving statements, taken together, in each of the factors reflected an overall
unitarist orientation, it was appropriate to refer to the 11 factors as ‘unitarist variables’.
They appear with their labels in table 6.28.
246
Table 6.28: The unitarist dimensions
Label SME Managers’ attitudes towards: Unitarist dimensions1
PARTICPN: employee participation
MANLEGIT: managerial legitimacy
MANRESPY: managerial responsibility
INDIVIDU: individualism
CONTROLS: management control
Managerial
prerogative
DYSFUNCT: the view that conflict is organisationally dysfunctional
INADEQCY: the view that employee inadequacy causes conflict
Conflict
COLLRELS: collective workplace relations Collectiveworkplace relations
INTRUSIN: the view that unions are an intrusion into the organisation
AVOIDANC: the view that trade unions ought to be avoidance
RELEVANC: the relevance of trade union
Trade unions
1 These dimensions were elaborated in chapter 2.
In the further analysis that follows, these factors will become the dependent variables for
testing against the independent variables for organisational characteristics and the personal
characteristics of the respondents. They will also become the independent variables for
testing the relationships between the unitarist variables and the managerial practice
variables. The four unitarist dimensions and the eleven factors of which they are
constituted, provide the backbone of the development of specific research questions about
the unitarist ideology.
In the next section, the data on the range and degree to which managers consult employees
are categorised for further analysis.
6.8 The range and degree to which managers consult employees
Questions C1 and C2 were intended to replicate the work on consultation and participation
conducted during a study on management style (McDonald and Wiesner 2000) in which a
distinction was made between the range of issues on which managers consult employees.
The intention was for the items in C2 to duplicate those in C1. Unfortunately, some of the
items differ between C1 and C2 in wording and content (C1.1/C2.5, C1.5/C2.7 and
C1.6/C2.8), some were omitted (C1.10, C1.12 and C1.15) and one item in question C2
(C2.2) was added. These differences were retained in error in the final version of the
questionnaire. The two questions therefore were treated separately.
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The questionnaire explained to the participants that ‘consult’ and ‘consultation’ meant ‘to
involve employees in decision-making to any degree at all, but means more than merely
informing employees of your decisions or intentions.’ The directions to Section C of the
questionnaire also specified that ‘employees’ referred to persons below supervisory or
leading hand levels. Sub-sections 6.8.1 and 6.8.2 present the categorisation of questions C1
and C2 respectively. Sub-section 6.8.3 refers to the forms of consultation managers in
SMEs say they use.
Attitudes towards specified items do not complete the picture. It is necessary also to
identify the practices, which SME managers put in place. There are 37 items. Table 6.29
summarises the practices indicated for each of the respondents to the survey. In all but one
question28, the negative responses are counted. The negative responses taken together
could indicate a unitarist bent towards aversion from the practices, which might otherwise
be regarded as participive. Question C2, whose results are summarised in section 6.8.2
above, is excluded as the items for the most part replicate the items in question C1, and in
this table the interest is in whether or not a manager employs the practice rather than how
that practice is employed. Other excluded items are C4.6 - a quality management
programme such as ISO 9000, C4.7 - a just-in-time inventory system, C4.8 – work process
re-engineering, C4.9 – job or task rotation, C4.11 – a multi-skilling or cross training
programme, C4.12 – job enlargement, C5.4 to C5.7 – various pay systems, C5.8 – C5.9,
which are management level decisions about selection, and C5.11 - line manager
performance appraisal. Each of these items of themselves either appear neutral with
respect to the unitarist construct, or, in the case of the latter questions, a positive response
could, taken together with some other practices, indicate a unitarist orientation.
Compared with the measure of managers’ tendencies, a much smaller percentage of
managers (21.8 percent) eschew a half or more of the practices identified in the survey,
which would broadly involve employees. Only 18 of the 63 managers who scored more
than 50 percent on attitudes, which would indicate a unitarist propensity, also did not
take up more than 50 percent of the practices which the questions put before them. At
28 The only possible answer for question C3.8, ‘no discussion’ (yes) has been re-coded as ‘no’ for table
6.29. Question C5 - ‘never used’ - has also been re-coded.
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this level of analysis, a tendency towards unitarist attitudes, which constitute the
characteristics of Fox’s unitarist construct are not a good predictor of practice. One of
the limitations of this study, though, is that the survey did not address the objectives of
the practices present in SMEs.
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Table 6.29: Unitarist practice case by case according to measures not taken by SME managers 1
Case No. Items not
practiced
(N.)
2
Items
(%)
Case No. Items not
practiced
(N.) a
Items
(%)
Case No. Items not
practiced
(N.) a
Items
(%)
Case No. Items not
practiced
(N.) a
Items
(%)
Case No. Items not
practiced
(N.) a
Items
(%)
262 3 511 10 562 13 21 16 4 20
37 3 533 10 544 13 530 16 589 20
318 3
8.1
545 10 67 13 291 16 255 20
94 4 330 10 216 13 510 16 134 20
481 4 101 10 195 13 7 16 260 20
549 4
10.8
53 10 398 13 257 16 222 20
102 5 175 10 71 13 301 16 36 20
288 5
13.5
517 10 141 13 250 16 508 20
286 6 162 10 320 13 31 16 582 20
54.1
131 6 454 10 599 13 403 16 300 21
173 6 507 10
27.0
258 13 44b 16 568 21
199 6 537 11 602 13 506 16 422 21
509 6 33 11 139 13 18 16 518 21
72 6 206 11 77 13 297 16
43.2
305 21
570 6
16.2
573 11 59 13
35.1
261 17 278 21
182 7 3 11 30 14 578 17 560 21
212 7 569 11 164 14 543 17 406 21
281 7 155 11 292 14 156 17 516 21
200 7 556 11 229 14 534 17 201 21
580 7
18.9
236 11 235 14 161 17 528 21
56.8
204 8 415 11 586 14 350 17 239 22
185 8 193 11 70 14 555 17 73 22
554 8 223 11 151 14 68 17 87 22
224 8 176 11 157 14 122 17
45.9
259 22
84 8 526 11 86 14 230 18 65 22
424 8 2 11
29.7
83 14 514 18 245 22
59.5
536 8 106 12 310 14 478 18 302 23
551 8 338 12 66 14
37.8
238 18 557 23
225 8 397 12 357 15 553 18 183 23
189 8 603 12 44a 15 360 18 473 23
592 8
21.6
271 12 407 15 521 18 0 23
120 9 313 12 585 15 515 18 46 23
62.2
426 9 231 12 208 15 572 18 444 24
179 9 74 12 304 15 436 18 442 24
430 9 323 12 9 15 52 18 209 24
523 9 525 12 299 15 482 18 256 24
64.9
309 9 248 12 595 15 535 18
48.6
369 28
145 9 125 12 213 15 89 19 480 28
104 9 584 12 96 15 192 19 35 28
75.7
109 9
24.3
437 12 411 15 181 19 146 293 78.4
268 12
32.4
277 15 559 19
590 15 282 19
51.4
16 15
40.5
1. Responses to questions C1, C3, C4, and C5, excluding items C4.6, C4.7, C4.8, C4.9, C4.11,
C4.12, C5.4 to C5.9, and C5.11
2. Non-responses are counted as items not practiced with the exception of items C3.7 and C3.8.
3. This respondent did not fill in items after C3.1.
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If a unitarist perspective were to be determined in part by whether managers did not
adopt a set of participative practices, then table 6.30 reinforces the conclusion that the
absence of participative practices of themselves may not be good indicators of a unitarist
approach to management.
Table 6.30: Items not practised in each quartile
Range of
responses
Number of
responses
Percentage of
SME managers
(N. = 206)
Cumulative
percent
1st Quartile 1 – 10 51 24.8 24.8
2nd Quartile 11 - 19 115 55.8 80.6
3rd Quartile 20 – 28 39 18.9 99.5
4th Quartile 29 - 37 1 0.5 100.0
Most managers (81 percent) do not exhibit a unitarist bent on account of practices alone,
leaving only 19 percent in the top two quartiles who do. There is only one case in the
top quartile and the probability of error in this case is high since, in counting the non-
responses as non-practices, no account can be taken in the descriptive data of
questionnaire fatigue.
There are 45 cases where managers have indicated that they do not employ more than 50
percent of the various practices, which involve some degree of employee involvement.
Of these, only 16 (35.6 percent) of the managers also identified agreement with more
than 50 percent of unitarist items. In table 6.31, the match of quartiles for the practices,
which these 16 managers indicated they did not have in place, and the unitarist items for
which each of these managers indicated agreement are set down.
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Table 6.31: Practices, which SME managers indicated they did not have in place and unitarist items
for which each manager indicated agreement
Case Quartile for practices1 Quartile for unitaristpropensity
89 2 3
181 2 3
559 2 3
582 3 3
300 3 3
568 3 4
278 3 3
87 3 3
65 3 4
245 3 3
302 3 3
0 3 3
442 3 3
369 3 3
480 3 4
146 4 4
1.practice/unitarism, r = 0.447; Pearson’s significance 0.082.
It is clear from table 6.31 that the correlation between practice and unitarist responses is
low (0.447).
6.8.1 The range of issues on which managers consult employees
Question C1 asked managers, In the normal course of your work as a manager do you or
would you consult with employees on the following issues and changes? The following
items were covered by question C1:
C1.1 Changes to job design and work organisation,
C1.2 Quality and cost improvement,
C1.3 On plant layout or office design,
C1.4 Training and skills development,
C1.5 Reliable customer service and delivery,
C1.6 The financial state of the firm and its market position,
C1.7 Corporate planning,
C1.8 Market performance,
C1.9 Employee amenities,
C1.10 Personnel practices,
C1.11 Major change issues facing the company,
C1.12 Major change decisions,
C1.13 Major policy decisions,
C1.14 Securing enterprise efficiency and productivity.
C1.15 Establishing work teams with direct responsibility for setting and achieving
targets
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The data were not suitable for factor analysis. However, two factors could be categorized
from an examination of the substantive statements. These referred to consultation on
workplace efficiency and consultation with employees on strategic issues at an
organisational level. These were labelled respectively, CONSEFFS and CONSTRAT. The
variables in CONSEFFS included changes to job design and work organisation, quality and
cost improvements, plant layout or office design, training and skills development, reliable
customer service and delivery, the financial state of the firm and its market position,
personnel practices, securing enterprise efficiency and productivity, and establishing work
teams with direct responsibility for setting and achieving targets. Each of these
consultation issues either directly or indirectly involves workplace efficiency.
CONSTRAT refers to consultation at the level of organisational strategy. The consultation
items related to organisational strategy were: corporate planning, market performance,
major change issues facing the company, major change decisions, and major policy
decisions. Item C1.9 did not fit either category and was excluded from further analysis.
These two categories of consultation issues are set out in table 6.32.
Table 6.32: Categories of consultation issues on which SME managers consult
employees
Consultation issues
Workplace efficiency
(CONSEFFS)
Organisational strategy
(CONSTRAT)
C1.1 C1.7
C1.2 C1.8
C1.3 C1.11
C1.4 C1.12
C1.5 C1.13
C1.6
C1.10
C1.14
C1.15
While the issues in question C1 addressed the range of issues about which SME managers
might consult employees, question C2 related to the degree of consultation. The proportion
of SME managers consulting employees on workplace efficiency and organisational
strategy are reported in table 6.33.
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Table 6.33: Proportion of SME managers’ consulting employees on workplace efficiency and
organisational strategy
Consultation on workplace efficiency
(CONSEFFS)
Consultation on organisational strategy
(CONSTRAT)
Consultation issue Percent Consultation issue Percent
C1.1 91.7 C1.7 32.7
C1.2 91.2 C1.8 66.8
C1.3 86.2 C1.11 71.7
C1.4 94.6 C1.12 64.6
C1.5 92.6 C1.13 53.4
C1.6 49.0
C1.10 85.4
C1.14 95.1
C1.15 89.3
More than eight out of ten SME managers indicate that they consult with employees on
workplace efficiency items, with the exception of the financial state of the firm and its
market position, on which just under a half of managers consult employees. The picture is
very different for consultation on matters related to organisational strategy. Fewer than
one-third of SME managers consult employees on corporate planning, and just over one-
half on major policy decisions. Less than two-thirds admit to consulting on major policy
decisions and one-third on market performance, and seven out of ten SME managers say
they consult on major change issues facing the company. SME managers are less likely to
consult employees, or involve them in strategic decision-making, than they are when
considering workplace efficiencies.
6.8.2 The degree to which managers consult employees
In question C2, the questionnaire asked SME managers to indicate, on a four-point scale,
the degree to which they do, or would, consult employees. The scale was adapted from
Dunphy and Stace (1992) who developed a typology of change leadership, which utilised
four styles which ranged from what they called collaborative, consultative, directive and
coercive leadership styles. These styles were summarised in the survey questionnaire.
McDonald and Wiesner (2000) referred to these as management styles. One extremity of
the continuum reflected widespread employee involvement in managerial decisions,
whereas consultation with employees in the sense of seeking employees’ views constituted
less commitment to including employees in decision-making processes. This might include
the possible limited involvement of employees in goal setting. At the other extremity,
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managerial authority and direction are the main forms of decision-making or management
initiated and implemented decisions are imposed on employees. McDonald and Wiesner
(2000), in referring to management styles, called the two categories into which these two
pairs of decision-making style fall, participance and exclusion. The data were not suitable
for factor analysis.
The items that composed question C2, in response to the question, To what degree do you
consult with employees? You have four different decision-making methods at the head of
each of the columns below. Please indicate which of these methods you do apply or would
apply to the introduction of the changes and the issues listed? were as follows:
C2.1 Major change issues facing the company,
C2.2 Occupational Health and safety,
C2.3 Changes to job design and work organisation,
C2.4 Quality and cost improvement,
C2.5 Plant layout,
C2.6 Training and skills development,
C2.7 Reliable customer service and delivery,
C2.8 The performance of the firm,
C2.9 Corporate planning,
C2.10 Market performance,
C2.11 Major policy decisions,
C2.12 Employee amenities,
C2.13 Securing enterprise efficiency and productivity.
Two factors corresponding to those reported in sub-section 6.8.1 could be categorized from
an examination of the substantive statements. These likewise referred to consultation on
workplace efficiency and consultation with employees on strategic issues at an
organisational level. To distinguish the two variables from those identified in question C1,
they were labelled respectively, DEGEFFIC and DEGSTRAT, reflecting the extent of
managers’ involvement of employees in decision-making as participation (or its converse,
exclusion). DEGEFFIC included the following consultation issues in the degree of
consultation by SME managers with employees: consultation on major change issues facing
the company, occupational health and safety, changes to job design and work organisation,
quality and cost improvements, plant layout, training and skills development, reliable
customer service and delivery, firm performance, and securing enterprise efficiency and
productivity. Each of these either directly or indirectly involves workplace efficiency. The
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four variables in DEGSTRAT refer to consultation at the level of organisational strategy.
These were consultation on major change issues facing the company, corporate planning,
market performance, and major policy decisions. These two categories of consultation
issues are set out in table 6.34.
Table 6.34: Categories of consultation issues on which SME managers
involve employees in decision-making
Issues on which SME managers involve employees
Workplace efficiency
(DEGEFFIC)
Organisational strategy
(DEGSTRAT)
C2.2 C2.1
C2.3 C2.9
C2.5 C2.10
C2.4 C2.11
C2.6
C2.7
C2.8
C2.13
Question C2 again included a four point scale based on Dunphy and Stace (1992), where
the values, 1 and 2, referred to participative styles of decision-making and the values, 3 and
4, referred to exclusionist practices, that is, the managers did not involve employees in
making decisions. The means for each item in the two categories, presented in table 6.35,
indicate, first, that SME managers were more likely to consult on matters related to
workplace efficiency than to organisational strategy issues. The apparent tendency was
also that employee consultation with limited involvement in goal setting was more likely
than widespread involvement of employees in decisions, with the overall mean of
DEGEFFIC at 1.9240. SME managers were more likely to be exclusionist in consulting
employees on the performance of the firm. Furthermore, as a whole, SME managers were
likely to be exclusionist in making decisions about all of the items relating to organisational
strategy, with the overall mean of DEGSTRAT at 2.7861.
Table 6.35: Mean values - the degree to which SME managers consult
employees on workplace efficiency and organisational strategy
Consultation issues
_
(X)
DEGEFFIC DEGSTRAT
1.9239 2.7861
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The values assigned to the four-point scale relating to the degree to which managers
consult, or involve employees in decision-making, ranged from 1.000 for high levels of
involvement to 4.000 for employee exclusion. Table 6.35 clearly indicates that SME
managers are more likely to consult on workplace efficiency than on organisational
strategy. However, on individual consultation issues they were least likely to consult
employees on the performance of the firm (C2.8) than other aspects of efficiency.
6.8.3 Forms of consultation
Question C3 was designed to elicit with whom SME managers discussed the consultation
issues set out in sub-sections 6.8.1 and 6.8.2. The results are tabulated in table 6.36. The
question required only a yes/no indication, and no further analysis is required.
Table 6.36: Discussions on consultation issues in SMEs (n. = 206)
Method of consultation Freq. %
C3.1. Informal discussions with those employees affected by change 197 95.4
C3.2. Formal meetings with those employees affected by change 191 80.1
C3.3. Discussions with an established joint consultative committee 182 36.3
C3.4. Discussions with a specially constituted committee established to consider
the particular change 180 39.4
C3.5. Discussions with union delegates at this specific workplace 187 20.3
C3.6. Discussions with full-time union officials from outside the workplace 180 12.8
C3.7. Other discussions 137 65.7
C3.8. No discussions 198 1.9
In response to question C3: Please tick the relevant boxes for one or more forms of consultation to indicate
the type(s) of consultation which took place if you consulted on the matters in questions C1 and C2. If the
matters in C1 and C2 did not apply to your workplace, which form(s) would the consultation take if you did
introduce them?
Both informal and formal discussions with employees who are affected by change are
prevalent in the SMEs surveyed. In 71.4 percent of the cases, SME managers do both. As
expected from the results regarding the frequency of consultative committees in the
Australian SME study (McDonald & Wiesner 2000) only 37.2 percent of SMEs had a joint
consultative committee in place. In only one-fifth of workplaces did managers consult
with workplace delegates and only 12.8 percent discussed changes with full-time union
officials. However, the predominant mode of consultation exists through informal
discussions.
6.9 Management practices
While questions C1 and C2 ascertained the range and degree of consultation on particular
issues, question C3 was designed to identify the forms of consultation implemented within
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the organisation. Question C4 referred to specific practices and processes, most of which
were participative:
C4.1 An employee involvement/participative programme
C4.2 Regular work or area meetings (for example, quality circles)
C4.3 A joint worker-management committee to discuss or implement workplace
change
C4.4 A committee to address specific workplace issues other than safety and
health
C4.5 An occupational safety and health committee
C4.6 A quality management programme (eg, ISO 9000 quality assurance, etc)
C4.7 A Just-in-Time inventory system
C4.8 Work process re-engineering (redesigning the company’s processes,
structure and culture)
C4.9 Job or task rotation
C4.10 Work in groups, teams, or cells
C4.11 A multi-skilling or cross training programme
C4.12 Job enlargement (viz, increased scope or responsibility level for employees)
C4.13 Autonomous/semi-autonomous work groups
McDonald and Wiesner (2002) distinguished between participant management practices
where managers involve employees in decision-making and exclusionist practices, where
managers exclude employees from decision-making. Practices and processes, which were
not of themselves participant, were reflected in the following items: a quality management
programme (eg, ISO 9000 quality assurance, etc.); a just-in-time inventory system; work
process re-engineering (redesigning the company’s processes, structure & culture); job or
task rotation; and a multi-skilling or cross training programme. The results are set out in
table 6.37.
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Table 6.37: Managerial practices and processes in SMEs (n.= 206)
Practices and processes Freq. % n.
C4.1. An employee involvement/participative scheme 151 75.5 200
C4.2. Regular work or area meetings (for example, quality circles) 152 74.9 203
C4.3. A joint worker-management committee to discuss or implement
workplace change 100 49.8 201
C4.4. A committee to address specific workplace issues other than safety
and health 105 52.0 202
C4.5. An occupational health and safety committee 109 53.7 203
C4.6. A quality management programme (eg, ISO 9000 quality assurance,
etc.) 121 60.2 201
C4.7. A Just-in-Time inventory system 37 18.6 199
C4.8. Work process re-engineering (redesigning the company’s processes,
structure & culture) 118 59.3 199
C4.9. Job or task rotation 142 69.9 204
C4.10. Work in groups, teams, or cells 127 63.2 201
Practices and processes Freq. % n.
C4.11. A multi-skilling or cross training programme 171 84.2 203
C4.12. Job enlargement (viz., increased scope or responsibility level for
employees) 160 79.9 201
C4.13. Autonomous/semi-autonomous work groups 80 40.2 199
In response to question C4: In your time as manager of this workplace have you initiated, increased or
maintained any of the following practices and processes in your organisation?
Practices involving committees, including joint worker-management bodies to discuss or
implement workplace change or to address specific workplace issues other than safety and
health, or an occupational health and safety committee were not widely represented
compared to most of the other practices and processes, although three-quarters of SME
managers claimed to have an employee involvement or participative scheme.
There is apparent, internal inconsistency in the answers to this question with respect to
teams, where 63.2 percent of managers reported work in groups, teams, or cells, but only
40.2 percent reported the presence of autonomous or semi-autonomous work teams. These
results possibly indicate a reliance on team as metaphor rather than established,
operational teams. This would be consistent with the tendency in the interview
programme for managers to talk about management philosophy in operational terms. The
latter proportion of managers who report the use of autonomous or semi-autonomous
teams is reasonably consistent with the results of the national SME study (McDonald &
Wiesner 2000). In that study, 43.3 percent of managers reported the introduction of self-
managing teams in the previous three years and 45 percent reported having engaged in the
establishing work teams with direct responsibility for setting and achieving targets. In
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table 6.38 the data for of work in groups, teams or cells and autonomous/semi-autonomous
work groups in SMEs is cross-tabulated.
Table 6.38: Cross-tabulation of work in groups, teams or cells and autonomous/semi-autonomous
work groups in SMEs
Work in groups, teams or cells present in SME: % Freq.
SMEs with autonomous/ semi-autonomous work groups, which also report work
in groups, teams or cells. 52.0 65
SMEs with no autonomous/ semi-autonomous work groups which report work in
groups, teams or cells 48.0 60
No work in groups, teams or cells present in SME:
SMEs with autonomous/ semi-autonomous work groups, which do not also report
work in groups, teams or cells. 19.2 14
SMEs with no autonomous/ semi-autonomous work groups which also do not
report work in groups, teams or cells 80.8 59
Results significant at p. = <0.05.
Table 6.38 indicates that only around one-half of those SMEs, which reported self-
managing work teams (autonomous or semi-autonomous work groups), also reported work
in groups, teams or cells. The use of ‘groups’ in item C4.13 instead of the word ‘teams’
might be significant. Managers sometimes apply the team metaphor in expressing an
overall ideology or perspective on the organisation (Fox 1971; Deery & Dowling 1988;
Alexander et al. 1994; Rimmer 1995) without referring to how workers are organised or
whether they are arranged in self-managed, autonomous, or semi- autonomous teams.
The next question asked SME managers whether they had never used the following
practices in the previous three years or used them for some jobs or all jobs:
C5.1. A group incentive plan
C5.2. A profit-sharing scheme
C5.3. An employee share ownership scheme
C5.4. A knowledge or skills base- pay programme
C5.5. An individual performance based pay system
C5.6. A group performance based pay system
C5.7. A bonus system
C5.8. Line manager makes employee selection decisions (non-managerial
employees below leading hand/supervisory level)
C5.9. More senior manager makes employee selection decisions (non-
managerial employees below leading hand/supervisory level)
C5.10. Other employees (non-managerial employees below leading
hand/supervisory level) have input into selection decisions
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C5.11. Line manager conducts employee (non-managerial employees
below leading hand/supervisory level) performance appraisal
C5.12. Peer appraisal is practiced at employee level (non-managerial
employees below leading hand/supervisory level)
C5.13. Negotiations and written agreements with employees
C5.14. Negotiations and written agreements with unions
In table 6.39, these human resources items, some of which are consistent with participant
management and some of which are consistent with exclusion, were identified to provide a
further dimension in the analysis of managers’ behaviour.
Table 6.39: The relationship of management practices with participant and exclusionist management
in SMEs (n. = 206)
Practice Style Neverused
Used for
some jobs
Used for
all jobs
Practice
is in use n.
C5.15. A group incentive plan Participance 52.2 33.3 14.4 47.7 201
C5.16. A profit-sharing scheme Participance 52.5 31.0 16.5 47.5 200
C5.17. An employee share ownership scheme Participance 85.9 8.0 6.0 14.0 199
C5.18. A knowledge or skills base- pay
programme * 47.3 39.9 12.8 52.7 203
C5.19. An individual performance based pay
system * 22.4 52.2 25.4 77.6 205
C5.20. A group performance based pay
system * 69.5 26.0 4.5 30.5 200
C5.21. A bonus system * 29.1 44.3 26.6 70.9 203
C5.22. Line manager makes employee
selection decisions (non-managerial
employees below leading
hand/supervisory level)
Exclusion 33.0 51.5 15.5 67.0 200
C5.23. More senior manager makes employee
selection decisions (non-managerial
employees below leading
hand/supervisory level)
Exclusion 15.5 65.5 19.0 84.5 200
C5.24. Other employees (non-managerial
employees below leading
hand/supervisory level) have input into
selection decisions
Participance 54.0 44.1 1.9 46.0 202
C5.25. Line manager conducts employee (non-
managerial employees below leading
hand/supervisory level) performance
appraisal
Exclusion 26.1 53.7 23.2 76.9 203
C5.26. Peer appraisal is practiced at employee
level (non-managerial employees below
leading hand/supervisory level)
Participance 70.8 24.3 5.0 29.3 202
C5.27. Negotiations and written agreements
with employees Participance 23.5 52.5 24.0 76.5 204
C5.28. Negotiations and written agreements
with unions Participance 75.0 19.5 5.5 25.0 200
* Not clearly participance or exclusion.
In response to question C5: To what extent have you employed the following practices in the past 3 years?
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In the second column, each item is categorised as to whether it constitutes a participant or
exclusionist action. This was not done on the questionnaire form. Seven of the 14
practices are unambiguously participant. The sixth column indicates the percentage of
SMEs in which the practice was used at all. Each practice was used for all jobs by a
smaller minority of managers than the proportion of managers who used that practice only
for some jobs. Only half of the practices were employed at all by SME managers, with the
most common practices being employee selection decisions by senior managers (C5.9,
84.5 percent), individual performance based pay systems (C 5.6, 77.6 percent),
performance appraisal conducted by line manager (C5.11, 76.9 percent), and negotiations
and written agreements with employees (C5.13, 76.5 percent). Of these four items, only
one, the latter, was clearly a participant practice.
In the next section, factor analysis was conducted on the level of satisfaction with employee
performance.
6.10 Managers’ satisfaction with employee performance
The final section of the survey questionnaire dealt with the level of satisfaction of SME
managers with their workforce and their firm’s performance. The participants were asked
to indicate their level of satisfaction on a four point scale from extremely satisfied to
extremely dissatisfied. There were 16 items. The question asked SME managers how
satisfied they were ‘with the following aspects of your workforce and your firm’s
performance’. The questions, however, were mostly about satisfaction with employees’
performance and attitudes, except for D1.5, which referred to organisational profitability.
D1.1 Employee morale,
D1.2 Employee commitment to organisational goals,
D1.3 Employee turnover,
D1.4 Employee attention to quality of service or product,
D1,5 Organisational profitability,
D1.6 Employee absenteeism,
D1.7 Accident rates,
D1.8 Employee stress,
D1.9 Employee loyalty to the firm,
D1.10 Employee cooperativeness,
D1.11 Employee willingness to complete tasks on time,
D1.12 Wastage rates (or damage to equipment, if you are a service organisation),
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D1.13 Necessity for reworking (or re-doing tasks, if you are a service organisation)
D1.14 Employees’ customer orientation,
D1.15 Employees’ interest in the work,
D1.16 Employees’ pride in the firm,
D1.17 Employees’ pride in their work.
No items were deleted after reliability analysis. Being a scaled set of responses, factor
analysis was considered appropriate in order to reduce the number of variables. The first
step produced the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin MSA with a value of .882, which met Hair et al.’s
description as ‘meritorious’ for further analysis. Bartlett’s test of sphericity obtained an
approximate 2 of 1328.069 (df=136), significant at p<.001, confirming the suitability for
the second step of factor analysis. The first four components accounted for 47 percent of
variance. Principal factor analysis was conducted with Varimax rotation. The results are
indicated in table 6.40.
Table 6.40: SME managers’ satisfaction with workforce and organisational performance
Variables
Factor 1:
Employee
altruism
ALTRUISM
Factor 2:
Employee
commitment
COMMITED
Factor 3:
Employee
productivity
PRODVITY
Factor 4:
Work effects on
Employees
WORKEFFS
D1.16* .753
D1.17* .730
D1.15 .684
D1.14* .541
D1.5 .334
D1.10 .733
D1.11 .609
D1.9* .536
D1.2* . .505
D1.12 .514
D1.13* .508
D1.6 .497
D1.7 .487
D1.4* .454
D1.3 .346
D1.1* .556
D1.8 .482
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation converged in 11 iterations.
* These variables were retained in the factor where the highest coefficient was found.
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Table 6.40 indicates that there were four factors latent in the satisfaction scale. Factor 1,
employee altruism (ALTRUISM), consists of four statements relating to SME managers’
satisfaction with the assiduity of employees as expressed in their pride in the firm (D1.16)
and their work (D1.17), interest in their work (D1,15) and having a customer orientation
(D1.5). The final statement refers to organisational productivity, which, it is argued, is
linked to employee commitment (Harrell-Cook & Ferris 1997) of which conscientiousness
or assiduity can be elements. The second factor, managers’ satisfaction with employee
commitment (COMMITED), has similar characteristics to the first, focussing on employee
qualities of cooperation (D1.10), task orientation (willingness to complete tasks on time,
D1.11), loyalty to the firm (D1.9), and commitment to organisational goals (D1.2). All of
the variables in Factor 3 refer to issues directly or indirectly associated with managers’
satisfaction with productivity. Employee productivity (PRODVITY) is distinguished from
COMMITED because the factor is task-oriented, focussing on wastage (D1.12), reworking
(D1.13) and attention to quality (D1.6). Indirect measures include absenteeism (D1.7),
accident rates (D1.4) and turnover (D1.3), which may have negative impacts on
productivity. The fourth factor includes managers’ satisfaction with two workplace
management effects on employees: their morale (D1.1) and stress (D1.8). This was called
‘Work effects on employees’ (WORKEFFS). These four variables were referred to as
satisfaction variables.
The scale ranged from extremely satisfied (1.000) to extremely dissatisfied (5.000). Table
6.41 indicates that there was strong support for each of the individual performance items.
There was an even split between SME managers regarding the satisfaction items as either
satisfactory (8 items) or excellent to satisfactory (9 items). There was strong support for
ALTRUISM, COMMITED, and WORKEFFS, and moderate support for PRODVITY
Table 6.41: Mean values - SME managers’ satisfaction with workforce performance
Satisfaction variables
_
(X)
ALTRUISM COMMITED PRODVITY WORKEFFS
1.9970 1.9146 2.0114 1.9728
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In the next section, nonparametric tests were used to analyse the relationship between the
independent variables (organisational and personal) and the eleven unitarist variables.
6.11 The significance of relationships between independent variables and the
unitarist variables
This section reports the impact of the organisational, personal and limitations independent
variables on the eleven unitarist variables using the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of
variance and, where applicable, Spearman’s rho ().
There were twelve independent variables, of which five were characteristics of the SMEs,
five were personal characteristics, and two related to the limitations managers reported in
managing employees. The organisational characteristics were size, industry, unionisation,
union presence, and whether a family owns the firm. The five managers’ characteristics
were the education level of the respondents, the major source of their ideas on management,
whether the respondent was an owner of the organisation, and the managers’ age and
gender. The limitations variables were managers’ perceptions of internal and external
restrictions on managing employees.
The three sets of independent variables suggested twelve research questions:
1. Is there a significant relationship between SME size and the unitarist variables?
2. Is there a significant relationship between industry sector and the unitarist
variables?
3. Is there a significant relationship between SME managers’ estimates of
unionisation and the unitarist variables?
4. Is there a significant relationship between the presence of unions in the SME and
the unitarist variables?
5. Is there a significant relationship between family ownership of the SME and the
unitarist variables?
6. Is there a significant relationship between the highest level of the SME
manager’s formal education and the unitarist variables?
7. Is there a significant relationship between major source of SME managers’ ideas
about management and the unitarist variables?
8. Is there a significant relationship between the ownership status of SME managers
and the unitarist variables?
9. Is there a significant relationship between the SME managers’ age and the
unitarist variables?
10. Is there a significant relationship between the SME managers’ gender and the
unitarist variables?
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11. Is there a significant relationship between SME managers’ perceptions of
internal limitations on the management of employees and the unitarist variables?
12. Is there a significant relationship between SME managers’ perceptions of
external limitations on the management of employees and the unitarist variables?
In each case, the null hypotheses derived from the research questions were tested. The
significance of the task in employing tests of null hypotheses was to establish whether a
relationship exists between the unitarist variables and other variables. Since there is in the
literature none of the detailed empirical research on unitarism that this thesis presents, the
employment of null hypotheses in order to establish whether there is, for example, any
relationship between a unitarist variable such as managerial attitudes towards unions and
managerial behaviour has avoided nonsensical, obvious or uninformative proposals. It is
not clear that any of the null hypotheses presented in this thesis are a priori false
(Anderson, Burnham & Thomson 2000, p. 913). Where a null hypothesis is rejected, a
relationship between the unitarist variables and other variables exists (Howell 1985, p.
105).
Nonparametric tests were applied to the relationship between the independent
organisational and personal variables and the dependent unitarist variables, derived by
factor analysis from the questions corresponding to each of the four unitarist dimensions.
The reason for the use of nonparametric methods is that the data for the four dimensions of
the unitarist ideology are ordinal data. In each of the four questions, ranked data were
derived on a five point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Siegal and Castellan
(1988, p. 3) argued that nonparametric techniques of testing hypotheses are suited to the
social sciences where the social scientist may not be dealing with normally distributed data.
Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by ranks was applied to the null hypotheses to
determine whether they can be rejected or not, addressing the research questions and null
hypotheses relating to the dimensions derived from the four core concepts established to
test Fox’s unitarist ideology (SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial prerogative,
conflict, collective workplace relations, and trade unions). Spearman’s ρ was used to test
the measure of association between the two sets of ranked data (Siegal & Castellan 1988, p.
235): the independent variables, managers’ perceptions of internal and external restrictions
on managing employees, and the unitarist variables.
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The Kruskal-Wallis test identified whether each of the organisational and personal
variables has a significant impact on the unitarist variables identified by the factor analysis.
The analysis of variance by ranks is a multivariate statistical technique with the objective of
establishing whether there are any significant relationships between the independent and
dependent variables. Since the dependent variables were ranked on a five-point scale from
strongly agree to strongly disagree (and in the case of questions C5 and D1, a four point
scale), the Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance of ranks was appropriate for the
data type (Selvanathan et al. 2000, p. 569). The Kruskal-Wallis test was employed to
determine possible differences between the independent variables and dependent variables.
Where the chi square (2) value of the items is equal to or greater than the tabled critical 2
value, the null hypothesis may be rejected (Sheskin 1997, p. 400). Where Kruskal-Wallis
tests cannot be performed because there are insufficient cases, Spearman’s nonparametric
rank correlation test was performed.
There were two sets of null hypotheses tested. The first dealt with the null hypotheses that
each of the independent organisational variables does not have a significant relationship
with each of the dependent variables identified by factor analysis. The second tested the
null hypotheses that each of the independent personal variables does not have a significant
relationship with each of the dependent variables identified by factor analysis. The third set
of null hypotheses explored the significance of the relationship between independent
internal and external limitations on the management of employees, on the one hand, and the
dependent unitarist variables, on the other hand.
There are 132 null hypotheses relating to the impact of the organisational, personal, and
limitations variables on the unitarist variables organised into 12 sets of null hypotheses.
Null hypotheses are employed because The 11 dependent unitarist variables in the null
hypotheses are grouped in each of the following null hypotheses. The individual
hypotheses, which the Kruskal-Wallis tests have rejected, are reported after table 6.34.
H001 SME size does not have a significant impact on the unitarist variables,
H002 The SME’s industry category does not have a significant impact on the
unitarist variables,
267
H003 SME managers’ estimates of union membership in the organisation do not
have a significant impact on the unitarist variables,
H004 Union presence in the organisation does not have a significant impact on the
unitarist variables,
H005 Family ownership of the SME does not have a significant impact on the
unitarist variables,
H006 The highest level of formal education does not have a significant impact on the
unitarist variables,
H007 The major source of managers’ ideas about management does not have a
significant impact on the unitarist variables,
H008 Whether the manager is an owner does not have a significant impact on the
unitarist variables,
H009 The manager’s age does not have a significant impact on the unitarist
variables,
H010 The manager’s gender does not have a significant impact on the unitarist
variables,
H011 Internal limitations perceived by the manager do not have a significant impact
on the unitarist variables, and
H012 External limitations perceived by the manager do not have a significant impact
on the unitarist variables.
The Chi-square value of the tests for the significance of the relationship between, on the
one hand, the independent organisational and personal variables and, on the other hand, the
dependent unitarist variables are presented in table 6.42. Table 6.43 presents the Spearman
correlation tests of the significance of the relationship between the perceived limitations on
management and the unitarist variables. While both sets of tests indicate whether there is a
significant relationship between the variables, they do not provide any information about
what managerial attitude towards the unitarist variables are predicted by the independent
variables. Where there is a significant relationship between an independent variable and a
unitarist variable, it is indicated in the table with shaded text.
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Table 6.42: The impact of the organisational and personal variables on the unitarist dimensions
Independent variables (2 values)
Organisational variables Personal variables
Unitarist
variables
SM
E
SIZ
E
S
IN
D
U
ST
R
Y
U
N
IO
N
ISN
U
PR
E
SE
N
C
FA
M
L
Y
B
U
S
M
A
N
Q
U
A
L
S
M
A
N
ID
E
A
S
M
A
N
O
W
N
E
R
A
G
E
G
E
N
D
E
R
PARTICPN: 1.136 1.763 4.496 2.851 1.806 2.614 .408 .297 1.457 .780
MANLEGIT: 4.945* 6.073
* 5.529 2.118 8.780** 10.213* 3.644 .328 4.682 2.949
MANRESPY: .411 4.753* 4.331 1.761 .957 5.589 3.065 1.919 2.951 .071
INDIVIDU: 1.282 1.688 .628 .702 .333 .622 1.111 .257 4.163 1.235
CONTROLS: .690 1.617 3.981 .711 .615 3.983 .864 .225 5.575 .594
DYSFUNCT: 5.549* 5.086* 8.071* .887 12.671** 13.116* 4.635 .241 9.564* 1.925
INADEQCY: .043 1.433 2.168 1.982 5.216* 20.880** 10.074* .006 4.708 .377
COLLRELS: 3.922* 3.336 3.189 1.731 2.362 7.454 4.199 .490 1.787 4.656*
INTRUSIN: .030 1.382 6.420 4.290 10.382** 6.347 3.575 .743 4.040 .073
AVOIDANC: .305 1.009 2.667 4.280 6.411* 6.237 4.720 .056 1.690 .004
RELEVANC: 9.628** 1.368 12.616* 9.209* 5.324* 1.262 .917 .853 .538 .155
*. p.05; **. p.01
Twenty-two null hypotheses, which exceeded the critical value for 2 for the relevant
degrees of freedom, were rejected, indicating a significant relationship between those
independent variables and the unitarist variables highlighted in table 6.42.
In table 6.43, the results of the Spearman rank correlation test are presented for the two
independent, limitations ranked variables (INTERNAL and EXTERNAL).
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Table 6.43: The significance of the relationship between the limitations variables
and the unitarist dimensions
Limitations on the management of employees ()
Unitarist variables Internal limitations
INTERNAL
External limitations
EXTERNAL
PARTICPN: -.022 .155*
MANLEGIT: .155* .185*
MANRESPY: .003 .146*
INDIVIDU: -.006 .062
CONTROLS: .157* .055
DYSFUNCT: -.042 -.007
INADEQCY: .060 .199**
COLLRELS: .224* .237**
INTRUSIN: .162* .172*
AVOIDANC: .123 .018
RELEVANC: .048 .009
*. p.05; **. p.01
It is evident from table 6.43 that there are significant relationships between the internal
variables and four of the unitarist variables. These were the internal limitations on the
management of employees’ and managers’ perspectives on managerial prerogative,
managerial direction, collective workplace relations and in regarding unions as an intrusion
into the organisation. Likewise, there were significant relationships between the external
variables and six of the unitarist variables. The perceived external limitations, which
included such sources as awards and unions, had a significant relationship with SME
managers’ views on employee participation, managerial legitimacy, managerial
responsibility, employee inadequacy as a cause of conflict in the workplace, collective
workplace relations and their views on unions as an intrusion into the organisation.
Nevertheless, the correlations are low.
Tables 6.42 and 6.43 indicate that there are 32 null hypotheses that the tests reject and that
there is a significant relationship between the independent variables and the unitarist
variables.. Sub-sections 6.11.1 to 6.11.12 present the rejected null hypotheses formulated
according to the research questions arising from organisational, personal and limitations
data and the unitarist variables. The findings are summarised in sub-section 6.11.1-6.11.13.
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6.11.1 SME size and the unitarist dimensions
The first set of significant relationships is determined by size. The Kruskal-Wallis test
found that there is a significant relationship between SME size and managers’ attitudes
towards managerial legitimacy, conflict being organisationally dysfunctional, collective
workplace management arrangements and the relevance of trade unions. The
corresponding null hypotheses rejected by the tests are as follows:
H0012 There is no significant relationship between SME size and managers’ attitudes
towards managerial legitimacy,
H0016 There is no significant relationship between SME size and managers’ views on the
perception that conflict is organisationally dysfunctional,
H0018 There is no significant relationship between SME size and managers’ attitudes
towards collective workplace relations, and
H00111 There is no significant relationship between SME size and managers’ attitudes
towards the relevance of trade unions.
6.11.2 Industry sector and the unitarist dimensions
Industry sector had a significant relationship with SME managers’ attitudes towards
managerial legitimacy, managerial responsibility, and conflict regarded as being
organisationally dysfunctional. The following null hypotheses were therefore rejected:
H0022 There is no significant relationship between the SME’s industry category and
managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy,
H0023 There is no significant relationship between the SME’s industry category managers’
attitudes towards managerial responsibility, and
H0026 There is no significant relationship between The SME’s industry category and
managers’ views on the perception that conflict is organisationally dysfunctional.
6.11.3 SME managers’ estimates of unionisation and the unitarist dimensions
Managers’ estimates of union membership in the SME were found to have a significant
relationship with two of the eleven unitarist variables. The first was the view that conflict
is organisationally dysfunctional. The second was the relevance of trade unions. The
rejected null hypotheses were:
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H0036 There is no significant relationship between SME managers’ estimates of union
membership in the organisation and managers’ views on the perception that conflict
is organisationally dysfunctional, and
H00311 There is no significant relationship between SME managers’ estimates of
union membership in the organisation and managers’ attitudes towards the
relevance of trade unions.
6.11.4 The presence of unions in the SME and the unitarist dimensions
Union presence was significant for only one of the eleven unitarist variables: that is,
managers’ attitudes towards the relevance of trade unions. The null hypothesis,
H00411There is no significant relationship between union presence in the organisation and
managers’ attitudes towards the relevance of trade unions.
was, therefore, rejected.
6.11.5 Family ownership of the SME and the unitarist dimensions
There was a significant relationship between family ownership of the SME and six of the
eleven unitarist variables. These dependent variables were managers’ attitudes towards,
first, managerial legitimacy; second, the view that conflict is organisationally
dysfunctional; third, the view that employee inadequacy causes conflict; fourth, the opinion
that unions are an intrusion into the organisation; fifth, the view that trade unions ought to
be avoided; and, sixth, whether trade unions are relevant. The following null hypotheses
were, therefore, rejected:
H0052 There is no significant relationship between family ownership of the SME and
managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy,
H0056 There is no significant relationship between family ownership of the SME and
managers’ views on the perception that conflict is organisationally dysfunctional,
H0057 There is no significant relationship between family ownership of the SME and
managers’ attitudes towards the view that that employee inadequacy causes conflict,
H0059 There is no significant relationship between family ownership of the SME and
managers’ attitudes towards the view that unions are an intrusion into the
organisation,
H00510 There is no significant relationship between family ownership of the SME and
managers’ attitudes towards the view that unions ought to be avoided,
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H00511 There is no significant relationship between family ownership of the SME and
managers’ attitudes towards the relevance of trade unions.
6.11.6 The highest level of the SME manager’s formal education and the unitarist
dimensions
The first of the personal characteristics, which have a significant relationship with some of
the eleven unitarist variables, is the highest level of the manager’s formal education. This
characteristic has a significant relationship with four of the unitarist variables. These were
the managers’ views on, first, managerial legitimacy, second, the view that conflict is
organisationally dysfunctional, third, the view that employee inadequacy causes conflict,
and, fourth, collective workplace relations, leading to the rejection of the following null
hypotheses:
H0062 There is no significant relationship between the highest level of formal education
and managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy,
H0066 There is no significant relationship between the highest level of formal education
and managers’ views on the perception that conflict is organisationally
dysfunctional, and
H0067 There is no significant relationship between the highest level of formal education
and managers’ views on the perception that that employee inadequacy causes
conflict.
6.11.7 The major source of SME managers’ ideas about management and the
unitarist dimensions
The major source of managers’ ideas about management was significant only for managers’
attitudes towards the view that employee inadequacy causes conflict. Thus the following
null hypothesis is rejected:
H0077 There is no significant relationship between the major source of managers’ ideas
about management and their attitudes towards the view that employee inadequacy
causes conflict.
6.11.8 The ownership status of SME managers and the unitarist dimensions
The ownership status of the SME manager was significant for none of the eleven unitarist
variables.
273
6.11.9 SME managers’ age and the unitarist dimensions
Age was significantly related only to the view that conflict is organisationally
dysfunctional, leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis:
H0096 There is no significant relationship between the manager’s age and their view on
the perception that conflict is organisationally dysfunctional.
6.11.10 SME managers’ gender and the unitarist dimensions
Gender was significant for only one of the unitarist variables, and that was managers’
attitudes towards collective workplace relations. The following null hypothesis was
therefore rejected:
H0108 There is no significant relationship between the manager’s gender and their
attitudes towards collective workplace relations.
6.11.11 SME managers’ perceptions of internal limitations on the management of
employees and the unitarist dimensions
Internal limitations on the management of employees had a significant relationship with
four of the eleven unitarist variables: managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy;
managerial control; collective workplace relations; and the view that unions are an intrusion
into the organisation. Thus, the null hypotheses,
H0112 There is no significant relationship between internal limitations perceived by the
manager and managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy,
H0115 There is no significant relationship between internal limitations perceived by the
manager and managers’ views on managerial control,
H0118 There is no significant relationship between internal limitations perceived by the
manager and managers’ attitudes towards collective workplace relations, and
H0119 There is no significant relationship between internal limitations perceived by the
manager and managers’ view on the perception that unions are an intrusion into the
organisation,
were rejected.
6.11.12 SME managers’ perceptions of external limitations on the management of
employees and the unitarist dimensions
Finally, the variable, external limitations on managing employees, impacted significantly
on six unitarist variables: managers’ attitudes towards employee participation, managerial
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legitimacy, managerial responsibility, the view that employee inadequacy causes conflict,
collective workplace relations, and the view that unions are an intrusion into the
organisation. The following null hypotheses were, therefore, rejected.
H0121 There is no significant relationship between external limitations perceived by the
manager and managers’ attitudes towards employee participation,
H0122 There is no significant relationship between external limitations perceived by the
manager and managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy,
H0123 There is no significant relationship between external limitations perceived by the
manager and managers’ attitudes towards managerial responsibility,
H0127 There is no significant relationship between external limitations perceived by the
manager and managers’ views on the perception that that employee inadequacy
causes conflict
H0128 There is no significant relationship between external limitations perceived by the
manager and managers’ attitudes towards collective workplace relations, and
H0129 There is no significant relationship between external limitations perceived by the
manager and managers’ view on the perception that unions are an intrusion into the
organisation.
6.11.13 Summary of the significance the independent organisational, personal, and
limitations variables for the unitarist dimensions
Eleven of the twelve independent variables had a significant impact on at least one unitarist
variable. The most influential independent variables were FAMLYBUS and EXTERNAL
(6 significant relationships) followed by SMESIZES and INTERNAL (4 significant
impacts each), which together accounted for 20 (62.5 percent) of the 32 significant
relationships between the independent and the unitarist variables. The only variable with a
significant impact on SME managers’ attitudes towards employee participation was
EXTERNAL. The organisational variables had no significant impact on INDIVIDU or
CONTROLS. Of the three groups of variables, the personal characteristics had the least
impact, exercising no significant relationship with PARTICIPN, MANRESPY, INDIVIDU,
CONTROLS, INTRUSIN, AVOIDANC or RELEVANC. If ideology were to reflect the
controlling interests of the owners of businesses, it is surprising that the ownership status of
SME managers was significant for none of the unitarist variables. Paradoxically, however,
the family business characteristic was significant for six of the eleven unitarist variables.
These were managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy, the view that conflict is
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organisationally dysfunctional, the view that employee inadequacy causes conflict, and all
three sets of views towards trade unions (INTRUSIN, AVOIDANC and RELEVANC).
Both internal and external limitations on managing employees had a significant relationship
with managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy, collective workplace relations and
the view that unions are an intrusion into the organisation. The single independent variable
with significance for managerial direction was the internal limitations variable. Six of the
independent variables were significant for the respondents’ perspectives towards
managerial legitimacy and on the view that conflict is organisationally dysfunctional. For
DYSFUNCT, these were the organisational variables: size, industry, unionisation and
whether the organisation was a family business. The personal characteristics, which
impacted on that perspective, were the managers’ qualifications and their age. One
organisational variable (family business), two personal characteristics (the manager’s
highest educational qualification and the principal source of the manager’s ideas about
management) and external limitations on the management of employees had a significant
relationship with managers’ perspectives on the view that employee inadequacies caused
conflict. The unitarist variable, collective workplace relations, was significantly impacted
by size and gender, and both of the limitations variables. If the SME was a family business
then there was a significant relationship with the view that trade unions are an intrusion into
the organisation and that trade unions should be avoided. Both internal and external
limitations on the management of employees were also significant for the perspective that
trade unions intrude into organisations, but not for AVOIDANC, which was significantly
impacted only by FAMLYBUS. Attitudes towards the question of the relevance of trade
unions were impacted solely by organisational variables: size, the manager’s estimates on
unionisation, the presence of trade unions and whether the business was family-owned.
In this section, the relationship between the organisational, personal and limitations
variables on the eleven unitarist variables was explored using Kruskal-Wallis tests for the
organisational and personal variables and Spearman’s test for the limitations variables.
Next, the unitarist variables will be treated as independent variables in exploring the
significance of their relationship with workplace practices in testing the notion of ideology
as ideas-and-action, using Spearman’s test.
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6.12 Unitarist dimensions and management practice
In chapter 3, ideology was discussed in terms of action-oriented values and beliefs. The
fusion of the ideational and practice in the notion of ideology raises a number of possible
hypotheses which are explored in this section. The tests of the significance related to the
question of the applicability of the notion of ideology as beliefs-and-action are reported in
sub-sections 6.12.1 to 6.12.3 and the findings summarised in sub-section 6.12.4.
The possible linkages between ideology and consultation and other management practices
suggest three research questions, as follows:
1. Are there any significant relationships between the unitarist variables and the
range of issues on which SME managers consult employees?
2. Are there any significant relationships between the unitarist variables and the
degree to which SME managers consult employees?
3. Do the unitarist variables have a significant relationship with workplace
management practices?
In the first sub-section, Spearman’s rho was used to test the ideological unity of attitudes
(beliefs and values) and managerial action, through examining the significance of the
relationship between the unitarist variables and about what SME managers do or might
consult employees.
6.12.1 Unitarist dimensions and the range of issues on which SME managers consult
employees
In this sub-section, the question, whether there is a significant relationship between the
unitarist variables for certain workplace practices, was tested. Spearman’s correlation was
used to test the significance. The results are set out in table 6.31. The issues on which
managers might consult were those matters referring to efficiencies in the workplace
(CONSEFFS) and those referring to organisational strategy (CONSTRAT).
Twenty-two null hypotheses were derived from analysing the impact of the eleven unitarist
variables on consultation with employees on a range of issues. The null hypotheses cover
the following:
H013 SME managers’ attitudes towards employee participation do not have a significant
impact on whether SME managers consult employees on workplace efficiencies,
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H014 SME managers’ attitudes towards employee participation do not have a significant
impact on whether SME managers consult employees on organisational strategy,
H015 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy do not have a significant
impact on whether SME managers consult employees on workplace efficiencies,
H016 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy do not have a significant
impact on whether SME managers consult employees on organisational strategy,
H017 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial responsibility do not have a
significant impact whether SME managers consult employees on workplace
efficiencies,
H018 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial responsibility do not have a
significant impact on whether SME managers consult employees on organisational
strategy,
H019 SME managers’ attitudes towards the individualisation of the employment contract
do not have a significant impact on whether SME managers consult employees on
workplace efficiencies,
H020 SME managers’ attitudes towards the individualisation of the employment contract
do not have a significant impact on whether SME managers consult employees on
organisational strategy,
H021
aSME managers’ attitudes towards managerial control do not have a significant
impact on whether SME managers consult employees on workplace efficiencies,
H022
aSME managers’ attitudes towards managerial control do not have a significant
impact on whether SME managers consult employees on organisational strategy,
H023 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that conflict is organisationally
dysfunctional do not have a significant impact on whether SME managers consult
employees on workplace efficiencies,
H024 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that conflict is organisationally
dysfunctional do not have a significant impact on whether SME managers consult
employees on organisational strategy,
H025 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that employee inadequacy causes
conflict do not have a significant impact on whether SME managers consult
employees on workplace efficiencies,
H026 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that employee inadequacy causes
conflict do not have a significant impact on whether SME managers consult
employees on organisational strategy,
H027 SME managers’ attitudes towards collective workplace relations do not have a
significant impact on whether SME managers consult employees on workplace
efficiencies,
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H028 SME managers’ attitudes towards collective workplace relations do not have a
significant impact on whether SME managers consult employees on organisational
strategy,
H029 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that unions are an intrusion into the
organisation do not have a significant impact on whether SME managers consult
employees on workplace efficiencies,
H030 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that unions are an intrusion into the
organisation do not have a significant impact on whether SME managers consult
employees on organisational strategy,
H031 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that trade unions ought to be avoided do
not have a significant impact on whether SME managers consult employees on
workplace efficiencies,
H032 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that trade unions ought to be avoided do
not have a significant impact on whether SME managers consult employees on
organisational strategy,
H033 SME managers’ attitudes towards the relevance of trade unions do not have a
significant impact on whether SME managers consult employees on workplace
efficiencies.
H034 SME managers’ attitudes towards the relevance of trade unions do not have a
significant impact on whether SME managers consult employees on organisational
strategy.
Consultation refers to management seeking and considering the views of its employees
before making a decision. It does not extend to further involvement or participation in
decision-making (Alexander and Lewer 1996). The distinction drawn by Dunphy and
Stace (1992), for example, between involvement and consultation is not clear, and this is a
problem with the consultation literature, which the author has discussed elsewhere
(McDonald & Wiesner 2000).
The results are set out in table 6.44.
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Table 6.44: The impact of unitarist dimensions on SME managers’ consultation of employees on
consultation issues
Unitarist variables (Spearman’s )
Consultation
variables
P
A
R
T
IC
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M
A
N
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E
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E
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O
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A
N
C
R
E
L
E
V
A
N
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CONSEFFS -.427***-.257** -.159* -.170* .014 -.125 -.218** -.231** -.084 -.063 .046
CONSTRAT -.495***-.321*** -.296** -.229** .063 -.144* -.219** -.223** -.120 -.192* -.048
* p.05; **; p.01
Six of the unitarist variables had a significant impact on SME managers’ consultation on
both workplace efficiencies and organisational strategy. These were managers’ attitudes
towards employee participation, managerial responsibility, individual contracts and their
effects on managerial prerogative, the view that employee inadequacy causes conflict, and
collective workplace relations. Their attitudes towards the view that conflict is
organisationally dysfunctional and that unions ought to be avoided were significant for
consultation on organisational strategy. Thus, 14 (63.6) of the 22 hypotheses were rejected.
The rejected hypotheses are as follows:
H013 SME managers’ attitudes towards employee participation do not have a significant
impact on whether SME managers consult employees on workplace efficiencies,
H014 SME managers’ attitudes towards employee participation do not have a significant
impact on whether SME managers consult employees on organisational strategy,
H015 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy do not have a significant
impact on whether SME managers consult employees on workplace efficiencies,
H016 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy do not have a significant
impact on whether SME managers consult employees on organisational strategy,
H017 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial responsibility do not have a
significant impact whether SME managers consult employees on workplace
efficiencies,
H018 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial responsibility do not have a
significant impact on whether SME managers consult employees on organisational
strategy,
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H019 SME managers’ attitudes towards the individualisation of the employment contract
do not have a significant impact on whether SME managers consult employees on
workplace efficiencies,
H020 SME managers’ attitudes towards the individualisation of the employment contract
do not have a significant impact on whether SME managers consult employees on
organisational strategy,
H024 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that conflict is organisationally
dysfunctional do not have a significant impact on whether SME managers consult
employees on organisational strategy,
H025 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that employee inadequacy causes
conflict do not have a significant impact on whether SME managers consult
employees on workplace efficiencies,
H026 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that employee inadequacy causes
conflict do not have a significant impact on whether SME managers consult
employees on organisational strategy,
H027 SME managers’ attitudes towards collective workplace relations do not have a
significant impact on whether SME managers consult employees on workplace
efficiencies,
H028 SME managers’ attitudes towards collective workplace relations do not have a
significant impact on whether SME managers consult employees on organisational
strategy, and
H032 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that trade unions ought to be avoided do
not have a significant impact on whether SME managers consult employees on
organisational strategy.
These null hypotheses refer to the range of matters on which managers might consult
employees. The next set of hypotheses in sub-section 6.9.2 refers to the degree to which
managers consult employees on a range of consultation issues.
6.12.2 The unitarist dimensions and the degree to which SME managers consult
employees
Question C2 dealt with four degrees of involving employees in decision-making on
consultation issues, from widespread employee involvement in decisions to managers
initiating and implementing change. The consultation issues were divided between the
degree to which SME managers consult employees on efficiencies (DEGEFFIC) and the
degree of consultation on organisational strategy (DEGSTRAT). Table 6.45 reports the
Spearman’s correlation tests on the following null hypotheses:
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H035 SME managers’ attitudes towards employee participation do not have a significant
impact on the degree to which SME managers consult employees on workplace
efficiencies,
H036 SME managers’ attitudes towards employee participation do not have a significant
impact on the degree to which SME managers consult employees on organisational
strategy,
H037 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy do not have a significant
impact on the degree to which SME managers consult employees on workplace
efficiencies,
H038 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy do not have a significant
impact on the degree to which SME managers consult employees on organisational
strategy,
H039 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial responsibility do not have a
significant impact on the degree to which SME managers consult employees on
workplace efficiencies,
H040 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial responsibility do not have a
significant impact on the degree to which SME managers consult employees on
organisational strategy,
H041 SME managers’ attitudes towards individualisation of the employment contract do
not have a significant impact on the degree to which SME managers consult
employees on workplace efficiencies,
H042 SME managers’ attitudes towards individualisation of the employment contract do
not have a significant impact on the degree to which SME managers consult
employees on organisational strategy,
H043
aSME managers’ attitudes towards managerial control do not have a significant
impact on the degree to which SME managers consult employees on workplace
efficiencies,
H044
aSME managers’ attitudes towards managerial control do not have a significant
impact on the degree to which SME managers consult employees on organisational
strategy,
H045 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that conflict is organisationally
dysfunctional do not have a significant impact on the degree to which SME
managers consult employees on workplace efficiencies,
H046 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that conflict is organisationally
dysfunctional do not have a significant impact on the degree to which SME
managers consult employees on organisational strategy,
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H047 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that employee inadequacy causes
conflict do not have a significant impact on the degree to which SME managers
consult employees on workplace efficiencies,
H048 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that employee inadequacy causes
conflict do not have a significant impact on the degree to which SME managers
consult employees on organisational strategy,
H049 SME managers’ attitudes towards collective workplace relations do not have a
significant impact on the degree to which SME managers consult employees on
workplace efficiencies,
H050 SME managers’ attitudes towards collective workplace relations do not have a
significant impact on the degree to which SME managers consult employees on
organisational strategy,
H051 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that unions are an intrusion into the
organisation do not have a significant impact on the degree to which SME
managers consult employees on workplace efficiencies,
H052 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that unions are an intrusion into the
organisation do not have a significant impact on the degree to which SME
managers consult employees on organisational strategy,
H053 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that trade unions ought to be avoided do
not have a significant impact on the degree to which SME managers consult
employees on workplace efficiencies,
H054 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that trade unions ought to be avoided do
not have a significant impact on the degree to which SME managers consult
employees on organisational strategy,
H055 SME managers’ attitudes towards the relevance of trade unions do not have a
significant impact on the degree to which SME managers consult employees on
workplace efficiencies.
H056 SME managers’ attitudes towards the relevance of trade unions do not have a
significant impact on the degree to which SME managers consult employees on
organisational strategy.
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Table 6.45: The impact of unitarist dimensions on the degree to which SME managers consult
employees
Unitarist variables (Spearman’s )
Consult-
ation
degree
variables
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DEGEFFIC -.389** -.354** -.265** -.186* -.040 -.126 -.207** -.282** -.230** -.137 -.038
DEGSTRAT -.374** -.348** -.334** -.210* -.050 -.100 -.174* -.232** -.127 -.092 -.010
* p.05; ** p.01
Six of the unitarist variables - managers’ attitudes towards employee participation,
managerial legitimacy, managerial responsibility, individual contracts and their effects on
managerial prerogative, the view that employee inadequacy causes conflict, and collective
workplace relations - had a significant impact on the degree of consultation on both
workplace efficiencies and organisational strategy. Managers’ attitudes towards the view
that unions are an intrusion into the organisation had a significant relationship with whether
managers involve employees in decisions on organisational strategy. The following 13 null
hypotheses were, therefore, rejected:
H035 SME managers’ attitudes towards employee participation do not have a significant
impact on the degree to which SME managers consult employees on workplace
efficiencies,
H036 SME managers’ attitudes towards employee participation do not have a significant
impact on the degree to which SME managers consult employees on organisational
strategy,
H037 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy do not have a significant
impact on the degree to which SME managers consult employees on workplace
efficiencies,
H038 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy do not have a significant
impact on the degree to which SME managers consult employees on organisational
strategy,
H039 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial responsibility do not have a
significant impact on the degree to which SME managers consult employees on
workplace efficiencies,
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H040 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial responsibility do not have a
significant impact on the degree to which SME managers consult employees on
organisational strategy,
H041 SME managers’ attitudes towards individualisation of the employment contract do
not have a significant impact on the degree to which SME managers consult
employees on workplace efficiencies,
H042 SME managers’ attitudes towards individualisation of the employment contract do
not have a significant impact on the degree to which SME managers consult
employees on organisational strategy,
H047 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that employee inadequacy causes
conflict do not have a significant impact on the degree to which SME managers
consult employees on workplace efficiencies,
H048 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that employee inadequacy causes
conflict do not have a significant impact on the degree to which SME managers
consult employees on organisational strategy,
H049 SME managers’ attitudes towards collective workplace relations do not have a
significant impact on the degree to which SME managers consult employees on
workplace efficiencies,
H050 SME managers’ attitudes towards collective workplace relations do not have a
significant impact on the degree to which SME managers consult employees on
organisational strategy,
H051 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that unions are an intrusion into the
organisation do not have a significant impact on the degree to which SME
managers consult employees on workplace efficiencies,
In this section, the tests were about the impact of the unitarist variables on the substance of
consultation and the degree to which SME managers consult employees. In the next
section, the attention is on the processes, which managers used where they consulted with
employees, involved them in participative practices, and where there were collective
arrangements.
6.12.3 The unitarist dimensions and workplace management practices
The management practices found in questions C3, C4 and C5 of the survey questionnaire
cover consultative, participative and collective measures. This sub-section addresses the
research questions associated with the significance of the relationship between the eleven
unitarist variables and specified practices from these three questions from the survey
questionnaire.
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The distinction between consultation and employees’ involvement or participation in
decision-making was drawn in section 6.9, above. While questions C1 and C2 in the
survey questionnaire focussed on the range and degree of consultation, question C3
identified a number of forms of consultation. Questions C4 and C5 looked at a range of
mainly participative practices, with some references to collective workplace practices.
Participative practices may include task participation such as quality circles (Marginson
and Sisson 1988), representative participation in joint consultative committees
(Marchington 1992) for example, or financial participation schemes (Marginson & Sisson
1988; Thornicroft 1989). Collective practices refer to representative processes such as
negotiations with unions, or other forms of employee associations, and management.
The data were arranged around these three sets of practices. Considerations of the
substantive references in each of the management practices canvassed in survey questions
C3 to C5 drove the selection of a number of statements as independent variables for further
testing using the unitarist variables as independent variables. The various practices were
then computed into three variables: CONSPRAC for the consultative practices referred to
in question C3, PARTPRAC for the participative practices in both questions C4 and C5,
and COLLPRAC for the collective practices referred to in question C5. These reflected
three further research questions:
1. Is there a significant relationship between the unitarist variables and the forms of
consultation practiced in SMEs?
2. Is there a significant relationship between the unitarist variables and participative
practices in SMEs?
3. Is there a significant relationship between the unitarist variables and collective
practices in SMEs?
These were expressed in terms of testing the null hypotheses about the significance of the
relationship of the unitarist variables with the consultative, participative, and collective
practices. Taken together, these were called management practices variables.
SME managers were asked in question C3 to indicate one or more of eight forms of
consultation they utilised or would utilise. In question C5 the variables were re-coded from
three responses (‘never used’, ‘for some jobs’ and ‘for all jobs’) into two: yes/no. ‘Never
used’ was re-coded from a value of 1 to a value of 2, and the combined category, which
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included ‘for some jobs’ and ‘for all jobs’, was re-coded with a value of 1. This treatment
of survey question C5 led to consistency with the coding of the responses in survey
questions C3 and C4. It was not necessary to re-code survey questions C3 and C4. In
survey question C5, C5.4 to C5.7 were not included because their pedigree as participative
practices was less certain. Although an argument could be made for bonus systems as a
form of financial participation, the conclusion was that this item was a form of
remuneration rather than of participation or involvement. Items C5.8-C5.12 were discarded
because three of them dealt with selection processes and two of them related to
performance appraisal. Although these items indicated some specific levels of involvement
of employees in selection and appraisal, they were seen as tangential to the thrust of the
issue of participation.
The consultative, participative, and collective practices, which were tested, are as listed in
table 6.46, together with their frequencies.
Table 6.46: Management practices variables
Management
practices
variables
Forms of consultation, participation and collective
arrangements
Percentage
of SMEs N
C3.1 Informal discussions with those employees affected by
change 94.5 197
C3.2 Formal meetings with those employees affected by
change 80.1 191
C3.3 Discussions with an established joint consultative
committee 36.3 182
C3.4 Discussions with a specially constituted committee
established to consider the particular change 39.4 180
C3.5 Discussions with union delegates at this workplace 20.3 187
CONSPRAC
C3.6 Discussions with full-time union officials from outside
the workplace 12.8 180
C4.1 An employee involvement/participative programme 75.5 200
C4.2 Regular work or area meetings (for example, quality
circles) 74.9 203
C4.3 A joint worker-management committee to discuss or
implement workplace management change 49.8 201
C4.4 A committee to address specific workplace
management issues other than safety and health 52.0 202
C4.5 An occupational safety and health committee 53.7 203
C5.1R1 A group incentive plan 52.2 201
C5.2R A profit or gain-sharing plan 52.5 200
PARTPRAC
C5.3R An employee share ownership scheme 85.9 199
C5.13R Negotiations and written agreements with employees 23.5 204COLLPRAC C5.14R Negotiations and written agreements with unions 75.0 200
1. ‘R’ refers to re-coded variables, combining ‘for some jobs’ and ‘for all jobs’ and reversing the values so
that each of the statements now have a yes/no response recorded, consistent with survey questions C3 and C4.
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The frequencies indicate that informal discussions (94.5 percent) and formal meetings (80.1
percent) with staff affected by changes to the organisation were common in SMEs. Other
forms of consultation were not. Less than one in four SME managers had discussions with
either established joint consultative committees or ad hoc committees established to
consider organisational change. Only one-fifth ever has discussions with union delegates.
This would indicate that if delegates are present, then discussions with them were likely to
occur, since just over one-quarter of SME managers reported the presence of a workplace
delegate (see table 6.5 above). There may have been a greater reticence to talk about
workplace or strategic issues with full-time union officials. Over 40 percent reported full-
time union officials visiting at least once a year, but only 12.8 percent of SME managers
indicated that they had conducted discussions with officials from outside the workplace.
There was a broader spread of participative practices evident. The most common form of
employee participation in SMEs was an employee share ownership scheme (85.9 percent),
followed by the less specific designation of ‘an employee/participative program. Seventy-
six percent of SME managers reported such schemes in general but, apart from regular
work or area meetings (74.9 percent), for which quality circles were given as an example,
only around one-half reported joint worker-management committees, specific, non-OHS
committees, OHS committees, group incentive plans and profit or gain-sharing plans.
Although three-quarters of SME managers reported union membership at either zero or less
than 10 percent, 75 percent also reported conducting negotiations and written agreements
with unions. Less than a quarter negotiated with employees outside the union framework
and struck written agreements with employees.
The following sets of null hypotheses arising from the three management practice variables
and the eleven unitarist variables were tested:
H057 SME managers’ attitudes towards employee participation do not have a significant
impact on SME managers’ management practices,
H058 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy do not have a significant
impact on SME managers’ management practices,
288
H059 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial responsibility do not have a
significant impact on SME managers’ management practices,
H060 SME managers’ attitudes towards individualism do not have a significant impact on
SME managers’ management practices,
H061
aSME managers’ attitudes towards managerial control do not have a significant
impact on SME managers’ management practices,
H062 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that conflict is organisationally
dysfunctional do not have a significant impact on SME managers’ management
practices,
H063 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that employee inadequacy causes
conflict do not have a significant impact on SME managers’ management practices,
H064 SME managers’ attitudes towards collective workplace relations do not have a
significant impact on SME managers’ management practices,
H065 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that unions are an intrusion into the
organisation do not have a significant impact on SME managers’ management
practices,
H066 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that trade unions ought to be avoided do
not have a significant impact on SME managers’ management practices,
H067SME managers’ attitudes towards the relevance of trade unions do not have a
significant impact on SME managers’ management practices.
Thirty-three null hypotheses were derived from the analysis of the relationship between the
unitarist variables and the specific workplace management practices identified in the
survey. Only in one-third of the relationships were practices significantly related to any of
the unitarist variables, utilising Spearman’s . The findings are summarised in table 6.47.
Table 6.47: The significance of the relationship between the unitarist dimensions and management
practices
Unitarist variables (Spearman’s )
Management
practices
variables
P
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A
V
O
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N
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CONSPRAC -.146 -.221** -.051 -.029 .024 -.226** -.078 -.218** -.070 -.175* -.259**
PARTPRAC -.106 -.029 -.027 .076 .076 .164* -.005 -.031 .154* .069 .276**
COLLPRAC .180* .169* .087 .092 .043 .118 .247** .057 .023 .066 .075
* p.05; ** p.01
The following 11 null hypotheses were, therefore, rejected:
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H0573 SME managers’ attitudes towards employee participation do not have a significant
impact on SME managers’ collective workplace practices,
H0581 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy do not have a significant
impact on SME managers’ consultation practices,
H0583 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy do not have a significant
impact on SME managers’ collective workplace practices,
H0621 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that conflict is organisationally
dysfunctional do not have a significant impact on SME managers’ consultation
practices,
H0622 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that conflict is organisationally
dysfunctional do not have a significant impact on SME managers’ participation
practices,
H0633 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that employee inadequacy causes
conflict do not have a significant impact on SME managers’ collective workplace
practices,
H0641 SME managers’ attitudes towards collective workplace relations do not have a
significant impact on SME managers’ consultation practices,
H0652 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that unions are an intrusion into the
organisation do not have a significant impact on SME managers’ participation
practices,
H0661 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that unions ought to be avoided do not
have a significant impact on SME managers’ consultation practices,
H0671 SME managers’ attitudes towards the relevance of trade unions do not have a
significant impact on SME managers’ consultation practices.
H0672 SME managers’ attitudes towards the relevance of trade unions do not have a
significant impact on SME managers’ participation practices.
Of the unitarist variables, SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy, the
view that conflict is organisationally dysfunctional, their attitudes towards collective
workplace relations, the view that unions ought to be avoided and the relevance of trade
unions were significant for their consultation practices. SME managers’ attitudes towards
the view that conflict is organisationally dysfunctional, the view that unions are an intrusion
into the organisation and the relevance of trade unions were significant for their
participation practices. While managerial attitudes towards unions and collective
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workplace relations were not significant for SME managers’ attitudes towards collective
workplace practices, their attitudes towards employee participation, managerial legitimacy
and the view that conflict is a result of employee inadequacy were.
6.12.4 Summary of the significance of the unitarist dimensions for managerial
practice
The survey explored managers’ attitudes towards three aspects of managerial practice. The
first was the range of matters on which SME managers indicated they consulted employees
(question C1). The second was the degree to which they indicated that they consulted
employees on a range of issues (question C2). Third, various forms of consultation
(question C3), the initiation of various practices (question C4) and the extent of other
nominated practices (question C5) were re-coded and categorised into consultative
practices (CONSPRAC), participative practices (PARTPRAC) and collective workplace
practices (COLLPRAC)
There were, thus, three sets of tests of the significance of the relationship between the
eleven unitarist variables and management practice. In the first, one test was of the
significance of the unitarist variables for consultation of employees on workplace
efficiency issues (CONSEFFS). The other tested the significance of the unitarist variables
for consultation of employees on organisational strategy issues (CONSTRAT).
In the second set, the significance between the unitarist variables and the degree to which
managers involve employees in decision-making on workplace efficiency issues
(DEGEFFIC) and organisational strategy issues (DEGSTRAT) was tested. CONSEFFS,
which refers to consultation on workplace efficiency matters, is distinct from the degree to
which managers involved employees in workplace efficiency matters (DEGEFFIC).
Likewise, there was a distinction between CONSTRAT and DEGSTRAT when dealing
with the degree of involvement of employees in organisational strategy matters.
In the third set of tests of the significance in the relationship between unitarist variables and
three managerial practice variables, three variables - the forms of consultation
(CONSPRAC), participative practices (PARTPRAC) and collective workplace practices
(COLLPRAC) - from questions C3, C4 and C5 were identified.
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The percentages of significant relationships between the unitarist variables and the
managerial practice variables indicate that a significant relationship between the unitarist
variables and consultation on the range of items indicated by the survey (63.6 percent of the
tests) is the most likely of the three sets managerial practice elements. A significant
relationship between the unitarist variables and the degree of consultation on a range of
items is likely for 59.1 percent of the tests and the unitarist variables are significant for the
implementation of consultative, participative or collective workplace practices for only 33.3
percent of the tests.
Tests for the impact of the unitarist variables on the consultation issues indicated that SME
managers’ attitudes towards control of employees (CONTROL), the views that conflict is
organisationally dysfunctional (DYSFUNCT), unions are an intrusion into the organisation
(INTRUSIN), organisations ought to avoid unions (AVOIDANC) and towards the
relevance of trade unions (RELEVANC) were not significant for consultation on
efficiencies. Their attitudes towards control of employees and the relevance of trade unions
were significant for neither consultation on efficiencies nor consultation on organisational
strategy. Attitudes towards the view that unions are an intrusion in to the organisation
(INTRUSIN) were significant only for the degree of consultation on workplace efficiency.
Six of the unitarist variables (PARTICPN, MANLEGIT, MANRESPY, INDIVIDU,
INADEQCY, and COLLRELS) were significant both for the range of issues managers
consulted employees and for the degree to which they consulted employees on workplace
efficiency and organisational strategy. Eight of the unitarist variables were significant for
consultation on organisational strategy matters (CONSTRAT) and seven for the degree to
which managers involved employees in decisions related to workplace efficiency
(DEGEFFIC).
The focus of the questions in C1 and C2 were on the substance of consultation, and while
question C2 explored the degree to which SME managers said they consulted employees,
there was no indication of the methods employed. These were found in questions C3, C4
and C5. Managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy (MANLEGIT), the view that
conflict is organisationally dysfunctional (DYSFUNCT), collective workplace relations
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(COLLRELS) and the view that unions ought to be avoided (AVOIDANC) were significant
for the use of consultative practices. DYSFUNCT, the view that unions are an intrusion
into the organisation (INTRUSIN) and the relevance of trade unions (RELEVANC) were
the only unitarist variables significant for participative practices. Finally, managers’
attitudes towards employee participation (PARTICPN), MANLEGIT, the view that conflict
is caused by employee inadequacy (INADEQCY), and the relevance of trade unions
(RELEVANC) were significant for collective workplace practices (COLLPRAC).
The next set of relationships to be explored is that between the unitarist variables and
managers’ satisfaction with employees’ performance.
6.13 The unitarist variables and SME managers’ satisfaction with employee
performance
This sub-section deals with establishing whether there is any significance between the
unitarist factors and managers’ satisfaction with employee and organisational performance.
As indicated in section 6.10, factor analysis produced four satisfaction variables: SME
managers’ satisfaction with employee altruism (ALTRUISM), employee commitment
(COMMITED), employee productivity (PRODVITY), and work effects on employees
(WORKEFFS). Altruism referred to a number of statements in question D1 of the survey
questionnaire, which focused on whether the manager believed employees held positive
attitudes towards work and the organisation. These were characterised as
conscientiousness, or assiduity. Employee commitment was a second set of managers’
perspectives on general attitudes of employees towards work and the organisation, whereas
employee productivity referred to more specific task-orientations, which referred to
employee performance. Finally, managers’ perceptions of morale and stress were
measured in terms of work effects on employees. The application of the eleven unitarist
variables towards these four employee satisfaction variables gave rise to the following sets
of null hypotheses:
H068 SME managers’ attitudes towards employee participation do not have a significant
impact on SME managers’ satisfaction with employee performance,
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H069 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy do not have a significant
impact on SME managers’ satisfaction with employee performance,
H070 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial responsibility do not have a
significant impact on SME managers’ satisfaction with employee performance,
H071 SME managers’ attitudes towards individualism do not have a significant impact on
SME managers’ satisfaction with employee performance.
H072 SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial control do not have a significant
impact SME managers’ satisfaction with employee performance,
H073 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that conflict is organisationally
dysfunctional do not have a significant impact on SME managers’ satisfaction with
employee performance,
H074 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that employee inadequacy causes
conflict do not have a significant impact on SME managers’ satisfaction with
employee performance,
H075 SME managers’ attitudes towards collective workplace relations do not have a
significant impact on SME managers’ satisfaction with employee performance,
H076 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that unions are an intrusion into the
organisation do not have a significant impact SME managers’ satisfaction with
employee performance,
H077 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that trade unions ought to be avoided do
not have a significant impact on SME managers’ satisfaction with employee
performance,
H078 SME managers’ attitudes towards the relevance of trade unions do not have a
significant impact on SME managers’ satisfaction with employee performance.
The Spearman rank order correlation test was used to determine the measure of
association between the unitarist factors and the satisfaction variables. The findings are
reported in table 6.48.
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Table 6.48: The impact of the unitarist dimensions on SME managers’ satisfaction with employee
performance
Spearman correlation ()
Satisfaction variables
Unitarist
variables
ALTRUISM COMMITED PRODVITY WORKEFFS
PARTICPN: -.198** -.091 -.102 -.091
MANLEGIT: .007 -.137 -.018 .098
MANRESPY: .040 .028 .027 .059
INDIVIDU: .011 -.028 -.024 .021
CONTROLS: .053 -.049 -.003 .020
DYSFUNCT: .201** .080 .122 .217**
INADEQCY: -.020 -.127 -.068 .000
COLLRELS: .014 -.104 .015 .030
INTRUSIN: .110 -.031 -.015 .098
AVOIDANC: .077 .000 .065 .055
RELEVANC: .217** .117 .187* .245**
* p<.05; ** p<.01
Three of the unitarist variables (PARTICPN, DYSFUNCT and RELEVANC) were
significant for ALTRUISM. DYSFUNCT had a significant relationship with ALTRUISM
and WORKEFFS. RELEVANCE was significant for ALTRUISM, PRODVITY and
WORKEFFS. Thus, only the following six null hypotheses were rejected:
H0681 SME managers’ attitudes towards employee participation do not have a significant
impact on SME managers’ satisfaction with employee altruism,
H0731 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that conflict is organisationally
dysfunctional do not have a significant impact on their satisfaction with the
workplace management effects on employees,
H0734 SME managers’ attitudes towards the view that conflict is organisationally
dysfunctional do not have a significant impact on their satisfaction with the
workplace management effects on employees,
H0781 SME managers’ attitudes towards the relevance of trade unions do not have a
significant impact on their satisfaction with employee altruism,
H0783 SME managers’ attitudes towards the relevance of trade unions do not have a
significant impact on SME managers’ satisfaction with productivity, and
H0784 SME managers’ attitudes towards the relevance of trade unions do not have a
significant impact on their satisfaction with the workplace management effects on
employees.
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Overall, unitarist variables have little impact on SME managers’ satisfaction with
employees. Is there a significant relationship between management practices in the SMEs
and managers’ satisfaction? This issue is considered in the next sub-section.
6.14 Managerial practices and SME managers’ satisfaction with employee
performance
One set of relationships, explored in the previous section, is that between the unitarist
variables and the satisfaction variables. A second set of relationships suggests itself, and
that is between managerial practices and managers’ satisfaction with employee
performance. If there is little of significance between unitarist variables and satisfaction
variables, is there any significance in the relationships between the between the managerial
practices set out in table 6.33 and the degree of managers’ satisfaction with a number of
characteristics of employee performance. This question gives rise to a the following null
hypotheses which were explored in this section:
H079 SME managers’ consultation with employees on workplace efficiencies does not
have a significant impact on their satisfaction with employee performance,
H080 SME managers’ consultation with employees on organisational strategy does not
have a significant impact on their satisfaction with employee performance,
H081 The degree to which SME managers’ involve employees in decision-making on
workplace efficiencies does not have a significant impact on their satisfaction with
employee performance,
H082 The degree to which SME managers’ involve employees in decision-making on
organisational strategy does not have a significant impact on their satisfaction with
employee performance,
H083 SME managers’ consultative practices do not have a significant impact on their
satisfaction with employee performance,
H084 SME managers’ participative practices do not have a significant impact on their
satisfaction with employee performance, and
H085 SME managers’ collective practices do not have a significant impact on their
satisfaction with employee performance.
The Spearman correlation coefficients and their significance are indicated in table 6.49.
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Table 6.49: Workplace management practices and SME managers’ satisfaction with employee
performance
Spearman correlation: ()
Satisfaction variables
Workplace
management
practice
variables ALTRUISM COMMITED PRODVITY WORKEFFS
CONSEFFS .160* .184* .146* .034
CONSTRAT .263** .226** .249** .171*
DEGEFFIC .257** .130 .242** .065
DEGSTRAT .172* .158* .253** .102
CONSPRAC 1.000 .833 1.000 -.544
PARTPRAC .081 .107 .112 -.008
COLLPRAC -.063 -.045 -.006 .053
*p<.05; ** p<.01
The managerial practice variables connected to consultation issues (question C1) and the
degree to which managers employed participative practices or not (C2), did have significant
relationships with the satisfaction variables, ALTRUISM, COMMITED and PRODVITY,
with the exception that DEGEFFIC did not have any significant relationship with
COMMITED. In addition, CONSTRAT was significant for WORKEFFS. However, there
were no significant relationships between the management practices found in survey
questions C3, C4 and C5 (CONSPRAC, DEGTPRAC and COLLPRAC) and the
satisfaction variables. Thus, the following 12 null hypotheses were rejected:
H0791 SME managers’ consultation with employees on workplace efficiencies does not
have a significant impact on their satisfaction with employee altruism,
H0792 SME managers’ consultation with employees on workplace efficiencies does not
have a significant impact on their satisfaction with employee commitment,
H0793 SME managers’ consultation with employees on workplace efficiencies does not
have a significant impact on their satisfaction with employee productivity,
H0801 SME managers’ consultation with employees on organisational strategy does not
have a significant impact on their satisfaction with employee altruism,
H0802 SME managers’ consultation with employees on organisational strategy does not
have a significant impact on their satisfaction with employee commitment,
H0803 SME managers’ consultation with employees on organisational strategy does not
have a significant impact on their satisfaction with employee productivity,
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H0804 SME managers’ consultation with employees on organisational strategy does not
have a significant impact on their satisfaction with workplace effects on employees,
H0811 The degree to which SME managers’ involve employees in decision-making on
workplace efficiencies does not have a significant impact on their satisfaction with
employee altruism,
H0813 The degree to which SME managers’ involve employees in decision-making on
workplace efficiencies does not have a significant impact on their satisfaction with
employee productivity,
H0821 The degree to which SME managers’ involve employees in decision-making on
organisational strategy does not have a significant impact on their satisfaction with
employee altruism,
H0822 The degree to which SME managers’ involve employees in decision-making on
organisational strategy does not have a significant impact on their satisfaction with
employee commitment, and
H0823 The degree to which SME managers’ involve employees in decision-making on
organisational strategy does not have a significant impact on their satisfaction with
employee productivity.
6.15 Summary of the findings
The survey questionnaire produced a wealth of data on the demographics of SMEs, the
characteristics of the managerial respondents, their attitudes towards a range of statements
organised around the four key concepts of Fox’s unitarist ideology, what SME managers
consult employees about, the consultative, participative and collective practices to be found
in SMEs, and managers’ satisfaction with employees’ performance.
When these data were analysed, factor analysis produced eleven unitarist variables. These
variables are at the core of the study because they provide the proxies for discovering the
ideological dimensions of SMEs managers through their attitudes towards each of the
statements constituting the new variables. Factor analysis also provided two extra variables
from a question, which asked the participants in the survey to consider the limitations they
experience in the management of their employees. These two variables were called the
limitations variables. Managerial practices were organised in the survey questionnaire
around a range of consultation issues, the degree of involvement or exclusion of employees
from decisions about such issues, and a range of specific management practices where the
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results indicated that SMEs are characterised predominantly by informal discussion rather
than formal participative structures. Finally, factor analysis of the managers’ responses to a
question on their satisfaction with employees’ performance produced four satisfaction
variables.
The identification of these variables led to the examination of a number of specific
relationships between the variables suggested by the articulated research questions.
Following factor analysis, the first of these involved nonparametric analysis of variation by
ranks, using the Kruskal-Wallis test, exploring the impact of the organisational, personal
and limitations variables on the unitarist variables. The second group of relationships
examined the concept of ideology as beliefs-and-action by analysing the significance of the
relationship between the unitarist variables and the managerial practice variables. The
analysis of the significance of the relationships between these variables commenced with an
examination of the significance of the relationship between the unitarist variables, on the
one hand, and, on the other hand, the range of consultation issues and the degree to which
managers involve employees in managerial decision-making.
Next, the significance of the unitarist variables for the managerial practice variables – the
consultative, participative and collective workplace practices – was tested. The third
analytical task involved the exploration of the significance between the unitarist variables
and SME managers’ satisfaction with organisational outcomes expressed in terms of
employee performance. Finally, the significance of managerial practices for managers’
satisfaction with employees was analysed. Each of the dimensions of the data analysis are
summarised in the following sub-sections.
6.15.1 Organisational, personal and limitations variables and the unitarist dimensions
Table 6.50 sets out the summary of the analysis of the significance of the independent
organisational, personal and limitations variables for the unitarist variables.
299
Table 6.50: The significance of organisational, personal and limitations variables for the unitarist
dimensions
Independent variables
Potential number of
significant
relationships
Actual number of
significant
relationships
Percent
Organisational 55 16 29.1
Personal 55 6 10.9
Limitations 22 10 45.5
The most striking outcome of the analysis of the effect of the independent variables on the
unitarist variables was the slight impact of the personal variables. The personal variables
were less likely by around a half to have a significant impact than the organisational
variables. They exhibited less than one-quarter of the incidence of significance than the
variables constituted by the mangers’ perspectives on the limitations placed on their
management of employees. Nevertheless, only 16 of the 55 independent organisational
variables potential relationships recorded a significant impact on the unitarist variables and
more than one-third of those were on account of the impact of whether the work
organisation was a family business. The limitations variables were far more likely to have
a significant impact than either of the other two groups of independent variables. More
than half of the significant limitations variables were the external factors.
6.15.2 Unitarist dimensions and management practice
Whether ideology as belief-and-action is constructed in terms of the Marxist notion of
praxis or from a non-Marxist perspective of ideas as action, the analysis of the significance
of the relationship between the unitarist variables and management actions was central to
exploring the empirical foundations of the classification of managerial behaviour in terms
of a unitarist ideology. The exploration of the links between unitarist ideology (through the
unitarist variables as proxies) and action, as reflected in the managerial practices variables,
took three paths. The first examined the impact of the unitarist variables on a range of
selected issues on which managers might consult employees. The second focussed on the
impact of the unitarist variables on the degree to which managers involved employees in, or
excluded them from, decision-making on a range of consultation issues. The third path of
the investigation as to whether a significant relationship existed between the unitarist
variables and managerial practices, was to analyse the links between the unitarist variables
and consultative, participative and collective practices in SMEs. The results of these tests
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suggest the possibility that the concepts of ideology as praxis or beliefs-and-action largely
rest on a weak to moderate empirical basis as table 6.51 indicates.
Table 6.51: The significance of the unitarist dimensions for management practice
Dependent variables
Potential number
of significant
relationships
Actual number of
significant
relationships
Percent
Range of consultation with
employees 22 14 63.6
Degree to which
employees are consulted 22 13 59.1
Consultative
practices 11 5 45.5
Participative
practices 11 3 27.3
Collective workplace
practices 11 3 27.3
An examination of the significant relationships indicates that there is a much stronger link
between the unitarist variables and those variables which concern consultation than there is
between the unitarist variables and either the participative or collective workplace practice
variables.
6.15.3 Unitarist dimensions and the satisfaction variables
The scope of the study of the unitarist ideology was extended to include managers’
satisfaction with employee performance. This was done through two tests. The first
considered the significance of the impact of the unitarist variables on satisfaction, and the
second was of the significance of workplace practices for satisfaction. Only three variables
had any significance for the satisfaction variables. They were managers’ attitudes towards
employee participation (for ALTRUISM), the view that conflict is organisationally
dysfunctional (for ALTRUISM) and the relevance of trade unions (for ALTRUISM,
PRODVITY and WORKEFFS). There were 44 potentially significant relationships
between the independent and the dependent variables. Only 13.6 percent were significant.
The overall linkage between work practices and satisfaction with employee performance
was stronger, but all of the significant relationships were with the consultation variables.
None of the other managerial practice variables (CONSPRAC, PARTPRAC and
COLLPRAC) was significant for the satisfaction variables. Only one of these
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(CONSTRAT) was significant for all of the satisfaction variables. Twelve (42.9 percent) of
the 28 null hypotheses were rejected because of a significant relationship.
The implications of these findings will be discussed in detail in chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Introduction
The purpose of this final chapter is, first, to present the conclusions arising from the
research questions, the conduct of interviews with SME managers and the analysis of the
arising data. The second purpose is to discuss the contribution that the research in this
thesis makes to the Industrial Relations literature on unitarism and managerial ideology.
The thesis commenced its examination of the industrial relations literature on managerial
ideology with the work of Norman Ross (1958) and Alan Fox (1966a; 1966b) in which
they announced the existence of a unitary frame of reference to which they said many
managers subscribed. Fox (1966a) specifically referred to this unitary concept as a
‘managerial ideology’. In this paper and its antecedent, the research paper for the
British Royal commission on Trade Unions and Employer Associations (Fox 1966b),
there are no references to any systematic study of work organisations, which led him to
this analysis. On his implicit admission, his work steered a course away from empirical
research to theorising geared towards reform of industrial relations. It was not until later
that he adopted more systematic attempts at analysing power and power relations (Fox
1990, pp. 231-5). This led him to define ideology in terms of ‘a resource in the struggle
for power, since it shapes the way men perceive, think, feel, and act’ (sic) (Fox 1971, p.
124).
Fox’s work was influential in categorising managerial assumptions about work
organisations and the management of employees to the extent that most industrial
relations textbooks in Australia and the United Kingdom continue to refer to Fox’s
unitary framework in discussions of theoretical perspectives on industrial relations or
management theories and concepts. Researchers, too, apply the unitarist construct to
their analyses of managerial behaviour and there has been a consensus among some
industrial relations writers that there has been a resurgence, if not a continued presence,
of unitarism in public policy and in work organisations (Gunnigle 1992; Provis 1996;
Bacon and Storey 2000), especially where management unilaterally determines
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conditions of employment (Corby 1992) and unitarist perceptions of organisations
promote familial organisational culture and deny conflict (Casey 2004).
Where Fox and others referred to a unitary ideology in general terms and were
concerned with the utility of a unitarist ideology in maintaining the legitimacy of
management for example, this thesis has sought to systematically apply the elements
found in discussions of unitarism to a significant sample of managers and test whether
the unitary concept has any validity as a construct of managerial ideology. In this final
chapter, the findings are thus discussed in terms of whether or not a unitarist ideology,
which might be characterised by the key attitudes of managers towards managing
employees and their managerial behaviour, can be applied to managers in SMEs. In
Fox’s construct, the core elements of unitarism consisted of managerial attitudes towards
management, conflict, collective workplace relations, and trade unions. In designing the
survey questionnaire, therefore, the research was directed, first, towards the participant
managers’ views of, or attitudes towards, the principles they might apply to their
workplace; second, whether the structures and processes in their organisations were
participative and/or collective; and, third, their satisfaction with certain aspects of their
workforce and their firm’s performance. Thus, the overriding objective of this project
was to test the unitarist construct by applying the four key dimensions of Fox’s unitary
frame of reference to the attitudes of managers in SMEs.
Analysis of the survey data produced eleven separate unitarist variables or dimensions
(see chapter 6, section 6.7) consisting of managerial attitudes to various aspects of
management, as follows:
Managerial prerogative
1. Employee participation (PARTICIP);
2. Managerial legitimacy (MANLEGIT);
3. Managerial responsibility (MANRESPY);
4. Individualisation of the employment contract (INDIVIDU);
5. Control of employees (CONTROLS);
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Conflict
6. Organisational dysfunction (DYSFUNCT);
7. Employee inadequacy (INADEQCY);
Collective Workplace Relations
8. Collective workplace relations (COLLRELS);
Trade Unions
9. Union intrusion (INTRUSIN);
10. Avoidance of unions (AVOIDANC);
11. Union relevance (RELEVANC).
These eleven unitarist dimensions provide the structure around which the discussion
develops, incorporating the relevant findings from the interview programme. The
interviews were not included in the discussion on the contingent characteristics because
of the small sample (19 SME managers).
The survey instrument examined both the range of issues about which managers might
consult employees and the degree to which they might consult them on those issues
(McDonald & Wiesner 2000). The range of matters on which managers might involve
employees and the degree to which they consulted them referred to consultation on
workplace efficiency and workplace strategy. The practices employed by managers
referred to the forms of consultation, any participative practices, and collective practices.
Since some of the characteristics of unitarism imply managers might, first, have a range
of attitudes towards the employees’ contribution to organisational effectiveness and,
second, that conflict can arise from employee inadequacies, the survey questionnaire
asked managers about their satisfaction with employee performance. The analysis led to
the identification of four further factors in managerial attitudes towards employees:
satisfaction with employee altruism; satisfaction with employee commitment;
satisfaction with employee productivity; and their views on the effects of workplace
management on employees.
7.1.1 Arrangement of the chapter
This chapter will address the characteristics and contexts of SME managers’ ideology
(section 7.2) by summarising the significance of the relationship between three sets of
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12 independent variables – the organisational characteristics of SMEs (sub-section 7.2.1
below), the personal characteristics of the respondents (sub-section 7.2.2), and the
limitations respondents perceive to constrain their managerial prerogative (sub-section
7.2.3) - and the unitarist variables. The organisational variables related to SME size, the
industry in which the workplace operated, managers’ perceptions of the percentage of
employees who were union members, managers’ perceptions of union presence in the
workplace, and whether the SME was a family owned business. These contingent
organisational characteristics were supplemented by the personal characteristics of the
respondent manager. The personal characteristics referred to the manager’s
qualifications, the source of managers’ ideas about management, whether or not the
manager was an owner and the manager’s gender. A final pair of contingent variables
related to limitations, which managers perceived to be affecting their management of
employees. These included limitations arising within the organisation and those from
external sources such as unions, awards and government legislation. Potentially, these
relationships would reveal whether there were any common characteristics of managers
who subscribed to a unitarist ideology rather than any deterministic relationship.
Of greater interest and significance for the industrial relations scholar, however, is the
question whether there are any significant relationships between unitarist variables and
workplace management practices, because the definition of ideology used in this thesis
integrates both managers’ assumptions (in terms of values and beliefs) and managerial
practice as discussed in chapter 2 (sub-sections 2.7.3, 2.7.4, 2.7.7 and 2.8). The analysis
thus tested the relationship between the unitarist variables and the forms of consultation
practised, any participative practices, and collective practices. This is reported in section
7.3, which discusses the relationships between the unitarist views and the forms of
consultation practiced in SMEs (sub-section 7.3.1), participative practices (7.3.2), and
collective practices (7.3.3). The conclusions from the analysis of the significance of the
unitarist dimensions for managerial behaviour are presented in sub-section 7.3.4. The
final question addressed the impact of both the unitarist dimensions and managerial
practices on SME managers’ satisfaction with employee and organisational
performance. This is set out in section 7.4. Finally the conclusions and contributions to
the literature on unitarist ideology are presented in section 7.5
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The scope of the research was limited to managers in Australian small and medium sized
enterprises in the eastern mainland states. First, SME managers were selected because
there has been little research in industrial relations on smaller businesses in Australia,
although that interest grew during the 1990s. Second, there is a pragmatic reason. This
thesis falls into a series of projects on employee management and organisational change
in SMEs, which the author co-directs. Third, there are some assumptions that small
businesses and SMEs are characterised by unitarist practices. The question of whether
or not this is so is a matter for conjecture. Swain (1997), for example, challenges this
view. SMEs thus provide a fertile foundation for a study exploring the nature of a
much-used concept, which has little systematic empirical foundation, although it has
been applied to empirical studies of managers, work organisations and public policy as
an a priori construct.
7.2 The characteristics and contexts of SME managers’ ideology
The means reported throughout chapter 6 indicate that none of the unitarist dimensions
has strong opposition or support, with moderate support existing only for managers’
attitudes towards managerial responsibility and the view that unions are an intrusion into
the organisation. Weak support characterises SME managers’ attitudes towards
employee inadequacy as a cause of conflict, collective workplace relations and the
question of the relevance of trade unions. There is weak opposition to the managerial
responsibility dimension, the view that organisational dysfunction leads to conflict and
about avoiding trade unions. Where there is no significant statistical impact on a
unitarist variable the strength of support or opposition is irrelevant.
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Table 7.1: The strength of SME managers’ attitudes towards the unitarist dimensions and the
organisational variables having significance for the unitarist dimensions
Unitarist
variable
_
X
Strength of support or
opposition for unitarist
dimension
Organisational variable
has significance
Attitudes towards management prerogative
PARTICPN 3.8451 N/A No significance
MANLEGIT 3.1334 Weak opposition
SIZE
INDUSTRY
FAMLYBUS
MANRESPY 2.3703 Moderate support INDUSTRY
INDIVIDU 2.9950 N/A No significance
CONTROLS 2.5437 N/A No significance
Attitudes towards conflict
DYSFUNCT 3.1422 Weak opposition
SIZE
INDUSTRY
UNIONISN
FAMLYBUS
INADEQCY 2.6256 Weak support FAMLYBUS
Attitudes towards collective workplace relations
COLLRELS 2.9061 Weak support SIZE
Attitudes towards trade unions
INTRUSIN 2.4754 Moderate support FAMLYBUS
AVOIDANC 3.3892 Weak opposition FAMLYBUS
RELEVANC 2.7542 Weak support
SIZE
UNIONISN
UPRESENC
FAMLYBUS
When managers talked about managerial prerogative in the interview programme, their
combined responses were in quite different terms from the results of factor analysis of
the survey data. The question in the interview schedule asked of managers about
managerial prerogative was, ‘Tell me what you think about the scope of your right to
manage. How far can other people encroach on the right to manage?’ As indicated in
chapter 5, managers tended to speak about their ‘philosophy’ of management in
operational rather than in abstract terms when dealing with open ended questions about
management. The basis of managerial prerogative in the survey rested on the inherent
nature of the management position, the strategic roles of managers, managers’ expertise,
managers’ knowledge, leadership, and the ability to convince others. Two managers
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referred to managerial prerogative in terms of the organisational objectives of company
survival and obtaining returns on capital.
SME managers moderately supported the unitarist dimension of managerial
responsibility in response to the survey questionnaire. Of the 12 managers in the
interview programme who commented on the responsibility of managers, eight regarded
profit as a major responsibility, only three regarded the employers’ and shareholders’
interests and three altruistically regarded the provision of employment for their
employees as primary responsibilities.
There was a closer link between attitudes towards individualism and the question in the
interview program about individual contracts. The interview question had two
components. The first sought the managers’ response to individual contracts such as
Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs). The second went to the issue of the impact
of individual contracts such as AWAs on employee commitment and performance. The
most common concern raised was the impact of individual contracts on pay equity with
five of the participants raising this as an issue. Eleven of the 19 interviewees (57.9
percent) were positive about individual contracts. This result was not significantly
different from the predominantly neutral perspectives expressed in the survey (the mean
for the individualisation of the employment contract was 2.9950).
The survey results suggested that SME managers were equivocal about the employee
participation dimension and there was no organisational variable significant for
managers’ attitudes towards involving employees in decision-making. Low-level
participation was the main option when managers did include employees in the decision
making process. When asked to what degree employees can or should be involved in
business decisions, the managers in the interview programme talked either of
consultation in non-specific terms or about the provision of information and feedback
from employees. This applied to eleven of the 19 managers (58 percent). Any employee
participation was, nevertheless, limited in substance or restricted to managerial and
supervisory staff, leading eight managers (42 percent) to exclude other employees
altogether from decision-making. The overall effect was to sustain, rather than dilute,
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managerial prerogative. Consultative committees were reported in only two of the
SMEs in the interview program compared with 36 and 39 percent for established joint
consultative committees and ad hoc committees respectively.. The results of the
interview programme reflected the low level support for employee participation
reflected in the survey. There is a suggestion of ambivalence or pragmatism in
managers’ attitudes towards participation, rather than commitment to a principle of
management, captured in the following statement:
Basically I try to be participatory [but] that has weakened. I find it hard to be participatory in
harder times than it is in easier times, so that's what I would say. I'm the decision maker so I
often make decisions by myself (interview 2, manager, a printing firm).
The primary concern of managers, illustrated here, is to exercise control over, or in, the
organisation, so that where altruistic notions of participation – which are consonant with
running an organisation in a democratic society – are acknowledged, they have a
subordinate ranking in managers’ priorities to managerial prerogative.
The first of the specific research questions following from the general question, whether
managers in SMEs exhibit the characteristics of a unitarist ideology in managing
employees, related to the impact of organisational contexts and personal characteristics
on the unitarist variables. Implicit in notions such as managerial prerogative and in
managers’ attitudes towards conflict, collective workplace relations and trade unions –
the four key aspects of unitarism analysed in this thesis – is the role of contingency in
managers’ adherence to a particular ideology. This is a significant question because, as
was discussed in chapter 2, section 2.7, the adoption of a definition of ideology that
refers both to managerial behaviour as well as values and assumptions precludes a
contingent approach to the study of managers.
Contingency theories postulate in positivist terms, the determinist, or normative,
linkages between environmental contexts or organisational characteristics, such as size,
and the behaviour of managers in organisations and other characteristics of
organisations. According to Dunphy and Stace (1992, p. 41), for example, strategic ‘fit’
involves ‘tight internal links’ between business strategies and organisational structure,
managerial process, organisational culture, change programs and human resource
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management. The confounding of contingency and fit derives from the normative and
deterministic characteristics of the model. Stace (1996, p. 554) denied there was any
contextual determinism, and argued that so-called ‘ideologies of change’ must refer ‘to
the conditions in the environment’. The normative significance for Stace was, first, that
‘effective companies stretch and influence their boundaries’. The implication of this is
that organisations can impact on their contexts. His second implication was that
organisations also respond to external impacts.
Advocates of contingency theory are not always consistent in their application of
contingency concepts. Although contingency refers to situational factors and the context
within which organisations operate, Donaldson (2000, p. 388) stretches Stace’s
prescription for companies dealing with their environment by referring to an
organization changing ‘its strategy, technology, or other contingency’ leading to the
improbable implication that organisations can change their contexts, taking the notion of
‘fit’ beyond that of adaptation.
Child (1972) developed a strategic choice theory, which focussed on the role of leaders
in organisations in actively influencing the structure and behaviour of their
organisations. Superficially it might seem that his argument that managers deal both
proactively and reactively with contextual factors such as size, technology and
ownership in an organisationally political manner (Child 1997, pp. 43-6) differs little
from the advocates of ‘fit’. There is a profound distinction, however. Donaldson’s
logical slip could not have occurred to Child, for the recognition of strategic process as
the exercise of political power involves the manager in the application of ideological
beliefs and values to the problematics of management, including those of dealing with
situational contingencies and managing employees.
While following Child (1997, p. 45) in rejecting the essentially positivist thrust of
contingency, the significance of any contingent characteristics of the organisation and of
the personal characteristics of the participants in the survey was tested to establish
whether those characteristics accompanied managers’ adherence to the eleven unitarist
dimensions. These characteristics were divided between organisational and personal
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variables. A third set of variables, which are implicit in the notion of strategy and
contingency, was also identified in the study. These were SME managers’ perceptions
of the limitations on the exercise of their managerial prerogative.
In the next subsection, the impact of organisational variables – SME size, industry
unionisation and union presence, and whether or not the SME was a family business –
on management attitudes towards each of the unitarist dimensions will be discussed.
7.2.1 Organisational characteristics and managers’ attitudes towards the unitarist
dimensions
The first set of questions flowing from the principal research question relates to the
contextual variables and whether these had a significant impact on the unitarist
dimensions. This study finds that size had limited influence on managerial attitudes in
SMEs. A significant relationship between size and the unitarist variables existed only
for four of the eleven unitarist dimensions: managers’ attitudes towards managerial
legitimacy, the perception that conflict is organisationally dysfunctional, collective
workplace relations, and the relevance of trade unions. Industry sector is significant
only for SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial legitimacy, managerial
responsibility, and the perception that conflict is organisationally dysfunctional. The
data revealed that industry sector for SMEs was slightly more reliable as an indicator for
managers subscribing to a unitarist perspectives than size, but significant for only
slightly more of the unitarist perspectives. Managers’ estimates of the level of
unionisation were significant only for the perception that conflict is organisationally
dysfunctional and questions about the relevance of trade unions. Union presence was
significant only for perspectives held by managers on the relevance of unions, but there
was only weak support for the unitarist perspectives overall on the relevance of trade
unions. The question whether the SME was a family business was the most significant
organisational variable for unitarist attitudes. This organisational characteristic had a
significant impact on six of the unitarist dimensions: managerial legitimacy, the
perception that conflict is organisationally dysfunctional, the view that employee
inadequacy causes conflict, the view that unions are an intrusion into the organisation,
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the view that unions ought to be avoided and that unions are relevant. These findings
are summarised in table 7.1.
7.2.2 Personal characteristics and managers’ attitudes towards the unitarist
variables
The personal variables impacted on fewer of the unitarist variables than did the
organisational variables. Of these, the most significant was the SME manager’s
educational qualifications. Management qualifications impacted significantly on
managers’ attitudes towards the legitimacy of management, the view that conflict is
dysfunctional, and conflict as an outcome of employee inadequacy. The source of
managers’ ideas had a significant relationship only with the view that conflict is an
outcome of employee inadequacy. Age was the sole personal characteristic that was
significant for managers’ view that conflict is dysfunctional. Gender was significant
only for managerial views on collective workplace relations. These findings are
summarised in table 7.2.
It was surprising that the personal feature - whether the manager was an owner of the
business - was not significant for any of the unitarist dimensions. This was not reflected
by the organisational characteristic of the SME as a family business, which was
significant for six of the unitarist dimensions.
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Table 7.2: The strength of attitudes towards the unitarist dimensions and the personal variables
having significance for the unitarist dimensions
Unitarist
variable
_
X
Strength of support or
opposition for unitarist
dimension
Personal variable has
significance
Attitudes towards management prerogative
PARTICPN 3.8451 N/A No significance
MANLEGIT 3.1334 Weak opposition MANQUALS
MANRESPY 2.3703 N/A No significance
INDIVIDU 2.9950 N/A No significance
CONTROLS 2.5437 N/A No significance
Attitudes towards conflict
DYSFUNCT 3.1422 Weak opposition MANQUALSAGE
INADEQCY 2.6256 Weak support
MANQUALS
MANIDEAS
Attitudes towards collective workplace relations
COLLRELS 2.9061 Weak support GENDER
Attitudes towards trade unions
INTRUSIN 2.4754 N/A No significance
AVOIDANC 3.3892 N/A No significance
RELEVANC 2.7542 N/A No significance
Surprisingly, there is little significance of the personal characteristics for the unitarist
ideology revealed by the survey results. Where there is significance the mean indicates
that the SME managers are equivocal about the specific unitarist dimensions. There was
no exploration of demographic and organisational characteristics in the interview
programme.
The next sub-section deals with the impacts of managers’ perceptions of the limitations
on their managerial role.
7.2.3 Managers’ perceptions on the limitations to their roles and their attitudes
towards the unitarist dimensions
Both the externally and internally perceived limitations impacted significantly on
managerial legitimacy, collective workplace relations and unions regarded as an
intrusion. Only the internal limitations were seen to impact on management control.
External limitations drive managers’ responses to employee participation,
314
individualisation of work relations and the view that conflict is caused by the inadequacy
of employees in a addition to the common relationships (table 6.43).
7.2.4 Conclusion: contingency and the unitarist dimensions
The most significant relationships between the contingent variables and managers’
unitarist attitudes are whether the business is owned by a family and the managers’
perceptions that they are limited by external factors. These two variables have a
significant impact on just over one-half of the unitarist dimensions. Both variables have
an impact on managers’ views on managerial legitimacy, their view on whether conflict
is caused by employee inadequacy and the view that unions are an intrusion in the
organisation. SME size, the managers’ qualifications and managers’ perceptions on the
internal organisational limitations on their role each have a significant impact on just
over one-third of the unitarist variables. The two common unitarist dimensions upon
which these three independent variables have a significant relationship are managerial
legitimacy and the view that conflict is organisationally dysfunctional.
This analysis suggests that organisational characteristics of work organisations, such as
size, are not particularly significant for SME managerial attitudes towards managing
employees. In each of the unitarist dimensions where size was significant, there was
either weak support or weak rejection of the unitarist perspective. This was also true for
the SME’s industry, whether the SME was a family business, and the manager’s
perceptions of a union presence. Where the manager’s perception of union density was
significant for the perspective that unions are an intrusion into the organisation,
managers in aggregate subscribed to those views moderately.
While further research should test these conclusions about the impact of organisational
and personal characteristics on managerial perspectives, managers appear to bring
perceptions to the role of managing employees and the organisation rather than have
them shaped by organisational characteristics.
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7.3 SME managers: unitarist ideology and managerial practice
There were three sets of research questions dealing with whether or not there was a
significant relationship between unitarist perspectives and management practice. These
explored the significance of relationships between the unitarist views and the forms of
consultation practiced in SMEs (sub-section 7.3.1), participative practices (7.3.2), and
collective practices (7.3.3).
7.3.1 Unitarist attitudes and consultation
The breadth of the unitarist variables significant for whether managers consult
employees on efficiencies and organisational strategy suggests that the link between
adherence to unitarist attitudes and consultation practices is stronger than for any of the
other dimensions of unitarism in this study. This is confirmed by the results testing for
significance in the relationship between views on unitarist attitudes and the degree of
consultation. The mean for consultation on efficiency issues was 1.9239, indicating that
managers might waver between widespread employee involvement in decisions and
employee consultation with possible limited involvement in goal setting with a
propensity for the lower degree of participation. The mean for consultation on strategic
items (2.7861) leaned towards managerial authority and direction being the main form of
decision-making, that is, the exercise of managerial prerogative rather than even limited
involvement. These results suggest that employee participation is not a strong suit in
managerial preferences and point to a unitarist leaning among SME managers in the
sample generally.
Six of the unitarist dimensions were significant for consultation on both efficiency and
strategic issues as well as for the degree to which they consulted on efficiency and
strategic issues. Managers’ attitudes towards conflict being organisationally
dysfunctional and towards the proposition that unions should be avoided were, in
addition, significant for consultation on organisational strategy, but not for the degree to
which managers might be consultative. The view that unions were an intrusion in the
workplace was also significant for the degree of consultation on efficiency. There is no
significant relationship on the extent and degree of consultation for either views on
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control over employees or for the issue of the relevance of trade unions. The interview
programme also indicated a unitarist orientation towards consultative processes. The
manager of a steel fabrication plant admitted the limitations on consultation in his firm:
‘I think we have restricted ourselves to consultation to the nice things.’ He explained
this in terms of using a consultative committee set up under an enterprise bargaining
agreement to arrange the Christmas party (Interview 12).
Consultation is a term widely used in relations between managers and employees and
unions, but it can mask low levels of employee involvement such as information
gathering rather than employee participation in making decisions. This was starkly
illustrated in the terms of a manager in a spectacle lens manufacturing company who
described the process in terms of ‘approach[ing] them [employees] for their ideas [if]
we've got something in mind or a change in mind and [we] look for their input on the
viability or feasibility of those changes’ (Interview 4). The owner-manager of a garment
manufacturing company gave a specific example of this, where she consulted employees
on technical matters ‘because the employees actually operate the machinery or the
computers. They are totally involved in the decision of what to buy …’ (Interview 1).
This limited approach was reflected in the example of setting up a new workshop in a
metals fabrication plant where there was consultation about machinery and machinery
location but not on the decision to design and build the new building (Interview 9).
The perspective evident on consultation, when managers spoke of it, was of it as a
process, which supported management decision-making, leading an abattoir manager to
confuse a consultative committee with a management committee (Interview 7), as did
the manager in an electronics firm (Interview 19). Canvassing employees in support of
management decision-making seemed to be an element of most of the interviewed
managers’ responses to the issue of consultation. Another example was of the manager
in steel fabrication who held ‘regular meetings with all our employees and I bring up
what our intentions are and if anybody would come up with good success, then certainly
we would listen to it’ (Interview 11). The lowest level of consultation consisted of
explanations in a furniture factory about what employees needed to do in their work and
of the reasons in order to avoid problems or resistance (Interview 6).
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With the emphasis on supporting the managerial function through consultation, power
very much remains in the hands of the managers and is little shared. Describing how a
consultative committee worked, the furniture factory manager admitted, ‘we try [to]
manoeuvre and advise, to steer the boat towards so that everyone’s happy and the
production is the best that’s necessary’ (sic) (Interview 6). One manager took
consultation further, setting up ‘operators’ meetings where the operators meet
themselves without management present to talk about issues’, but the reporting back
procedure suggested a view consistent with management support rather than devolution
of decision-making power (Interview 3).
Consultation represents a low-end form of involving employees in decision-making and
there are degrees of consultation, as suggested. These might range from merely
providing employees with information to collecting employee input for managerial
decision-making. From a managerial perspective, employees who provide technical and
operational perspectives, which might be taken into account in the decision-making
process or, more likely, in the implementation phase of decision-making, provide
support, technical or otherwise, to management decision-making. The managerial
support function in consulting employees is also apparent from the proportion of
managers who were more likely to consult on matters of efficiency than on strategic
issues. The predominant mode of consultation, revealed in the survey and evident in the
accounts of the managers interviewed, is characterised by informality, except where
consultative committees were established under enterprise agreements. Often, the
consultative committee was only one forum for managers getting in touch with
employees’ views or transmitting information. The survey indicated that most of the
characteristics of a unitarist approach to managing employees were significant for
consultation.
Managerial prerogative remains intact when consultation with employees is limited in
the extent and the degree to which managers seek input from employees, and usually
remains a process initiated and controlled by the manager. The evidence pointing to
managers using consultative processes to support their role rather than to extend
employee involvement in decision-making was reinforced by the greater strength of
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support for consultation on efficiency-related factors rather than strategic factors. In
dealing with strategic issues concerning the organisation, managers make decisions,
which set the scene for operational decisions. This ‘first order’ level of decision-making
is at the centre of the realm of managerial prerogative. In any case, while the interview
programme revealed in some organisations the involvement of middle managers down to
first line supervisors in decision-making, shopfloor workers and other employees below
supervisory levels tended to be excluded from decision-making. The findings indicate
that in employee consultation managers determine to maintain power in the hierarchy of
decision-making, and seek to sustain their domination of the workforce.
Was the link between unitarist views and management consultation evident when
looking at participative practices? This is addressed in the next sub-section.
7.3.2 Unitarist attitudes and employee participation
Employee participation has been defined in terms varying from ‘the individual worker’s
personal control over his or her immediate work tasks, to more significant examples of
direct participation in the management of the enterprise’ (Sutcliffe & Callus 1994, p.
208) or in rather more diffuse terms of ‘employee influence’ where employees have ‘the
opportunity to have a genuine say and influence on decision making’ (DEIR 1986, cited
in Davis & Lansbury 1996, p. 2). Involvement, or participation, in decision-making
suggests a more active role in decision-making than consultation where employees’
views might at best merely be sought on technical or operational matters as an
information resource to support the managerial function of decision-making.
Nevertheless, employee participation is often constrained in employee involvement
schemes where there is information sharing with small groups and individuals
(consultation). But, they are excluded from high-level decision-making and the central
purpose is employee motivation and commitment to organisational objectives
(Marchington and Wilkinson 2000, p. 340). The distinction between consultation and
participation is blurred where employees are in any case excluded from the making of a
decision. Managers in the interview programme conflated consultation and
participation.
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The survey identified five common aspects of participation and its antithesis: two
participative modes and three forms of exclusion. In no case of five forms of
participation did more than half of the managers use the practice. Three of these
practices were a group incentive plan, a profit-sharing scheme, and an employee share
ownership scheme. None of these is specifically directed towards decision-making.
Non-managerial employees below leading hand/supervisory level having input into
selection decisions, and peer appraisal for non-managerial employees below leading
hand/supervisory level were two others. Only one of these was directly related to the
process of decision-making and peer appraisal could easily be subordinated to final
decisions made by managers.
SME managers in the survey strongly supported propositions that effective managers
involve employees in key decisions affecting the organisation and that empowering
employees will improve the company’s performance. However, when it came to the
impact of such views on managerial practice, the significance of the relationship
between the unitarist variables and participative practices was slight with views that
conflict is organisationally dysfunctional and on the relevance of unions and their
intrusive characteristic being the only three variables with significance for managers’
views on employee participation. Furthermore, as indicated above, involvement tends
towards being limited to lower level participance, characterised by support for decisions
made by managers. The pragmatism about employee participation in managerial
decision-making, suggested in sub-section 7.2.1, was about limiting who would
participate and in what issues they would be involved. For example, a SME manager in
the metals industry described a limited involvement of employees in the decision to
purchase new equipment (Interview 14). At the same time, he described a vertically
structured consultative process with the line drawn against involving operators in the
decision: ‘I’ll ask the operator his views but I won’t involve him in the decision-
making.’
In this scenario, involvement in decision-making is limited to the hierarchy of managers
and immediate supervisors. A similar line was drawn in a metals manufacturing
concern, where the manager relied on the designers and tradesmen in the office in a
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decision on purchasing a laser-cutting machine, but not the workshop employees
(Interview 17). Reflecting on the influence of external contexts on management style,
the manager of a tile-retailing firm said as much: ‘profitability has a lot more impact on
your management style than maybe one would think…. I know it’s had a big impact on
mine. The lack of profitability has made me much more focused on expenditure.’ When
asked whether involvement was a matter of principle or a practical matter, he replied,
‘Oh, it’s a practical matter… (Interview 13). Frequently, when managers talked about
involvement they were referring to managerial committees, or management groups, and
supervisory levels. In few cases were consultative committees evident. When there
were, they were established under collective enterprise agreements.
Not only did managers restrict who would participate in a decision, they also commonly
restricted the decisions in which employees might be involved. Thus the manager of a
printing firm talked of the need to refer to the consultative committee any proposal to
change shiftwork arrangements, but in ‘major’ decisions the there would be no
involvement of employees below supervisory level (Interview 2). Likewise, a metals
manufacturer excluded workshop employees from a decision on purchasing equipment,
but they were actively involved in setting up a quality assurance (QA) programme
because the manager felt that ‘With something like the QA system that the boys on the
workshop floor are going to be involved with every day it was important for them to
have some sort of input into it’ (Interview 17). The rationale was effectiveness,
reflecting the greater propensity for managers in the survey to approve of consultation
on efficiency rather than on strategic issues.
Even so, where a manager feels some inclination to involve employees, the managerial
imperative will rule the extent to which employees are involved (Interview 2).
Likewise, managers might adopt an instrumental approach to employee involvement and
limit employees’ contributions to obtaining feedback on technical issues, for example
(Interview 3), but this can arise from employee initiative (Interview 16). Each
perspective, however, is consistent with a managerialist constraint on consultation and
participation to support management roles in decision-making. The manager’s role is to
balance employee and organisational inputs (Interview 3), but in that case a management
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committee made major decisions, limiting consultation or involvement, which was
expressed in terms of submissions from lower levels of management in ‘almost in an
off-the-cuff sort of fashion’. In this way, any input from employees was both supportive
of, and subordinated to, the managerial role. The supportive function is reflected where
managers made any approach to employees for input, often on an ad hoc basis, for
operational (Interview 8) or instrumental reasons rather than any commitment to
participatory principles (Interviews 4, 7, 8) and often at the implementation phase of a
change in machinery and equipment or other decision (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 15, 19),
facilities and buildings (Interviews 7, 9, 18) and organisation of the workplace. With
change leading to redundancy (Interview 5) or new organisational structures (Interview
12), any subordinate participation and consultation is a matter of timing and experience
of difficulties might lead managers to abandon any consultative or participative practices
at all (Interview 5). In every case, managers in the interview programme made the key
decisions even where there was an indication of wide consultation on major changes
(Interview 19). In one case (Interview 20) consultation was discussed only in terms of
upward referral to the Board and management consideration, rather than involvement of
non-management employees.
The distinction between employee participation and collective practices was more
clearly apparent, whereas the distinction between consulting employees and employee
participation was blurred because involvement of employees in any significant decision-
making at all was limited. This was true even where some forms of participation, such
as consultative committees, were evident. The notions of consultation and participation
providing support for management decision-making preserves managerial prerogative
consistent with a unitarist perspective on the role of management.
In the next sub-section, the third set of the relationships arising from the broad research
question between the unitarist characteristics and collective workplace practices is
considered.
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7.3.3 Unitarist attitudes and collective workplace practices
In section C of the survey questionnaire, the focus of each set of questions was on
management practices. Collective workplace practices refer to those processes in which
management and workers’ representatives or bodies comprised of staff elected
representatives deal with organisational matters and make joint decisions. It is
distinguished from employee participation and consultation in that negotiation is the key
process of joint decision-making, which is designed to reach mutually acceptable
outcomes in all the circumstances, whether this concerns strategic or operational issues,
or the employer-employee relationship.
Statements in the survey questionnaire referring to collective workplace practices were
spread between each of the questions. Table 7.3 lists the questions specifically dealing
with collective arrangements:
Table 7.3: Percentage of SME managers using collective practices
Question No. Consultative Practice Percent
C3.3 Discussions with an established joint consultative committee 36.3
C3.4 Discussions with a specially constituted committee established to
consider the particular change 39.4
C3.5 Discussions with union delegates at this specific workplace 20.3
C3.6 Discussions with full-time union officials from outside the workplace 12.8
C4.3 A joint worker-management committee to discuss or implement
workplace change 49.8
C4.4 A committee to address specific workplace issues other than safety
and health 52.0
C5.27 Negotiations and written agreements with employees 76.5
C5.28 Negotiations and written agreements with unions 25.0
The proportion of SME managers employing collective practices in the workplace was
quite low when they involved dealing with trade unions, whether through union
delegates or union officials. This is not surprising, since just over 88 percent of
managers believed that half or less of their workforce were union members. Only a
quarter of SME managers reported the presence of a union delegate; 41.5 percent had
visits from a union official at least once a year; and a little more than a quarter said that
union members raised issues from a union perspective. Of itself, the willingness to
negotiate wages and conditions with employees appears to indicate that SME managers
might be prepared to engage in collective relations with their workforce so long as a
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union was not involved. However, the wording could have been interpreted by SME
managers as applying not to a collective but to individual workers. A unitarist
perspective would indicate subordination of collectivism to managerial imperatives
according to the degree of control maintained by the manager.
The results for various aspects of dealing with committees, as indicated in table 7.3,
might indicate that between one-half and a third of managers were prepared to engage
with collective bodies. This is not inconsistent with the finding that just over 71 percent
of SME managers use both formal and informal methods of discussing changes with
employees. However, working through committees might not be indicative of collective
relations. While one-half of the respondents claimed to work through a joint worker-
management committee to discuss or implement workplace change there is no clear
indication available from the data that this was an inherently collective decision-making
process. The results for other types of committees, which would accompany a collective
approach to management, were significantly lower than for this type of committee. The
responses of some managers in the interview programme indicated that their perspective
of consultative bodies included managerial committees and sometimes this was the only
level of consultation.
Perspectives on employee participation, managerial legitimacy and the inadequacy of
employees as a cause of conflict were the only unitarist dimensions of significance for
collective workplace practices in SMEs. The only collective practices referred to in that
test were negotiations with either employees or unions (questions C5.27 and C5.28; see
table 7.3 above) but there was only lukewarm support for unitarist perspectives on
collective workplace relations expressed in responses to the survey questionnaire.
Collective arrangements were addressed more generally in the interview programme
than they were in the survey. These were distinct from questions dealing with unions.
The interviews addressed negotiation in terms of adversarialism, its necessity and
individual contracts. Unitarist perspectives were evident, for example, in ascribing
adversarialism, which was seen in negative terms, to the ignorance of union officials.
The SME managers who were interviewed generally found negotiation problematic. It
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was a process which most agreed was ‘a necessary evil’. For some, the legal
technicalities and formalities in the certified agreement process created problems for
employees and managers alike. While open commitment to negotiation was rare, a
minority indicated a preference for individualised approaches. The results suggest that
further research managerial prerogative and managers’ attitudes towards negotiation is
required. Negotiation is a form of joint decision-making as well as a process of reaching
agreement and problem solving. As such, managers who lean towards a unitarist
perspective on the employment relationship and the work organisation would find the
process irksome not only from an operational perspective (for example, that negotiation
is inconvenient and time consuming), but also from the perspective that bargaining
undermines managerial prerogative, something Australian managers have been reluctant
to allow (Markey & Reglar 1997, cited in Gollan & Hamburger 2003, p. 46).
The general research question was whether the concept of ideology as beliefs-and-action
was reflected in the relationship between the unitarist dimensions and management
practice. The conclusions from this part of the study are summarised in the next sub-
section.
7.3.4 Conclusions: unitarist ideology and managerial practice
Employee participation could be a proxy for a pluralist rather than a unitarist perspective
on the management of employees, where employees make decisions that are
traditionally within the scope of management. It is more strongly inclusive than
consultative processes. However, the results suggest that consultative and participative
practices adopted by SME managers characteristically constitute lower levels of
employee involvement, and can accompany a unitarist ideology through the
subordination of involvement to supporting managerial decision-making and the
maintenance of existing decision-making hierarchies. When participation and
consultation are limited principally to supporting the managerial function, managers
retain rather than share decision-making power, upholding managerial prerogative and
excluding employees.
325
The examples raised by the SME managers interviewed indicated the limited scope of
either consultation or employee participation. Where managers continued to retain
managerial prerogative in decisions, employees’ roles were limited to the mere provision
of information, in particular by providing technical and operational input, which might
be taken into account in the decision-making process, but which might have limited
influence in the implementation of decisions taken. Managers also commonly restricted
the decisions in which employees might have any involvement. The survey revealed the
protection of managerial prerogative through limitations on the extent and the degree to
which managers seek input from employees. In practical terms, illustrated in the
interviews with SME managers, this often meant the exclusion of any employees not in
the managerial and supervisory hierarchy. In all cases, managers continued to make the
final decision. The ideology underpinning participation and consultation thus, in
Thompson’s (1984) terms, sustains managerial dominance through the protection of
managers’ prerogative rather than extending employee decision-making power.
The low proportion of SME managers employing collective practices in the workplace
reinforced these unitarist characteristics especially when they involved dealing with
union delegates or union officials. Where managers indicated they were willing to
negotiate wages and conditions with employees, it appears there was, in this context, an
ambiguity as to whether this constituted a collective scenario because such willingness
was related to whether or not a union was involved. Likewise, the reported presence of
joint worker-management committees to discuss or implement workplace change did not
necessarily indicate that a collective process was present in the workplace for two
reasons. The first was that there was no consistency in the findings between committees
dealing with change and other committees. The second, as already indicated, was that
some managers in the interview programme appeared to think the establishment of
middle managerial committees de facto constituted employee consultation. Consistent
with a unitarist ideology, SME managers found negotiation generally, but not
universally, difficult and most managers were resigned to the ‘necessary evil’ suggested
in both the survey and the interviews. There was little open commitment to negotiation,
with some openly preferring individualised approaches.
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The propensity of managers to consult employees on efficiency rather than on strategy
when they did consult was revealed in the survey data. This was consistent with
protecting managerial prerogative. Nevertheless, SME managers in the survey strongly
subscribed to statements advocating employee participation and empowering employees
in order to improve the company’s performance. However, when it came to the impact
of such views on managerial practice, the significance of the relationship between the
unitarist variables and participative practices was slight. This suggests that the
researcher needs to be careful in interpreting what principles managers say they
subscribe to. It also reflects the observation that managers’ actions (and what they say
their basic values and beliefs might be) might not reflect their ideological assumptions.
Does this support the observations made by others about managers’ having a ‘ragbag of
assorted notions’ (Fox 1971, p. 124), being expedient (Anthony 1977), holding
inconsistent ideas about management (Nichols 1969), diffuseness of principles (Boudon
1989), and merely being pragmatic?
There are two observations that emerge from this research about the inconsistency
between uttered principles, or attitudes towards the unitarist dimensions, and managerial
practice. First, managers’ perspectives are limited by their role and their power
relationships. The interview programme suggested that, where managers referred to
participation and involvement, they often meant committees consisting of middle
managers and supervisors, excluding shopfloor workers and other workers without
supervisory roles. Second, it is clear that managers predominantly adopt practices,
which otherwise might indicate a pluralist perspective on managing employees, that
maintain the power relationships inherent in organisational structures.
If managers’ practices indicated a general unitarist ideology, was this reflected in the
data on the relationship between the eleven unitarist dimensions and their practices?
This part of the study focussed on consultative, participative and collective practices.
The unitarist dimensions’ most significant relationships were with consultation, which
has the least impact on managerial prerogative of these three sets of practices.
Conversely, employee participation, which would involve some diminution of
managerial prerogative and control, was less common and only in a single case among
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the SME managers interviewed was significant decision-making made by non-managers.
Only three of the unitarist variables had a significant impact on participative practices.
For collective workplace practices in SMEs, perspectives on the unitarist dimensions of
employee participation, managerial legitimacy and the inadequacy of employees as a
cause of conflict were the only unitarist variables of significance for workplace
practices. While managers could adopt or reject various consultative, participative and
collective practices, it is clear that the action-related values and beliefs of managers
(Thompson 1984), reflect overall a unitarist-oriented aversion to practices that
undermine management domination.
Another possibility is that managers might employ a mix of pluralist and unitarist
strategies in managing employees as Wright (1995), Guest and Hogue (1996) and
Danford (1997) suggest. A superficial application of the concept of ideology could lead
to a conclusion that managers apply a pragmatic mix of strategies to the management of
employees. However, in the responses to a broad range of statements covering the four
principal sets of attitudes in Fox’s framework (the unitarist dimensions), a typology of
unitarist practice was apparent.
When the links between the apparent assumptions managers bring to the employment
relationship and managerial behaviour are examined, the data analysis provides no clear
and consistent, across-the-board application of principles that clearly support the notion of
ideology as beliefs-and-action other than in SME managers’ attitudes towards managerial
prerogative.
Ascertaining managerial assumptions or attitudes in order to classify managers’ ideology is
difficult because managers might say one thing and behave entirely differently or
inconsistently. Thus SME managers in the survey acknowledged the contribution that
employees might make to the work organisation when they are involved in decision-
making. Yet, the evidence from this research suggests that SME managers hang onto
managerial prerogative. They tend to employ low-level stratagems in consultation or
participation rather than bringing employees into the actual process of making decisions.
Where inclusive practices are adopted, managers use them to support that prerogative rather
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than modify it in any way. Sometimes, the adoption of such practices represents a
pragmatic adaptation to the modifying influence of unions and collective bargaining as
Kochan et al. (1994) suggest. Thus, in SMEs in this research project, managers are most
likely to limit the involvement of employees to technical or operational advice in
implementation of decisions and, where there is a stronger inclination to provide for
employee involvement in decision-making, to limit that to the operational issues associated
with efficiency and organisational effectiveness rather than broader strategic issues. The
findings suggest that the researcher needs to identify managerial perspectives on issues
rather than relying exclusively on what managers do in order to ascertain their ideological
bent.
In other words, identifying the ideological proclivity of a manager is difficult because there
are degrees to which managers might reflect a unitarist ideology, exhibiting a range of
unitarist responses and it is clear that managers will fit different unitarist categories. The
managers in the survey fell into five categories: those who are unlikely to be unitarist, and
those with low, moderate, high and very high unitarist tendencies. The unitarist taxonomy
derived from managers’ responses to the unitarist statements organised around the four
dimensions of unitarism revealed that only 3.4 percent of managers responded positively to
most of the unitarist items. At the other extreme, more than one-fifth (21.8 percent) of
managers agreed with less than a quarter of the unitarist statements. These SME managers
were less likely than the other managers in the survey to reflect a unitarist ideology.
Nevertheless, there was only a low correlation between managers’ workplace practices and
their unitarist responses, indicating again the problems with assuming managers’ ideology
entirely from either their behaviour or their attitudes.
7.4 Unitarist dimensions, managerial practices and SME managers’ satisfaction
with employee performance
The final general research question was whether there was a significant relationship
between the dimensions of unitarism and SME managers’ satisfaction with their employees
and the organisation. The analysis revealed only that managers’ attitudes towards
employee participation, the view that conflict is organisationally dysfunctional, and
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whether managers thought trade unions were relevant were significant for their satisfaction
with performance.
The overall linkage between work practices and satisfaction with employee performance
was stronger for consultation on both efficiency and strategic issues and the degree of
consultation on strategy. All of the consultative variables were significant for employee
altruism and employee productivity. The degree of consultation on efficiency issues
impacted on all of these but employee commitment. Only consultation on strategy was
significant for the effects of work on employees.
The significance of consultative behaviours for satisfaction with employee and
organisational performance could arise because consultation preserves managerial
prerogative while providing support for managerial decision-making. This requires further
research.
7.5 Conclusions: contributions to the literature on unitarist ideology
In this thesis there has been an attempt to explore thoroughly the ideology of managers by
focussing on the characteristics of unitarist attitudes and behaviours. Fox’s unitarism was
an intuitive category of managerial ideology rather than one built upon systematic,
empirical research because it was developed as part of a normative analysis of British
industrial relations. It has since had significant impact on industrial relations research on
managers. Much of the analysis in the literature uses unitarism to categorise managers and
their behaviour. Not all of this literature has applied Fox’s notion uncritically, especially
when it provided the framework for the development of work on managerial style.
However, where industrial relations scholars have investigated managerial attitudes in order
to ascertain whether managers are unitarists or pluralists, such studies have not developed
an adequate, detailed instrument in order to ascertain managers’ ideology.
As this study demonstrates, the identification of managerial ideology is difficult, whether
qualitative or quantitative methodologies are applied. The detailed analysis of managerial
attitudes towards a broad range of unitarist statements covering the full range of key
managerial attitudes from the literature goes part of the way towards overcoming this
difficulty. The research design for this thesis provides a considerably broader range than in
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most studies of testable attitudes related to the unitarist managerial ideology, providing a
comprehensive basis for analysing managerial ideology. By restricting the analysis to a
consideration of unitarist ideology alone, the study sought to establish whether or not Fox’s
unitarist framework was valid as a construct at all.
The key contribution is, first, an empirically based understanding that the adoption in work
organisations of practices, which are prima facie pluralist in conception and practice, does
not necessarily reflect a pluralist ideology or orientation. While Kochan et al. (1994)
acknowledged that employers might harbour anti-union feelings while maintaining
collective workplace arrangements, this study focuses on the ideology rather than
management pragmatism. The fact that managers limit what decisions they involve
employees in, and frequently exclude non-managerial and non-supervisory employees,
indicates that among the SME managers in this study there is a very limited observance of
participative practices, giving further impetus to the conclusion that adherence to
managerial power is a significant characteristic of unitarist managerial ideology. Managers
are more likely to consult employees than involve them in decision-making, but
consultation does not threaten managerial prerogative because decision-making power
continues to reside with the manager. Managers are focussed on managerial prerogative
rather than committing themselves to consultative or participative practices or to collective
arrangements. These insights are important for future research on management behaviour,
particularly when public policy changes in industrial relations appear to be leading to an
individualised, employer-controlled, and deregulated industrial relations regime, which
would sustain managerial prerogative and power rather than lead to pluralist decision-
making structures and processes in the workplace.
Second, the study provides insights into the management of small and medium sized
businesses, which employ a significant proportion of the labour market. The industrial
relations literature on SMEs is increasing, but there have been few dedicated studies, with
most studies employing meta-analysis of larger surveys or case studies. One of the key
results for future studies of SMEs is the finding that organisational characteristics are
relatively unimportant contextual variables in management behaviour in businesses that
employ fewer than 200 employees. The exception was where the SME was described as a
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family business. In that case there was significance for more than half of the unitarist
dimensions.
Third, this thesis provides an alternative to the conclusions of some industrial relations
scholars that managers employ a mix of unitarist and pluralist strategies. While an apparent
crossing of the ideological divide might suggest pragmatism in the managerial imperatives
of dealing with the constraints of legislation and the strategies of other parties in industrial
relations, these explanations do little to explain the fundamental assumptions managers
bring to the employment relationship. The adoption of apparently pluralist management
practices in consultation and employee participation are revealed in this research as being
predominantly non-threatening to managerial prerogative and organisational power
structures in workplaces in terms of who is involved or excluded, and about what matters
employees are consulted or involved. The overall results of managers’ attitudes to
collective workplace arrangements and trade unions confirm a general unitarist orientation
in Australian SMEs.
Fourth, the evidence suggests that normative precepts guiding managerial behaviour
(roughly applied in the diverse notions of Marxist praxis, non-Marxist linkages between
values and action, and strategic choice theory) are rather diffuse. Indeed, the approval of
statements, for example, lauding the role of employee participation in effectively running
an organisation, is not reflected generally in managerial practices found in Australian
SMEs. Underpinning normative perspectives on management is an underlying
commitment to protecting managers’ power in the work organisation. It is this fundamental
political commitment that both guides and constrains strategic choice, confirming and
extending Streeck’s (1987) observation that the need to retain control over the workforce is
one of the key imperatives in exercising strategic choice. Unitarist ideology is thus central
to the raison d’etre of management. Fox (1966a, pp. 371-2) argued, as was seen in section
2.7.5, that unitarism was ‘incongruent with reality and useless for purposes of analysis’.
This study shows conversely that unitarism goes to the core of managerial prerogative. It is
useful also because, as the data analysis revealed there are eleven key dimensions, which
are worthy of further study and application and which provide the basis for further
developing an understanding of managerial ideology as ideas and behaviour.
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Finally, the results indicated that SME managers in the study usually did not demonstrate
strong attachments to their views on the issues presented to them. Nevertheless, just over
30 percent of the SME managers surveyed expressed views supportive of more than half of
the issues expressed in unitarist terms. Managers’ personal characteristics contained little
significance for the views they adopted – except when they also owned the business –
providing little additional insight into their assumptions. However, the positivist’s focus on
the contingency of managerial behaviour does not receive support from this research, since
the contextual variables also have little significance for ideology and management
behaviour.
While the analysis of the survey data and the interviews provides a more thorough
perspective on the elements of a unitarist ideology than any other study of unitarism, the
results highlight the need to further research the relationship between management attitudes
and practice. While the findings showed that the eleven unitarist dimensions had limited
impact on managerial practice, apart from consultation, these dimensions suggest
themselves as a framework for future analysis of managerial assumptions and for the study
of management behaviour in managing employees both in SMEs and in larger
organisations.
The research sought to test existing concepts rather than develop a new model of unitarism,
although the eleven dimensions and their significance for managerial practice refine the
study of management ideology and behaviour for the industrial relations student.
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© J. McDonald & R. Wiesner 1
Please answer all the questions. All answers will be treated in the strictest confidence and anonymity of
responses is assured. The responses will be retained in the Department of HRM & Employment Relations in the
Faculty of Business, University of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba. The sample list will not be forwarded to
any other individual or organisation.
SECTION A: YOU AND YOUR ORGANISATION
A1 How many employees are in your organisation?
Fewer than 20 1
21-50 2
51-100 3
101-200 4
200+ 5
_____________________________________________
A2 Is your business in:
agriculture 1
mining 2
manufacturing 3
electricity and gas 4
construction 5
wholesale 6
retail 7
transport 8
storage 9
communication 10
finance 11
public administration 12
community service 13
entertainment 14
If uncertain, please enter here:________________
________________________________________
______________________________________________
A3 What is your organisation’s principal
product or service? Please specify:
________________________________________
______________________________________________
A4 What is the management level of your current
work position (tick the nearest equivalent box)
Chief Executive Officer 1
Executive reporting to CEO 2
Senior manager 3
Middle manager 4
Supervisor 5
Other (please specify) 6
_____________________________________
______________________________________
A5 What is your highest level of formal education?
Secondary school certificate 1
A TAFE qualification/formal trade certificate 2
An undergraduate degree 3
Postgraduate diploma or certificate 4
MBA 5
Postgraduate degree other than MBA 6
Other 7
________________________________________
A6 Please indicate the major source of your ideas
about management (rank from 1-3, the most
significant influences):
Managers in your network (eg, chamber of
commerce, Rotary, AIM, etc) 1
Experience 2
Management books 3
Business/management training (eg MBA) 4
Your religious beliefs 5
Your political affiliations 6
Industry Association advice/publications 7
Government publications 8
Other (please specify) 9
_________________________________________
A7 To your knowledge, what is the percentage of
union members?
None at all 1
If None at all skip to Question A9
Less than 10% 2
11 – 25% 3
26 – 50% 4
51 – 65% 5
66 – 75% 6
More than 75% 7
_____________________________________________
A8 Is the union active at your workplace?
Yes No
1. There is a union delegate on site 1 2
2. A full time official visits at least once a year 1 2
3. Union members raise issues with me from a
union perspective 1 2
______________________________________________
A9 Is this organisation owned by a family?
Yes 1
No 2
If No, skip to question A11
______________________________________
A10 Do the family members actively manage the
business?
Yes 1
No 2
______________________________________
A11 Are you an owner of this company (ownership
includes significant shareholding)?
Yes (family member) 1
Yes (non-family member) 2
No 3
_____________________________________________
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A12 What is your age group?
Under 30 years 1
31-45 years 2
46-55 years 3
56-65 years 4
More than 65 years 5
A13 What is your gender?
Female 1
Male 2
SECTION B: VIEWS ON EMPLOYEE MANAGEMENT
Questions in this part are about your attitudes towards a number of principles which you might apply to your
workplace rather than about what actually happens in your workplace.
B1 Please tick the box which most closely reflects your view
on the following statements about management
1. It is a manager’s primary role to direct employees
2. A healthy organisation is unified around management as the
central source of authority
3. Managers’ principal responsibility is towards the
employer/shareholders
4. Individual employee agreements such as Australian
Workplace Agreements restore managers’ rights to manage
5. Managers have more commitment to the company than
other employees
6. Negotiating trade-offs in agreements compromises effective
management
7. Involving shopfloor employees in major decisions is
necessary for effective management
8. Individual employee agreements such as Australian
Workplace Agreements reinstate managers’ primary
responsibility towards the employer/shareholders
9. Effective managers involve employees in key decisions
affecting the organisation
10. Empowering employees will improve the company’s
performance
11. Self-managing teams are the way of the future for
successful companies
12. One key to successful management of employees is to put
in place up-to-date systems to monitor employee
performance
13. Employee resistance to change must be met by firm
management action
14. Involving employees in key decision-making is impractical
15. Managers must set the goals shared by all of the members
of the organisation
16. Third parties such as unions, government, and the
Commission undermine management’s legitimate authority
17. Consultation with employees on major issues leads to
decisions which are less than optimal for the efficient
functioning of the firm
Strongly
agree
1

















Agree
2

















Neither
agree
nor
disagree
3

















Disagree
4

















Strongly
disagree
5

















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B2 Please tick the box which most closely reflects your view
on each of the following statements about collective
workplace relations.
1. Negotiations and bargaining encourage an adversarial
“them and us” culture in the workplace
2. Negotiating with unions or employee associations interferes
with managers’ responsibility to the employer
3. Negotiations and bargaining encourage a “trade off”
mentality that works against the role of management in
achieving organisational goals
4. Employees on individual contracts will be better team
players than employees on collective agreements
5. Collective agreements and awards encourage employees to
view third parties as the source of improved employment
terms and conditions rather than management
6. Management is best placed to determine what is best for the
employees
7. The presence of unions generally reflects a history of poor
management in an organisation
8. The presence of a union in the workplace enhances our
ability to deal with the difficult external environment of the
1990s
9. Collective agreement-making enhances employee
commitment to shared goals
10. The achievement of management goals is compromised
when organisational objectives are modified for the sake of
getting agreement with a union or employees
11. Agreement-making is a necessary evil which impedes the
process of managing the organisation
18. There is too much third party interference in management
from government and unions
Strongly
agree
1












Agree
2












Neither
agree
nor
disagree
3












Disagree
4












Strongly
disagree
5












B3 Please tick the box which most closely reflects your your
view on each of the following statements about conflict (by
conflict is also meant disputes & grievances in the
workplace)
Strongly
agree
1
Agree
2
Neither
agree
nor
disagree
3
Disagree
4
Strongly
disagree
5
1. Conflict in the workplace is inevitable whatever
management structures are put in place
2. Conflict would be eliminated if management’s legitimacy
was recognised by all parties
3. Unions contribute significantly to the presence of conflict
in the workplace
4. Conflict is symptomatic of employees’ inability to
understand the complexity of work in today’s organisation
5. Where conflict occurs it reflects a failure on management’s
part to manage competently
6. If managers could deal with employees face to face without
the intervention of third parties, conflict would be reduced
7. Conflict is mostly the product of individual employees’
reactions to grievances



































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Question B3 continued Strongly
agree
1
Agree
2
Neither
agree
nor
disagree
3
Disagree
4
Strongly
disagree
5
8. Conflict is irrational because managers and employees share
common objectives
9. Conflict between managers and employees is usually stirred
up by third parties
10. There will be no conflict when all employees consider
themselves team players
11. Individual contracts would eliminate conflict
12. Management failures in communication and leadership are
the most significant causes of conflict
13. Conflict and loyalty to the firm are incompatible






























B4 Please tick the box which most closely reflects your your
view on each of the following statements about trade
unions
Strongly
agree
1
Agree
2
Neither
agree
nor
disagree
3
Disagree
4
Strongly
disagree
5
1. Unions are too powerful in Australia
2. Unions divide employees’ loyalty to the detriment of the
organisation
3. Management is at a disadvantage vis-à-vis unions
4. Unions are unnecessary if management treats its workers
properly
5. Ultimately, management has the right not to deal with trade
unions
6. Without trade unions there would be no conflict of interest
between employees and management
7. Trade unions are an impediment to change in dealing with
today’s environment
8. Management does not have any moral obligation to deal
with unions
9. Union recognition should be a matter for management and
employees to decide
10. Management owes it to the owner/shareholders to do
everything possible to avoid unions
11. Unions place unnecessary restrictions on effective
management of the firm
12. Unions are an impediment to flexibility and productivity
13. Managers should try and find ways of getting the union out
of the workplace
14. Unions have their place but not in this company






































































B5 To what extent do you believe are limited in how you
manage your employees by the following factors:
Entirely To a
major
degree
Partly To a
minor
degree
Not at all
1. Human resource policy from corporate headquarters 1 2 3 4 5
2. Awards 1 2 3 4 5
3. Unions 1 2 3 4 5
4. Employee resistance to your management 1 2 3 4 5
5. Government legislation 1 2 3 4 5
6. Lack of resources 1 2 3 4 5
7. Other limitations (Please specify)
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SECTION C: STRUCTURES AND PROCESS
In this question and the next, “consult” and “consultation” means to involve employees in decision –
making to any degree at all, but means more than merely informing employees of your decisions or
intentions. “Employees” refers to persons in the firm below supervisory and/or leading hand levels.
C1 In the normal course of your work as a manager do you or would you consult with employees on the
following issues and changes?
Issues and Changes Yes No
1. Changes to job design and work organisation 1 2
2. Quality and cost improvement 1 2
3. On plant layout or office design 1 2
4. Training and skills development 1 2
5. Reliable customer service and on time delivery 1 2
6. The financial state of the firm and its market position 1 2
7. Corporate planning 1 2
8. Market performance 1 2
9. Employee amenities 1 2
10. Personnel practices 1 2
11. Major change issues facing the company 1 2
12. Major change decisions 1 2
13. Major policy decisions 1 2
14. Securing enterprise efficiency and productivity 1 2
15. Establishing work teams with direct responsibility for setting and achieving targets 1 2
16. Other, Please specify: 1 2
C2 To what degree do you consult with employees? You have four different decision-making methods at the
head of each of the columns below. Please indicate which of these methods you do apply or would apply to
the introduction of the changes and the issues listed?
Issues and Changes
Involves
widespread
employee in-
volvement in
decisions
Employee
consultation
with possible
limited involve-
ment in goal
setting
Managerial
authority &
direction is the
main form of
decision making
Managers
initiate &
implement
change
1. Major change issues facing the company 1 2 3 4
2. Occupational health and safety 1 2 3 4
3. Changes to job design and work organisation 1 2 3 4
4. Quality and cost improvement 1 2 3 4
5. Plant layout 1 2 3 4
6. Training and skills development 1 2 3 4
7. Reliable customer service and delivery 1 2 3 4
8. The performance of the firm 1 2 3 4
9. Corporate planning 1 2 3 4
10. Market performance 1 2 3 4
11. Major policy decisions 1 2 3 4
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Question C2 continued Involves
widespread
employee in-
volvement in
decisions
Employee
consultation
with possible
limited involve-
ment in goal
setting
Managerial
authority &
direction is the
main form of
decision making
Managers
initiate &
implement
change
12. Employee amenities 1 2 3 4
13. Securing enterprise efficiency and productivity 1 2 3 4
14. Other (Please specify)
_________________________________________ 1 2 3 4
C3 Please tick the relevant box(es) for one or more forms of consultation to indicate the type(s) of consultation
which took place if you consulted on the matters in questions C1 and C2. If the matters in C1 and C2 did
not apply to your workplace, which form(s) would the consultation take if you did introduce them?
Method of consultation Yes No
1. Informal discussions with those employees affected by change 1 2
2. Formal meetings with those employees affected by change 1 2
3. Discussions with an established joint consultative committee 1 2
4. Discussions with a specially constituted committee established to consider the particular
change
1 2
5. Discussions with union delegates at this workplace 1 2
6. Discussions with full-time union officials from outside the workplace 1 2
7. Other discussions 1 2
8. No discussions 1
C4 In your time as manager of this workplace have you initiated, increased or maintained any of the following
practices and processes in your organisation?
Practices and Processes Yes No
1. An employee involvement/participative programme 1 2
2. Regular work or area meetings (for example, quality circles) 1 2
3. A joint worker-management committee to discuss or implement workplace change 1 2
4. A committee to address specific workplace issues other than safety and health 1 2
5. An occupational safety and health committee 1 2
6. A quality management programme (eg, ISO 9000 quality assurance, etc) 1 2
7. A Just-in-Time inventory system 1 2
8. Work process re-engineering (redesigning the company’s processes, structure and culture) 1 2
9. Job or task rotation 1 2
10. Work in groups, teams, or cells 1 2
11. A multi-skilling or cross training programme 1 2
12. Job enlargement (viz, increased scope or responsibility level for employees) 1 2
13. Autonomous/semi-autonomous work groups 1 2
C5 To what extent have you employed the following practices in the past 3 years
Never used For some jobs For all jobs
1. A group incentive plan 1 2 3
2. A profit or gain-sharing scheme 1 2 3
3. An employee share ownership scheme 1 2 3
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Question C5 continued Never used For some jobs For all jobs
4. A knowledge or skills-based pay programme 1 2 3
5. An individual performance based pay system 1 2 3
6. A group performance based pay system 1 2 3
7. A bonus system 1 2 3
8. Line manager makes employee selection decisions (non-
managerial employees below leading hand/supervisory level )
1 2 3
9. More senior manager than line manager makes employee
selection decisions (non-managerial employees below leading
hand/supervisory level )
1 2 3
10. Other employees (non-managerial employees below leading
hand/supervisory level ) have input into selection decisions
1 2 3
11. Line manager conducts employee (non-managerial, and below
leading hand/supervisory level) performance appraisal
1 2 3
12. Peer appraisal is practiced at employee level (non-managerial
employees below leading hand/supervisory level )
1 2 3
13. Negotiations and written agreements with employees 1 2 3
14. Negotiations and written agreements with unions 1 2 3
15. Other, please specify: 1 2 3
SECTION D: OUTCOMES
D1 How satisfied are you with the following aspects of your workforce and your firm’s performance?
Please tick the box under the appropriate heading:
Aspects of your workforce and firm’s performance
Extremely
satisfied
1
Satisfied
2
Dissatisfied
3
Extremely
dissatisfied
4
1. Employee morale 1 2 4 5
2. Employee commitment to organisational goals 1 2 4 5
3. Employee turn-over 1 2 4 5
4. Employee attention to quality of service or product 1 2 4 5
5. Organisational profitability 1 2 4 5
6. Employee absenteeism 1 2 4 5
7. Accident rates 1 2 4 5
8. Employee stress 1 2 4 5
9. Employee loyalty to the firm 1 2 4 5
10. Employee cooperativeness 1 2 4 5
11. Employee willingness to complete tasks on time 1 2 4 5
12. Wastage rates (or damage to equipment, if you are a service
organisation)
1 2 4 5
13. Necessity for reworking (or re-doing tasks, if you are a
service organisation)
1 2 4 5
14. Employees’ customer orientation 1 2 4 5
15. Employees’ interest in the work 1 2 4 5
16. Employees’ pride in the firm 1 2 4 5
17. Employees’ pride in their work 1 2 4 5
END OF SURVEY, THANK YOU.
